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From: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
To: "Salvatore Mesoraca" <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 13:49:22 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <69ff2195-d0e1-8a0f-b80e-5d8d55947907@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJHCu1K1Hg5M2HhJxN_aj2P_S8Pez9+8KL=wHKBgAN0jN1+mLg@mail.gmail.com>

On 7/11/17 12:58 PM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> 2017-07-11 1:40 GMT+02:00 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>:
>>
>> On 10/07/2017 09:59, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
>>> 2017-07-09 21:35 GMT+02:00 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> I think it make sense to merge the W^X features with the TPE/shebang LSM
>>>> [1].
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>  Mickaël
>>>>
>>>> [1]
>>>> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d9aca46b-97c6-4faf-b559-484feb4aa640@digikod.net
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>> Can you elaborate why it would be an advantage to have those features merged?
>>> They seem quite unrelated.
>>> Also, they work in rather different ways in respect to how they are configured.
>>> I'm not sure what would be a reasonable way to merge them.
>>> Thank you for your comment,
>>>
>>> Salvatore
>>>
>>
>> The aim of the Trusted Path Execution is to constraint calls to execve
>> (e.g. forbid an user to execute his own binaries, i.e. apply a W^X
>> security policy). This should handle binaries and could handle scripts
>> too [1]. However, there is always a way for a process to mmap/mprotect
>> arbitrary data and make it executable, be it intentional or not. PaX and
>> the W^X part of your LSM can handle this, or make exceptions by marking
>> a file with dedicated xattr values. This kind of exception fit well with
>> TPE to get a more hardened executable security policy (e.g. forbid an
>> user to execute his own binaries or to mmap arbitrary executable code).
>> Moreover, TPE could handle some part of its configuration from some
>> xattr values (e.g. allow scripts/interpreters, a whitelist of
>> environment variables, additional memory restrictions…) as you do with
>> SARA thanks to your tools.
> 
> I understand your point. They complement each other in some sense.
> On the other hand, I'm still worried about the suitability of merging,
> under the same LSM, two features that are managed in two
> completely different ways.
> IMHO, if they have to be merged, they should be "integrated".
> As I see it, there are only 3 possible solutions to this problem:
> 1 - SARA gives up its configuration mechanics and starts using xattrs
> 2 - TPE/shebang gives up xattrs and starts using SARA-style configurations
> 3 - SARA adds xattrs support to its quiver *and* TPE/shebang adds SARA-style
>      configuration support.
> 
> The solution number 1 is the one I'm less inclined to, as you can imagine.
> I'm in favor of solutions 2 and 3, but of course we need to know Mimi Zohar and
> Matt Brown opinion on this matter.
> If we can find a consensus on the best way to merge them, I'm not against
> the merge.
> Anyway, these LSMs are stackable and they can be used together even if they
> don't get merged. So I think that merging them is not a "must".
> 
> Salvatore
> 

I have merged my TPE LSM with Mimi Zohar's shebang LSM and will be
releasing a version 3 soon. I have also added securityfs support to
shebang that will allow users to update the interpreter list at run
time. This allows for user's to configure TPE/Shebang without any
xattrs. For a preview of my version 3 you can check out my dev tree
here:
https://github.com/nmatt0/linux-security/tree/tpe/security/tpe

Note: that git tree is WIP and may not have all of the attribution and
documentation needed.

Matt Brown

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: matt@nmatt.com (Matt Brown)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 13:49:22 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <69ff2195-d0e1-8a0f-b80e-5d8d55947907@nmatt.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJHCu1K1Hg5M2HhJxN_aj2P_S8Pez9+8KL=wHKBgAN0jN1+mLg@mail.gmail.com>

