All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 16:37:58 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+LP8Yq8R=FUUA1TX2gD5G5xaYNVkt56aezZ_GLpxn69g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4b7e94c1-79c9-0380-25c6-762762ed595f@redhat.com>

On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 4:07 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> struct stackleak {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>         unsigned long           lowest;
>> #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>>         unsigned long           prev_lowest;
>> #endif
>> #endif
>> };
>>
>
> Is this well defined across all compilers if the plugin is off?
> This seems to compile with gcc at least but 0 sized structs
> make me a little uneasy.

Yup! Or at least, there have been no problems with this and the
seccomp struct, which is empty when !CONFIG_SECCOMP.

>> This is the only difference between x86 and arm64 in this code. What
>> do you think about implementing on_thread_stack() to match x86:
>>
>>          if (on_thread_stack())
>>                  boundary = current_stack_pointer;
>>          else
>>                  boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>>
>> then we could make this common code too instead of having two copies in
>> arch/?
>>
>
> The issue isn't on_thread_stack, it's current_top_of_stack which isn't
> defined on arm64. I agree it would be good if the code would be common
> but I'm not sure how much we want to start trying to force APIs.

Ah, gotcha. Well, I'd rather we had an #ifdef here that two copies of
the code. ;)

>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
>>> +{
>>> +       unsigned long sp, stack_left;
>>> +
>>> +       sp = current_stack_pointer;
>>> +
>>> +       stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>>> +       BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
>>> +}
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
>>
>>
>> This is pretty different from x86. Is this just an artifact of ORC, or
>> something else?
>>
>
> This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to
> not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info
> but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best
> practice.

Alexander, what was the history here?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 16:37:58 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+LP8Yq8R=FUUA1TX2gD5G5xaYNVkt56aezZ_GLpxn69g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4b7e94c1-79c9-0380-25c6-762762ed595f@redhat.com>

On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 4:07 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> struct stackleak {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>         unsigned long           lowest;
>> #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>>         unsigned long           prev_lowest;
>> #endif
>> #endif
>> };
>>
>
> Is this well defined across all compilers if the plugin is off?
> This seems to compile with gcc at least but 0 sized structs
> make me a little uneasy.

Yup! Or at least, there have been no problems with this and the
seccomp struct, which is empty when !CONFIG_SECCOMP.

>> This is the only difference between x86 and arm64 in this code. What
>> do you think about implementing on_thread_stack() to match x86:
>>
>>          if (on_thread_stack())
>>                  boundary = current_stack_pointer;
>>          else
>>                  boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>>
>> then we could make this common code too instead of having two copies in
>> arch/?
>>
>
> The issue isn't on_thread_stack, it's current_top_of_stack which isn't
> defined on arm64. I agree it would be good if the code would be common
> but I'm not sure how much we want to start trying to force APIs.

Ah, gotcha. Well, I'd rather we had an #ifdef here that two copies of
the code. ;)

>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
>>> +{
>>> +       unsigned long sp, stack_left;
>>> +
>>> +       sp = current_stack_pointer;
>>> +
>>> +       stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>>> +       BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
>>> +}
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
>>
>>
>> This is pretty different from x86. Is this just an artifact of ORC, or
>> something else?
>>
>
> This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to
> not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info
> but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best
> practice.

Alexander, what was the history here?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-02 23:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-06 14:22 [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 1/6] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2018-04-16 18:29   ` Kees Cook
2018-04-18 18:33     ` Laura Abbott
2018-04-18 18:50     ` Dave Hansen
2018-04-24  1:03       ` Kees Cook
2018-04-24  4:23   ` Dave Hansen
2018-04-30 23:48     ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02  8:42       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 12:38         ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 12:39           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 12:51             ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 21:02               ` Kees Cook
2018-05-06 10:04                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 3/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov
2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33   ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33   ` [PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update " Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33     ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33   ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33     ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 21:31     ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 21:31       ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 23:07       ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 23:07         ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 23:37         ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-05-02 23:37           ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 16:05         ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 16:05           ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 16:45           ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 16:45             ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03  7:19     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03  7:19       ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 11:37       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-05-03 11:37         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-05-03 17:33       ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 17:33         ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 19:09         ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-03 19:09           ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-04  8:30           ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-04  8:30             ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-04 11:09         ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 11:09           ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-06  8:22           ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-06  8:22             ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 15:50             ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 15:50               ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 16:13               ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-11 16:13                 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-13  8:40                 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-13  8:40                   ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14  5:15                   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14  5:15                     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14  9:35                     ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14  9:35                       ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 10:06                       ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 10:06                         ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 13:53                         ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 13:53                           ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 14:07                           ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 14:07                             ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 19:00       ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-03 19:00         ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-04 11:16         ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-04 11:16           ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 18:55 ` [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Laura Abbott
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-07-18 21:10 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-07-18 21:10 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-07-18 21:10   ` Laura Abbott
2018-07-19  2:20   ` Kees Cook
2018-07-19  2:20     ` Kees Cook
2018-07-19 10:41   ` Alexander Popov
2018-07-19 10:41     ` Alexander Popov
2018-07-19 11:41   ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-19 11:41     ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21  1:13 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13   ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 15:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21 15:38     ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21 23:53     ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 23:53       ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22  1:35       ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22  1:35         ` Laura Abbott

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAGXu5j+LP8Yq8R=FUUA1TX2gD5G5xaYNVkt56aezZ_GLpxn69g@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=alex.popov@linux.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.