From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 09:45:36 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ7ER58PvF4V=-BiNpmhxU2=_C8tkcNSPR5ANp2B7Seeg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <fc4f2832-4e8f-3e70-6ab0-9f077790eca0@linux.com> On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 9:05 AM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote: > Hello Laura and Kees, > > On 03.05.2018 02:07, Laura Abbott wrote: >> On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version >>> >>> Awesome! Notes below for both you and Alexander, since I think we can >>> create a common code base instead of having near-duplicates in the >>> arch/ trees... > > Yes, sure. > > I will extract the common part and send v12 for x86. Then Laura will be able to > add arm64 support in a separate patch series. Is it fine? Sure, though if you could fold the plugin fix from her, that would be ideal. I'll likely carry both patch sets together once the arm64 one stabilizes. >> This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to >> not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info >> but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best >> practice. > > I've changed that in v4. Quote from the changelog: > - Fixed the surplus and erroneous code for calculating stack_left in > check_alloca() on x86_64. That code repeats the work which is already > done in get_stack_info() and it misses the fact that different > exception stacks on x86_64 have different size. > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/04/68 > > We can see that in arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c. > > Is it fine if check_alloca() would be arch-specific? I'm fine if check_alloca() remains arch-specific. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 09:45:36 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ7ER58PvF4V=-BiNpmhxU2=_C8tkcNSPR5ANp2B7Seeg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <fc4f2832-4e8f-3e70-6ab0-9f077790eca0@linux.com> On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 9:05 AM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote: > Hello Laura and Kees, > > On 03.05.2018 02:07, Laura Abbott wrote: >> On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version >>> >>> Awesome! Notes below for both you and Alexander, since I think we can >>> create a common code base instead of having near-duplicates in the >>> arch/ trees... > > Yes, sure. > > I will extract the common part and send v12 for x86. Then Laura will be able to > add arm64 support in a separate patch series. Is it fine? Sure, though if you could fold the plugin fix from her, that would be ideal. I'll likely carry both patch sets together once the arm64 one stabilizes. >> This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to >> not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info >> but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best >> practice. > > I've changed that in v4. Quote from the changelog: > - Fixed the surplus and erroneous code for calculating stack_left in > check_alloca() on x86_64. That code repeats the work which is already > done in get_stack_info() and it misses the fact that different > exception stacks on x86_64 have different size. > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/04/68 > > We can see that in arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c. > > Is it fine if check_alloca() would be arch-specific? I'm fine if check_alloca() remains arch-specific. Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-03 16:45 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-04-06 14:22 [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 1/6] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov 2018-04-16 18:29 ` Kees Cook 2018-04-18 18:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-04-18 18:50 ` Dave Hansen 2018-04-24 1:03 ` Kees Cook 2018-04-24 4:23 ` Dave Hansen 2018-04-30 23:48 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 8:42 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-05-02 12:38 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 12:39 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-05-02 12:51 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 21:02 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-06 10:04 ` Thomas Gleixner 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 3/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov 2018-04-06 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov 2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update " Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 20:33 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 21:31 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 21:31 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 23:07 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 23:07 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-02 23:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-02 23:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-03 16:05 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 16:05 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 16:45 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2018-05-03 16:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-05-03 7:19 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-03 7:19 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-03 11:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-05-03 11:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2018-05-03 17:33 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 17:33 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-03 19:09 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-03 19:09 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-04 8:30 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-04 8:30 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-04 11:09 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-04 11:09 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-06 8:22 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-06 8:22 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-11 15:50 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-11 15:50 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-11 16:13 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-11 16:13 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-13 8:40 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-13 8:40 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 5:15 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 5:15 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 9:35 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 9:35 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 10:06 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 10:06 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 13:53 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 13:53 ` Alexander Popov 2018-05-14 14:07 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 14:07 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-03 19:00 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-03 19:00 ` Laura Abbott 2018-05-04 11:16 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-04 11:16 ` Mark Rutland 2018-05-14 18:55 ` [PATCH v11 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Laura Abbott -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2018-07-18 21:10 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott 2018-07-18 21:10 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott 2018-07-18 21:10 ` Laura Abbott 2018-07-19 2:20 ` Kees Cook 2018-07-19 2:20 ` Kees Cook 2018-07-19 10:41 ` Alexander Popov 2018-07-19 10:41 ` Alexander Popov 2018-07-19 11:41 ` Mark Rutland 2018-07-19 11:41 ` Mark Rutland 2018-02-21 1:13 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 1:13 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 1:13 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 15:38 ` Mark Rutland 2018-02-21 15:38 ` Mark Rutland 2018-02-21 23:53 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-21 23:53 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-22 1:35 ` Laura Abbott 2018-02-22 1:35 ` Laura Abbott
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