From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, tobin@ibm.com, dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com, frankeh@us.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM. Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 12:28:46 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <8a94ce57b4aa28df1504dcf08aace88d594ffb32.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <YR0qoV6tDuVxddL5@work-vm> On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:43 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * James Bottomley (jejb@linux.ibm.com) wrote: [...] > > Given the lack of SMI, we can't guarantee that with plain SEV and > > -ES. Once we move to -SNP, we can use VMPLs to achieve this. > > Doesn't the MH have access to different slots and running on separate > vCPUs; so it's still got some separation? Remember that the OVMF code is provided by the host, but its attested to and run by the guest. Once the guest takes control (i.e. after OVMF boots the next thing), we can't guarantee that it wont overwrite the MH code, so the host must treat the MH as untrusted. > > But realistically, given the above API, even if the guest is > > malicious, what can it do? I think it's simply return bogus pages > > that cause a crash on start after migration, which doesn't look > > like a huge risk to the cloud to me (it's more a self destructive > > act on behalf of the guest). > > I'm a bit worried about the data structures that are shared between > the migration code in qemu and the MH; the code in qemu is going to > have to be paranoid about not trusting anything coming from the MH. Given that we have to treat the host MH structure as untrusted, this is definitely something we have to do. Although the primary API is simply "here's a buffer, please fill it", so there's not much checking to do, we just have to be careful that we don't expose any more of the buffer than the guest needs to write to ... and, obviously, clean it before exposing it to the guest. James
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From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>, brijesh.singh@amd.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, tobin@ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankeh@us.ibm.com, dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM. Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 12:28:46 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <8a94ce57b4aa28df1504dcf08aace88d594ffb32.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <YR0qoV6tDuVxddL5@work-vm> On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 16:43 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * James Bottomley (jejb@linux.ibm.com) wrote: [...] > > Given the lack of SMI, we can't guarantee that with plain SEV and > > -ES. Once we move to -SNP, we can use VMPLs to achieve this. > > Doesn't the MH have access to different slots and running on separate > vCPUs; so it's still got some separation? Remember that the OVMF code is provided by the host, but its attested to and run by the guest. Once the guest takes control (i.e. after OVMF boots the next thing), we can't guarantee that it wont overwrite the MH code, so the host must treat the MH as untrusted. > > But realistically, given the above API, even if the guest is > > malicious, what can it do? I think it's simply return bogus pages > > that cause a crash on start after migration, which doesn't look > > like a huge risk to the cloud to me (it's more a self destructive > > act on behalf of the guest). > > I'm a bit worried about the data structures that are shared between > the migration code in qemu and the MH; the code in qemu is going to > have to be paranoid about not trusting anything coming from the MH. Given that we have to treat the host MH structure as untrusted, this is definitely something we have to do. Although the primary API is simply "here's a buffer, please fill it", so there's not much checking to do, we just have to be careful that we don't expose any more of the buffer than the guest needs to write to ... and, obviously, clean it before exposing it to the guest. James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-18 16:29 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-16 13:25 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:26 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] machine: Add mirrorvcpus=N suboption to -smp Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 21:23 ` Eric Blake 2021-08-16 21:23 ` Eric Blake 2021-08-16 13:27 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] hw/boards: Add mirror_vcpu flag to CPUArchId Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:27 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] hw/i386: Mark mirror vcpus in possible_cpus Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:27 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] hw/acpi: Don't include mirror vcpus in ACPI tables Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] cpu: Add boolean mirror_vcpu field to CPUState Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] hw/i386: Set CPUState.mirror_vcpu=true for mirror vcpus Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] kvm: Add Mirror VM ioctl and enable cap interfaces Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] kvm: Add Mirror VM support Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] kvm: create Mirror VM and share primary VM's encryption context Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:30 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] softmmu/cpu: Skip mirror vcpu's for pause, resume and synchronization Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:30 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] kvm/apic: Disable in-kernel APIC support for mirror vcpu's Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:31 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] hw/acpi: disable modern CPU hotplug interface " Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 13:31 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] hw/i386/pc: reduce fw_cfg boot cpu count taking into account " Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add support for Mirror VM Claudio Fontana 2021-08-16 14:01 ` Claudio Fontana 2021-08-16 14:15 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 14:15 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 14:23 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-08-16 14:23 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-08-16 15:00 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 15:00 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 15:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-08-16 15:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-08-16 15:35 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 15:35 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 14:44 ` Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 14:58 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 14:58 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 15:13 ` Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 15:38 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 15:38 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 15:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-16 15:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 10:31 ` Ashish Kalra 2021-08-18 11:25 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 11:25 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 15:31 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 15:31 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 15:35 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 15:35 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 15:43 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 15:43 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 16:28 ` James Bottomley [this message] 2021-08-18 16:28 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 17:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 17:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 18:51 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 18:51 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 19:47 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 17:23 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-16 17:23 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-16 20:53 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-16 23:53 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-16 23:53 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-17 7:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-08-17 7:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-08-17 8:38 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-17 8:38 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-17 14:08 ` Ashish Kalra 2021-08-17 16:32 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-17 16:32 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-17 20:50 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-17 20:50 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-17 22:04 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-17 22:04 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-18 15:32 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-18 15:32 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-18 19:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 19:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-18 21:42 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-18 21:42 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-19 8:22 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-19 8:22 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-19 14:06 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-19 14:06 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-19 14:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-19 14:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-19 22:10 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-19 22:10 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-23 12:26 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-23 12:26 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-08-23 16:28 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-23 16:28 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-19 14:07 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-19 14:07 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-17 23:20 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-17 23:20 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-17 21:54 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-17 21:54 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-17 22:37 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-17 22:37 ` Paolo Bonzini 2021-08-17 22:57 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-17 22:57 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-17 23:10 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-17 23:10 ` Steve Rutherford 2021-08-18 2:49 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 2:49 ` James Bottomley 2021-08-18 14:06 ` Ashish Kalra 2021-08-18 17:07 ` Ashish Kalra 2021-08-16 15:07 Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum 2021-08-16 15:07 ` Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
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