From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>, Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>, Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@arm.com>, Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>, Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>, Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] arm64: untag user addresses in copy_from_user and others Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 15:03:09 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180309150309.4sue2zj6teehx6e3@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <d681c0dee907ee5cc55d313e2f843237c6087bf0.1520600533.git.andreyknvl@google.com> On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 03:02:00PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data > from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can > provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, > we need to correctly handle such pointers. I don't think it makes sense to do this in the low-level uaccess primitives, given we're going to have to untag pointers before common code can use them, e.g. for comparisons against TASK_SIZE or user_addr_max(). I think we'll end up with subtle bugs unless we consistently untag pointers before we get to uaccess primitives. If core code does untag pointers, then it's redundant to do so here. Thanks, Mark. > > Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> > --- > arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++++- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h > index 2d6451cbaa86..24a221678fe3 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h > @@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si > #define untagged_addr(addr) \ > ((__typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__u64)(addr), 55)) > > -#define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) > +#define access_ok(type, addr, size) \ > + __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) > #define user_addr_max get_fs > > #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ > @@ -238,12 +239,15 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) > /* > * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the > * current addr_limit. > + * Also untag user pointers that have the top byte tag set. > */ > #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) > static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) > { > void __user *safe_ptr; > > + ptr = untagged_addr(ptr); > + > asm volatile( > " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" > " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" > -- > 2.16.2.395.g2e18187dfd-goog >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland) To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/6] arm64: untag user addresses in copy_from_user and others Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 15:03:09 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180309150309.4sue2zj6teehx6e3@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <d681c0dee907ee5cc55d313e2f843237c6087bf0.1520600533.git.andreyknvl@google.com> On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 03:02:00PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data > from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can > provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, > we need to correctly handle such pointers. I don't think it makes sense to do this in the low-level uaccess primitives, given we're going to have to untag pointers before common code can use them, e.g. for comparisons against TASK_SIZE or user_addr_max(). I think we'll end up with subtle bugs unless we consistently untag pointers before we get to uaccess primitives. If core code does untag pointers, then it's redundant to do so here. Thanks, Mark. > > Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> > --- > arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++++- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h > index 2d6451cbaa86..24a221678fe3 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h > @@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si > #define untagged_addr(addr) \ > ((__typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__u64)(addr), 55)) > > -#define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) > +#define access_ok(type, addr, size) \ > + __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size) > #define user_addr_max get_fs > > #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ > @@ -238,12 +239,15 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void) > /* > * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the > * current addr_limit. > + * Also untag user pointers that have the top byte tag set. > */ > #define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) > static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) > { > void __user *safe_ptr; > > + ptr = untagged_addr(ptr); > + > asm volatile( > " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" > " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" > -- > 2.16.2.395.g2e18187dfd-goog >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-09 15:03 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-03-09 14:01 [RFC PATCH 0/6] arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] arm64: add type casts to untagged_addr macro Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:01 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] arm64: untag user addresses in copy_from_user and others Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:03 ` Mark Rutland [this message] 2018-03-09 15:03 ` Mark Rutland 2018-03-09 15:58 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-09 15:58 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-09 15:58 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-09 15:58 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-09 17:57 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:57 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] mm, arm64: untag user addresses in memory syscalls Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:53 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-09 15:53 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-09 17:31 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:31 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:42 ` Evgenii Stepanov 2018-03-09 17:42 ` Evgenii Stepanov 2018-03-14 15:45 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-14 15:45 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-14 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-14 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas 2018-03-16 1:11 ` Evgenii Stepanov 2018-03-16 1:11 ` Evgenii Stepanov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] mm, arm64: untag user addresses in mm/gup.c Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] lib, arm64: untag addrs passed to strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] arch: add untagged_addr definition for other arches Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:02 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:11 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-03-09 14:11 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann 2018-03-09 14:11 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-03-09 14:11 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-03-09 14:11 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-03-09 14:11 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-03-09 14:16 ` Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 14:16 ` [OpenRISC] " Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 14:16 ` Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 14:16 ` Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 15:47 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:47 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:47 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:47 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:47 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 15:47 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:15 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 14:15 ` [OpenRISC] " Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 14:15 ` Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 14:15 ` Robin Murphy 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:58 ` [OpenRISC] " Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 14:55 ` Mark Rutland 2018-03-09 14:55 ` Mark Rutland 2018-03-09 15:16 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2018-03-09 15:16 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov 2018-03-09 17:58 ` Andrey Konovalov
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