* [PATCH v32 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v32: Rebase to 5.17-rc2
Incorporate additional feedback from v30.
v31: Rebase to 5.16-rc4
Incorporate feedback from Paul Moore on the audit
component changes.
v30: Rebase to 5.16-rc1
Replace the integrity sub-system reuse of the audit
subsystem event matching functions with IMA specific
functions. This is done because audit needs to maintain
information about multiple security modules in audit
rules while IMA to restricts the information to a single
security module.
The binder hooks have been changed and are no longer
called with sufficient information to identify the
interface_lsm. Pass that information in the binder
message, and use that in the compatibility decision.
Refactor the audit changes.
v29: Rebase to 5.15-rc1
Rework the supplimental audit record generation. Attach
a list of supplimental data to the audit_buffer and
generate the auxiliary records as needed on event end.
This should be usable for other auxiliary data, such as
container IDs. There is other ongoing audit work that
will require integration with this.
v28: Rebase to 5.14-rc2
Provide IMA rules bounds checking (patch 04)
Quote contexts in MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS and MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
audit records because of AppArmor's use of '=' in context
values. (patch 22,23)
v27: Fixes for landlock (patch 02)
Rework the subject audit record generation. This version is
simpler and reflects feedback from Paul Moore. (patch 22)
v26: Rebase to 5.13-rc1
Include the landlock security module.
Accomodate change from security_task_getsecid() to
security_task_getsecid_obj() and security_task_getsecid_subj().
v25: Rebase to 5.12-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v24
- The IMA team suggested improvements to the integrity rule
processing.
v24: Rebase to 5.11-rc1
Incorporate feedback from v23
- Address the IMA team's concerns about "label collisions".
A label collision occurs when there is ambiguity about
which of multiple LSMs is being targeted in the definition
of an integrity check rule. A system with Smack and
AppArmor would be unable to distinguish which LSM is
important to an integrity rule referrencing the label
"unconfined" as that label is meaningful to both.
Provide a boot option to specify which LSM will be used in
IMA rules when multiple LSMs are present. (patch 04)
Pull LSM "slot" identification from later audit patches in
in support of this (patch 03).
- Pick up a few audit events that need to include supplimental
subject context records that had been missed in the
previous version.
v23: Rebase to 5.10-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v22
- Change /proc/*/attr/display to /proc/*/attr/interface_lsm to
make the purpose clearer. (patch 0012)
- Include ABI documentation. (patch 0012, 0022)
- Introduce LSM documentation updates with the patches where
the interfaces are added rather than at the end. (patch 0012, 0022)
Include more maintainers and mail lists in To: and Cc: directives.
v22: Rebase to 5.10-rc1
v21: Rebase to 5.9-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v20
- Further revert UDS SO_PEERSEC to use scaffolding around
the interfaces that use lsmblobs and store only a single
secid. The possibility of multiple security modules
requiring data here is still a future problem.
- Incorporate Richard Guy Briggs' non-syscall auxiliary
records patch (patch 0019-0021) in place of my "supplimental"
records implementation. [I'm not sure I've given proper
attestation. I will correct as appropriate]
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002)
Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015)
Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020)
Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs
directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct
treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case
is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005)
Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit
records so that there's always exactly one when it's
appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial
change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond
syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 01 separates the audit rule processing from the
integrity rule processing. They were never really the
same, but void pointers could hide that. The changes
following use the rule pointers differently in audit
and IMA, so keeping the code common is not a good idea.
Patch 02 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 03-04 introduce a structure "lsmblob" that will gradually
replace the "secid" as a shorthand for security module information.
At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that
used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests
one.
Patch 05 provides mechanism for the IMA subsystem to identify
explicitly which LSM is subject to IMA policy. This includes
a boot option for specifying the default and an additional option
in IMA rules "lsm=".
Patches 06-15 change LSM interfaces to use the lsmblob instead
of secids. It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 15 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which
security module's hooks should be used when displaying or
converting a security context string. A new interface
/proc/self/attr/interface_lsm contains the name of the security
module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of
the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names
of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name
is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module
which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The interface LSM of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for
reading the interface LSM of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 16 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 17-18 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 19. This is not strictly
necessary as there can only be one security module that
uses Netlabel at this point. Using a lsmblob is much
cleaner, as the interfaces that use the data have all
been converted.
Patch 20 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that both ends of a transaction use the same interface LSM.
Patch 21 adds a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx()
that indicates which of the security modules should be used
to provide the context.
Patches 22-24 provide mechanism to keeping a list of auxiliary
record data in an audit_buffer. The list is read when the
audit record is ended, and supplimental records are created
as needed.
Patch 25 adds a supplimental audit record for subject
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a
"subj=?" field to identify the subject data. The
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: subj_selinux="xyz_t" subj_apparmor="abc".
