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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: matthew.garrett@nebula.com, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:11:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149141230688.31282.8468893625928605292.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c |    9 +++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c      |    8 +++++++-
 drivers/pci/syscall.c   |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 25d010d449a3..f70b3668036f 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1018,6 +1021,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	resource_size_t start, end;
 	int i;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
 			break;
@@ -1117,6 +1123,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index f82710a8694d..139d6f09ae7b 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret, write_combine;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index 9bf993e1f71e..c09524738ceb 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:11:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149141230688.31282.8468893625928605292.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c |    9 +++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c      |    8 +++++++-
 drivers/pci/syscall.c   |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 25d010d449a3..f70b3668036f 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1018,6 +1021,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	resource_size_t start, end;
 	int i;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
 			break;
@@ -1117,6 +1123,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index f82710a8694d..139d6f09ae7b 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret, write_combine;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index 9bf993e1f71e..c09524738ceb 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-05 17:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:09 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:44   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:44     ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:44     ` James Morris
2017-04-06 10:43   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 10:43     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 21:55     ` James Morris
2017-04-06 21:55       ` James Morris
2017-04-06 21:55       ` James Morris
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-04-05 17:11   ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:34   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:25 ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:25   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:25   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:37 ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:37   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:37   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:50   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-18 17:50     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-18 17:50     ` Bjorn Helgaas

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