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From: "Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
To: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "labbott@redhat.com" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com" <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>,
	"torvalds@linux-foundation.org" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"bp@suse.de" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	"rkrcmar@redhat.com" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"karahmed@amazon.de" <karahmed@amazon.de>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	"tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dwmw2@infradead.org" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"mhiramat@kernel.org" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"arjan@linux.intel.com" <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	"thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"aarcange@redhat.com" <aarcange@redhat.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 02:55:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0575AF4FD06DD142AD198903C74E1CC87A60059A@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <23aae227-461c-4d0d-8ccb-df01bae98b2e@default>





> -----Original Message-----
> From: Liran Alon [mailto:liran.alon@oracle.com]
> Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2018 6:50 PM
> To: Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: labbott@redhat.com; luto@kernel.org; Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com;
> torvalds@linux-foundation.org; bp@suse.de; Mallick, Asit K
> <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>; rkrcmar@redhat.com; karahmed@amazon.de;
> hpa@zytor.com; mingo@redhat.com; Nakajima, Jun
> <jun.nakajima@intel.com>; x86@kernel.org; Raj, Ashok <ashok.raj@intel.com>;
> Van De Ven, Arjan <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>; tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com;
> pbonzini@redhat.com; ak@linux.intel.com; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> dwmw2@infradead.org; peterz@infradead.org; tglx@linutronix.de;
> gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; mhiramat@kernel.org; arjan@linux.intel.com;
> thomas.lendacky@amd.com; Williams, Dan J <dan.j.williams@intel.com>;
> joro@8bytes.org; kvm@vger.kernel.org; aarcange@redhat.com
> Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect
> Branch Speculation
> 
> 
 
> Google P0 blog-post
> (https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.il/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-
> with-side.html) claims that BTB & BHB only use <31 low bits of the address of
> the source instruction to lookup into the BTB. In addition, it claims that the
> higher bits of the predicated destination change together with the higher bits of
> the source instruction.
> 
> Therefore, it should be possible to leak the low bits of high predicition-mode
> code BTB/BHB entries from low prediction-mode code. Because the predicted
> destination address will reside in user-space.
> 
> What am I missing?


I thought this email thread was about the RSB...


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
To: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "labbott@redhat.com" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com" <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>,
	"torvalds@linux-foundation.org" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"bp@suse.de" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	"rkrcmar@redhat.com" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"karahmed@amazon.de" <karahmed@amazon.de>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	"tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Subject: RE: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 02:55:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0575AF4FD06DD142AD198903C74E1CC87A60059A@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <23aae227-461c-4d0d-8ccb-df01bae98b2e@default>





> -----Original Message-----
> From: Liran Alon [mailto:liran.alon@oracle.com]
> Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2018 6:50 PM
> To: Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: labbott@redhat.com; luto@kernel.org; Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com;
> torvalds@linux-foundation.org; bp@suse.de; Mallick, Asit K
> <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>; rkrcmar@redhat.com; karahmed@amazon.de;
> hpa@zytor.com; mingo@redhat.com; Nakajima, Jun
> <jun.nakajima@intel.com>; x86@kernel.org; Raj, Ashok <ashok.raj@intel.com>;
> Van De Ven, Arjan <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>; tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com;
> pbonzini@redhat.com; ak@linux.intel.com; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> dwmw2@infradead.org; peterz@infradead.org; tglx@linutronix.de;
> gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; mhiramat@kernel.org; arjan@linux.intel.com;
> thomas.lendacky@amd.com; Williams, Dan J <dan.j.williams@intel.com>;
> joro@8bytes.org; kvm@vger.kernel.org; aarcange@redhat.com
> Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect
> Branch Speculation
> 
> 
 
> Google P0 blog-post
> (https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.il/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-
> with-side.html) claims that BTB & BHB only use <31 low bits of the address of
> the source instruction to lookup into the BTB. In addition, it claims that the
> higher bits of the predicated destination change together with the higher bits of
> the source instruction.
> 
> Therefore, it should be possible to leak the low bits of high predicition-mode
> code BTB/BHB entries from low prediction-mode code. Because the predicted
> destination address will reside in user-space.
> 
> What am I missing?


I thought this email thread was about the RSB...


  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-26  2:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 120+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-26  2:50 [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation Liran Alon
2018-01-26  2:55 ` Van De Ven, Arjan [this message]
2018-01-26  2:55   ` Van De Ven, Arjan
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-26  2:11 Liran Alon
2018-01-26  2:23 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26  9:11   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26  9:11     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:19     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 17:19       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-26 17:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 17:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 17:29       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:29         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:31         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:31           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 17:59       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-26 17:59         ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-26 18:11         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:11           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:12           ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-26 18:12             ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-26 18:26             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:26               ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:28               ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-26 18:28                 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-26 18:43                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:43                   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:44                   ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-26 18:44                     ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-26 18:53                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:53                       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 19:02         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-26 19:02           ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-26 19:11           ` Hansen, Dave
2018-01-26 19:11             ` Hansen, Dave
2018-01-27 13:42             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-27 13:42               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-27 15:55               ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-27 15:55                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-26 19:11           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 19:11             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26  8:46 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26  8:46   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 11:13 Liran Alon
2018-01-25 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-22 22:15 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2018-01-20 19:22 [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:23   ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 19:14   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-21 19:14     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-23 16:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 16:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 16:20       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:20         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 22:37         ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 22:37           ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 22:49           ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 22:49             ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:14             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 23:14               ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 23:22               ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:22                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24  0:47               ` Tim Chen
2018-01-24  0:47                 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-24  1:00                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-24  1:00                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-24  1:22                   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24  1:22                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24  1:59                   ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-24  1:59                     ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-24  3:25                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-24  3:25                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-21 19:34   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 20:28     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:28       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 21:35       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 21:35         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 22:00         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 22:00           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 22:27           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 22:27             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-22 16:27             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 16:27               ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23  7:29               ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23  7:29                 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23  7:53                 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23  7:53                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23  9:27                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23  9:27                     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23  9:37                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23  9:37                       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 15:01                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 15:01                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23  9:30                   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23  9:30                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:15                     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:15                       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:27                       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:27                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:44                         ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:44                           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:57                           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:23                     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:23                       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:35                       ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-04 18:43                       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-04 18:43                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-04 20:22                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-04 20:22                           ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-06  9:14                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-06  9:14                           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:19                     ` Mason
2018-01-25 16:19                       ` Mason
2018-01-25 17:16                       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-25 17:16                         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-29 11:59                         ` Mason
2018-01-29 11:59                           ` Mason
2018-01-24  0:05                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 20:16       ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-23 20:16         ` Pavel Machek

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