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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 21:14:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149142329539.5101.10838131250626684698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed.  Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
---

 arch/x86/Kconfig        |   12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c |    8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cc98d5a294ee..21f39855661d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI
+	prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+	---help---
+	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may
+	  also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+	  userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 396285bddb93..85dfa745c442 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <video/edid.h>
 
@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 			break;
 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
 			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
-			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+				lock_kernel_down();
+				pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
+			} else {
+				pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+			}
 			break;
 		default:
 			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 21:14:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149142329539.5101.10838131250626684698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed.  Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi at vger.kernel.org
---

 arch/x86/Kconfig        |   12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c |    8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cc98d5a294ee..21f39855661d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI
+	prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+	---help---
+	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may
+	  also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+	  userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 396285bddb93..85dfa745c442 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <video/edid.h>
 
@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 			break;
 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
 			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
-			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+				lock_kernel_down();
+				pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
+			} else {
+				pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+			}
 			break;
 		default:
 			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");

--
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-05 20:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 216+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:26   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06  8:26     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06  8:48   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:48     ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-04-05 20:14   ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-14 18:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:05     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:05     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 18:15       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 18:15       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 23:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-14 23:16       ` David Howells
2017-04-14 23:16       ` David Howells
2017-04-16 20:46     ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-16 20:46       ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-16 20:46       ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-07  3:07   ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:07     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:07     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:07     ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-07  3:05   ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:05     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:05     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:05     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  3:49       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  3:49       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  6:19       ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:19         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:19         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:19         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:45         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:45           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:45           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:01           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:01             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:01             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:07       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:07         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:07         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:41         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:41           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:41           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:41           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:28           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:42             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:42               ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:42               ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:42               ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:09     ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:09       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:09       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:46       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:46         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:46         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  9:17       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  9:17         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  9:17         ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:36         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07 12:36           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07 12:36           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-10 13:19         ` David Howells
2017-04-10 13:19           ` David Howells
2017-04-10 13:19           ` David Howells
2017-05-02 19:01           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 19:01             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 19:01             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 19:01             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 23:38   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 23:38     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 23:38     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06  6:39     ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06  6:39       ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06  8:41     ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:41       ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:09       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:09         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:09         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:25           ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-06 20:25             ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-08  3:28             ` poma
2017-04-08  3:28               ` poma
2017-04-12 13:44               ` joeyli
2017-04-12 13:44                 ` joeyli
2017-04-06  6:55   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  6:55     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:07     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:07       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:50   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-18 17:50     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-18 17:50     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-14 18:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-14 18:30   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:30     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-07 10:25   ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 10:25     ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 12:50   ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:50     ` David Howells
2017-04-09 11:10     ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-09 11:10       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-10 13:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-10 13:16       ` David Howells
2017-04-18  6:06       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18  6:06         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18  6:06         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18 14:34         ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 14:34           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 14:55         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 14:55           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 14:55           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:19           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 15:19             ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 15:34           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:34             ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:34             ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:39           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 17:39             ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 17:39             ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 19:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 19:43     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-07  6:31     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:31       ` Dave Young
     [not found]     ` <20170407063107.GA10451-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07  7:05       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:05         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:05         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:39         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:39           ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 12:29   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-04-06 12:29     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-04-06 12:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06 12:40       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-12 14:57   ` joeyli
2017-04-12 14:57     ` joeyli
2017-04-12 14:57     ` joeyli
2017-04-13  8:46   ` David Howells
2017-04-13  8:46     ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18   ` David Howells
2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2017-04-07 15:59   ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2017-04-07 16:29   ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-07 16:29     ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-07 16:29     ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells
2017-04-10 23:15   ` David Howells
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07   ` David Howells

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