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From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
	hch@infradead.org, igor.stoppa@huawei.com,
	james.l.morris@oracle.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 15:43:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531154317.4f487300@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201705311941.CGD64590.MOFSOLFJtQFOVH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

> I saw several companies who ship their embedded devices with
> single-function LSM modules (e.g. restrict only mount operation and
> ptrace operation). What is unfortunate is that their LSM modules had
> never been proposed for upstream, and thus bugs remained unnoticed.

So which of them cannot be done with seccomp ? We have a small tight
interface for simple things like restricting a few calls.
 
> via lack of ability to use LKM-based LSM modules). My customers cannot afford
> enabling SELinux, but my customers cannot rebuild their kernels because
> rebuilding makes it even more difficult to get help from support centers.

And "I've loaded this third party module" doesn't ?

Alan

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk (Alan Cox)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 15:43:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531154317.4f487300@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201705311941.CGD64590.MOFSOLFJtQFOVH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

> I saw several companies who ship their embedded devices with
> single-function LSM modules (e.g. restrict only mount operation and
> ptrace operation). What is unfortunate is that their LSM modules had
> never been proposed for upstream, and thus bugs remained unnoticed.

So which of them cannot be done with seccomp ? We have a small tight
interface for simple things like restricting a few calls.
 
> via lack of ability to use LKM-based LSM modules). My customers cannot afford
> enabling SELinux, but my customers cannot rebuild their kernels because
> rebuilding makes it even more difficult to get help from support centers.

And "I've loaded this third party module" doesn't ?

Alan
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
	hch@infradead.org, igor.stoppa@huawei.com,
	james.l.morris@oracle.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 15:43:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531154317.4f487300@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201705311941.CGD64590.MOFSOLFJtQFOVH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

> I saw several companies who ship their embedded devices with
> single-function LSM modules (e.g. restrict only mount operation and
> ptrace operation). What is unfortunate is that their LSM modules had
> never been proposed for upstream, and thus bugs remained unnoticed.

So which of them cannot be done with seccomp ? We have a small tight
interface for simple things like restricting a few calls.
 
> via lack of ability to use LKM-based LSM modules). My customers cannot afford
> enabling SELinux, but my customers cannot rebuild their kernels because
> rebuilding makes it even more difficult to get help from support centers.

And "I've loaded this third party module" doesn't ?

Alan

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-05-31 14:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-27 11:17 [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 11:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 11:17 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-27 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-27 22:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-27 22:30   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28  0:38   ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  0:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  0:38     ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  1:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28  1:04   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28  1:04   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28  1:26   ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  1:26     ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28  1:26     ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 17:57     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 17:57       ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-28 17:57       ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:22     ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:22       ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:22       ` James Morris
2017-05-30 14:29       ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 14:29         ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 14:29         ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-30 15:25         ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 15:25           ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-30 15:25           ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 23:06           ` James Morris
2017-05-30 23:06             ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 23:06             ` James Morris
2017-05-31 10:41             ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 10:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 10:41               ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:04               ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:04                 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-31 11:04                 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 11:31                 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:31                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 11:31                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 14:43               ` Alan Cox [this message]
2017-05-31 14:43                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-31 14:43                 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:10                 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:10                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:10                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-31 15:14                   ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:14                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:14                     ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31  9:44         ` José Bollo
2017-05-31  9:44           ` [kernel-hardening] " José Bollo
2017-05-31  9:44           ` José Bollo
2017-05-28 20:29 ` [PATCH v2] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 20:29   ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 20:29   ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-05-28 21:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-28 21:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-28 21:19     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-29 17:32   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-29 17:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-05-29 17:32     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 10:32   ` James Morris
2017-05-30 10:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-30 10:32     ` James Morris
2017-05-31 20:49     ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 20:49       ` [kernel-hardening] " Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 20:49       ` Igor Stoppa
2017-05-31 22:56       ` James Morris
2017-05-31 22:56         ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-05-31 22:56         ` James Morris

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