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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: CFI hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:50:54 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125127.17985-38-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125127.17985-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.

Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/genapic/bigsmp.c      |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/genapic/delivery.c    | 12 ++++++------
 xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c      | 16 ++++++++++------
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/genapic.h | 18 +++++++++---------
 xen/arch/x86/smp.c                 |  6 +++---
 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/bigsmp.c b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/bigsmp.c
index b9d976e8abf2..2000383ab0bf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/bigsmp.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/bigsmp.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 #include <xen/dmi.h>
 #include <asm/io_apic.h>
 
-static __init int force_bigsmp(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
+static int __init cf_check force_bigsmp(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
 {
 	printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s detected: force use of apic=bigsmp\n", d->ident);
 	def_to_bigsmp = true;
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id __initconstrel bigsmp_dmi_table[] = {
 };
 
 
-static __init int probe_bigsmp(void)
+static int __init cf_check probe_bigsmp(void)
 { 
 	/*
 	 * We don't implement cluster mode, so force use of
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/delivery.c b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/delivery.c
index 548c33f282dd..d1f99bf6834a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/delivery.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/delivery.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  * LOGICAL FLAT DELIVERY MODE (multicast via bitmask to <= 8 logical APIC IDs).
  */
 
-void init_apic_ldr_flat(void)
+void cf_check init_apic_ldr_flat(void)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
 
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ void init_apic_ldr_flat(void)
 	apic_write(APIC_LDR, val);
 }
 
-const cpumask_t *vector_allocation_cpumask_flat(int cpu)
+const cpumask_t *cf_check vector_allocation_cpumask_flat(int cpu)
 {
 	return &cpu_online_map;
 } 
 
-unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
+unsigned int cf_check cpu_mask_to_apicid_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
 {
 	return cpumask_bits(cpumask)[0]&0xFF;
 }
@@ -33,17 +33,17 @@ unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
  * PHYSICAL DELIVERY MODE (unicast to physical APIC IDs).
  */
 
-void init_apic_ldr_phys(void)
+void cf_check init_apic_ldr_phys(void)
 {
 	/* We only deliver in phys mode - no setup needed. */
 }
 
-const cpumask_t *vector_allocation_cpumask_phys(int cpu)
+const cpumask_t *cf_check vector_allocation_cpumask_phys(int cpu)
 {
 	return cpumask_of(cpu);
 }
 
-unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_phys(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
+unsigned int cf_check cpu_mask_to_apicid_phys(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
 {
 	/* As we are using single CPU as destination, pick only one CPU here */
 	return cpu_physical_id(cpumask_any(cpumask));
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
index bd44bb753995..de5032f2020a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/genapic/x2apic.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline u32 x2apic_cluster(unsigned int cpu)
     return per_cpu(cpu_2_logical_apicid, cpu) >> 16;
 }
 
-static void init_apic_ldr_x2apic_cluster(void)
+static void cf_check init_apic_ldr_x2apic_cluster(void)
 {
     unsigned int cpu, this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
@@ -74,12 +74,14 @@ static void init_apic_ldr_x2apic_cluster(void)
     cpumask_set_cpu(this_cpu, per_cpu(cluster_cpus, this_cpu));
 }
 
-static const cpumask_t *vector_allocation_cpumask_x2apic_cluster(int cpu)
+static const cpumask_t *cf_check vector_allocation_cpumask_x2apic_cluster(
+    int cpu)
 {
     return per_cpu(cluster_cpus, cpu);
 }
 
-static unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_x2apic_cluster(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
+static unsigned int cf_check cpu_mask_to_apicid_x2apic_cluster(
+    const cpumask_t *cpumask)
 {
     unsigned int cpu = cpumask_any(cpumask);
     unsigned int dest = per_cpu(cpu_2_logical_apicid, cpu);
@@ -92,12 +94,13 @@ static unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_x2apic_cluster(const cpumask_t *cpumask)
     return dest;
 }
 
-static void send_IPI_self_x2apic(uint8_t vector)
+static void cf_check send_IPI_self_x2apic(uint8_t vector)
 {
     apic_wrmsr(APIC_SELF_IPI, vector);
 }
 
-static void send_IPI_mask_x2apic_phys(const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
+static void cf_check send_IPI_mask_x2apic_phys(
+    const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
 {
     unsigned int cpu;
     unsigned long flags;
@@ -130,7 +133,8 @@ static void send_IPI_mask_x2apic_phys(const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
     local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
-static void send_IPI_mask_x2apic_cluster(const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
+static void cf_check send_IPI_mask_x2apic_cluster(
+    const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
 {
     unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
     cpumask_t *ipimask = per_cpu(scratch_mask, cpu);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/genapic.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/genapic.h
index 51a65d3e0f0c..beeaddf19daa 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/genapic.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/genapic.h
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ extern struct genapic genapic;
 extern const struct genapic apic_default;
 extern const struct genapic apic_bigsmp;
 
-void send_IPI_self_legacy(uint8_t vector);
+void cf_check send_IPI_self_legacy(uint8_t vector);
 
-void init_apic_ldr_flat(void);
-unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask);
-void send_IPI_mask_flat(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
-const cpumask_t *vector_allocation_cpumask_flat(int cpu);
+void cf_check init_apic_ldr_flat(void);
+unsigned int cf_check cpu_mask_to_apicid_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask);
+void cf_check send_IPI_mask_flat(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
+const cpumask_t *cf_check vector_allocation_cpumask_flat(int cpu);
 #define GENAPIC_FLAT \
 	.int_delivery_mode = dest_LowestPrio, \
 	.int_dest_mode = 1 /* logical delivery */, \
@@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ const cpumask_t *vector_allocation_cpumask_flat(int cpu);
 	.send_IPI_mask = send_IPI_mask_flat, \
 	.send_IPI_self = send_IPI_self_legacy
 
-void init_apic_ldr_phys(void);
-unsigned int cpu_mask_to_apicid_phys(const cpumask_t *cpumask);
-void send_IPI_mask_phys(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
-const cpumask_t *vector_allocation_cpumask_phys(int cpu);
+void cf_check init_apic_ldr_phys(void);
+unsigned int cf_check cpu_mask_to_apicid_phys(const cpumask_t *cpumask);
+void cf_check send_IPI_mask_phys(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector);
+const cpumask_t *cf_check vector_allocation_cpumask_phys(int cpu);
 #define GENAPIC_PHYS \
 	.int_delivery_mode = dest_Fixed, \
 	.int_dest_mode = 0 /* physical delivery */, \
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
index 33748e629a21..0a02086966c0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smp.c
@@ -161,13 +161,13 @@ void send_IPI_self(int vector)
  * The following functions deal with sending IPIs between CPUs.
  */
 
-void send_IPI_self_legacy(uint8_t vector)
+void cf_check send_IPI_self_legacy(uint8_t vector)
 {
     /* NMI continuation handling relies on using a shorthand here. */
     send_IPI_shortcut(APIC_DEST_SELF, vector, APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL);
 }
 
-void send_IPI_mask_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
+void cf_check send_IPI_mask_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
 {
     unsigned long mask = cpumask_bits(cpumask)[0];
     unsigned long cfg;
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ void send_IPI_mask_flat(const cpumask_t *cpumask, int vector)
     local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
-void send_IPI_mask_phys(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector)
+void cf_check send_IPI_mask_phys(const cpumask_t *mask, int vector)
 {
     unsigned long cfg, flags;
     unsigned int query_cpu;
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:53   ` David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

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