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor==unconfined
subj_smack=_
Patch 26 adds a supplimental audit record for object
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction The
with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: obj_selinux="xyz_t obj_apparmor="abc". While
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain an entry
for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
records will only contain entries for security modules for
which the object in question has data.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Patch 27 adds a new interface for getting the compound security
contexts, /proc/self/attr/context. An example of the content
of this file is:
selinux\0one_u:one_r:one_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023\0apparmor\0unconfined\0
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed,
Patch 28 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary
stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in
their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise".
The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8%
difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.17-rc2-v32
Casey Schaufler (28):
integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
LSM: Specify which LSM to display
LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +-
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +
drivers/android/binder.c | 47 +-
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +
include/linux/audit.h | 15 +-
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 19 +-
include/linux/security.h | 243 ++++++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-
include/net/scm.h | 15 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 250 +++++--
kernel/audit.h | 17 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 128 ++--
kernel/cred.c | 12 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 24 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 +-
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 105 +--
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +-
security/commoncap.c | 7 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 -
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 63 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 58 +-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 +-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +-
security/security.c | 615 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 99 +--
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 91 +--
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
66 files changed, 1746 insertions(+), 624 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 01/28] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because
they use security module registered hooks that we don't
want exported.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6d72772182c8..33e0f2e659df 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1909,6 +1909,32 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
-/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-
-#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
-#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
-
-#else
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
#else
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22261d79f333..5208b21c8433 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2566,6 +2566,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+/*
+ * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
+ * the audit subsystem.
+ */
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
{
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 01/28] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because
they use security module registered hooks that we don't
want exported.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6d72772182c8..33e0f2e659df 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1909,6 +1909,32 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
-/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-
-#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
-#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
-
-#else
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
#else
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22261d79f333..5208b21c8433 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2566,6 +2566,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+/*
+ * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
+ * the audit subsystem.
+ */
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
{
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 66 ++++++++++++--------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
10 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3bf5c658bc44..129d99c6f9ed 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1600,6 +1600,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index aadb4b29fb66..fac8999ba7a3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4f0eecb67dde..be8976c407f4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -782,33 +782,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -817,8 +799,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
if (new->label)
aa_put_label(new->label);
@@ -874,7 +856,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1059,7 +1041,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1072,7 +1054,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1156,7 +1138,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1166,7 +1148,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1183,6 +1165,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1219,7 +1202,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1771,7 +1753,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5208b21c8433..f2d4b20613c8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -659,6 +662,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2263,12 +2288,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5b6895e4fc29..dffde40d367e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4593,7 +4593,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4650,7 +4650,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4666,8 +4666,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4682,7 +4682,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4817,7 +4817,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4996,9 +4996,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -5030,8 +5030,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5073,7 +5073,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5106,7 +5106,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5174,13 +5174,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5240,34 +5242,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5281,7 +5276,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5291,7 +5286,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5306,7 +5301,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5457,8 +5452,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5475,7 +5470,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5496,7 +5491,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5513,7 +5508,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5597,7 +5592,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5726,7 +5721,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5749,7 +5744,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5842,7 +5837,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5871,7 +5866,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5920,7 +5915,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
u32 perm;
@@ -6920,6 +6915,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 2953132408bf..007d1ae7ee27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1321f15799e2..800ab4b4239e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -373,8 +374,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -507,7 +508,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index fc837dcebf96..ef9d0b7b1954 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -363,6 +363,11 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 14b279cc75c9..d58b50006e79 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2237,11 +2237,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2255,11 +2251,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2268,7 +2263,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2281,9 +2275,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2396,7 +2389,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
*/
static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
int rc;
@@ -2428,7 +2421,7 @@ static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
*/
static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Take the label off the socket if one is set.
@@ -2460,7 +2453,7 @@ static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
struct smack_known *skp;
int rc = 0;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2533,7 +2526,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2621,7 +2614,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2715,7 +2708,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2763,7 +2756,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2788,8 +2781,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2852,7 +2845,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3583,9 +3576,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3631,8 +3624,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3669,7 +3662,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3881,7 +3874,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
if (sk)
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
@@ -3903,7 +3896,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
*/
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -4007,7 +4000,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4056,7 +4049,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4105,7 +4098,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4125,7 +4118,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
struct smack_known *hskp;
@@ -4211,7 +4204,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4747,6 +4740,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4857,7 +4851,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index b945c1d3a743..bad71b7e648d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 66 ++++++++++++--------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
10 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3bf5c658bc44..129d99c6f9ed 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1600,6 +1600,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index aadb4b29fb66..fac8999ba7a3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4f0eecb67dde..be8976c407f4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -782,33 +782,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -817,8 +799,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
if (new->label)
aa_put_label(new->label);
@@ -874,7 +856,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1059,7 +1041,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1072,7 +1054,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1156,7 +1138,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1166,7 +1148,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1183,6 +1165,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1219,7 +1202,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1771,7 +1753,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5208b21c8433..f2d4b20613c8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -659,6 +662,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2263,12 +2288,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5b6895e4fc29..dffde40d367e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4593,7 +4593,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4650,7 +4650,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4666,8 +4666,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4682,7 +4682,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4817,7 +4817,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4996,9 +4996,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -5030,8 +5030,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5073,7 +5073,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5106,7 +5106,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5174,13 +5174,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5240,34 +5242,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5281,7 +5276,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5291,7 +5286,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5306,7 +5301,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5457,8 +5452,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5475,7 +5470,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5496,7 +5491,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5513,7 +5508,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5597,7 +5592,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5726,7 +5721,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5749,7 +5744,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5842,7 +5837,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5871,7 +5866,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5920,7 +5915,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
u32 perm;
@@ -6920,6 +6915,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 2953132408bf..007d1ae7ee27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1321f15799e2..800ab4b4239e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -373,8 +374,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -507,7 +508,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index fc837dcebf96..ef9d0b7b1954 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -363,6 +363,11 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 14b279cc75c9..d58b50006e79 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2237,11 +2237,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2255,11 +2251,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2268,7 +2263,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2281,9 +2275,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2396,7 +2389,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
*/
static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
int rc;
@@ -2428,7 +2421,7 @@ static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
*/
static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Take the label off the socket if one is set.
