All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: "Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>,
	"Szabolcs Nagy" <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	"Richard Sandiford" <richard.sandiford@arm.com>,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, libc-alpha@sourceware.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christoffer Dall" <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 02/28] arm64: KVM: Hide unsupported AArch64 CPU features from guests
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 18:00:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1504198860-12951-3-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1504198860-12951-1-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com>

Currently, a guest kernel sees the true CPU feature registers
(ID_*_EL1) when it reads them using MRS instructions.  This means
that the guest will observe features that are present in the
hardware but the host doesn't understand or doesn't provide support
for.  A guest may legimitately try to use such a feature as per the
architecture, but use of the feature may trap instead of working
normally, triggering undef injection into the guest.

This is not a problem for the host, but the guest may go wrong when
running on newer hardware than the host knows about.

This patch hides from guest VMs any AArch64-specific CPU features
that the host doesn't support, by exposing to the guest the
sanitised versions of the registers computed by the cpufeatures
framework, instead of the true hardware registers.  To achieve
this, HCR_EL2.TID3 is now set for AArch64 guests, and emulation
code is added to KVM to report the sanitised versions of the
affected registers in response to MRS and register reads from
userspace.

The affected registers are removed from invariant_sys_regs[] (since
the invariant_sys_regs handling is no longer quite correct for
them) and added to sys_reg_desgs[], with appropriate access(),
get_user() and set_user() methods.  No runtime vcpu storage is
allocated for the registers: instead, they are read on demand from
the cpufeatures framework.  This may need modification in the
future if there is a need for userspace to customise the features
visible to the guest.

Attempts by userspace to write the registers are handled similarly
to the current invariant_sys_regs handling: writes are permitted,
but only if they don't attempt to change the value.  This is
sufficient to support VM snapshot/restore from userspace.

Because of the additional registers, restoring a VM on an older
kernel may not work unless userspace knows how to handle the extra
VM registers exposed to the KVM user ABI by this patch.

Under the principle of least damage, this patch makes no attempt to
handle any of the other registers currently in
invariant_sys_regs[], or to emulate registers for AArch32: however,
these could be handled in a similar way in future, as necessary.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

---

Changes since v1
----------------

Requested by Marc Zyngier:

* Get rid of ternary operator use in walk_sys_regs().

* Call write_to_read_only() if an attempt to write an ID reg is
trapped, rather than reinventing.
Probably we won't get there anyway: the architecture says that this
should undef at EL1 instead.

* Make ID register sysreg table less cryptic and spread the entries one
per line.
Also, make the architecturally unallocated and allocated but hidden
cases more clearly distinct.  These require the same behaviour but for
different reasons, so it's better to identify them as separate.

Other:

* Delete BUG_ON()s that are skipped by construction:
These check that the result of sys_reg_to_index() is a 64-bit
register, which is always true because sys_reg_to_index()
explicitly sets this.

* Remove duplicate const in __access_id_reg args [sparse]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h |   3 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c     |   6 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c       | 282 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
index f707fed..480ecd6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@
 #define SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 0)
 #define SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 1)
 
+#define SYS_ID_AA64AFR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 4)
+#define SYS_ID_AA64AFR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 5)
+
 #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 0)
 #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 1)
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
index 945e79c..35a90b8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
@@ -81,11 +81,17 @@ static void __hyp_text __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * it will cause an exception.
 	 */
 	val = vcpu->arch.hcr_el2;
+
 	if (!(val & HCR_RW) && system_supports_fpsimd()) {
 		write_sysreg(1 << 30, fpexc32_el2);
 		isb();
 	}
+
+	if (val & HCR_RW) /* for AArch64 only: */
+		val |= HCR_TID3; /* TID3: trap feature register accesses */
+
 	write_sysreg(val, hcr_el2);
+
 	/* Trap on AArch32 cp15 c15 accesses (EL1 or EL0) */
 	write_sysreg(1 << 15, hstr_el2);
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index 2e070d3..b1f7552 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -892,6 +892,137 @@ static bool access_cntp_cval(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return true;
 }
 
