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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 17:37:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160822223722.29880.94331.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223529.29880.50884.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Encrypt memory areas in place when possible (e.g. zero page, etc.) so
that special handling isn't needed afterwards.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c |   93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c  |    8 ++++
 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 88c7bae..358d7bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
 }
 
 /* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+static int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
 {
 	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
 	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
 	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
-	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
 
 	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
 	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
@@ -94,12 +94,95 @@ again:
 		memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
 		*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
 	}
-	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
 	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd;
+
+	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
+static void __init create_unencrypted_mapping(void *address, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = (unsigned long)address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+	if (!sme_me_mask)
+		return;
+
+	/* Clear the encryption mask from the early_pmd_flags */
+	pmd_flags = early_pmd_flags & ~sme_me_mask;
+
+	do {
+		pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags;
+		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)address, pmd);
+
+		address += PMD_SIZE;
+		physaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size < PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+}
+
+static void __init __clear_mapping(unsigned long address)
+{
+	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
+	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
+	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
+
+	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
+	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM ||
+	    read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
+		return;
+
+	pgd_p = &early_level4_pgt[pgd_index(address)].pgd;
+	pgd = *pgd_p;
+
+	if (!pgd)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * The use of __START_KERNEL_map rather than __PAGE_OFFSET here matches
+	 * __early_make_pgtable where the entry was created.
+	 */
+	pud_p = (pudval_t *)((pgd & PTE_PFN_MASK) + __START_KERNEL_map - phys_base);
+	pud_p += pud_index(address);
+	pud = *pud_p;
+
+	if (!pud)
+		return;
+
+	pmd_p = (pmdval_t *)((pud & PTE_PFN_MASK) + __START_KERNEL_map - phys_base);
+	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = 0;
+}
+
+static void __init clear_mapping(void *address, unsigned long size)
+{
+	if (!sme_me_mask)
+		return;
+
+	do {
+		__clear_mapping((unsigned long)address);
+
+		address += PMD_SIZE;
+		size = (size < PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+	} while (size);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_memcpy(void *dst, void *src, unsigned long size)
+{
+	create_unencrypted_mapping(src, size);
+	memcpy(dst, src, size);
+	clear_mapping(src, size);
+}
+
 /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
    yet. */
 static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -122,12 +205,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
 	char * command_line;
 	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
 
-	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
+	sme_memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
 	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
 	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
 	if (cmd_line_ptr) {
 		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
-		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+		sme_memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 1489da8..1fdaa11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
 #include <asm/microcode.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/kaslr.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 /*
  * max_low_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn under 4GB
@@ -376,6 +377,13 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
 	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
 		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
 
+	/*
+	 * This memory is marked encrypted by the kernel but the ramdisk
+	 * was loaded in the clear by the bootloader, so make sure that
+	 * the ramdisk image is encrypted.
+	 */
+	sme_early_mem_enc(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
 	initrd_start = 0;
 
 	mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 22:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02  8:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-09 15:53   ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky

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