@@ -2460,7 +2453,7 @@ static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
struct smack_known *skp;
int rc = 0;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2533,7 +2526,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2621,7 +2614,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2715,7 +2708,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2763,7 +2756,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2788,8 +2781,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2852,7 +2845,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3583,9 +3576,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3631,8 +3624,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3669,7 +3662,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3881,7 +3874,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
if (sk)
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
@@ -3903,7 +3896,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
*/
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -4007,7 +4000,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4056,7 +4049,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4105,7 +4098,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4125,7 +4118,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
struct smack_known *hskp;
@@ -4211,7 +4204,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4747,6 +4740,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4857,7 +4851,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index b945c1d3a743..bad71b7e648d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
void ** parameters.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
include/linux/security.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
21 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/audit_arch.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
+struct audit_lsm_rules {
+ void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
union {
@@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
- char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ bool lsm_isset;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 129d99c6f9ed..2c2d0ef59a41 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1582,6 +1582,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#undef LSM_HOOK
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -1590,7 +1598,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -1626,7 +1634,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 33e0f2e659df..1a7e5bf36a82 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
struct sembuf;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
struct audit_context;
+struct audit_lsm_rules;
struct super_block;
struct inode;
struct dentry;
@@ -134,6 +135,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1879,15 +1939,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
#else
static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1898,12 +1960,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ &df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..f1c26a322f9d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
if (need_sid) {
/* @tsk should always be equal to
* @current with the exception of
@@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
- f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ &f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
};
+/*
+ * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
+ * supplied by this module require a slot.
+ */
+struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "bpf",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
@@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
+struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
+};
+
static int __init landlock_init(void)
{
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.h
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
extern bool landlock_initialized;
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
@@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f2d4b20613c8..2bf21c726ba0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
+
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -2075,7 +2093,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2579,9 +2597,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2589,14 +2625,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dffde40d367e..d67bcd1aeaf5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7009,6 +7009,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7324,7 +7329,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d58b50006e79..ff832d47479f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
void ** parameters.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
include/linux/security.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
21 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/audit_arch.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
+struct audit_lsm_rules {
+ void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
union {
@@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
- char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ bool lsm_isset;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 129d99c6f9ed..2c2d0ef59a41 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1582,6 +1582,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#undef LSM_HOOK
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -1590,7 +1598,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -1626,7 +1634,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 33e0f2e659df..1a7e5bf36a82 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
struct sembuf;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
struct audit_context;
+struct audit_lsm_rules;
struct super_block;
struct inode;
struct dentry;
@@ -134,6 +135,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1879,15 +1939,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
#else
static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1898,12 +1960,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ &df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fce5d43a933f..f1c26a322f9d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
if (need_sid) {
/* @tsk should always be equal to
* @current with the exception of
@@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
- f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ &f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
};
+/*
+ * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
+ * supplied by this module require a slot.
+ */
+struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "bpf",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
@@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
+struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
+};
+
static int __init landlock_init(void)
{
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.h
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
extern bool landlock_initialized;
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
@@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f2d4b20613c8..2bf21c726ba0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
+
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -2075,7 +2093,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2579,9 +2597,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2589,14 +2625,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dffde40d367e..d67bcd1aeaf5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7009,6 +7009,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7324,7 +7329,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d58b50006e79..ff832d47479f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-04 10:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2022-03-04 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-kernel
On 03/02/2022 00:52, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
>
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
> security module data rather than a single instance.
