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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>,
	matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:12:44 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149141236435.31282.18405211623757724751.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>

ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features.  If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.

Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors.  This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.

While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
the kernel is locked down.

Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
index ec50c32ea3da..e082718d01c2 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
 	int rc;
 	u64 base_addr, size;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
 	if (flags && (flags &
 		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 18:12:44 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149141236435.31282.18405211623757724751.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149141219387.31282.6648284836568938717.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>

ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features.  If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.

Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors.  This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.

While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
the kernel is locked down.

Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
index ec50c32ea3da..e082718d01c2 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
 	int rc;
 	u64 base_addr, size;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
 	if (flags && (flags &
 		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-05 17:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:09 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:44   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:44     ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:44     ` James Morris
2017-04-06 10:43   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 10:43     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 21:55     ` James Morris
2017-04-06 21:55       ` James Morris
2017-04-06 21:55       ` James Morris
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:11   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:34   ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:34     ` Kees Cook
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-04-05 17:12   ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 19:57   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:25 ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:25   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:25   ` James Morris
2017-04-06  8:37 ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:37   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:37   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells

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