+/* Read a sanitised cpufeature ID register by sys_reg_desc */
+static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)
+{
+	u32 id = sys_reg((u32)r->Op0, (u32)r->Op1,
+			 (u32)r->CRn, (u32)r->CRm, (u32)r->Op2);
+
+	return raz ? 0 : read_sanitised_ftr_reg(id);
+}
+
+/* cpufeature ID register access trap handlers */
+
+static bool __access_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			    struct sys_reg_params *p,
+			    const struct sys_reg_desc *r,
+			    bool raz)
+{
+	if (p->is_write)
+		return write_to_read_only(vcpu, p, r);
+
+	p->regval = read_id_reg(r, raz);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool access_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			  struct sys_reg_params *p,
+			  const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
+{
+	return __access_id_reg(vcpu, p, r, false);
+}
+
+static bool access_raz_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct sys_reg_params *p,
+			      const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
+{
+	return __access_id_reg(vcpu, p, r, true);
+}
+
+static int reg_from_user(u64 *val, const void __user *uaddr, u64 id);
+static int reg_to_user(void __user *uaddr, const u64 *val, u64 id);
+static u64 sys_reg_to_index(const struct sys_reg_desc *reg);
+
+/*
+ * cpufeature ID register user accessors
+ *
+ * For now, these registers are immutable for userspace, so no values
+ * are stored, and for set_id_reg() we don't allow the effective value
+ * to be changed.
+ */
+static int __get_id_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd, void __user *uaddr,
+			bool raz)
+{
+	const u64 id = sys_reg_to_index(rd);
+	const u64 val = read_id_reg(rd, raz);
+
+	return reg_to_user(uaddr, &val, id);
+}
+
+static int __set_id_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd, void __user *uaddr,
+			bool raz)
+{
+	const u64 id = sys_reg_to_index(rd);
+	int err;
+	u64 val;
+
+	err = reg_from_user(&val, uaddr, id);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* This is what we mean by invariant: you can't change it. */
+	if (val != read_id_reg(rd, raz))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+		      const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __get_id_reg(rd, uaddr, false);
+}
+
+static int set_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+		      const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __set_id_reg(rd, uaddr, false);
+}
+
+static int get_raz_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+			  const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __get_id_reg(rd, uaddr, true);
+}
+
+static int set_raz_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+			  const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __set_id_reg(rd, uaddr, true);
+}
+
+/* sys_reg_desc initialiser for known cpufeature ID registers */
+#define ID_SANITISED(name) {			\
+	SYS_DESC(SYS_##name),			\
+	.access	= access_id_reg,		\
+	.get_user = get_id_reg,			\
+	.set_user = set_id_reg,			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * sys_reg_desc initialiser for architecturally unallocated cpufeature ID
+ * register with encoding Op0=3, Op1=0, CRn=0, CRm=crm, Op2=op2
+ * (1 <= crm < 8, 0 <= Op2 < 8).
+ */
+#define ID_UNALLOCATED(crm, op2) {			\
+	Op0(3), Op1(0), CRn(0), CRm(crm), Op2(op2),	\
+	.access = access_raz_id_reg,			\
+	.get_user = get_raz_id_reg,			\
+	.set_user = set_raz_id_reg,			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * sys_reg_desc initialiser for known ID registers that we hide from guests.
+ * For now, these are exposed just like unallocated ID regs: they appear
+ * RAZ for the guest.
+ */
+#define ID_HIDDEN(name) {			\
+	SYS_DESC(SYS_##name),			\
+	.access = access_raz_id_reg,		\
+	.get_user = get_raz_id_reg,		\
+	.set_user = set_raz_id_reg,		\
+}
+
 /*
  * Architected system registers.
  * Important: Must be sorted ascending by Op0, Op1, CRn, CRm, Op2
@@ -944,6 +1075,84 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_DBGVCR32_EL2), NULL, reset_val, DBGVCR32_EL2, 0 },
 