> A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
> confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
> void ** parameters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Minor fixes:
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
> kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
> security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
> security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> 21 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/audit_arch.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
> @@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
> /* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
> #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
>
> +struct audit_lsm_rules {
> + void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> struct audit_field {
> u32 type;
> union {
> @@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> struct {
> - char *lsm_str;
> - void *lsm_rule;
> + bool lsm_isset;
> + char *lsm_str;
> + struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
> };
> };
> u32 op;
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 129d99c6f9ed..2c2d0ef59a41 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1582,6 +1582,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> #undef LSM_HOOK
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> +/*
> + * Information that identifies a security module.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id {
> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Security module hook list structure.
> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
> @@ -1590,7 +1598,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
> struct hlist_node list;
> struct hlist_head *head;
> union security_list_options hook;
> - char *lsm;
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> /*
> @@ -1626,7 +1634,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
> extern char *lsm_names;
>
> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm);
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>
> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 33e0f2e659df..1a7e5bf36a82 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
> struct sembuf;
> struct kern_ipc_perm;
> struct audit_context;
> +struct audit_lsm_rules;
> struct super_block;
> struct inode;
> struct dentry;
> @@ -134,6 +135,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>
> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
*a* value
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
const struct lsmblob empty = {};
> +
> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
const struct lsmblob *bloba, const struct lsmblob *blobb
> +{
> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -1879,15 +1939,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -1898,12 +1960,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> }
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> { }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> kfree(f->lsm_str);
> - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
> + security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
> entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
> f->lsm_str = str;
> err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
> - (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (err == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
> +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
> * re-initialized. */
> static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> struct audit_field *sf)
> @@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> return -ENOMEM;
> df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
>
> - /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
> + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
> ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
> - (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
> + &df->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (ret == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
> new->tree = old->tree;
> memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
>
> - /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
> + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
> @@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> + f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> @@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> +static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
> {
> struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
> struct audit_entry *nentry;
> @@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> return err;
> }
>
> -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
> +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
> * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
> * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
> * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
> @@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
>
> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
> list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
> - int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
> + int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
> if (!err)
> err = res;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index fce5d43a933f..f1c26a322f9d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> match for now to avoid losing information that
> may be wanted. An error message will also be
> logged upon error */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> if (need_sid) {
> /* @tsk should always be equal to
> * @current with the exception of
> @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
> @@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
> also applies here */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> name->osid,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid,
> - f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule)) {
> + n->osid, f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> }
> @@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> break;
> if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> f->type, f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule))
> + &f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> }
> break;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "apparmor",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
> goto buffers_out;
> }
> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
> - "apparmor");
> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
> apparmor_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
> };
>
> +/*
> + * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
> + * supplied by this module require a slot.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "bpf",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
> {
> - security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
> + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
> + &bpf_lsmid);
> pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "capability",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> @@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static int __init capability_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
> - "capability");
> + &capability_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
> index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
> @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> @@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
> };
>
> +struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
> +};
> +
> static int __init landlock_init(void)
> {
> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
> index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
> @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
> extern bool landlock_initialized;
>
> extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
> +extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
>
> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "loadpin",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> @@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> enforce ? "" : "not ");
> parse_exclude();
> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
> + &loadpin_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "lockdown",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> {
> #if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
> @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
> #endif
> security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
> - "lockdown");
> + &lockdown_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "safesetid",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
> @@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
> safesetid_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f2d4b20613c8..2bf21c726ba0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>
> /*
> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + */
> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> * @hooks: the hooks to add
> * @count: the number of hooks to add
> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
> *
> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
> + * for it in the lsmblob.
> */
> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm)
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
> {
> int i;
>
> + WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
> +
> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> + lsmid->slot);
> + }
> +
> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
> }
>
> @@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> * and fix this up afterwards.
> */
> if (slab_is_available()) {
> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
> }
> }
> @@ -2075,7 +2093,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> @@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> @@ -2579,9 +2597,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + bool one_is_good = false;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int trc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (trc == 0)
> + one_is_good = true;
> + else
> + rc = trc;
> + }
> + if (one_is_good)
> + return 0;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> @@ -2589,14 +2625,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
> }
>
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index dffde40d367e..d67bcd1aeaf5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7009,6 +7009,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "selinux",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
> * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
> @@ -7324,7 +7329,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>
> hashtab_cache_init();
>
> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
> + &selinux_lsmid);
>
> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index d58b50006e79..ff832d47479f 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "smack",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> /*
> * Register with LSM
> */
> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
> smack_enabled = 1;
>
> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> }
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
> * registering TOMOYO.
> @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>
> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "yama",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
> static int __init yama_init(void)
> {
> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
> yama_init_sysctl();
> return 0;
> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
@ 2022-03-04 10:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2022-03-04 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
On 03/02/2022 00:52, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
>
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
> security module data rather than a single instance.