On 7/11/17 12:58 PM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> 2017-07-11 1:40 GMT+02:00 Micka?l Sala?n <mic@digikod.net>:
>>
>> On 10/07/2017 09:59, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
>>> 2017-07-09 21:35 GMT+02:00 Micka?l Sala?n <mic@digikod.net>:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> I think it make sense to merge the W^X features with the TPE/shebang LSM
>>>> [1].
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>  Micka?l
>>>>
>>>> [1]
>>>> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d9aca46b-97c6-4faf-b559-484feb4aa640 at digikod.net
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>> Can you elaborate why it would be an advantage to have those features merged?
>>> They seem quite unrelated.
>>> Also, they work in rather different ways in respect to how they are configured.
>>> I'm not sure what would be a reasonable way to merge them.
>>> Thank you for your comment,
>>>
>>> Salvatore
>>>
>>
>> The aim of the Trusted Path Execution is to constraint calls to execve
>> (e.g. forbid an user to execute his own binaries, i.e. apply a W^X
>> security policy). This should handle binaries and could handle scripts
>> too [1]. However, there is always a way for a process to mmap/mprotect
>> arbitrary data and make it executable, be it intentional or not. PaX and
>> the W^X part of your LSM can handle this, or make exceptions by marking
>> a file with dedicated xattr values. This kind of exception fit well with
>> TPE to get a more hardened executable security policy (e.g. forbid an
>> user to execute his own binaries or to mmap arbitrary executable code).
>> Moreover, TPE could handle some part of its configuration from some
>> xattr values (e.g. allow scripts/interpreters, a whitelist of
>> environment variables, additional memory restrictions?) as you do with
>> SARA thanks to your tools.
> 
> I understand your point. They complement each other in some sense.
> On the other hand, I'm still worried about the suitability of merging,
> under the same LSM, two features that are managed in two
> completely different ways.
> IMHO, if they have to be merged, they should be "integrated".
> As I see it, there are only 3 possible solutions to this problem:
> 1 - SARA gives up its configuration mechanics and starts using xattrs
> 2 - TPE/shebang gives up xattrs and starts using SARA-style configurations
> 3 - SARA adds xattrs support to its quiver *and* TPE/shebang adds SARA-style
>      configuration support.
> 
> The solution number 1 is the one I'm less inclined to, as you can imagine.
> I'm in favor of solutions 2 and 3, but of course we need to know Mimi Zohar and
> Matt Brown opinion on this matter.
> If we can find a consensus on the best way to merge them, I'm not against
> the merge.
> Anyway, these LSMs are stackable and they can be used together even if they
> don't get merged. So I think that merging them is not a "must".
> 
> Salvatore
> 

I have merged my TPE LSM with Mimi Zohar's shebang LSM and will be
releasing a version 3 soon. I have also added securityfs support to
shebang that will allow users to update the interpreter list at run
time. This allows for user's to configure TPE/Shebang without any
xattrs. For a preview of my version 3 you can check out my dev tree
here:
https://github.com/nmatt0/linux-security/tree/tpe/security/tpe

Note: that git tree is WIP and may not have all of the attribution and
documentation needed.

Matt Brown
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  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-11 17:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 124+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-12 16:56 [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:49   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-12 17:49     ` Jann Horn
2017-06-13  7:43     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:43       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-27 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:51     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54       ` Kees Cook
2017-07-04 10:12     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-04 10:12       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-04 10:12       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 02/11] S.A.R.A. framework creation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:35   ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-12 17:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-12 17:35     ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-13  7:47     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:47       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 19:38   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-12 19:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-12 19:38     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-13  7:50     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:50       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:50       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13  7:51     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:51       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  1:15   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  1:15     ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  1:15     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20  7:07   ` Pavel Machek
2017-06-20  7:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2017-06-20  7:53     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20  7:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20  7:53       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13  7:55     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:55       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:55       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  6:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  6:34     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  7:52     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:52       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:52       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:52       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 06/11] S.A.R.A. cred blob management Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-12 17:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-12 17:32     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-13  7:41     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:41       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  0:02   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  0:02     ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  0:02     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 10/11] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` [PATCH 11/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-09 19:35 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-10  7:59   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10  7:59     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10 23:40     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-11 16:58       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 16:58         ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 17:49         ` Matt Brown [this message]
2017-07-11 17:49           ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 19:31           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-11 19:31             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 12:39             ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 12:39               ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 15:19               ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 15:19                 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 19:51                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 19:51                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 22:33                   ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 22:33                     ` Matt Brown
2017-07-24  0:58                   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-24  0:58                     ` Casey Schaufler

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