From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: "Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, "KarimAllah Ahmed" <karahmed@amazon.de>, "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "Andi Kleen" <ak@linux.intel.com>, "Andrea Arcangeli" <aarcange@redhat.com>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "Arjan van de Ven" <arjan@linux.intel.com>, "Ashok Raj" <ashok.raj@intel.com>, "Asit Mallick" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>, "Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, "Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>, "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Janakarajan Natarajan" <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Jun Nakajima" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>, "Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>, "Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, "KVM list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>, "Arjan Van De Ven" <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 10:27:56 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180123092756.iznzepwnolsviof7@gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180123075358.nztpyxympwfkyi2a@gmail.com> * Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote: > Is there a testcase for the SkyLake 16-deep-call-stack problem that I could run? > Is there a description of the exact speculative execution vulnerability that has > to be addressed to begin with? Ok, so for now I'm assuming that this is the 16 entries return-stack-buffer underflow condition where SkyLake falls back to the branch predictor (while other CPUs wrap the buffer). > If this approach is workable I'd much prefer it to any MSR writes in the syscall > entry path not just because it's fast enough in practice to not be turned off by > everyone, but also because everyone would agree that per function call overhead > needs to go away on new CPUs. Both deployment and backporting is also _much_ more > flexible, simpler, faster and more complete than microcode/firmware or compiler > based solutions. > > Assuming the vulnerability can be addressed via this route that is, which is a big > assumption! So I talked this over with PeterZ, and I think it's all doable: - the CALL __fentry__ callbacks maintain the depth tracking (on the kernel stack, fast to access), and issue an "RSB-stuffing sequence" when depth reaches 16 entries. - "the RSB-stuffing sequence" is a return trampoline that pushes a CALL on the stack which is executed on the RET. - All asynchronous contexts (IRQs, NMIs, etc.) stuff the RSB before IRET. (The tracking could probably made IRQ and maybe even NMI safe, but the worst-case nesting scenarios make my head ache.) I.e. IBRS can be mostly replaced with a kernel based solution that is better than IBRS and which does not negatively impact any other non-SkyLake CPUs or general code quality. I.e. a full upstream Spectre solution. Thanks, Ingo
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>, Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>, Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, Subject: Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 10:27:56 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180123092756.iznzepwnolsviof7@gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180123075358.nztpyxympwfkyi2a@gmail.com> * Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote: > Is there a testcase for the SkyLake 16-deep-call-stack problem that I could run? > Is there a description of the exact speculative execution vulnerability that has > to be addressed to begin with? Ok, so for now I'm assuming that this is the 16 entries return-stack-buffer underflow condition where SkyLake falls back to the branch predictor (while other CPUs wrap the buffer). > If this approach is workable I'd much prefer it to any MSR writes in the syscall > entry path not just because it's fast enough in practice to not be turned off by > everyone, but also because everyone would agree that per function call overhead > needs to go away on new CPUs. Both deployment and backporting is also _much_ more > flexible, simpler, faster and more complete than microcode/firmware or compiler > based solutions. > > Assuming the vulnerability can be addressed via this route that is, which is a big > assumption! So I talked this over with PeterZ, and I think it's all doable: - the CALL __fentry__ callbacks maintain the depth tracking (on the kernel stack, fast to access), and issue an "RSB-stuffing sequence" when depth reaches 16 entries. - "the RSB-stuffing sequence" is a return trampoline that pushes a CALL on the stack which is executed on the RET. - All asynchronous contexts (IRQs, NMIs, etc.) stuff the RSB before IRET. (The tracking could probably made IRQ and maybe even NMI safe, but the worst-case nesting scenarios make my head ache.) I.e. IBRS can be mostly replaced with a kernel based solution that is better than IBRS and which does not negatively impact any other non-SkyLake CPUs or general code quality. I.e. a full upstream Spectre solution. Thanks, Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-23 9:27 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 311+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-01-20 19:22 [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 01/10] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 02/10] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 20:18 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-20 20:18 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-22 18:56 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-22 18:56 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-22 19:31 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-22 19:31 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 03/10] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 04/10] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 21:06 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-20 21:06 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-22 18:29 ` Tim Chen 2018-01-22 18:29 ` Tim Chen 2018-01-21 11:22 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-21 11:22 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-21 12:04 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 12:04 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 14:07 ` H.J. Lu 2018-01-21 14:07 ` H.J. Lu 2018-01-22 10:19 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-22 10:19 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-22 10:23 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-22 10:23 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 16:21 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-21 16:21 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-21 16:25 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-21 16:25 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-21 22:20 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-21 22:20 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-29 6:35 ` Jon Masters 2018-01-29 6:35 ` Jon Masters 2018-01-29 14:07 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-29 14:07 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 05/10] x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-21 14:31 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-01-21 14:31 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-01-21 14:56 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-21 14:56 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-22 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-22 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-22 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-22 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-22 13:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-22 13:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-22 13:36 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-22 13:37 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-21 15:25 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 15:25 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 20:58 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 20:58 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 22:43 ` Johannes Erdfelt 2018-01-24 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-24 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-24 9:02 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 9:02 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-24 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-24 15:09 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-24 15:09 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-24 15:18 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 15:18 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-24 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-24 10:49 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh 2018-01-24 10:49 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh 2018-01-24 12:30 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 12:30 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 12:14 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 12:14 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 12:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-24 12:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-24 12:58 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 12:58 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-29 20:14 ` [RFC,05/10] " Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 20:14 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 20:17 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-29 20:17 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-29 20:42 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 20:42 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 20:44 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-29 20:44 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-29 21:02 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-29 21:02 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-29 21:37 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-29 21:37 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-29 21:50 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 21:50 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 22:12 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-29 22:12 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-30 1:22 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-30 1:22 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 22:25 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-29 22:25 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-30 1:37 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-30 1:37 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 21:37 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-29 21:37 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-29 21:44 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 21:44 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-29 22:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-29 22:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-30 1:12 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-30 1:12 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-30 0:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-30 0:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-30 1:03 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-30 1:03 ` Jim Mattson 2018-01-30 3:13 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-30 3:13 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-31 15:03 ` Paolo Bonzini 2018-01-31 15:03 ` Paolo Bonzini 2018-01-31 15:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 15:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-30 1:32 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-30 1:32 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-30 3:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-30 3:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-30 12:04 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-30 12:04 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-30 13:54 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-30 13:54 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-30 8:22 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-30 8:22 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-30 11:35 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-30 11:35 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-30 11:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-30 11:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-30 12:11 ` Christian Borntraeger 2018-01-30 12:11 ` Christian Borntraeger 2018-01-30 14:46 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-30 14:46 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-30 14:52 ` Christian Borntraeger 2018-01-30 14:52 ` Christian Borntraeger 2018-01-30 14:56 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-30 14:56 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-30 15:33 ` Christian Borntraeger 2018-01-30 15:33 ` Christian Borntraeger 2018-01-30 20:46 ` Alan Cox 2018-01-30 20:46 ` Alan Cox 2018-01-31 10:05 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-31 10:05 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-31 10:15 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-01-31 10:15 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-01-31 11:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 11:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 11:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-31 11:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-31 12:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 12:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-31 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-31 14:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 14:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-01-31 14:44 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-31 14:44 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-31 16:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-31 16:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-31 11:07 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-31 11:07 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-31 15:00 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-31 15:00 ` Eduardo Habkost 2018-01-31 15:11 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-31 15:11 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-31 10:03 ` [RFC 05/10] " Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-31 10:03 ` Christophe de Dinechin 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 06/10] x86/speculation: Add inlines to control Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 07/10] x86: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 08/10] x86/idle: Control Indirect Branch Speculation in idle KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:22 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:23 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-21 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-01-21 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-01-23 16:12 ` Tom Lendacky 2018-01-23 16:12 ` Tom Lendacky 2018-01-23 16:20 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-23 16:20 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-23 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2018-01-23 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky 2018-01-23 22:49 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-23 22:49 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-23 23:14 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-23 23:14 ` Woodhouse, David 2018-01-23 23:22 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-23 23:22 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-24 0:47 ` Tim Chen 2018-01-24 0:47 ` Tim Chen 2018-01-24 1:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-01-24 1:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-01-24 1:22 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 1:22 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-24 1:59 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-24 1:59 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-24 3:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-01-24 3:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-01-21 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-21 20:28 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 20:28 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-21 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-21 22:00 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 22:00 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-21 22:27 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-21 22:27 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-22 16:27 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-22 16:27 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 7:29 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 7:29 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 7:53 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 7:53 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 9:27 ` Ingo Molnar [this message] 2018-01-23 9:27 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 9:37 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 9:37 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 15:01 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-23 15:01 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-23 9:30 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 9:30 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 10:15 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 10:15 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 10:27 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 10:27 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 10:44 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 10:44 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 10:57 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-23 10:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 10:23 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-01-23 10:35 ` David Woodhouse 2018-02-04 18:43 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-02-04 18:43 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-02-04 20:22 ` David Woodhouse 2018-02-04 20:22 ` David Woodhouse 2018-02-06 9:14 ` David Woodhouse 2018-02-06 9:14 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-25 16:19 ` Mason 2018-01-25 16:19 ` Mason 2018-01-25 17:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-25 17:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2018-01-29 11:59 ` Mason 2018-01-29 11:59 ` Mason 2018-01-24 0:05 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-23 20:16 ` Pavel Machek 2018-01-23 20:16 ` Pavel Machek 2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 10/10] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-20 19:23 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-21 13:50 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-21 13:50 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-21 14:40 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-21 14:40 ` KarimAllah Ahmed 2018-01-21 17:22 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-21 17:22 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-21 14:02 ` [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-21 14:02 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-22 21:27 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-22 21:27 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-22 22:15 [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 2018-01-23 11:13 Liran Alon 2018-01-25 22:20 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-26 2:11 Liran Alon 2018-01-26 2:23 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-26 9:11 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 9:11 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 17:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-26 17:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-26 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-26 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov 2018-01-26 17:29 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 17:29 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 17:31 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 17:31 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 17:59 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-26 17:59 ` Andi Kleen 2018-01-26 18:11 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:11 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:12 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-26 18:12 ` Arjan van de Ven 2018-01-26 18:26 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:26 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:28 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-26 18:28 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-26 18:43 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:43 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:44 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-26 18:44 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-26 18:53 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 18:53 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 19:02 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-26 19:02 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-26 19:11 ` Hansen, Dave 2018-01-26 19:11 ` Hansen, Dave 2018-01-27 13:42 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-27 13:42 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-01-27 15:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-27 15:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-01-26 19:11 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 19:11 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 8:46 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 8:46 ` David Woodhouse 2018-01-26 2:50 Liran Alon 2018-01-26 2:55 ` Van De Ven, Arjan 2018-01-26 2:55 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
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