> A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
> confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
> void ** parameters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Minor fixes:
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
> kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
> security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
> security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> 21 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/audit_arch.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
> @@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
> /* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
> #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
>
> +struct audit_lsm_rules {
> + void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> struct audit_field {
> u32 type;
> union {
> @@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> struct {
> - char *lsm_str;
> - void *lsm_rule;
> + bool lsm_isset;
> + char *lsm_str;
> + struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
> };
> };
> u32 op;
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 129d99c6f9ed..2c2d0ef59a41 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1582,6 +1582,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> #undef LSM_HOOK
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> +/*
> + * Information that identifies a security module.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id {
> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Security module hook list structure.
> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
> @@ -1590,7 +1598,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
> struct hlist_node list;
> struct hlist_head *head;
> union security_list_options hook;
> - char *lsm;
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> /*
> @@ -1626,7 +1634,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
> extern char *lsm_names;
>
> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm);
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>
> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 33e0f2e659df..1a7e5bf36a82 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
> struct sembuf;
> struct kern_ipc_perm;
> struct audit_context;
> +struct audit_lsm_rules;
> struct super_block;
> struct inode;
> struct dentry;
> @@ -134,6 +135,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>
> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
*a* value
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
const struct lsmblob empty = {};
> +
> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
const struct lsmblob *bloba, const struct lsmblob *blobb
> +{
> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -1879,15 +1939,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -1898,12 +1960,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> }
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> { }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> kfree(f->lsm_str);
> - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
> + security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
> entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
> f->lsm_str = str;
> err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
> - (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (err == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
> +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
> * re-initialized. */
> static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> struct audit_field *sf)
> @@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> return -ENOMEM;
> df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
>
> - /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
> + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
> ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
> - (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
> + &df->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (ret == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
> new->tree = old->tree;
> memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
>
> - /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
> + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
> @@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> + f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> @@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> +static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
> {
> struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
> struct audit_entry *nentry;
> @@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> return err;
> }
>
> -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
> +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
> * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
> * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
> * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
> @@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
>
> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
> list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
> - int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
> + int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
> if (!err)
> err = res;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index fce5d43a933f..f1c26a322f9d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> match for now to avoid losing information that
> may be wanted. An error message will also be
> logged upon error */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> if (need_sid) {
> /* @tsk should always be equal to
> * @current with the exception of
> @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
> @@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
> also applies here */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> name->osid,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid,
> - f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule)) {
> + n->osid, f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> }
> @@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> break;
> if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> f->type, f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule))
> + &f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> }
> break;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "apparmor",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
> goto buffers_out;
> }
> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
> - "apparmor");
> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
> apparmor_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
> };
>
> +/*
> + * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
> + * supplied by this module require a slot.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "bpf",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
> {
> - security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
> + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
> + &bpf_lsmid);
> pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "capability",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> @@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static int __init capability_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
> - "capability");
> + &capability_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
> index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
> @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> @@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
> };
>
> +struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
> +};
> +
> static int __init landlock_init(void)
> {
> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
> index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
> @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
> extern bool landlock_initialized;
>
> extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
> +extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
>
> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "loadpin",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> @@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> enforce ? "" : "not ");
> parse_exclude();
> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
> + &loadpin_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "lockdown",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> {
> #if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
> @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
> #endif
> security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
> - "lockdown");
> + &lockdown_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "safesetid",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
> @@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
> safesetid_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f2d4b20613c8..2bf21c726ba0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>
> /*
> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + */
> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> * @hooks: the hooks to add
> * @count: the number of hooks to add
> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
> *
> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
> + * for it in the lsmblob.
> */
> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm)
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
> {
> int i;
>
> + WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
> +
> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> + lsmid->slot);
> + }
> +
> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
> }
>
> @@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> * and fix this up afterwards.
> */
> if (slab_is_available()) {
> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
> }
> }
> @@ -2075,7 +2093,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> @@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> @@ -2579,9 +2597,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + bool one_is_good = false;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int trc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (trc == 0)
> + one_is_good = true;
> + else
> + rc = trc;
> + }
> + if (one_is_good)
> + return 0;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> @@ -2589,14 +2625,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
> }
>
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index dffde40d367e..d67bcd1aeaf5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7009,6 +7009,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "selinux",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
> * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
> @@ -7324,7 +7329,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>
> hashtab_cache_init();
>
> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
> + &selinux_lsmid);
>
> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index d58b50006e79..ff832d47479f 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "smack",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> /*
> * Register with LSM
> */
> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
> smack_enabled = 1;
>
> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> }
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
> * registering TOMOYO.
> @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>
> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "yama",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
> static int __init yama_init(void)
> {
> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
> yama_init_sysctl();
> return 0;
> }
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
2022-03-04 10:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2022-03-04 19:14 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-04 19:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, casey.schaufler, jmorris,
linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds,
linux-kernel, Casey Schaufler
On 3/4/2022 2:48 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 03/02/2022 00:52, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
>> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
>> security modules built into the system that would
>> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
>> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
>> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
>> slots.
>>
>> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
>> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
>> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
>> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>>
>> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
>> security module data rather than a single instance.
