From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 07:59:43 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20220418145945.38797-28-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20220418145945.38797-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS. An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is: type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421] msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050): obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?". An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has multiple security modules that may make access decisions based on an object security context. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++-------------------------- 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 14849d5f84b4..1b05eb2dbe77 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation); extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); +extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, + struct lsmblob *blob); extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab); extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab); @@ -251,6 +253,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) { } static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation) { } +static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, + struct lsmblob *blob) +{ } static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { return 0; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799 diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab) ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list); } +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob) +{ + int i; + int error; + struct lsmcontext context; + + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) { + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST); + if (error) { + if (error != -EINVAL) + goto error_path; + return; + } + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context); + security_release_secctx(&context); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?"); + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS); + if (error) + goto error_path; + + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) { + if (blob->secid[i] == 0) + continue; + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i); + if (error) { + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?", + i ? " " : "", + lsm_slot_to_name(i)); + if (error != -EINVAL) + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context"); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s", + i ? " " : "", + lsm_slot_to_name(i), + context.context); + security_release_secctx(&context); + } + } + + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab); + } + return; + +error_path: + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context"); +} int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1114,36 +1114,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) kfree(context); } -static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, - kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, - unsigned int sessionid, - struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) +static void audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, + kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, + unsigned int sessionid, + struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - struct lsmcontext lsmctx; - int rc = 0; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); if (!ab) - return rc; + return; audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); - if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) { - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); - rc = 1; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context); - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx); - } - } + if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) + audit_log_object_context(ab, blob); audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); audit_log_end(ab); - - return rc; } static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode); if (osid) { - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; struct lsmblob blob; lsmblob_init(&blob, osid); - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt, - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); - *call_panic = 1; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context); - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt); - } + audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob); } if (context->ipc.has_perm) { audit_log_end(ab); @@ -1588,19 +1569,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), MAJOR(n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev)); - if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) { - struct lsmcontext lsmctx; - - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx, - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?"); - if (call_panic) - *call_panic = 2; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context); - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx); - } - } + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) + audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob); /* log the audit_names record type */ switch (n->type) { @@ -1805,21 +1775,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) - if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], - axs->target_auid[i], - axs->target_uid[i], - axs->target_sessionid[i], - &axs->target_lsm[i], - axs->target_comm[i])) - call_panic = 1; - } - - if (context->target_pid && - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, - context->target_sessionid, - &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) - call_panic = 1; + audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], + axs->target_auid[i], + axs->target_uid[i], + axs->target_sessionid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], + axs->target_comm[i]); + } + + if (context->target_pid) + audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, + context->target_auid, context->target_uid, + context->target_sessionid, + &context->target_lsm, + context->target_comm); if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); -- 2.35.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 07:59:43 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20220418145945.38797-28-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20220418145945.38797-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS. An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is: type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421] msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050): obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?". An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has multiple security modules that may make access decisions based on an object security context. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++-------------------------- 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 14849d5f84b4..1b05eb2dbe77 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation); extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); +extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, + struct lsmblob *blob); extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab); extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab); @@ -251,6 +253,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) { } static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation) { } +static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, + struct lsmblob *blob) +{ } static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { return 0; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799 diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab) ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list); } +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob) +{ + int i; + int error; + struct lsmcontext context; + + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) { + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST); + if (error) { + if (error != -EINVAL) + goto error_path; + return; + } + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context); + security_release_secctx(&context); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?"); + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS); + if (error) + goto error_path; + + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) { + if (blob->secid[i] == 0) + continue; + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i); + if (error) { + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?", + i ? " " : "", + lsm_slot_to_name(i)); + if (error != -EINVAL) + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context"); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s", + i ? " " : "", + lsm_slot_to_name(i), + context.context); + security_release_secctx(&context); + } + } + + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab); + } + return; + +error_path: + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context"); +} int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1114,36 +1114,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) kfree(context); } -static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, - kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, - unsigned int sessionid, - struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) +static void audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, + kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, + unsigned int sessionid, + struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - struct lsmcontext lsmctx; - int rc = 0; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); if (!ab) - return rc; + return; audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); - if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) { - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); - rc = 1; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context); - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx); - } - } + if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) + audit_log_object_context(ab, blob); audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); audit_log_end(ab); - - return rc; } static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode); if (osid) { - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; struct lsmblob blob; lsmblob_init(&blob, osid); - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt, - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); - *call_panic = 1; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context); - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt); - } + audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob); } if (context->ipc.has_perm) { audit_log_end(ab); @@ -1588,19 +1569,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), MAJOR(n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev)); - if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) { - struct lsmcontext lsmctx; - - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx, - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?"); - if (call_panic) - *call_panic = 2; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context); - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx); - } - } + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) + audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob); /* log the audit_names record type */ switch (n->type) { @@ -1805,21 +1775,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) - if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], - axs->target_auid[i], - axs->target_uid[i], - axs->target_sessionid[i], - &axs->target_lsm[i], - axs->target_comm[i])) - call_panic = 1; - } - - if (context->target_pid && - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, - context->target_sessionid, - &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) - call_panic = 1; + audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], + axs->target_auid[i], + axs->target_uid[i], + axs->target_sessionid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], + axs->target_comm[i]); + } + + if (context->target_pid) + audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, + context->target_auid, context->target_uid, + context->target_sessionid, + &context->target_lsm, + context->target_comm); if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); -- 2.35.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-18 15:14 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 132+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20220418145945.38797-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 00/29] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-21 16:51 ` John Johansen 2022-04-21 16:51 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 02/29] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-26 23:15 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 23:15 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-19 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-20 19:23 ` Mimi Zohar 2022-04-20 21:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-21 3:22 ` Mimi Zohar 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-21 16:49 ` John Johansen 2022-04-21 16:49 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 07/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-27 0:38 ` John Johansen 2022-04-27 0:38 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 09/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 10/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 11/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 12/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 18:02 ` kernel test robot 2022-04-18 18:02 ` kernel test robot 2022-04-19 0:41 ` kernel test robot 2022-04-19 0:41 ` kernel test robot 2022-04-19 0:51 ` kernel test robot 2022-04-19 0:51 ` kernel test robot 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 14/29] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 15/29] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 16/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 17/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 18/29] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 19/29] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 20/29] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 17:57 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 17:57 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen 2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-27 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-27 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-22 16:26 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-22 16:26 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-25 23:33 ` John Johansen 2022-04-25 23:33 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 19:01 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 19:01 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-22 16:28 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-22 16:28 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 19:07 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 19:07 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler 2022-04-22 16:29 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-22 16:29 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore 2022-04-26 19:24 ` John Johansen 2022-04-26 19:24 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-04-22 8:37 ` John Johansen 2022-04-22 8:37 ` John Johansen 2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 29/29] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
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