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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: CFI hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:51:00 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125127.17985-44-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125127.17985-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.

Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c       |  8 ++++----
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h       |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c   |  9 ++++----
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.h   |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 3467e0f1a315..275c54be7c0f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int __init cf_check mce_set_verbosity(const char *str)
 custom_param("mce_verbosity", mce_set_verbosity);
 
 /* Handle unconfigured int18 (should never happen) */
-static void unexpected_machine_check(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check unexpected_machine_check(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     console_force_unlock();
     printk("Unexpected Machine Check Exception\n");
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static int mce_urgent_action(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
 }
 
 /* Shared #MC handler. */
-void mcheck_cmn_handler(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+void cf_check mcheck_cmn_handler(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     static DEFINE_MCE_BARRIER(mce_trap_bar);
     static atomic_t severity_cpu = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
@@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@ long cf_check do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
 }
 
 int mcinfo_dumpped;
-static int x86_mcinfo_dump_panic(mctelem_cookie_t mctc)
+static int cf_check x86_mcinfo_dump_panic(mctelem_cookie_t mctc)
 {
     struct mc_info *mcip = mctelem_dataptr(mctc);
 
@@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ static enum mce_result mce_action(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
  * should be committed for dom0 consumption, 0 if it should be
  * dismissed.
  */
-static int mce_delayed_action(mctelem_cookie_t mctc)
+static int cf_check mce_delayed_action(mctelem_cookie_t mctc)
 {
     enum mce_result result;
     int ret = 0;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
index 195362691904..535d0abf8f9b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern void x86_mce_vector_register(x86_mce_vector_t);
  * Common generic MCE handler that implementations may nominate
  * via x86_mce_vector_register.
  */
-extern void mcheck_cmn_handler(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
+void cf_check mcheck_cmn_handler(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 
 /* Register a handler for judging whether mce is recoverable. */
 typedef bool (*mce_recoverable_t)(uint64_t status);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
index 279a8e6f122d..d7ae8919df77 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ mc_ec2type(uint16_t errorcode)
     return 0;
 }
 
-bool mc_amd_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status)
+bool cf_check mc_amd_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status)
 {
     bool ret = false;
     enum mc_ec_type ectype;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ bool mc_amd_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status)
     return ret;
 }
 
-bool mc_amd_addrcheck(uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype)
+bool cf_check mc_amd_addrcheck(uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype)
 {
     enum mc_ec_type ectype;
     uint16_t errorcode;
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static void mcequirk_amd_apply(enum mcequirk_amd_flags flags)
     }
 }
 
-static struct mcinfo_extended *
+static struct mcinfo_extended *cf_check
 amd_f10_handler(struct mc_info *mi, uint16_t bank, uint64_t status)
 {
     struct mcinfo_extended *mc_ext;
@@ -252,7 +252,8 @@ amd_f10_handler(struct mc_info *mi, uint16_t bank, uint64_t status)
     return mc_ext;
 }
 
-static bool amd_need_clearbank_scan(enum mca_source who, uint64_t status)
+static bool cf_check amd_need_clearbank_scan(
+    enum mca_source who, uint64_t status)
 {
     if ( who != MCA_MCE_SCAN )
         return true;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.h
index 67c45454707d..c12c25d74567 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #ifndef _MCHECK_AMD_H
 #define _MCHECK_AMD_H
 
-bool mc_amd_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status);
-bool mc_amd_addrcheck(uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype);
+bool cf_check mc_amd_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status);
+bool cf_check mc_amd_addrcheck(uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
index 7aaa56fd02eb..50198e0c295c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce_intel.c
@@ -271,12 +271,13 @@ static void intel_memerr_dhandler(
     mc_memerr_dhandler(binfo, result, regs);
 }
 
-static bool intel_srar_check(uint64_t status)
+static bool cf_check intel_srar_check(uint64_t status)
 {
     return (intel_check_mce_type(status) == intel_mce_ucr_srar);
 }
 
-static bool intel_checkaddr(uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype)
+static bool cf_check intel_checkaddr(
+    uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype)
 {
     if ( !(status & MCi_STATUS_ADDRV) ||
          !(status & MCi_STATUS_MISCV) ||
@@ -287,10 +288,9 @@ static bool intel_checkaddr(uint64_t status, uint64_t misc, int addrtype)
     return (addrtype == MC_ADDR_PHYSICAL);
 }
 
-static void intel_srar_dhandler(
-             struct mca_binfo *binfo,
-             enum mce_result *result,
-             const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check intel_srar_dhandler(
+    struct mca_binfo *binfo, enum mce_result *result,
+    const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     uint64_t status = binfo->mib->mc_status;
 
@@ -306,15 +306,14 @@ static void intel_srar_dhandler(
     }
 }
 
-static bool intel_srao_check(uint64_t status)
+static bool cf_check intel_srao_check(uint64_t status)
 {
     return (intel_check_mce_type(status) == intel_mce_ucr_srao);
 }
 
-static void intel_srao_dhandler(
-             struct mca_binfo *binfo,
-             enum mce_result *result,
-             const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check intel_srao_dhandler(
+    struct mca_binfo *binfo, enum mce_result *result,
+    const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     uint64_t status = binfo->mib->mc_status;
 
@@ -333,15 +332,14 @@ static void intel_srao_dhandler(
     }
 }
 
-static bool intel_default_check(uint64_t status)
+static bool cf_check intel_default_check(uint64_t status)
 {
     return true;
 }
 
-static void intel_default_mce_dhandler(
-             struct mca_binfo *binfo,
-             enum mce_result *result,
-             const struct cpu_user_regs * regs)
+static void cf_check intel_default_mce_dhandler(
+    struct mca_binfo *binfo, enum mce_result *result,
+    const struct cpu_user_regs * regs)
 {
     uint64_t status = binfo->mib->mc_status;
     enum intel_mce_type type;
@@ -360,10 +358,9 @@ static const struct mca_error_handler intel_mce_dhandlers[] = {
     {intel_default_check, intel_default_mce_dhandler}
 };
 
-static void intel_default_mce_uhandler(
-             struct mca_binfo *binfo,
-             enum mce_result *result,
-             const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check intel_default_mce_uhandler(
+    struct mca_binfo *binfo, enum mce_result *result,
+    const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     uint64_t status = binfo->mib->mc_status;
     enum intel_mce_type type;
@@ -396,7 +393,7 @@ static const struct mca_error_handler intel_mce_uhandlers[] = {
  * 3) ser_support = 1, SRAO, UC = 1, S = 1, AR = 0, [EN = 1]
  */
 
-static bool intel_need_clearbank_scan(enum mca_source who, u64 status)
+static bool cf_check intel_need_clearbank_scan(enum mca_source who, u64 status)
 {
     if ( who == MCA_CMCI_HANDLER )
     {
@@ -453,7 +450,7 @@ static bool intel_need_clearbank_scan(enum mca_source who, u64 status)
  * 4) SRAO ser_support = 1, PCC = 0, S = 1, AR = 0, EN = 1 [UC = 1]
  * 5) UCNA ser_support = 1, OVER = 0, EN = 1, PCC = 0, S = 0, AR = 0, [UC = 1]
  */
-static bool intel_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status)
+static bool cf_check intel_recoverable_scan(uint64_t status)
 {
 
     if ( !(status & MCi_STATUS_UC ) )
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 13:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:53   ` David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

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