>> A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
>> confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
>> void ** parameters.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>
>
> Minor fixes:
Thank you. I will incorporate these changes.
>
>
>> ---
>> include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
>> include/linux/security.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
>> security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
>> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
>> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
>> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
>> security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
>> security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
>> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
>> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
>> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
>> security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
>> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
>> 21 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>> index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>> #include <linux/sched.h>
>> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
>> +#include <linux/security.h>
>> #include <linux/audit_arch.h>
>> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
>> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
>> @@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
>> /* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
>> #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
>> +struct audit_lsm_rules {
>> + void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>> +};
>> +
>> struct audit_field {
>> u32 type;
>> union {
>> @@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
>> kuid_t uid;
>> kgid_t gid;
>> struct {
>> - char *lsm_str;
>> - void *lsm_rule;
>> + bool lsm_isset;
>> + char *lsm_str;
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
>> };
>> };
>> u32 op;
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 129d99c6f9ed..2c2d0ef59a41 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -1582,6 +1582,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>> #undef LSM_HOOK
>> } __randomize_layout;
>> +/*
>> + * Information that identifies a security module.
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_id {
>> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
>> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * Security module hook list structure.
>> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
>> @@ -1590,7 +1598,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>> struct hlist_node list;
>> struct hlist_head *head;
>> union security_list_options hook;
>> - char *lsm;
>> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
>> } __randomize_layout;
>> /*
>> @@ -1626,7 +1634,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>> extern char *lsm_names;
>> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> - char *lsm);
>> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
>> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 33e0f2e659df..1a7e5bf36a82 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
>> struct sembuf;
>> struct kern_ipc_perm;
>> struct audit_context;
>> +struct audit_lsm_rules;
>> struct super_block;
>> struct inode;
>> struct dentry;
>> @@ -134,6 +135,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>> +/*
>> + * Data exported by the security modules
>> + *
>> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
>> + */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
>> +
>> +struct lsmblob {
>> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>> +};
>> +
>> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
>> + * @secid: The initial secid value
>> + *
>> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
>> + */
>> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
>
> *a* value
>
>
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
>> +{
>> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
>
> const struct lsmblob empty = {};
>
>> +
>> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
>> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
>> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
>
> const struct lsmblob *bloba, const struct lsmblob *blobb
>
>
>> +{
>> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
>> +}
>> +
>> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>> int cap, unsigned int opts);
>> @@ -1879,15 +1939,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
>> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>> #else
>> static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>> - void **lsmrule)
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -1898,12 +1960,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> }
>> static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>> - void *lsmrule)
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> return 0;
>> }
>> -static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> { }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
>> index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
>> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
>> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
>> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
>> kfree(f->lsm_str);
>> - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
>> + security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
>> entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
>> f->lsm_str = str;
>> err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
>> - (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
>> + &f->lsm_rules);
>> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
>> * become valid after a policy reload. */
>> if (err == -EINVAL) {
>> @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
>> return 0;
>> }
>> -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
>> +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
>> * re-initialized. */
>> static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
>> struct audit_field *sf)
>> @@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
>> - /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
>> + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
>> ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
>> - (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
>> + &df->lsm_rules);
>> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
>> * become valid after a policy reload. */
>> if (ret == -EINVAL) {
>> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
>> new->tree = old->tree;
>> memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
>> - /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
>> + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
>> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
>> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
>> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
>> @@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
>> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
>> + if (f->lsm_str) {
>> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
>> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
>> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>> + f->type, f->op,
>> + &f->lsm_rules);
>> }
>> break;
>> case AUDIT_EXE:
>> @@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>> return ret;
>> }
>> -static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
>> +static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
>> {
>> struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
>> struct audit_entry *nentry;
>> @@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
>> return err;
>> }
>> -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
>> +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
>> * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
>> * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
>> * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
>> @@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
>> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
>> list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
>> - int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
>> + int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
>> if (!err)
>> err = res;
>> }
>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> index fce5d43a933f..f1c26a322f9d 100644
>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> match for now to avoid losing information that
>> may be wanted. An error message will also be
>> logged upon error */
>> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
>> + if (f->lsm_str) {
>> if (need_sid) {
>> /* @tsk should always be equal to
>> * @current with the exception of
>> @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> need_sid = 0;
>> }
>> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
>> - f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule);
>> + f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
>> }
>> break;
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
>> @@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
>> /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
>> also applies here */
>> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
>> + if (f->lsm_str) {
>> /* Find files that match */
>> if (name) {
>> result = security_audit_rule_match(
>> name->osid,
>> f->type,
>> f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule);
>> + &f->lsm_rules);
>> } else if (ctx) {
>> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
>> if (security_audit_rule_match(
>> - n->osid,
>> - f->type,
>> - f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule)) {
>> + n->osid, f->type, f->op,
>> + &f->lsm_rules)) {
>> ++result;
>> break;
>> }
>> @@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> break;
>> if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
>> f->type, f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule))
>> + &f->lsm_rules))
>> ++result;
>> }
>> break;
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> @@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
>> };
>> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "apparmor",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>> goto buffers_out;
>> }
>> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
>> - "apparmor");
>> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
>> apparmor_initialized = 1;
>> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
>> index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
>> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
>> @@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
>> };
>> +/*
>> + * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
>> + * supplied by this module require a slot.
