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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos-sUDqSbJrdHQHWmgEVkV9KA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-bcache-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Serge Hallyn
	<serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
	dm-devel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
	LSM
	<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
	Kernel Mailing List
	<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-raid-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	fuse-devel
	<fuse-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn
	<ahferroin7-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-mtd-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
	"Eric W. Biederman"
	<ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
	selinux-+05T5uksL2qpZYMLLGbcSA@public.gmane.org,
	Linux-Fsdevel
	<linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
	Alexander Viro
	<viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2016 11:07:26 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160309170726.GB28779@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJfpegv5KR_Hi-79a8oyb+R+tv9W3RYqy5pngUKSyauVNk2ScQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>

On Wed, Mar 09, 2016 at 04:51:42PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 09, 2016 at 03:48:22PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> 
> >> Can't we use current_cred()->uid/gid? Or fsuid/fsgid maybe?
> >
> > That would be a departure from the current behavior in the !allow_other
> > case for unprivileged users. Since those mounts are done by an suid
> > helper all of those ids would be root in the userns, wouldn't they?
> 
> Well, actually this is what the helper does:
> 
>     sprintf(d, "fd=%i,rootmode=%o,user_id=%u,group_id=%u",
>         fd, rootmode, getuid(), getgid());

Sorry, I was thinking of euid. So this may not be a problem.

> So it just uses the current uid/gid.  Apparently no reason to do this
> in userland, we could just as well set these in the kernel.  Except
> for possible backward compatibility problems for things not using the
> helper.
> 
> BUT if the mount is unprivileged or it's a userns mount, or anything
> previously not possible, then we are not constrained by the backward
> compatibility issues, and can go with the saner solution.
> 
> Does that not make sense?

But we generally do want backwards compatibility, and we want userspace
software to be able to expect the same behavior whether or not it's
running in a user namespaced container. Obviously we can't always have
things 100% identical, but we shouldn't break things unless we really
need to.

However it may be that this isn't actually going to break assumptions of
existing software like I had feared. My preference is still to not
change any userspace-visible behaviors since we never know what software
might have made assumptions based on those behaviors. But if you're
confident that it won't break anything I'm willing to give it a try.

> >> When we have true unprivileged mounts, the user_id/group_id options
> >> become redundant anyway and we can just use the current credentials.
> >
> > True, but we don't yet have that.
> 
> What's missing?

A user must still be privileged to mount, even if only towards their own
user and mount namespaces. Maybe that's what you meant though and I just
misunderstood.

Thanks,
Seth

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	Linux-Fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	fuse-devel <fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2016 11:07:26 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160309170726.GB28779@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJfpegv5KR_Hi-79a8oyb+R+tv9W3RYqy5pngUKSyauVNk2ScQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Mar 09, 2016 at 04:51:42PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 09, 2016 at 03:48:22PM +0100, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> 
> >> Can't we use current_cred()->uid/gid? Or fsuid/fsgid maybe?
> >
> > That would be a departure from the current behavior in the !allow_other
> > case for unprivileged users. Since those mounts are done by an suid
> > helper all of those ids would be root in the userns, wouldn't they?
> 
> Well, actually this is what the helper does:
> 
>     sprintf(d, "fd=%i,rootmode=%o,user_id=%u,group_id=%u",
>         fd, rootmode, getuid(), getgid());

Sorry, I was thinking of euid. So this may not be a problem.

> So it just uses the current uid/gid.  Apparently no reason to do this
> in userland, we could just as well set these in the kernel.  Except
> for possible backward compatibility problems for things not using the
> helper.
> 
> BUT if the mount is unprivileged or it's a userns mount, or anything
> previously not possible, then we are not constrained by the backward
> compatibility issues, and can go with the saner solution.
> 
> Does that not make sense?

But we generally do want backwards compatibility, and we want userspace
software to be able to expect the same behavior whether or not it's
running in a user namespaced container. Obviously we can't always have
things 100% identical, but we shouldn't break things unless we really
need to.

However it may be that this isn't actually going to break assumptions of
existing software like I had feared. My preference is still to not
change any userspace-visible behaviors since we never know what software
might have made assumptions based on those behaviors. But if you're
confident that it won't break anything I'm willing to give it a try.

> >> When we have true unprivileged mounts, the user_id/group_id options
> >> become redundant anyway and we can just use the current credentials.
> >
> > True, but we don't yet have that.
> 
> What's missing?

A user must still be privileged to mount, even if only towards their own
user and mount namespaces. Maybe that's what you meant though and I just
misunderstood.

Thanks,
Seth

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-03-09 17:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-04 18:03 [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1451930639-94331-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-15 12:09     ` [PATCH] fs: remove excess check for in_userns Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-15 13:45       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-15 14:19         ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-15 14:19         ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-22 23:19         ` James Morris
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-03 17:02     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-04 22:43       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-06 15:48         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-06 22:07           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-07 13:32             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-28 16:59         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30  1:36           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-30 14:58             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30 20:18               ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 10:53     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:17       ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:29     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:18       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 14:48         ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:48           ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]           ` <CAJfpegv5JmB15yHpjYxVeOYdWWkoLMftr9-e_iS93Y_7m=t4Zw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-09 15:25             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:25               ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:51               ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]                 ` <CAJfpegv5KR_Hi-79a8oyb+R+tv9W3RYqy5pngUKSyauVNk2ScQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-09 17:07                   ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2016-03-09 17:07                     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-14 20:58                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-25 20:31                       ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:40     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 13:08     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-25 19:47 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-25 20:01   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 20:01     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 20:36     ` Seth Forshee

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