From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 15:07:15 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180514140714.sfmvfpwco63eomor@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c5bebf0b-9667-5725-2800-97c5a85635c4@linux.com> On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 04:53:12PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote: > On 14.05.2018 13:06, Mark Rutland wrote: > > I think it is reasonable to panic() here even with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > > selected. > > It's too tough for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK on x86 - the system can proceed to live. > Anyway, the check_alloca() code will not be shared between x86 and arm64, I've > described the reasons in this thread. So I can have BUG() for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > on x86 and Laura can consistently use panic() on arm64. If we need arch-specific implementations anyway, then that's fine by me. > >> So we should not do it in check_alloca() as well, just use BUG() and > >> hope for the best. > > > > Regardless of whether we BUG() or panic(), we're hoping for the best. > > > > Consistently using panic() here will keep things simpler, so any failure > > reported will be easier to reason about, and easier to debug. > > Let me keep BUG() for !CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK. I beware of using panic() > by default, let distro/user decide this. I remember very well how I was shouted > at, when this one was merged: > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6fa91b93630396ca220c33dd38ffc62686d499 Sure; my comments needn't hold up your patches. Thanks, Mark.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland) To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 15:07:15 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180514140714.sfmvfpwco63eomor@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c5bebf0b-9667-5725-2800-97c5a85635c4@linux.com> On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 04:53:12PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote: > On 14.05.2018 13:06, Mark Rutland wrote: > > I think it is reasonable to panic() here even with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > > selected. > > It's too tough for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK on x86 - the system can proceed to live. > Anyway, the check_alloca() code will not be shared between x86 and arm64, I've > described the reasons in this thread. So I can have BUG() for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > on x86 and Laura can consistently use panic() on arm64. If we need arch-specific implementations anyway, then that's fine by me. > >> So we should not do it in check_alloca() as well, just use BUG() and > >> hope for the best. > > > > Regardless of whether we BUG() or panic(), we're hoping for the best. > > > > Consistently using panic() here will keep things simpler, so any failure > > reported will be easier to reason about, and easier to debug. > > Let me keep BUG() for !CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK. I beware of using panic() > by default, let distro/user decide this. I remember very well how I was shouted > at, when this one was merged: > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6fa91b93630396ca220c33dd38ffc62686d499 Sure; my comments needn't hold up your patches. Thanks, Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-14 14:07 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-04-06 14:22 [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 1/6] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov 2018-04-16 18:29 ` Kees Cook 2018-04-18 18:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-04-18 18:50 ` Dave Hansen 2018-04-24 1:03 ` Kees Cook 2018-04-24 4:23 ` Dave Hansen 2018-04-30 23:48 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 8:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-05-02 12:38 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 12:39 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-05-02 12:51 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 21:02 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-06 10:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 3/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov 2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update " Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 21:31 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 21:31 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 23:07 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 23:07 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 23:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 23:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-03 16:05 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 16:05 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 16:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-03 16:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-03 7:19 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-03 7:19 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-03 11:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-05-03 11:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-05-03 17:33 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 17:33 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 19:09 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-03 19:09 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-04 8:30 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-04 8:30 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-04 11:09 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-04 11:09 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-06 8:22 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-06 8:22 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-11 15:50 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-11 15:50 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-11 16:13 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-11 16:13 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-13 8:40 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-13 8:40 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 5:15 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 5:15 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 9:35 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 9:35 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 10:06 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 10:06 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 13:53 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 13:53 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 14:07 ` Mark Rutland [this message] 2018-05-14 14:07 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-03 19:00 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-03 19:00 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-04 11:16 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-04 11:16 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 18:55 ` [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Laura Abbott -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2018-07-18 21:10 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott 2018-07-18 21:10 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott 2018-07-18 21:10 ` Laura Abbott 2018-07-19 2:20 ` Kees Cook 2018-07-19 2:20 ` Kees Cook 2018-07-19 10:41 ` Alexander Popov 2018-07-19 10:41 ` Alexander Popov 2018-07-19 11:41 ` Mark Rutland 2018-07-19 11:41 ` Mark Rutland 2018-02-21 1:13 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 1:13 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 1:13 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 15:38 ` Mark Rutland 2018-02-21 15:38 ` Mark Rutland 2018-02-21 23:53 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 23:53 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-22 1:35 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-22 1:35 ` Laura Abbott
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20180514140714.sfmvfpwco63eomor@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com \ --to=mark.rutland@arm.com \ --cc=alex.popov@linux.com \ --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \ --cc=labbott@redhat.com \ --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=luto@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.