From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jan Blunck <jblunck@infradead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>, Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 12:18:54 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxeLwgwxh2iJTf6Dz0T_a_TZfTdhBw5TkcSsCmjt2N5pw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuvP=0AHGtfGJ5+cT+kHRy3fU4BLjwkvzP0rLO6q5ejAQQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 11:58 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> wrote:
>
> Our ability to determine that userland hasn't been tampered with
> depends on the kernel being trustworthy. If userland can upload
> arbitrary firmware to DMA-capable devices then we can no longer trust
> the kernel. So yes, firmware is special.
You're ignoring the whole "firmware is already signed by the hardware
manufacturer and we don't even have access to it" part.
You're also ignoring the fact that we can't trust firmware _anyway_,
as Alan pointed out.
Seriously. Some of the worst security issues have been with exactly
the fact that we can't trust the hardware to begin with, where
firmware/hardware combinations are not trusted to begin with.
This is all theoretical security masturbation. The _real_ attacks have
been elsewhere.
Linus
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar
<zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Alan Cox
<gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
"Luis R. Rodriguez"
<mcgrof-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"AKASHI,
Takahiro"
<takahiro.akashi-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>,
Jan Blunck <jblunck-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall-L2FTfq7BK8M@public.gmane.org>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>,
Gary Lin <GLin-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
LSM List
<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 12:18:54 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxeLwgwxh2iJTf6Dz0T_a_TZfTdhBw5TkcSsCmjt2N5pw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuvP=0AHGtfGJ5+cT+kHRy3fU4BLjwkvzP0rLO6q5ejAQQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 11:58 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>
> Our ability to determine that userland hasn't been tampered with
> depends on the kernel being trustworthy. If userland can upload
> arbitrary firmware to DMA-capable devices then we can no longer trust
> the kernel. So yes, firmware is special.
You're ignoring the whole "firmware is already signed by the hardware
manufacturer and we don't even have access to it" part.
You're also ignoring the fact that we can't trust firmware _anyway_,
as Alan pointed out.
Seriously. Some of the worst security issues have been with exactly
the fact that we can't trust the hardware to begin with, where
firmware/hardware combinations are not trusted to begin with.
This is all theoretical security masturbation. The _real_ attacks have
been elsewhere.
Linus
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: torvalds@linux-foundation.org (Linus Torvalds)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 12:18:54 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxeLwgwxh2iJTf6Dz0T_a_TZfTdhBw5TkcSsCmjt2N5pw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuvP=0AHGtfGJ5+cT+kHRy3fU4BLjwkvzP0rLO6q5ejAQQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 11:58 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> wrote:
>
> Our ability to determine that userland hasn't been tampered with
> depends on the kernel being trustworthy. If userland can upload
> arbitrary firmware to DMA-capable devices then we can no longer trust
> the kernel. So yes, firmware is special.
You're ignoring the whole "firmware is already signed by the hardware
manufacturer and we don't even have access to it" part.
You're also ignoring the fact that we can't trust firmware _anyway_,
as Alan pointed out.
Seriously. Some of the worst security issues have been with exactly
the fact that we can't trust the hardware to begin with, where
firmware/hardware combinations are not trusted to begin with.
This is all theoretical security masturbation. The _real_ attacks have
been elsewhere.
Linus
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More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-14 20:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 359+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-19 14:50 [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells
2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells
2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris
2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli
2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli
2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox
2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox
2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli
2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli
2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli
2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee
2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee at suse.com
2017-10-20 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-23 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee
2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee at suse.com
2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli
2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli
2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris
2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris
2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 22:39 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 22:39 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 22:39 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:34 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-23 14:34 ` David Howells
2017-10-23 14:34 ` David Howells
2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao
2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao
2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao
2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells
2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:01 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:04 ` Firmware signing -- " David Howells
2017-11-02 22:04 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:04 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells
2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells
2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek
2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek
2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
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--in-reply-to=CA+55aFxeLwgwxh2iJTf6Dz0T_a_TZfTdhBw5TkcSsCmjt2N5pw@mail.gmail.com \
--to=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=GLin@suse.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=jblunck@infradead.org \
--cc=julia.lawall@lip6.fr \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
--cc=meissner@suse.de \
--cc=mjg59@google.com \
--cc=takahiro.akashi@linaro.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
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