All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-riscv@nongnu.org
Cc: alistair23@gmail.com, palmer@sifive.com, alistair.francis@wdc.com
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH-4.2 v2 1/5] target/riscv: Don't set write permissions on dirty PTEs
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2019 16:35:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <868a01ec5dd656f26ebb06d0b4313452f66206e3.1564529681.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1564529681.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>

Setting write permission on dirty PTEs results in userspace inside a
Hypervisor guest (VU) becoming corrupted. This appears to be because it
ends up with write permission in the second stage translation in cases
where we aren't doing a store.

Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
---
 target/riscv/cpu_helper.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
index e32b6126af..f027be7f16 100644
--- a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
+++ b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
@@ -340,10 +340,8 @@ restart:
             if ((pte & PTE_X)) {
                 *prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
             }
-            /* add write permission on stores or if the page is already dirty,
-               so that we TLB miss on later writes to update the dirty bit */
-            if ((pte & PTE_W) &&
-                    (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE || (pte & PTE_D))) {
+            /* add write permission on stores */
+            if ((pte & PTE_W) && (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE)) {
                 *prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
             }
             return TRANSLATE_SUCCESS;
-- 
2.22.0



WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-riscv@nongnu.org
Cc: palmer@sifive.com, alistair.francis@wdc.com, alistair23@gmail.com
Subject: [Qemu-riscv] [PATCH-4.2 v2 1/5] target/riscv: Don't set write permissions on dirty PTEs
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2019 16:35:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <868a01ec5dd656f26ebb06d0b4313452f66206e3.1564529681.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1564529681.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>

Setting write permission on dirty PTEs results in userspace inside a
Hypervisor guest (VU) becoming corrupted. This appears to be because it
ends up with write permission in the second stage translation in cases
where we aren't doing a store.

Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
---
 target/riscv/cpu_helper.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
index e32b6126af..f027be7f16 100644
--- a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
+++ b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
@@ -340,10 +340,8 @@ restart:
             if ((pte & PTE_X)) {
                 *prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
             }
-            /* add write permission on stores or if the page is already dirty,
-               so that we TLB miss on later writes to update the dirty bit */
-            if ((pte & PTE_W) &&
-                    (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE || (pte & PTE_D))) {
+            /* add write permission on stores */
+            if ((pte & PTE_W) && (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE)) {
                 *prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
             }
             return TRANSLATE_SUCCESS;
-- 
2.22.0



  reply	other threads:[~2019-07-30 23:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-30 23:35 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH-4.2 v2 0/5] RISC-V: Hypervisor prep work part 2 Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35 ` [Qemu-riscv] " Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35 ` Alistair Francis [this message]
2019-07-30 23:35   ` [Qemu-riscv] [PATCH-4.2 v2 1/5] target/riscv: Don't set write permissions on dirty PTEs Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH-4.2 v2 2/5] riscv: plic: Remove unused interrupt functions Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35   ` [Qemu-riscv] " Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH-4.2 v2 3/5] target/riscv: Create function to test if FP is enabled Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35   ` [Qemu-riscv] " Alistair Francis
2019-08-05  6:59   ` [Qemu-devel] " Chih-Min Chao
2019-08-05  6:59     ` [Qemu-riscv] " Chih-Min Chao
2019-07-30 23:35 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH-4.2 v2 4/5] target/riscv: Update the Hypervisor CSRs to v0.4 Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35   ` [Qemu-riscv] " Alistair Francis
2019-08-05  6:19   ` [Qemu-devel] " Chih-Min Chao
2019-08-05  6:19     ` [Qemu-riscv] " Chih-Min Chao
2019-07-30 23:35 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH-4.2 v2 5/5] target/riscv: Fix Floating Point register names Alistair Francis
2019-07-30 23:35   ` [Qemu-riscv] " Alistair Francis
2019-08-12 23:08   ` [Qemu-devel] " Palmer Dabbelt
2019-08-12 23:08     ` [Qemu-riscv] " Palmer Dabbelt
2019-08-13 17:06     ` [Qemu-devel] " Alistair Francis
2019-08-13 17:06       ` [Qemu-riscv] " Alistair Francis
2019-08-14 18:07       ` [Qemu-devel] " Palmer Dabbelt
2019-08-14 18:07         ` [Qemu-riscv] " Palmer Dabbelt

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=868a01ec5dd656f26ebb06d0b4313452f66206e3.1564529681.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com \
    --to=alistair.francis@wdc.com \
    --cc=alistair23@gmail.com \
    --cc=palmer@sifive.com \
    --cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
    --cc=qemu-riscv@nongnu.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.