From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Cc: <dgilbert@redhat.com>, <pair@us.ibm.com>, <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>, <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <pasic@linux.ibm.com>, <pragyansri.pathi@intel.com>, <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, <berrange@redhat.com>, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, "Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <mtosatti@redhat.com>, <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>, <qemu-ppc@nongnu.org>, <qemu-s390x@nongnu.org>, <thuth@redhat.com>, <mst@redhat.com>, <frankja@linux.ibm.com>, <jun.nakajima@intel.com>, <andi.kleen@intel.com>, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 17:19:32 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210203171932.1aff3727@bahia.lan> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210202041315.196530-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> On Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:10 +1100 David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote: > While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for > securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given > that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic > kvm_init() code. > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> > Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> > --- Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- > accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- > target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ > target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- > 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > index 3d820d0c7d..7150acdbcc 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > @@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) > > kvm_state = s; > > - /* > - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory > - * encryption context. > - */ > - if (ms->cgs) { > - Error *local_err = NULL; > - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ > - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); > - if (ret < 0) { > - error_report_err(local_err); > - goto err; > - } > - } > - > ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); > if (ret < 0) { > goto err; > diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ > > int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) > { > - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ > - g_assert_not_reached(); > + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ > + return 0; > } > diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c > index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644 > --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c > +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c > @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ > #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" > #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" > #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" > +#include "sysemu/sev.h" > > #include "hw/pci/pci.h" > #include "hw/pci/msi.h" > @@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) > uint64_t shadow_mem; > int ret; > struct utsname utsname; > + Error *local_err = NULL; > + > + /* > + * Initialize SEV context, if required > + * > + * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is > + * a no-op. > + * > + * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support > + * mechanism is selected. SEV is the only mechanism available to > + * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new > + * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need > + * their own initialization either here or elsewhere. > + */ > + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); > + if (ret < 0) { > + error_report_err(local_err); > + return ret; > + } > > if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { > error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) > > int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) > { > - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); > + SevGuestState *sev > + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > char *devname; > int ret, fw_error; > uint32_t ebx; > uint32_t host_cbitpos; > struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; > > + if (!sev) { > + return 0; > + } > + > ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); > if (ret) { > error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, mst@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, richard.henderson@linaro.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, berrange@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 17:19:32 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210203171932.1aff3727@bahia.lan> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210202041315.196530-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> On Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:10 +1100 David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote: > While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for > securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given > that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic > kvm_init() code. > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> > Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> > --- Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- > accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- > target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ > target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- > 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > index 3d820d0c7d..7150acdbcc 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > @@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) > > kvm_state = s; > > - /* > - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory > - * encryption context. > - */ > - if (ms->cgs) { > - Error *local_err = NULL; > - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ > - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); > - if (ret < 0) { > - error_report_err(local_err); > - goto err; > - } > - } > - > ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); > if (ret < 0) { > goto err; > diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ > > int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) > { > - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ > - g_assert_not_reached(); > + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ > + return 0; > } > diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c > index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644 > --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c > +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c > @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ > #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" > #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" > #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" > +#include "sysemu/sev.h" > > #include "hw/pci/pci.h" > #include "hw/pci/msi.h" > @@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) > uint64_t shadow_mem; > int ret; > struct utsname utsname; > + Error *local_err = NULL; > + > + /* > + * Initialize SEV context, if required > + * > + * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is > + * a no-op. > + * > + * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support > + * mechanism is selected. SEV is the only mechanism available to > + * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new > + * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need > + * their own initialization either here or elsewhere. > + */ > + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); > + if (ret < 0) { > + error_report_err(local_err); > + return ret; > + } > > if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { > error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) > > int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) > { > - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); > + SevGuestState *sev > + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > char *devname; > int ret, fw_error; > uint32_t ebx; > uint32_t host_cbitpos; > struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; > > + if (!sev) { > + return 0; > + } > + > ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); > if (ret) { > error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-03 16:45 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-02-02 4:13 [PATCH v8 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 10:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-02-03 10:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-02-03 16:15 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-03 16:15 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-04 2:45 ` David Gibson 2021-02-04 2:45 ` David Gibson 2021-02-10 16:25 ` Venu Busireddy 2021-02-10 16:25 ` Venu Busireddy 2021-02-11 23:48 ` David Gibson 2021-02-11 23:48 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 16:19 ` Greg Kurz [this message] 2021-02-03 16:19 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 17:50 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-03 17:50 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-04 2:47 ` David Gibson 2021-02-04 2:47 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 23:06 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-02-02 23:06 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-02-03 4:53 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 4:53 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 9:05 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-02-03 9:05 ` Christian Borntraeger
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