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_MPIDR_EL1), NULL, reset_mpidr, MPIDR_EL1 },
+
+	/*
+	 * ID regs: all ID_SANITISED() entries here must have corresponding
+	 * entries in arm64_ftr_regs[].
+	 */
+
+	/* AArch64 mappings of the AArch32 ID registers */
+	/* CRm=1 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_PFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_PFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_DFR0_EL1),
+	ID_HIDDEN(ID_AFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR2_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR3_EL1),
+
+	/* CRm=2 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR2_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR3_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR4_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR5_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR4_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(2,7),
+
+	/* CRm=3 */
+	ID_SANITISED(MVFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(MVFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(MVFR2_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,7),
+
+	/* AArch64 ID registers */
+	/* CRm=4 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,2),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,7),
+
+	/* CRm=5 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,2),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,3),
+	ID_HIDDEN(ID_AA64AFR0_EL1),
+	ID_HIDDEN(ID_AA64AFR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,7),
+
+	/* CRm=6 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,2),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,7),
+
+	/* CRm=7 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,7),
+
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_SCTLR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, SCTLR_EL1, 0x00C50078 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_CPACR_EL1), NULL, reset_val, CPACR_EL1, 0 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR0_EL1 },
@@ -1790,8 +1999,8 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc *index_to_sys_reg_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	if (!r)
 		r = find_reg(&params, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
 
-	/* Not saved in the sys_reg array? */
-	if (r && !r->reg)
+	/* Not saved in the sys_reg array and not otherwise accessible? */
+	if (r && !(r->reg || r->get_user))
 		r = NULL;
 
 	return r;
@@ -1815,20 +2024,6 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc *index_to_sys_reg_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(midr_el1)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(ctr_el0)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(revidr_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_pfr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_pfr1_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_dfr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_afr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr1_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr2_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr3_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar1_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar2_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar3_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar4_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar5_el1)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(clidr_el1)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(aidr_el1)
 
@@ -1836,20 +2031,6 @@ FUNCTION_INVARIANT(aidr_el1)
 static struct sys_reg_desc invariant_sys_regs[] = {
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_MIDR_EL1), NULL, get_midr_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_REVIDR_EL1), NULL, get_revidr_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_pfr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1), NULL, get_id_pfr1_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_dfr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_AFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_afr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr1_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr2_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr3_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar1_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar2_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar3_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar4_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar5_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_CLIDR_EL1), NULL, get_clidr_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_AIDR_EL1), NULL, get_aidr_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_CTR_EL0), NULL, get_ctr_el0 },
@@ -2079,12 +2260,31 @@ static bool copy_reg_to_user(const struct sys_reg_desc *reg, u64 __user **uind)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static int walk_one_sys_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+			    u64 __user **uind,
+			    unsigned int *total)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Ignore registers we trap but don't save,
+	 * and for which no custom user accessor is provided.
+	 */
+	if (!(rd->reg || rd->get_user))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!copy_reg_to_user(rd, uind))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	(*total)++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Assumed ordered tables, see kvm_sys_reg_table_init. */
 static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
 {
 	const struct sys_reg_desc *i1, *i2, *end1, *end2;
 	unsigned int total = 0;
 	size_t num;
+	int err;
 
