From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net, mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu, eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org, jmorris@namei.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Subject: [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 16:47:52 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1334267284-19166-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> Introduces a new BPF ancillary instruction that all LD calls will be mapped through when skb_run_filter() is being used for seccomp BPF. The rewriting will be done using a secondary chk_filter function that is run after skb_chk_filter. The code change is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER which is added, along with the seccomp_bpf_load() function later in this series. This is based on http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/3/2/141 Suggested-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> v18: rebase ... v15: include seccomp.h explicitly for when seccomp_bpf_load exists. v14: First cut using a single additional instruction ... v13: made bpf functions generic. --- include/linux/filter.h | 1 + net/core/filter.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 8eeb205..aaa2e80 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ enum { BPF_S_ANC_HATYPE, BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH, BPF_S_ANC_CPU, + BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W, }; #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 6f755cc..491e2e1 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/reciprocal_div.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> /* No hurry in this branch * @@ -352,6 +353,11 @@ load_b: A = 0; continue; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + case BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W: + A = seccomp_bpf_load(fentry->k); + continue; +#endif default: WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "Unknown code:%u jt:%u tf:%u k:%u\n", fentry->code, fentry->jt, -- 1.7.5.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net, mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu, eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org, jmorris@namei.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 16:47:52 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1334267284-19166-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> Introduces a new BPF ancillary instruction that all LD calls will be mapped through when skb_run_filter() is being used for seccomp BPF. The rewriting will be done using a secondary chk_filter function that is run after skb_chk_filter. The code change is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER which is added, along with the seccomp_bpf_load() function later in this series. This is based on http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/3/2/141 Suggested-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> v18: rebase ... v15: include seccomp.h explicitly for when seccomp_bpf_load exists. v14: First cut using a single additional instruction ... v13: made bpf functions generic. --- include/linux/filter.h | 1 + net/core/filter.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 8eeb205..aaa2e80 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ enum { BPF_S_ANC_HATYPE, BPF_S_ANC_RXHASH, BPF_S_ANC_CPU, + BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W, }; #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 6f755cc..491e2e1 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/reciprocal_div.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> /* No hurry in this branch * @@ -352,6 +353,11 @@ load_b: A = 0; continue; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + case BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W: + A = seccomp_bpf_load(fentry->k); + continue; +#endif default: WARN_RATELIMIT(1, "Unknown code:%u jt:%u tf:%u k:%u\n", fentry->code, fentry->jt, -- 1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-04-12 21:54 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2012-04-12 21:47 [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 02/15] Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` Will Drewry [this message] 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 06/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 22:18 ` Kees Cook 2012-04-12 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 22:19 ` Kees Cook 2012-04-12 22:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2012-04-12 22:19 ` Kees Cook 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 22:16 ` Kees Cook 2012-04-12 22:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry 2012-04-12 21:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-12 22:11 ` Kees Cook 2012-04-12 22:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2012-04-18 2:28 ` Paul Gortmaker 2012-04-18 2:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Gortmaker 2012-04-18 2:53 ` Will Drewry 2012-04-18 2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-18 2:53 ` Will Drewry 2012-04-12 22:17 ` [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Kees Cook 2012-04-12 22:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2012-04-13 4:16 ` James Morris 2012-04-13 4:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris 2012-04-13 4:16 ` James Morris 2012-04-13 4:16 ` James Morris 2012-04-13 4:25 ` Andrew Lutomirski 2012-04-13 4:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski 2012-04-13 4:25 ` Andrew Lutomirski 2012-04-13 4:34 ` James Morris 2012-04-13 4:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris 2012-04-13 4:34 ` James Morris 2012-04-13 4:34 ` James Morris 2012-04-13 4:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2012-04-13 4:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2012-04-14 1:45 ` James Morris 2012-04-14 1:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris 2012-04-14 3:06 ` Will Drewry 2012-04-14 3:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry 2012-04-14 3:06 ` Will Drewry
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