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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 20:25:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161122192526.vg63jjhwsbjwex7i@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003740.3280.57300.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 06:37:40PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if memory encryption is active in the kernel and that
> it has been enabled on the AP. If memory encryption is active in the kernel
> but has not been enabled on the AP then do not allow the AP to continue
> start up.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h      |   12 ++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/realmode/init.c             |    4 ++++
>  arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> index 230e190..850dbe0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> @@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
>  #ifndef _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
>  #define _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
>  
> +/*
> + * Flag bit definitions for use with the flags field of the trampoline header
> + * when configured for X86_64

Let's use kernel nomenclature: "... of the trampoline header in the
CONFIG_X86_64 variant."

> + */
> +#define TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE_BIT		0
> +#define TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE		BIT_ULL(TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE_BIT)

BIT() is the proper one for u32 flags variable.

> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +
>  #include <linux/types.h>
>  #include <asm/io.h>
>  
> @@ -38,6 +47,7 @@ struct trampoline_header {
>  	u64 start;
>  	u64 efer;
>  	u32 cr4;
> +	u32 flags;
>  #endif
>  };
>  
> @@ -69,4 +79,6 @@ static inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
>  void set_real_mode_mem(phys_addr_t mem, size_t size);
>  void reserve_real_mode(void);
>  
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
>  #endif /* _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> index 44ed32a..a8e7ebe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> @@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
>  	trampoline_cr4_features = &trampoline_header->cr4;
>  	*trampoline_cr4_features = mmu_cr4_features;
>  
> +	trampoline_header->flags = 0;
> +	if (sme_me_mask)
> +		trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE;
> +
>  	trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
>  	trampoline_pgd[0] = trampoline_pgd_entry.pgd;
>  	trampoline_pgd[511] = init_level4_pgt[511].pgd;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> index dac7b20..94e29f4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #include <asm/msr.h>
>  #include <asm/segment.h>
>  #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
> +#include <asm/realmode.h>
>  #include "realmode.h"
>  
>  	.text
> @@ -92,6 +93,23 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
>  	movl	%edx, %fs
>  	movl	%edx, %gs
>  
> +	/* Check for memory encryption support */
> +	bt	$TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE_BIT, pa_tr_flags
> +	jnc	.Ldone
> +	movl	$MSR_K8_SYSCFG, %ecx
> +	rdmsr
> +	bt	$MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT, %eax
> +	jc	.Ldone
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Memory encryption is enabled but the MSR has not been set on this
> +	 * CPU so we can't continue

Can this ever happen?

I mean, we set TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE when sme_me_mask is set and this
would have happened only if the BSP has MSR_K8_SYSCFG[23] set.

How is it possible that that bit won't be set on some of the APs but set
on the BSP?

I'd assume the BIOS is doing a consistent setting everywhere...

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 20:25:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161122192526.vg63jjhwsbjwex7i@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003740.3280.57300.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 06:37:40PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to check if memory encryption is active in the kernel and that
> it has been enabled on the AP. If memory encryption is active in the kernel
> but has not been enabled on the AP then do not allow the AP to continue
> start up.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h      |   12 ++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/realmode/init.c             |    4 ++++
>  arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> index 230e190..850dbe0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> @@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
>  #ifndef _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
>  #define _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
>  
> +/*
> + * Flag bit definitions for use with the flags field of the trampoline header
> + * when configured for X86_64

Let's use kernel nomenclature: "... of the trampoline header in the
CONFIG_X86_64 variant."

> + */
> +#define TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE_BIT		0
> +#define TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE		BIT_ULL(TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE_BIT)

BIT() is the proper one for u32 flags variable.

> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +
>  #include <linux/types.h>
>  #include <asm/io.h>
>  
> @@ -38,6 +47,7 @@ struct trampoline_header {
>  	u64 start;
>  	u64 efer;
>  	u32 cr4;
> +	u32 flags;
>  #endif
>  };
>  
> @@ -69,4 +79,6 @@ static inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
>  void set_real_mode_mem(phys_addr_t mem, size_t size);
>  void reserve_real_mode(void);
>  
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
>  #endif /* _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> index 44ed32a..a8e7ebe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> @@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
>  	trampoline_cr4_features = &trampoline_header->cr4;
>  	*trampoline_cr4_features = mmu_cr4_features;
>  
> +	trampoline_header->flags = 0;
> +	if (sme_me_mask)
> +		trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE;
> +
>  	trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
>  	trampoline_pgd[0] = trampoline_pgd_entry.pgd;
>  	trampoline_pgd[511] = init_level4_pgt[511].pgd;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> index dac7b20..94e29f4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
>  #include <asm/msr.h>
>  #include <asm/segment.h>
>  #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
> +#include <asm/realmode.h>
>  #include "realmode.h"
>  
>  	.text
> @@ -92,6 +93,23 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
>  	movl	%edx, %fs
>  	movl	%edx, %gs
>  
> +	/* Check for memory encryption support */
> +	bt	$TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE_BIT, pa_tr_flags
> +	jnc	.Ldone
> +	movl	$MSR_K8_SYSCFG, %ecx
> +	rdmsr
> +	bt	$MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT, %eax
> +	jc	.Ldone
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Memory encryption is enabled but the MSR has not been set on this
> +	 * CPU so we can't continue

Can this ever happen?

I mean, we set TH_FLAGS_SME_ENABLE when sme_me_mask is set and this
would have happened only if the BSP has MSR_K8_SYSCFG[23] set.

How is it possible that that bit won't be set on some of the APs but set
on the BSP?

I'd assume the BIOS is doing a consistent setting everywhere...

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-22 19:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 244+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-10  0:34 [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 10:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 13:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 13:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11  1:26     ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11  1:26       ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11  1:26       ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-14 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 11:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11 11:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 12:10   ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:10     ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:10     ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 12:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 14:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:40         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 15:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 15:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 16:06           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:06             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:06             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:33             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 16:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 17:08               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:08                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:08                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:33         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 21:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 21:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 22:01           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 22:01             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 18:18     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 18:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 18:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 20:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 20:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 10:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 10:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 12:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 12:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 16:17   ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11 16:17     ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-14 16:24     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 15:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 15:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:33       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:33       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-20 23:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-20 23:04         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-12-07 13:19   ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-07 13:19     ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-07 13:19     ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-09 14:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-12-09 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-12-09 14:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-21  8:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-21  8:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 18:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:39   ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 14:39     ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 14:39     ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 17:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:17       ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17         ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17         ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17         ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 20:33         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:16   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 15:16     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 15:16     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 18:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 19:16       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 19:16         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 19:16         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 11:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 11:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 11:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:22         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:22           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:22           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:41             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 20:41             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 20:41               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 20:41               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:32   ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:32     ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:32     ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 19:25   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-11-22 19:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:00     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:00       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:00       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-24 12:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-24 12:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-24 12:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 18:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 18:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 18:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 19:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 19:56         ` Borislav Petkov

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