 	/* We check for duplicates here, to allow arch-specific overrides. */
 	i1 = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
@@ -2098,21 +2298,13 @@ static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
 	while (i1 || i2) {
 		int cmp = cmp_sys_reg(i1, i2);
 		/* target-specific overrides generic entry. */
-		if (cmp <= 0) {
-			/* Ignore registers we trap but don't save. */
-			if (i1->reg) {
-				if (!copy_reg_to_user(i1, &uind))
-					return -EFAULT;
-				total++;
-			}
-		} else {
-			/* Ignore registers we trap but don't save. */
-			if (i2->reg) {
-				if (!copy_reg_to_user(i2, &uind))
-					return -EFAULT;
-				total++;
-			}
-		}
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			err = walk_one_sys_reg(i1, &uind, &total);
+		else
+			err = walk_one_sys_reg(i2, &uind, &total);
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 
 		if (cmp <= 0 && ++i1 == end1)
 			i1 = NULL;
-- 
2.1.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave.Martin@arm.com (Dave Martin)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 02/28] arm64: KVM: Hide unsupported AArch64 CPU features from guests
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 18:00:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1504198860-12951-3-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1504198860-12951-1-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com>

Currently, a guest kernel sees the true CPU feature registers
(ID_*_EL1) when it reads them using MRS instructions.  This means
that the guest will observe features that are present in the
hardware but the host doesn't understand or doesn't provide support
for.  A guest may legimitately try to use such a feature as per the
architecture, but use of the feature may trap instead of working
normally, triggering undef injection into the guest.

This is not a problem for the host, but the guest may go wrong when
running on newer hardware than the host knows about.

This patch hides from guest VMs any AArch64-specific CPU features
that the host doesn't support, by exposing to the guest the
sanitised versions of the registers computed by the cpufeatures
framework, instead of the true hardware registers.  To achieve
this, HCR_EL2.TID3 is now set for AArch64 guests, and emulation
code is added to KVM to report the sanitised versions of the
affected registers in response to MRS and register reads from
userspace.

The affected registers are removed from invariant_sys_regs[] (since
the invariant_sys_regs handling is no longer quite correct for
them) and added to sys_reg_desgs[], with appropriate access(),
get_user() and set_user() methods.  No runtime vcpu storage is
allocated for the registers: instead, they are read on demand from
the cpufeatures framework.  This may need modification in the
future if there is a need for userspace to customise the features
visible to the guest.

Attempts by userspace to write the registers are handled similarly
to the current invariant_sys_regs handling: writes are permitted,
but only if they don't attempt to change the value.  This is
sufficient to support VM snapshot/restore from userspace.

Because of the additional registers, restoring a VM on an older
kernel may not work unless userspace knows how to handle the extra
VM registers exposed to the KVM user ABI by this patch.

Under the principle of least damage, this patch makes no attempt to
handle any of the other registers currently in
invariant_sys_regs[], or to emulate registers for AArch32: however,
these could be handled in a similar way in future, as necessary.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

---

Changes since v1
----------------

Requested by Marc Zyngier:

* Get rid of ternary operator use in walk_sys_regs().

* Call write_to_read_only() if an attempt to write an ID reg is
trapped, rather than reinventing.
Probably we won't get there anyway: the architecture says that this
should undef at EL1 instead.

* Make ID register sysreg table less cryptic and spread the entries one
per line.
Also, make the architecturally unallocated and allocated but hidden
cases more clearly distinct.  These require the same behaviour but for
different reasons, so it's better to identify them as separate.

Other:

* Delete BUG_ON()s that are skipped by construction:
These check that the result of sys_reg_to_index() is a 64-bit
register, which is always true because sys_reg_to_index()
explicitly sets this.

* Remove duplicate const in __access_id_reg args [sparse]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h |   3 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c     |   6 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c       | 282 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
index f707fed..480ecd6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@
 #define SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 0)
 #define SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 1)
 
+#define SYS_ID_AA64AFR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 4)
+#define SYS_ID_AA64AFR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 5, 5)
+
 #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 0)
 #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 1)
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
index 945e79c..35a90b8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
@@ -81,11 +81,17 @@ static void __hyp_text __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * it will cause an exception.
 	 */
 	val = vcpu->arch.hcr_el2;
+
 	if (!(val & HCR_RW) && system_supports_fpsimd()) {
 		write_sysreg(1 << 30, fpexc32_el2);
 		isb();
 	}
+
+	if (val & HCR_RW) /* for AArch64 only: */
+		val |= HCR_TID3; /* TID3: trap feature register accesses */
+
 	write_sysreg(val, hcr_el2);
+
 	/* Trap on AArch32 cp15 c15 accesses (EL1 or EL0) */
 	write_sysreg(1 << 15, hstr_el2);
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index 2e070d3..b1f7552 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -892,6 +892,137 @@ static bool access_cntp_cval(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return true;
 }
 
