From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 15:51:49 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <150842470945.7923.134066103094708461.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 ++++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 1eecfa301f7f..e1a3b0e765c2 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -881,6 +881,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -1175,6 +1178,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1255,6 +1261,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index 098360d7ff81..a6c53d855daa 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -236,7 +242,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index 9bf993e1f71e..afa01cc3ceec 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 15:51:49 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <150842470945.7923.134066103094708461.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> cc: linux-pci at vger.kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 ++++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 1eecfa301f7f..e1a3b0e765c2 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -881,6 +881,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -1175,6 +1178,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type; struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start)) return -EINVAL; @@ -1255,6 +1261,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index 098360d7ff81..a6c53d855daa 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -236,7 +242,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) { diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index 9bf993e1f71e..afa01cc3ceec 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access")) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn); -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-19 14:51 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 360+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-10-19 14:50 [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap 2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap 2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap 2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells 2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann 2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells 2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli 2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli 2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris 2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells [this message] 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox 2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox 2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli 2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli 2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells 2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli 2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli 2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee 2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee at suse.com 2017-10-20 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-23 14:51 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells 2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee 2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee at suse.com 2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli 2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli 2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli 2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells 2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells 2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris 2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris 2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells 2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 22:39 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-10-19 22:39 ` David Howells 2017-10-19 22:39 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:34 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-10-23 14:34 ` David Howells 2017-10-23 14:34 ` David Howells 2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao 2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao 2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao 2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:01 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:04 ` Firmware signing -- " David Howells 2017-11-02 22:04 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:04 ` David Howells 2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro 2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells 2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells 2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley 2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek 2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek 2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox 2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox 2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez 2019-03-25 22:09 [PULL REQUEST] Lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett 2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
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