All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>, Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 15:48:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e35ca83f-12ad-0c28-075b-82ff08b2bf1d@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <826c97dd-dda9-b6c2-37bf-451354fcfde2@citrix.com>

On 17.02.2022 13:06, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 17/02/2022 10:42, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 17.02.2022 11:01, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> Scanning for embedded endbranch instructions involves parsing the .text
>>> disassembly.  Data in the kexec trampoline has no ELF metadata, so objdump
>>> treats it as instructions and tries to disassemble.  Convert:
>>>
>>>   ffff82d040396108 <compatibility_mode_far>:
>> What about the (possible) padding ahead of this? Should the .align
>> there perhaps specify a filler character?
> 
> What about it?  It's just long nops like all other padding in .text
> 
> ffff82d040396101:       ff d5                   call   *%ebp
> ffff82d040396103:       0f 0b                   ud2    
> ffff82d040396105:       0f 1f 00                nopl   (%eax)
> 
> ffff82d040396108 <compatibility_mode_far>:
> ffff82d040396108:       00 00 00 00 10
> 00                                   ......
> 
> And for this problem, we don't need to care about the behaviour of any
> pre-CET version of binutils.

I was about to ask, but yes - this is a good point.

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

>>>   ffff82d040396108:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
>>>   ffff82d04039610a:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
>>>   ffff82d04039610c:       10 00                   adc    %al,(%rax)
>>>
>>>   ffff82d04039610e <compat_mode_gdt_desc>:
>>>   ffff82d04039610e:       17                      (bad)
>>>           ...
>>>
>>>   ffff82d040396118 <compat_mode_gdt>:
>>>           ...
>>>   ffff82d040396120:       ff                      (bad)
>>>   ffff82d040396121:       ff 00                   incl   (%rax)
>>>   ffff82d040396123:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
>>>   ffff82d040396125:       93                      xchg   %eax,%ebx
>>>   ffff82d040396126:       cf                      iret
>>>   ffff82d040396127:       00 ff                   add    %bh,%bh
>>>   ffff82d040396129:       ff 00                   incl   (%rax)
>>>   ffff82d04039612b:       00 00                   add    %al,(%rax)
>>>   ffff82d04039612d:       9b                      fwait
>>>   ffff82d04039612e:       cf                      iret
>>>           ...
>>>
>>>   ffff82d040396130 <compat_mode_idt>:
>>>           ...
>>>
>>>   ffff82d0403961b6 <kexec_reloc_size>:
>>>   ffff82d0403961b6:       b6 01                   mov    $0x1,%dh
>>>           ...
>>>
>>> to:
>>>
>>>   ffff82d040396108 <compatibility_mode_far>:
>>>   ffff82d040396108:       00 00 00 00 10 00                               ......
>>>
>>>   ffff82d04039610e <compat_mode_gdt_desc>:
>>>   ffff82d04039610e:       17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                   ..........
>>>
>>>   ffff82d040396118 <compat_mode_gdt>:
>>>           ...
>>>   ffff82d040396120:       ff ff 00 00 00 93 cf 00 ff ff 00 00 00 9b cf 00 ................
>>>
>>>   ffff82d040396130 <compat_mode_idt>:
>>>   ffff82d040396130:       00 00 00 00 00 00                               ......
>> With the .size directives added, can we rely on consistent (past,
>> present, and future) objcopy behavior for padding gaps?
> 
> Of course not.  We don't know how things will develop in the future. 
> The best we can do is hope that it doesn't change too much.
> 
> But on that note, the way this would go wrong is the binary scan finding
> an endbr that wasn't disassembled properly here, for whatever reason.

True; it'll "just" be a false positive build failure.

>>  It just so
>> happens that there's no 4-byte gap between compat_mode_gdt_desc and
>> compat_mode_gdt. Changing the .align ahead of compatibility_mode_far
>> would eliminate the risk of padding appearing if the code further up
>> changed.
> 
> Gaps will be formed of long nops because we're in .text, and they merge
> with the previous data blob (see below).
> 
>>
>>>   ffff82d040396136 <reloc_stack>:
>>>           ...
>> Now this is particularly puzzling: Us setting %rsp to an unaligned
>> address is clearly not ABI-conforming. Since you're fiddling with
>> all of this already anyway, how about fixing this at the same time?
>> Of course there would then appear padding ahead of the stack, unless
>> the stack was moved up some.
> 
> Oh - I'd not even noticed that.  Luckily there is no ABI which matters,
> because it's the call/push/pop's in this file alone.

And the entity transitioned to is forbidden to make use of our stack?

> With an align 8, we get:
> 
> ffff82d0403a7138 <compat_mode_idt>:
> ffff82d0403a7138:       00 00 00 00 00 00 66
> 90                             ......f.
> 
> ffff82d0403a7140 <reloc_stack>:
>         ...
> 
> where the 66 90 in compat_mode_idt is the padding.  Recall c/s 9fd181540c7e6
> 
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S
>>> @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ SECTIONS
>>>         *(.text.unlikely)
>>>         *(.fixup)
>>>         *(.text.kexec)
>>> +       kexec_reloc_end = .;
>> Does this maybe want aligning on a 4- or even 8-byte boundary? If
>> so, imo preferably not here, but by adding a trailing .align in the
>> .S file.
> 
> There's no special need for it to be aligned, and it is anyway as the
> stack is the last object in it.

You mean it anyway would be, if the stack was aligned? Or am I to imply
that you've amended the patch to add alignment there?

Jan



  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-17 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:53   ` David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=e35ca83f-12ad-0c28-075b-82ff08b2bf1d@suse.com \
    --to=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
    --cc=wl@xen.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.