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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 15:16:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+6kWpuNudi_43J1coK-fN5NTrev=ycYSmcbr+dFBJMFg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-14-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 2:48 PM, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> Enable support for seccomp filter on x86:
> - syscall_get_arch()
> - syscall_get_arguments()
> - syscall_rollback()
> - syscall_set_return_value()
> - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
> - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
> - secure_computing return value is checked (see below).
>
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_TRAP may result in seccomp needing to
> skip a system call without killing the process.  This is done by
> returning a non-zero (-1) value from secure_computing.  This change
> makes x86 respect that return value.
>
> To ensure that minimal kernel code is exposed, a non-zero return value
> results in an immediate return to user space (with an invalid syscall
> number).
>
> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 15:16:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+6kWpuNudi_43J1coK-fN5NTrev=ycYSmcbr+dFBJMFg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-14-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 2:48 PM, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> Enable support for seccomp filter on x86:
> - syscall_get_arch()
> - syscall_get_arguments()
> - syscall_rollback()
> - syscall_set_return_value()
> - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
> - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
> - secure_computing return value is checked (see below).
>
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_TRAP may result in seccomp needing to
> skip a system call without killing the process.  This is done by
> returning a non-zero (-1) value from secure_computing.  This change
> makes x86 respect that return value.
>
> To ensure that minimal kernel code is exposed, a non-zero return value
> results in an immediate return to user space (with an invalid syscall
> number).
>
> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security

  reply	other threads:[~2012-04-12 22:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-04-12 21:47 [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 02/15] Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 06/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:18   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:18     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:16   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2012-04-12 22:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:11   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-18  2:28   ` Paul Gortmaker
2012-04-18  2:28     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Gortmaker
2012-04-18  2:53     ` Will Drewry
2012-04-18  2:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-18  2:53       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:17 ` [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-13  4:16 ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:16   ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-13  4:16   ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:16   ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:25   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:25     ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:34     ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:34       ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-13  4:34       ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:34       ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:40       ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:40         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-14  1:45 ` James Morris
2012-04-14  1:45   ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-14  3:06   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-14  3:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-14  3:06     ` Will Drewry

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