From: "José Bollo" <jobol@nonadev.net>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
hch@infradead.org, igor.stoppa@huawei.com,
james.l.morris@oracle.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 11:44:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531114417.5a7d8bcb@d-jobol.iot.bzh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201705302329.IEB05735.FLJOFHSQVtOOFM@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Tue, 30 May 2017 23:29:10 +0900
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> wrote:
> James Morris wrote:
> > On Sun, 28 May 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> >
> > > can afford enabling". And we know that we cannot merge all
> > > security modules into mainline. Thus, allowing LKM-based LSM
> > > modules is inevitable.
> >
> > Nope, it's not inevitable. The LSM API only caters to in-tree
> > users.
> >
> > I'm not sure why you persist against this.
>
> Then, we are willing to accept LSM modules with users less than 10,
> aren't we? Forcing users to patch and recompile is as heartless as
> forcing CONFIG_MODULES=n.
These are good reasons. I'm in favor of Tetsuo.
Regards
José
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: jobol@nonadev.net (José Bollo)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 11:44:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531114417.5a7d8bcb@d-jobol.iot.bzh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201705302329.IEB05735.FLJOFHSQVtOOFM@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Tue, 30 May 2017 23:29:10 +0900
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> wrote:
> James Morris wrote:
> > On Sun, 28 May 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> >
> > > can afford enabling". And we know that we cannot merge all
> > > security modules into mainline. Thus, allowing LKM-based LSM
> > > modules is inevitable.
> >
> > Nope, it's not inevitable. The LSM API only caters to in-tree
> > users.
> >
> > I'm not sure why you persist against this.
>
> Then, we are willing to accept LSM modules with users less than 10,
> aren't we? Forcing users to patch and recompile is as heartless as
> forcing CONFIG_MODULES=n.
These are good reasons. I'm in favor of Tetsuo.
Regards
Jos?
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "José Bollo" <jobol@nonadev.net>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
hch@infradead.org, igor.stoppa@huawei.com,
james.l.morris@oracle.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 11:44:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531114417.5a7d8bcb@d-jobol.iot.bzh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201705302329.IEB05735.FLJOFHSQVtOOFM@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Tue, 30 May 2017 23:29:10 +0900
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> wrote:
> James Morris wrote:
> > On Sun, 28 May 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> >
> > > can afford enabling". And we know that we cannot merge all
> > > security modules into mainline. Thus, allowing LKM-based LSM
> > > modules is inevitable.
> >
> > Nope, it's not inevitable. The LSM API only caters to in-tree
> > users.
> >
> > I'm not sure why you persist against this.
>
> Then, we are willing to accept LSM modules with users less than 10,
> aren't we? Forcing users to patch and recompile is as heartless as
> forcing CONFIG_MODULES=n.
These are good reasons. I'm in favor of Tetsuo.
Regards
José
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-31 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-27 11:17 [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 11:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 11:17 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-27 22:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 0:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 0:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 0:38 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 1:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 1:26 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 17:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:22 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:22 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 14:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 14:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 14:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 15:25 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 15:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-30 15:25 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 23:06 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 23:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 23:06 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 10:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 10:41 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:04 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-31 11:04 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 14:43 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 14:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-31 14:43 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:14 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:14 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 9:44 ` José Bollo [this message]
2017-05-31 9:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " José Bollo
2017-05-31 9:44 ` José Bollo
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [PATCH v2] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 20:29 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 21:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 21:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-29 17:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-29 17:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-29 17:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:32 ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:32 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 20:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 20:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 20:49 ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 22:56 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 22:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-31 22:56 ` James Morris
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