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From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 16:47:56 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1334267284-19166-7-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

Add syscall_get_arch() to export the current AUDIT_ARCH_* based on system call
entry path.

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

v18: - update comment about x32 tasks
     - rebase to v3.4-rc2
v17: rebase and reviewed-by
v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
index 386b786..1ace47b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -13,9 +13,11 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H
 #define _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H
 
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>	/* For NR_syscalls */
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>	/* for TS_COMPAT */
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
 extern const unsigned long sys_call_table[];
@@ -88,6 +90,12 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
 	memcpy(&regs->bx + i, args, n * sizeof(args[0]));
 }
 
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
+				   struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
+}
+
 #else	 /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
 static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
@@ -212,6 +220,25 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
 		}
 }
 
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
+				   struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+	/*
+	 * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entry and then
+	 * remains set until we return to user mode.
+	 *
+	 * TIF_IA32 tasks should always have TS_COMPAT set at
+	 * system call time.
+	 *
+	 * x32 tasks should be considered AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64.
+	 */
+	if (task_thread_info(task)->status & TS_COMPAT)
+		return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
+#endif
+	/* Both x32 and x86_64 are considered "64-bit". */
+	return AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
 #endif	/* _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H */
-- 
1.7.5.4


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 16:47:56 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1334267284-19166-7-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1334267284-19166-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

Add syscall_get_arch() to export the current AUDIT_ARCH_* based on system call
entry path.

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

v18: - update comment about x32 tasks
     - rebase to v3.4-rc2
v17: rebase and reviewed-by
v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
index 386b786..1ace47b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -13,9 +13,11 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H
 #define _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H
 
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>	/* For NR_syscalls */
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>	/* for TS_COMPAT */
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
 extern const unsigned long sys_call_table[];
@@ -88,6 +90,12 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
 	memcpy(&regs->bx + i, args, n * sizeof(args[0]));
 }
 
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
+				   struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
+}
+
 #else	 /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
 static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
@@ -212,6 +220,25 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
 		}
 }
 
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
+				   struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+	/*
+	 * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entry and then
+	 * remains set until we return to user mode.
+	 *
+	 * TIF_IA32 tasks should always have TS_COMPAT set at
+	 * system call time.
+	 *
+	 * x32 tasks should be considered AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64.
+	 */
+	if (task_thread_info(task)->status & TS_COMPAT)
+		return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
+#endif
+	/* Both x32 and x86_64 are considered "64-bit". */
+	return AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
 #endif	/* _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H */
-- 
1.7.5.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-04-12 21:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-04-12 21:47 [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 02/15] Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 06/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:18   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:18     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47 ` [PATCH v18 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:16   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-12 21:48 ` [PATCH v18 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-04-12 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:11   ` Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-18  2:28   ` Paul Gortmaker
2012-04-18  2:28     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Gortmaker
2012-04-18  2:53     ` Will Drewry
2012-04-18  2:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-18  2:53       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-12 22:17 ` [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Kees Cook
2012-04-12 22:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-13  4:16 ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:16   ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-13  4:16   ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:16   ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:25   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:25     ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:34     ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:34       ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-13  4:34       ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:34       ` James Morris
2012-04-13  4:40       ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-13  4:40         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-14  1:45 ` James Morris
2012-04-14  1:45   ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-14  3:06   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-14  3:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-14  3:06     ` Will Drewry

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