+/* Read a sanitised cpufeature ID register by sys_reg_desc */
+static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)
+{
+	u32 id = sys_reg((u32)r->Op0, (u32)r->Op1,
+			 (u32)r->CRn, (u32)r->CRm, (u32)r->Op2);
+
+	return raz ? 0 : read_sanitised_ftr_reg(id);
+}
+
+/* cpufeature ID register access trap handlers */
+
+static bool __access_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			    struct sys_reg_params *p,
+			    const struct sys_reg_desc *r,
+			    bool raz)
+{
+	if (p->is_write)
+		return write_to_read_only(vcpu, p, r);
+
+	p->regval = read_id_reg(r, raz);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool access_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			  struct sys_reg_params *p,
+			  const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
+{
+	return __access_id_reg(vcpu, p, r, false);
+}
+
+static bool access_raz_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			      struct sys_reg_params *p,
+			      const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
+{
+	return __access_id_reg(vcpu, p, r, true);
+}
+
+static int reg_from_user(u64 *val, const void __user *uaddr, u64 id);
+static int reg_to_user(void __user *uaddr, const u64 *val, u64 id);
+static u64 sys_reg_to_index(const struct sys_reg_desc *reg);
+
+/*
+ * cpufeature ID register user accessors
+ *
+ * For now, these registers are immutable for userspace, so no values
+ * are stored, and for set_id_reg() we don't allow the effective value
+ * to be changed.
+ */
+static int __get_id_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd, void __user *uaddr,
+			bool raz)
+{
+	const u64 id = sys_reg_to_index(rd);
+	const u64 val = read_id_reg(rd, raz);
+
+	return reg_to_user(uaddr, &val, id);
+}
+
+static int __set_id_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd, void __user *uaddr,
+			bool raz)
+{
+	const u64 id = sys_reg_to_index(rd);
+	int err;
+	u64 val;
+
+	err = reg_from_user(&val, uaddr, id);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* This is what we mean by invariant: you can't change it. */
+	if (val != read_id_reg(rd, raz))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+		      const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __get_id_reg(rd, uaddr, false);
+}
+
+static int set_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+		      const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __set_id_reg(rd, uaddr, false);
+}
+
+static int get_raz_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+			  const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __get_id_reg(rd, uaddr, true);
+}
+
+static int set_raz_id_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+			  const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr)
+{
+	return __set_id_reg(rd, uaddr, true);
+}
+
+/* sys_reg_desc initialiser for known cpufeature ID registers */
+#define ID_SANITISED(name) {			\
+	SYS_DESC(SYS_##name),			\
+	.access	= access_id_reg,		\
+	.get_user = get_id_reg,			\
+	.set_user = set_id_reg,			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * sys_reg_desc initialiser for architecturally unallocated cpufeature ID
+ * register with encoding Op0=3, Op1=0, CRn=0, CRm=crm, Op2=op2
+ * (1 <= crm < 8, 0 <= Op2 < 8).
+ */
+#define ID_UNALLOCATED(crm, op2) {			\
+	Op0(3), Op1(0), CRn(0), CRm(crm), Op2(op2),	\
+	.access = access_raz_id_reg,			\
+	.get_user = get_raz_id_reg,			\
+	.set_user = set_raz_id_reg,			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * sys_reg_desc initialiser for known ID registers that we hide from guests.
+ * For now, these are exposed just like unallocated ID regs: they appear
+ * RAZ for the guest.
+ */
+#define ID_HIDDEN(name) {			\
+	SYS_DESC(SYS_##name),			\
+	.access = access_raz_id_reg,		\
+	.get_user = get_raz_id_reg,		\
+	.set_user = set_raz_id_reg,		\
+}
+
 /*
  * Architected system registers.
  * Important: Must be sorted ascending by Op0, Op1, CRn, CRm, Op2
@@ -944,6 +1075,84 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_DBGVCR32_EL2), NULL, reset_val, DBGVCR32_EL2, 0 },
 
