From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
ehabkost@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
frankeh@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM.
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 03:05:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210817024924-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABayD+fyrcyPGg5TdXLr95AFkPFY+EeeNvY=NvQw_j3_igOd6Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 04:53:17PM -0700, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> Separately, I'm a little weary of leaving the migration helper mapped
> into the shared address space as writable. Since the migration threads
> will be executing guest-owned code, the guest could use these threads
> to do whatever it pleases (including getting free cycles). The
> migration helper's code needs to be trusted by both the host and the
> guest. Making it non-writable, sourced by the host, and attested by
> the hardware would mitigate these concerns.
Well it's an ABI to maintain against *both* guest and host then.
And a separate attestation isn't making things easier to manage.
I feel guest risks much more than the hypervisor here,
the hypervisor at worst is giving out free cycles and that can
be mitigated, so it makes sense to have guest be in control.
How about we source it from guest but write-protect it on the
hypervisor side? It could include a signature that hypervisor could
verify, which would be more flexible than hardware attestation.
--
MST
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
tobin@ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, frankeh@us.ibm.com,
dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM.
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 03:05:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210817024924-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABayD+fyrcyPGg5TdXLr95AFkPFY+EeeNvY=NvQw_j3_igOd6Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 04:53:17PM -0700, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> Separately, I'm a little weary of leaving the migration helper mapped
> into the shared address space as writable. Since the migration threads
> will be executing guest-owned code, the guest could use these threads
> to do whatever it pleases (including getting free cycles). The
> migration helper's code needs to be trusted by both the host and the
> guest. Making it non-writable, sourced by the host, and attested by
> the hardware would mitigate these concerns.
Well it's an ABI to maintain against *both* guest and host then.
And a separate attestation isn't making things easier to manage.
I feel guest risks much more than the hypervisor here,
the hypervisor at worst is giving out free cycles and that can
be mitigated, so it makes sense to have guest be in control.
How about we source it from guest but write-protect it on the
hypervisor side? It could include a signature that hypervisor could
verify, which would be more flexible than hardware attestation.
--
MST
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-17 7:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-16 13:25 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:26 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] machine: Add mirrorvcpus=N suboption to -smp Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 21:23 ` Eric Blake
2021-08-16 21:23 ` Eric Blake
2021-08-16 13:27 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] hw/boards: Add mirror_vcpu flag to CPUArchId Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:27 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] hw/i386: Mark mirror vcpus in possible_cpus Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:27 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] hw/acpi: Don't include mirror vcpus in ACPI tables Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] cpu: Add boolean mirror_vcpu field to CPUState Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] hw/i386: Set CPUState.mirror_vcpu=true for mirror vcpus Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] kvm: Add Mirror VM ioctl and enable cap interfaces Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] kvm: Add Mirror VM support Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] kvm: create Mirror VM and share primary VM's encryption context Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:30 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] softmmu/cpu: Skip mirror vcpu's for pause, resume and synchronization Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:30 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] kvm/apic: Disable in-kernel APIC support for mirror vcpu's Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:31 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] hw/acpi: disable modern CPU hotplug interface " Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 13:31 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] hw/i386/pc: reduce fw_cfg boot cpu count taking into account " Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM Claudio Fontana
2021-08-16 14:01 ` Claudio Fontana
2021-08-16 14:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 14:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 14:23 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-08-16 14:23 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-08-16 15:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 15:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 15:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-08-16 15:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-08-16 15:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 15:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 14:44 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 14:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 14:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 15:13 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 15:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 15:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 15:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-16 15:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 10:31 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-08-18 11:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 11:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 15:31 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 15:31 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 15:35 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 15:35 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 15:43 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 15:43 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 16:28 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 16:28 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 17:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 17:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 18:51 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 18:51 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 19:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 17:23 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-16 17:23 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-16 20:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-16 23:53 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-16 23:53 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-17 7:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2021-08-17 7:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-08-17 8:38 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-17 8:38 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-17 14:08 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-08-17 16:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-17 16:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-17 20:50 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-17 20:50 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-17 22:04 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-17 22:04 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-18 15:32 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-18 15:32 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-18 19:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 19:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-18 21:42 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-18 21:42 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-19 8:22 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-19 8:22 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-19 14:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-19 14:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-19 14:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-19 14:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-19 22:10 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-19 22:10 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-23 12:26 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-23 12:26 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-08-23 16:28 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-23 16:28 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-19 14:07 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-19 14:07 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-17 23:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-17 23:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-17 21:54 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-17 21:54 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-17 22:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-17 22:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-17 22:57 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-17 22:57 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-17 23:10 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-17 23:10 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-08-18 2:49 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 2:49 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-18 14:06 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-08-18 17:07 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-08-16 15:07 Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
2021-08-16 15:07 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
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