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "bpf",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
>> {
>> - security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
>> + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
>> + &bpf_lsmid);
>> pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> @@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "capability",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
>> @@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> static int __init capability_init(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
>> - "capability");
>> + &capability_lsmid);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
>> index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
>> @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> + &landlock_lsmid);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
>> index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
>> @@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> + &landlock_lsmid);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
>> index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
>> @@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> + &landlock_lsmid);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
>> index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
>> @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
>> };
>> +struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
>> +};
>> +
>> static int __init landlock_init(void)
>> {
>> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
>> index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
>> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
>> @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
>> extern bool landlock_initialized;
>> extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
>> +extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
>> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
>> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
>> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> @@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
>> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "loadpin",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
>> @@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>> enforce ? "" : "not ");
>> parse_exclude();
>> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
>> + &loadpin_lsmid);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
>> index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
>> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
>> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
>> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
>> };
>> +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "lockdown",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
>> {
>> #if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
>> @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
>> lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
>> #endif
>> security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
>> - "lockdown");
>> + &lockdown_lsmid);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
>> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
>> return -EACCES;
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "safesetid",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
>> @@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
>> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
>> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
>> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
>> safesetid_initialized = 1;
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index f2d4b20613c8..2bf21c726ba0 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
>> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
>> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
>> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>> /*
>> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
>> @@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>> return 0;
>> }
>> +/*
>> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
>> + */
>> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
>> +
>> /**
>> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
>> * @hooks: the hooks to add
>> * @count: the number of hooks to add
>> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
>> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
>> *
>> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
>> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
>> + * for it in the lsmblob.
>> */
>> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> - char *lsm)
>> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
>> {
>> int i;
>> + WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
>> +
>> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
>> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>> + lsmid->slot);
>> + }
>> +
>> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
>> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
>> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
>> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
>> }
>> @@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> * and fix this up afterwards.
>> */
>> if (slab_is_available()) {
>> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -2075,7 +2093,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
>> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>> }
>> @@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
>> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>> }
>> @@ -2579,9 +2597,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
>> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + bool one_is_good = false;
>> + int rc = 0;
>> + int trc;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
>> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + if (trc == 0)
>> + one_is_good = true;
>> + else
>> + rc = trc;
>> + }
>> + if (one_is_good)
>> + return 0;
>> + return rc;
>> }
>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> @@ -2589,14 +2625,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
>> }
>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
>> + continue;
>> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + }
>> }
>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + int rc;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
>> + continue;
>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
>> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index dffde40d367e..d67bcd1aeaf5 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -7009,6 +7009,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "selinux",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
>> * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
>> @@ -7324,7 +7329,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>> hashtab_cache_init();
>> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
>> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
>> + &selinux_lsmid);
>> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
>> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index d58b50006e79..ff832d47479f 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>> };
>> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "smack",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
>> /*
>> * Register with LSM
>> */
>> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
>> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
>> smack_enabled = 1;
>> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> @@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>> }
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
>> * registering TOMOYO.
>> @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
>> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
>> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
>> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
>> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
>> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
>> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
>> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
>> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
>> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
>> return rc;
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "yama",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
>> static int __init yama_init(void)
>> {
>> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
>> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
>> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
>> yama_init_sysctl();
>> return 0;
>> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
@ 2022-03-04 19:14 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-04 19:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, casey.schaufler, jmorris,
linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
On 3/4/2022 2:48 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 03/02/2022 00:52, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
>> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
>> security modules built into the system that would
>> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
>> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
>> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
>> slots.
>>
>> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
>> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
>> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
>> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>>
>> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
>> security module data rather than a single instance.
>> A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
>> confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
>> void ** parameters.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>
>
> Minor fixes:
Thank you. I will incorporate these changes.
>
>
>> ---
>> include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
>> include/linux/security.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
>> security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
>> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
>> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
>> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
>> security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
>> security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
>> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
>> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
>> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
>> security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
>> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
>> 21 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>> index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>> #include <linux/sched.h>
>> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
>> +#include <linux/security.h>
>> #include <linux/audit_arch.h>
>> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
>> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
>> @@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
>> /* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
>> #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
>> +struct audit_lsm_rules {
>> + void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>> +};
>> +
>> struct audit_field {
>> u32 type;
>> union {
>> @@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
>> kuid_t uid;
>> kgid_t gid;
>> struct {
>> - char *lsm_str;
>> - void *lsm_rule;
>> + bool lsm_isset;
>> + char *lsm_str;
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
>> };
>> };
>> u32 op;
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 129d99c6f9ed..2c2d0ef59a41 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -1582,6 +1582,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>> #undef LSM_HOOK
>> } __randomize_layout;
>> +/*
>> + * Information that identifies a security module.