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_MPIDR_EL1), NULL, reset_mpidr, MPIDR_EL1 },
+
+	/*
+	 * ID regs: all ID_SANITISED() entries here must have corresponding
+	 * entries in arm64_ftr_regs[].
+	 */
+
+	/* AArch64 mappings of the AArch32 ID registers */
+	/* CRm=1 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_PFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_PFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_DFR0_EL1),
+	ID_HIDDEN(ID_AFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR2_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR3_EL1),
+
+	/* CRm=2 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR2_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR3_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR4_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_ISAR5_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_MMFR4_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(2,7),
+
+	/* CRm=3 */
+	ID_SANITISED(MVFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(MVFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(MVFR2_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(3,7),
+
+	/* AArch64 ID registers */
+	/* CRm=4 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,2),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(4,7),
+
+	/* CRm=5 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,2),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,3),
+	ID_HIDDEN(ID_AA64AFR0_EL1),
+	ID_HIDDEN(ID_AA64AFR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(5,7),
+
+	/* CRm=6 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,2),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,7),
+
+	/* CRm=7 */
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,3),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,4),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,5),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,6),
+	ID_UNALLOCATED(7,7),
+
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_SCTLR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, SCTLR_EL1, 0x00C50078 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_CPACR_EL1), NULL, reset_val, CPACR_EL1, 0 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR0_EL1 },
@@ -1790,8 +1999,8 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc *index_to_sys_reg_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	if (!r)
 		r = find_reg(&params, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
 
-	/* Not saved in the sys_reg array? */
-	if (r && !r->reg)
+	/* Not saved in the sys_reg array and not otherwise accessible? */
+	if (r && !(r->reg || r->get_user))
 		r = NULL;
 
 	return r;
@@ -1815,20 +2024,6 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc *index_to_sys_reg_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(midr_el1)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(ctr_el0)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(revidr_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_pfr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_pfr1_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_dfr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_afr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr1_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr2_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_mmfr3_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar0_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar1_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar2_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar3_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar4_el1)
-FUNCTION_INVARIANT(id_isar5_el1)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(clidr_el1)
 FUNCTION_INVARIANT(aidr_el1)
 
@@ -1836,20 +2031,6 @@ FUNCTION_INVARIANT(aidr_el1)
 static struct sys_reg_desc invariant_sys_regs[] = {
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_MIDR_EL1), NULL, get_midr_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_REVIDR_EL1), NULL, get_revidr_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_pfr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1), NULL, get_id_pfr1_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_dfr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_AFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_afr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr1_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr2_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1), NULL, get_id_mmfr3_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar0_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar1_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar2_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar3_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar4_el1 },
-	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1), NULL, get_id_isar5_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_CLIDR_EL1), NULL, get_clidr_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_AIDR_EL1), NULL, get_aidr_el1 },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_CTR_EL0), NULL, get_ctr_el0 },
@@ -2079,12 +2260,31 @@ static bool copy_reg_to_user(const struct sys_reg_desc *reg, u64 __user **uind)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static int walk_one_sys_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
+			    u64 __user **uind,
+			    unsigned int *total)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Ignore registers we trap but don't save,
+	 * and for which no custom user accessor is provided.
+	 */
+	if (!(rd->reg || rd->get_user))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!copy_reg_to_user(rd, uind))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	(*total)++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Assumed ordered tables, see kvm_sys_reg_table_init. */
 static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
 {
 	const struct sys_reg_desc *i1, *i2, *end1, *end2;
 	unsigned int total = 0;
 	size_t num;
+	int err;
 
