From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 19:49:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1DBG9cwGtcwKmrL9tSfi4vvNk-X07jnUmzv81RM4Po_Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-2-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 6:56 PM, Salvatore Mesoraca
<s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> wrote:
> Adding documentation for S.A.R.A. LSM.
>
> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
[...]
> +/proc/PID/attr/sara/wxprot interface
> +------------------------------------
> +The `procattr` interface can be used by a program to discover which
> +WX Protection features are enabled and/or to tighten them: protection
> +can't be softened via procattr.
> +The interface is simple: it's a text file with an hexadecimal
> +number in it representing enabled features (more information can be
> +found in the `Flags values`_ section). Via this interface it is also
> +possible to perform a complete memory scan to remove the write permission
> +from pages that are both writable and executable.
> +
> +Protections that prevent the runtime creation of executable code
> +can be troublesome for all those programs that actually need to do it
> +e.g. programs shipping with a JIT compiler built-in.
> +Given that it's possible to segregate the part that runs untrusted
> +code from the rest through a fork, this feature can be use to run the JIT
> +compiler with few restrictions while enforcing full WX Protection in the
> +rest of the program.
As far as I can tell, the wxprot interface in procfs, when used as
/proc/PID/attr/sara/wxprot, actually only sets restrictions on one of the
threads.
The documentation doesn't seem to mention this.
> +.. [3] `saralib <https://github.com/smeso/saralib>`_
This link is broken.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: jannh@google.com (Jann Horn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 19:49:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1DBG9cwGtcwKmrL9tSfi4vvNk-X07jnUmzv81RM4Po_Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-2-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 6:56 PM, Salvatore Mesoraca
<s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> wrote:
> Adding documentation for S.A.R.A. LSM.
>
> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
[...]
> +/proc/PID/attr/sara/wxprot interface
> +------------------------------------
> +The `procattr` interface can be used by a program to discover which
> +WX Protection features are enabled and/or to tighten them: protection
> +can't be softened via procattr.
> +The interface is simple: it's a text file with an hexadecimal
> +number in it representing enabled features (more information can be
> +found in the `Flags values`_ section). Via this interface it is also
> +possible to perform a complete memory scan to remove the write permission
> +from pages that are both writable and executable.
> +
> +Protections that prevent the runtime creation of executable code
> +can be troublesome for all those programs that actually need to do it
> +e.g. programs shipping with a JIT compiler built-in.
> +Given that it's possible to segregate the part that runs untrusted
> +code from the rest through a fork, this feature can be use to run the JIT
> +compiler with few restrictions while enforcing full WX Protection in the
> +rest of the program.
As far as I can tell, the wxprot interface in procfs, when used as
/proc/PID/attr/sara/wxprot, actually only sets restrictions on one of the
threads.
The documentation doesn't seem to mention this.
> +.. [3] `saralib <https://github.com/smeso/saralib>`_
This link is broken.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-12 17:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 124+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-12 16:56 [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:49 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2017-06-12 17:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-13 7:43 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:43 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-27 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-04 10:12 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-04 10:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-04 10:12 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 02/11] S.A.R.A. framework creation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:35 ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-12 17:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-12 17:35 ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-13 7:47 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:47 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 19:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-12 19:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-12 19:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-13 7:50 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:50 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13 7:51 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:51 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 1:15 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 1:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 1:15 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 3:11 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 3:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 3:11 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20 7:07 ` Pavel Machek
2017-06-20 7:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2017-06-20 7:53 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20 7:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20 7:53 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13 7:55 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:55 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:55 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13 6:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13 7:52 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:52 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:52 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 06/11] S.A.R.A. cred blob management Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-12 17:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-12 17:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-13 7:41 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 7:41 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 0:02 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 0:02 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 10/11] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` [PATCH 11/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-09 19:35 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-10 7:59 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10 7:59 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10 23:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-11 16:58 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 16:58 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 17:49 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 17:49 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 19:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-11 19:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 12:39 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 12:39 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 15:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 15:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 19:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 19:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 22:33 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 22:33 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-24 0:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-24 0:58 ` Casey Schaufler
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