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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: matthew.garrett@nebula.com, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:10:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149141224171.31282.11926701357832474000.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions.  Prevent this when the
kernel has been locked down.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 drivers/char/mem.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 6d9cc2d39d22..f8144049bda3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (p != *ppos)
 		return -EFBIG;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -513,6 +516,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:10:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149141224171.31282.11926701357832474000.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to
be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions.  Prevent this when the
kernel has been locked down.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 drivers/char/mem.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 6d9cc2d39d22..f8144049bda3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (p != *ppos)
 		return -EFBIG;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -513,6 +516,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-05 17:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:09 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:44   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:44     ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:44     ` James Morris
2017-04-06 10:43   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 10:43     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 21:55     ` James Morris
2017-04-06 21:55       ` James Morris
2017-04-06 21:55       ` James Morris
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-04-05 17:10   ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:34   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:25 ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:25   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:25   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:37 ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:37   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:37   ` David Howells
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-04-05 20:14 David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07   ` David Howells

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