 	/* We check for duplicates here, to allow arch-specific overrides. */
 	i1 = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
@@ -2098,21 +2298,13 @@ static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
 	while (i1 || i2) {
 		int cmp = cmp_sys_reg(i1, i2);
 		/* target-specific overrides generic entry. */
-		if (cmp <= 0) {
-			/* Ignore registers we trap but don't save. */
-			if (i1->reg) {
-				if (!copy_reg_to_user(i1, &uind))
-					return -EFAULT;
-				total++;
-			}
-		} else {
-			/* Ignore registers we trap but don't save. */
-			if (i2->reg) {
-				if (!copy_reg_to_user(i2, &uind))
-					return -EFAULT;
-				total++;
-			}
-		}
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			err = walk_one_sys_reg(i1, &uind, &total);
+		else
+			err = walk_one_sys_reg(i2, &uind, &total);
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 
 		if (cmp <= 0 && ++i1 == end1)
 			i1 = NULL;
-- 
2.1.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-08-31 17:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 224+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-08-31 17:00 [PATCH v2 00/28] ARM Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 01/28] regset: Add support for dynamically sized regsets Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` Dave Martin [this message]
2017-08-31 17:00   ` [PATCH v2 02/28] arm64: KVM: Hide unsupported AArch64 CPU features from guests Dave Martin
2017-09-13 14:37   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-13 14:37     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-13 14:37     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-15  0:04     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-15  0:04       ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 03/28] arm64: efi: Add missing Kconfig dependency on KERNEL_MODE_NEON Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 04/28] arm64: Port deprecated instruction emulation to new sysctl interface Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 05/28] arm64: fpsimd: Simplify uses of {set,clear}_ti_thread_flag() Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` [PATCH v2 05/28] arm64: fpsimd: Simplify uses of {set, clear}_ti_thread_flag() Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 06/28] arm64/sve: System register and exception syndrome definitions Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 14:48   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-13 14:48     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-13 14:48     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 07/28] arm64/sve: Low-level SVE architectural state manipulation functions Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 15:39   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-13 15:39     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-13 15:39     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 08/28] arm64/sve: Kconfig update and conditional compilation support Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 09/28] arm64/sve: Signal frame and context structure definition Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 13:36   ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 13:36     ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 21:33     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 21:33       ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 10/28] arm64/sve: Low-level CPU setup Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 13:32   ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 13:32     ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 19:21     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 19:21       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 19:21       ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 10:47       ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 10:47         ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 11:04         ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-10-05 11:04           ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-10-05 11:22           ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 11:22             ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 11/28] arm64/sve: Core task context handling Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 14:33   ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 14:33     ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-14 19:55     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 19:55       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-20 13:58       ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-20 13:58         ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-03 11:11         ` Dave Martin
2017-10-03 11:11           ` Dave Martin
2017-10-04 17:29           ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-04 17:29             ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-03 11:33     ` Dave Martin
2017-10-03 11:33       ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 11:28       ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-05 11:28         ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-06 13:10         ` Dave Martin
2017-10-06 13:10           ` Dave Martin
2017-10-06 13:36           ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-06 13:36             ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-06 15:15             ` Dave Martin
2017-10-06 15:15               ` Dave Martin
2017-10-06 15:33               ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-06 15:33                 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 17:26   ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 17:26     ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 19:17     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 19:17       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 22:21       ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 22:21         ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-14 19:40         ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 19:40           ` Dave Martin
2017-09-19 17:13           ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-19 17:13             ` Catalin Marinas
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 12/28] arm64/sve: Support vector length resetting for new processes Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14  8:47   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  8:47     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  8:47     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 13/28] arm64/sve: Signal handling support Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14  9:30   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:30     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:30     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 14/28] arm64/sve: Backend logic for setting the vector length Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 17:29   ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 17:29     ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 19:06     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 19:06       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-13 22:11       ` Catalin Marinas
2017-09-13 22:11         ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-05 16:42         ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 16:42           ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 16:53           ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-05 16:53             ` Catalin Marinas
