From: debug@rivosinc.com To: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, broonie@kernel.org, Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, keescook@chromium.org, ajones@ventanamicro.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com, palmer@dabbelt.com, conor.dooley@microchip.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, atishp@atishpatra.org, alex@ghiti.fr, bjorn@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com Cc: corbet@lwn.net, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, oleg@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, arnd@arndb.de, ebiederm@xmission.com, shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, debug@rivosinc.com, guoren@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com, evan@rivosinc.com, xiao.w.wang@intel.com, apatel@ventanamicro.com, mchitale@ventanamicro.com, waylingii@gmail.com, greentime.hu@sifive.com, heiko@sntech.de, jszhang@kernel.org, shikemeng@huaweicloud.com, david@redhat.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, panqinglin2020@iscas.ac.cn, willy@infradead.org, vincent.chen@sifive.com, andy.chiu@sifive.com, gerg@kernel.org, jeeheng.sia@starfivetech.com, mason.huo@starfivetech.com, ancientmodern4@gmail.com, mathis.salmen@matsal.de, cuiyunhui@bytedance.com, bhe@redhat.com, chenjiahao16@huawei.com, ruscur@russell.cc, bgray@linux.ibm.com, alx@kernel.org, baruch@tkos.co.il, zhangqing@loongson.cn, catalin.marinas@arm.com, revest@chromium.org, josh@joshtriplett.org, joey.gouly@arm.com, shr@devkernel.io, omosnace@redhat.com, ojeda@kernel.org, jhubbard@nvidia.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:21:40 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20240125062739.1339782-16-debug@rivosinc.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com> From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page. This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require token to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by itself. However to provide compatiblity and portability with other architectues, user mode can specify token set flag. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> --- arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile index fee22a3d1b53..8c668269e886 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile @@ -102,3 +102,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat_vdso/ obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += pi/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) += usercfi.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..35ede2cbc05b --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Rivos, Inc. + * Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> + */ + +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/sizes.h> +#include <linux/user.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <asm/csr.h> +#include <asm/usercfi.h> + +#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *) + +/* + * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen + * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to + * shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow + * stack. + */ +static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long *addr, unsigned long val) +{ + /* + * In case ssamoswap faults, return -1. + * Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero + */ + unsigned long swap = -1; + + __enable_user_access(); + asm_volatile_goto( + ".option push\n" + ".option arch, +zicfiss\n" +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + "1: ssamoswap.d %0, %2, %1\n" +#else + "1: ssamoswap.w %0, %2, %1\n" +#endif + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault]) + RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER + ".option pop\n" + : "=r" (swap), "+A" (*addr) + : "r" (val) + : "memory" + : fault + ); + __disable_user_access(); + return swap; +fault: + __disable_user_access(); + return -1; +} + +/* + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide + * and aligned to XLEN. + */ +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr) +{ + unsigned long addr; + + /* Token must be aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */ + addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE; + + if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long) ssp) == -1) + return -EFAULT; + + if (token_addr) + *token_addr = addr; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, + unsigned long token_offset, + bool set_tok) +{ + int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + unsigned long populate, tok_loc = 0; + + if (addr) + flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE; + + mmap_write_lock(mm); + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_SHADOWSTACK, flags, + VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0, &populate, NULL); + mmap_write_unlock(mm); + + if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + goto out; + + if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, &tok_loc)) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + addr = tok_loc; + +out: + return addr; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags) +{ + bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN; + unsigned long aligned_size = 0; + + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */ + if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is available + * CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction + * itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't + * be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas + * which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since + * CSR_SSP is writeable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent + * to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architecture (because + * `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token + * flag in flags and if provided in flags, setup a token at the base. + */ + + /* If there isn't space for a token */ + if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) + return -ENOSPC; + + if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); + if (aligned_size < size) + return -EOVERFLOW; + + return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok); +} diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h index 57e8195d0b53..0c0ac6214de6 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h @@ -19,4 +19,5 @@ #define MCL_FUTURE 2 /* lock all future mappings */ #define MCL_ONFAULT 4 /* lock all pages that are faulted in */ +#define SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN (1ULL << 0) /* Set up a restore token in the shadow stack */ #endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_MMAN_H */ -- 2.43.0 _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: debug@rivosinc.com To: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, broonie@kernel.org, Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, keescook@chromium.org, ajones@ventanamicro.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com, palmer@dabbelt.com, conor.dooley@microchip.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, atishp@atishpatra.org, alex@ghiti.fr, bjorn@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com Cc: corbet@lwn.net, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, oleg@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, arnd@arndb.de, ebiederm@xmission.com, shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, debug@rivosinc.com, guoren@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com, evan@rivosinc.com, xiao.w.wang@intel.com, apatel@ventanamicro.com, mchitale@ventanamicro.com, waylingii@gmail.com, greentime.hu@sifive.com, heiko@sntech.de, jszhang@kernel.org, shikemeng@huaweicloud.com, david@redhat.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, panqinglin2020@iscas.ac.cn, willy@infradead.org, vincent.chen@sifive.com, andy.chiu@sifive.com, gerg@kernel.org, jeeheng.sia@starfivetech.com, mason.huo@starfivetech.com, ancientmodern4@gmail.com, mathis.salmen@matsal.de, cuiyunhui@bytedance.com, bhe@redhat.com, chenjiahao16@huawei.com, ruscur@russell.cc, bgray@linux.ibm.com, alx@kernel.org, baruch@tkos.co.il, zhangqing@loongson.cn, catalin.marinas@arm.com, revest@chromium.org, josh@joshtriplett.org, joey.gouly@arm.com, shr@devkernel.io, omosnace@redhat.com, ojeda@kernel.org, jhubbard@nvidia.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:21:40 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20240125062739.1339782-16-debug@rivosinc.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com> From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page. This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require token to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by itself. However to provide compatiblity and portability with other architectues, user mode can specify token set flag. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> --- arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile index fee22a3d1b53..8c668269e886 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile @@ -102,3 +102,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat_vdso/ obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += pi/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) += usercfi.