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From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for /dev/mem and /dev/kmem access
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2013 17:32:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363642353-30749-9-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 7eee4d8..772ee2b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long copied;
 	void *ptr;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
-- 
1.8.1.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for /dev/mem and /dev/kmem access
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2013 17:32:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363642353-30749-9-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel
to be subverted. Restrict this when we need to protect the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 7eee4d8..772ee2b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long copied;
 	void *ptr;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -530,6 +533,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
-- 
1.8.1.2


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kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-03-18 21:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 129+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-03-18 21:32 [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 02/12] SELinux: define mapping for CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 03/12] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 04/12] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 05/12] PCI: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for PCI BAR access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-27 15:03   ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-27 15:03     ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-27 15:08     ` Kyle McMartin
2013-03-27 15:08       ` Kyle McMartin
2013-03-28 12:46       ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-28 12:46         ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 06/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for IO port access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20  1:00   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20  1:00     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 07/12] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 08/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-03-18 21:32   ` [PATCH 09/12] Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for /dev/mem and /dev/kmem access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 10/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-19  8:47   ` Dave Young
2013-03-19  8:47     ` Dave Young
2013-03-19  8:47     ` Dave Young
2013-03-19 11:19     ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-19 11:19       ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-19 11:19       ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-19 17:07       ` [PATCH v2] " Josh Boyer
2013-03-19 17:07         ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 11/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for MSR writing Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 12/12] kexec: Require CAP_SYS_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-19  4:47 ` [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL James Morris
2013-03-19  4:47   ` James Morris
2013-03-19  4:47   ` James Morris
2013-03-20  1:03   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20  1:03     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:41   ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 16:41     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 16:49     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:49       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:49       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:49       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:01       ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:01         ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:01         ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:12         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:12           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:12           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:12           ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 19:16           ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 19:16             ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 19:16             ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 19:16             ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 20:37             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 20:37               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 20:37               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 20:37               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:11               ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:11                 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:11                 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:18                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:18                   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:18                   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:18                   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-21 13:43                   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 13:43                     ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 13:43                     ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 13:43                     ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:37                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:37                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:37                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:37                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:52                       ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:52                         ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:52                         ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:52                         ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:58                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:58                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:58                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:58                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:04                           ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:04                             ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:04                             ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:19                             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:19                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:19                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:19                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 17:15                               ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 17:15                                 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 17:15                                 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 17:15                                 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21  1:58     ` James Morris
2013-03-21  1:58       ` James Morris
2013-03-19  7:18 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2013-03-19  7:18   ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2013-03-20  1:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20  1:02   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20  1:05   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20  1:05     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 13:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 13:15     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 13:15     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 13:15     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:03     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:03       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:03       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:03       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:14       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:14         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:14         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:14         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:45         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:45           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:45           ` H. Peter Anvin

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