2017-10-05 17:04             ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 17:04               ` Dave Martin
2017-09-20 10:57   ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-20 10:57     ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-20 10:59   ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-20 10:59     ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-20 11:09     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-20 11:09       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-20 18:08       ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-20 18:08         ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-21 11:19         ` Dave Martin
2017-09-21 11:19           ` Dave Martin
2017-09-21 11:57           ` Alan Hayward
2017-09-21 11:57             ` Alan Hayward
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 15/28] arm64: cpufeature: Move sys_caps_initialised declarations Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14  9:33   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:33     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:33     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:35   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-09-14  9:35     ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 16/28] arm64/sve: Probe SVE capabilities and usable vector lengths Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14  9:45   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:45     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14  9:45     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-28 14:22     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-28 14:22       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-28 17:32       ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-28 17:32         ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-28 17:32         ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 17/28] arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around kernel-mode NEON use Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 10:52   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 10:52     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 10:52     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 18/28] arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around EFI runtime service calls Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 11:01   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 11:01     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 11:01     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 19/28] arm64/sve: ptrace and ELF coredump support Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-06 16:21   ` Okamoto, Takayuki
2017-09-06 16:21     ` Okamoto, Takayuki
2017-09-06 18:16     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-06 18:16       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-07  5:11       ` Okamoto, Takayuki
2017-09-07  5:11         ` Okamoto, Takayuki
2017-09-07  5:11         ` Okamoto, Takayuki
2017-09-08 13:11         ` Dave Martin
2017-09-08 13:11           ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 12:57   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 12:57     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 12:57     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-28 14:57     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-28 14:57       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-29 12:46     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-29 12:46       ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 20/28] arm64/sve: Add prctl controls for userspace vector length management Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 13:02   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:02     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:02     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 21/28] arm64/sve: Add sysctl to set the default vector length for new processes Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 13:05   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:05     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:05     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 22/28] arm64/sve: KVM: Prevent guests from using SVE Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 13:28   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:28     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:28     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 23/28] arm64/sve: KVM: Treat guest SVE use as undefined instruction execution Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 13:30   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:30     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:30     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:31   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:31     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:31     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-29 13:00     ` Dave Martin
2017-09-29 13:00       ` Dave Martin
2017-09-29 14:43       ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-29 14:43         ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-29 14:43         ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 24/28] arm64/sve: KVM: Hide SVE from CPU features exposed to guests Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-09-14 13:32   ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:32     ` Alex Bennée
2017-09-14 13:32     ` Alex Bennée
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 25/28] arm64/sve: Detect SVE and activate runtime support Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [PATCH v2 26/28] arm64/sve: Add documentation Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 16:39   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2017-10-05 16:39     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2017-10-05 17:02     ` Dave Martin
2017-10-05 17:02       ` Dave Martin
2017-10-06 15:43   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2017-10-06 15:43     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2017-10-06 17:37     ` Dave Martin
2017-10-06 17:37       ` Dave Martin
2017-10-09  9:34       ` Alex Bennée
2017-10-09  9:34         ` Alex Bennée
2017-10-09  9:34         ` Alex Bennée
2017-10-09  9:49         ` Dave Martin
2017-10-09  9:49           ` Dave Martin
2017-10-09 14:07           ` Alex Bennée
2017-10-09 14:07             ` Alex Bennée
2017-10-09 14:07             ` Alex Bennée
2017-10-09 16:20             ` Dave Martin
2017-10-09 16:20               ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/28] arm64: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:00   ` Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:01 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/28] arm64/sve: signal: Include SVE when computing AT_MINSIGSTKSZ Dave Martin
2017-08-31 17:01   ` Dave Martin

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1504198860-12951-3-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com \
    --to=dave.martin@arm.com \
    --cc=alex.bennee@linaro.org \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=christoffer.dall@linaro.org \
    --cc=kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu \
    --cc=libc-alpha@sourceware.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=marc.zyngier@arm.com \
    --cc=richard.sandiford@arm.com \
    --cc=szabolcs.nagy@arm.com \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.