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..35ede2cbc05b --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Rivos, Inc. + * Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> + */ + +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/sizes.h> +#include <linux/user.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <asm/csr.h> +#include <asm/usercfi.h> + +#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *) + +/* + * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen + * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to + * shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow + * stack. + */ +static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long *addr, unsigned long val) +{ + /* + * In case ssamoswap faults, return -1. + * Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero + */ + unsigned long swap = -1; + + __enable_user_access(); + asm_volatile_goto( + ".option push\n" + ".option arch, +zicfiss\n" +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + "1: ssamoswap.d %0, %2, %1\n" +#else + "1: ssamoswap.w %0, %2, %1\n" +#endif + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault]) + RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER + ".option pop\n" + : "=r" (swap), "+A" (*addr) + : "r" (val) + : "memory" + : fault + ); + __disable_user_access(); + return swap; +fault: + __disable_user_access(); + return -1; +} + +/* + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide + * and aligned to XLEN. + */ +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr) +{ + unsigned long addr; + + /* Token must be aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */ + addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE; + + if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long) ssp) == -1) + return -EFAULT; + + if (token_addr) + *token_addr = addr; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, + unsigned long token_offset, + bool set_tok) +{ + int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + unsigned long populate, tok_loc = 0; + + if (addr) + flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE; + + mmap_write_lock(mm); + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_SHADOWSTACK, flags, + VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0, &populate, NULL); + mmap_write_unlock(mm); + + if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + goto out; + + if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, &tok_loc)) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + addr = tok_loc; + +out: + return addr; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags) +{ + bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN; + unsigned long aligned_size = 0; + + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */ + if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is available + * CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction + * itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't + * be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas + * which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since + * CSR_SSP is writeable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent + * to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architecture (because + * `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token + * flag in flags and if provided in flags, setup a token at the base. + */ + + /* If there isn't space for a token */ + if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) + return -ENOSPC; + + if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); + if (aligned_size < size) + return -EOVERFLOW; + + return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok); +} diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h index 57e8195d0b53..0c0ac6214de6 100644 --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h @@ -19,4 +19,5 @@ #define MCL_FUTURE 2 /* lock all future mappings */ #define MCL_ONFAULT 4 /* lock all pages that are faulted in */ +#define SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN (1ULL << 0) /* Set up a restore token in the shadow stack */ #endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_MMAN_H */ -- 2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-25 6:30 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 122+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2024-01-25 6:21 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] riscv: abstract envcfg CSR debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-02-12 10:23 ` Andrew Jones 2024-02-12 10:23 ` Andrew Jones 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] riscv: envcfg save and restore on trap entry/exit debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 7:19 ` Stefan O'Rear 2024-01-25 7:19 ` Stefan O'Rear 2024-01-25 17:09 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 17:09 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 17:54 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 17:54 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] riscv: define default value for envcfg debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] riscv: zicfiss/zicfilp enumeration debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 17:59 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 17:59 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 18:26 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 18:26 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 18:46 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 18:46 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] riscv: zicfiss/zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] riscv: kernel handling on trap entry/exit for user cfi debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 7:29 ` Stefan O'Rear 2024-01-25 7:29 ` Stefan O'Rear 2024-01-25 17:30 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 17:30 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 19:47 ` Stefan O'Rear 2024-01-25 19:47 ` Stefan O'Rear 2024-01-26 0:25 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-26 0:25 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for RISC-V debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 8:17 ` David Hildenbrand 2024-01-25 8:17 ` David Hildenbrand 2024-01-25 17:05 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 17:05 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] mm: abstract shadow stack vma behind `arch_is_shadow_stack` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 8:18 ` David Hildenbrand 2024-01-25 8:18 ` David Hildenbrand 2024-01-25 17:07 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 17:07 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-13 10:34 ` David Hildenbrand 2024-02-13 10:34 ` David Hildenbrand 2024-02-22 1:32 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-22 1:32 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] riscv/mm : Introducing new protection flag "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] riscv: Implementing "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" on riscv debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-02-09 20:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2024-02-09 20:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2024-02-22 0:39 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-22 0:39 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug [this message] 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall debug 2024-01-25 21:24 ` Charlie Jenkins 2024-01-25 21:24 ` Charlie Jenkins 2024-01-26 0:44 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-26 0:44 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-06 16:01 ` Mark Brown 2024-02-06 16:01 ` Mark Brown 2024-02-22 0:47 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-22 0:47 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-22 13:33 ` Mark Brown 2024-02-22 13:33 ` Mark Brown 2024-02-09 20:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2024-02-09 20:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2024-02-22 0:50 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-22 0:50 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prtcl for indirect branch tracking debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-02-06 16:13 ` Mark Brown 2024-02-06 16:13 ` Mark Brown 2024-02-22 0:42 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-02-22 0:42 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] riscv: Implements arch argnostic indirect branch tracking prctls debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] riscv sigcontext: adding cfi state field in sigcontext debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] riscv signal: Save and restore of shadow stack for signal debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] riscv: select config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 18:04 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 18:04 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 18:12 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 18:12 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 18:44 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 18:44 ` Conor Dooley 2024-01-25 19:26 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 19:26 ` Deepak Gupta 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi debug 2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug
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