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_id {
>> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
>> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * Security module hook list structure.
>> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
>> @@ -1590,7 +1598,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>> struct hlist_node list;
>> struct hlist_head *head;
>> union security_list_options hook;
>> - char *lsm;
>> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
>> } __randomize_layout;
>> /*
>> @@ -1626,7 +1634,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>> extern char *lsm_names;
>> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> - char *lsm);
>> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
>> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 33e0f2e659df..1a7e5bf36a82 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
>> struct sembuf;
>> struct kern_ipc_perm;
>> struct audit_context;
>> +struct audit_lsm_rules;
>> struct super_block;
>> struct inode;
>> struct dentry;
>> @@ -134,6 +135,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>> +/*
>> + * Data exported by the security modules
>> + *
>> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
>> + */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
>> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
>> +
>> +struct lsmblob {
>> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
>> +};
>> +
>> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
>> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
>> + * @secid: The initial secid value
>> + *
>> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
>> + */
>> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
>> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
>
> *a* value
>
>
>> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
>> +{
>> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
>
> const struct lsmblob empty = {};
>
>> +
>> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
>> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
>> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
>> + */
>> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
>
> const struct lsmblob *bloba, const struct lsmblob *blobb
>
>
>> +{
>> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
>> +}
>> +
>> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>> int cap, unsigned int opts);
>> @@ -1879,15 +1939,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
>> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>> #else
>> static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>> - void **lsmrule)
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -1898,12 +1960,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> }
>> static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>> - void *lsmrule)
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> return 0;
>> }
>> -static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> { }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
>> index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
>> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
>> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
>> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
>> kfree(f->lsm_str);
>> - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
>> + security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
>> entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
>> f->lsm_str = str;
>> err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
>> - (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
>> + &f->lsm_rules);
>> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
>> * become valid after a policy reload. */
>> if (err == -EINVAL) {
>> @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
>> return 0;
>> }
>> -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
>> +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
>> * re-initialized. */
>> static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
>> struct audit_field *sf)
>> @@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
>> - /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
>> + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
>> ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
>> - (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
>> + &df->lsm_rules);
>> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
>> * become valid after a policy reload. */
>> if (ret == -EINVAL) {
>> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
>> new->tree = old->tree;
>> memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
>> - /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
>> + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
>> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
>> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
>> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
>> @@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
>> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
>> + if (f->lsm_str) {
>> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
>> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
>> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>> + f->type, f->op,
>> + &f->lsm_rules);
>> }
>> break;
>> case AUDIT_EXE:
>> @@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>> return ret;
>> }
>> -static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
>> +static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
>> {
>> struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
>> struct audit_entry *nentry;
>> @@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
>> return err;
>> }
>> -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
>> +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
>> * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
>> * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
>> * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
>> @@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
>> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
>> list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
>> - int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
>> + int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
>> if (!err)
>> err = res;
>> }
>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> index fce5d43a933f..f1c26a322f9d 100644
>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> match for now to avoid losing information that
>> may be wanted. An error message will also be
>> logged upon error */
>> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
>> + if (f->lsm_str) {
>> if (need_sid) {
>> /* @tsk should always be equal to
>> * @current with the exception of
>> @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> need_sid = 0;
>> }
>> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
>> - f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule);
>> + f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
>> }
>> break;
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
>> @@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
>> /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
>> also applies here */
>> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
>> + if (f->lsm_str) {
>> /* Find files that match */
>> if (name) {
>> result = security_audit_rule_match(
>> name->osid,
>> f->type,
>> f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule);
>> + &f->lsm_rules);
>> } else if (ctx) {
>> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
>> if (security_audit_rule_match(
>> - n->osid,
>> - f->type,
>> - f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule)) {
>> + n->osid, f->type, f->op,
>> + &f->lsm_rules)) {
>> ++result;
>> break;
>> }
>> @@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>> break;
>> if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
>> f->type, f->op,
>> - f->lsm_rule))
>> + &f->lsm_rules))
>> ++result;
>> }
>> break;
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> @@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
>> };
>> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "apparmor",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>> goto buffers_out;
>> }
>> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
>> - "apparmor");
>> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
>> apparmor_initialized = 1;
>> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
>> index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
>> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
>> @@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
>> };
>> +/*
>> + * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
>> + * supplied by this module require a slot.
>> + */
>> +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "bpf",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
>> {
>> - security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
>> + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
>> + &bpf_lsmid);
>> pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> @@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "capability",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
>> @@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> static int __init capability_init(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
>> - "capability");
>> + &capability_lsmid);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
>> index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
>> @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> + &landlock_lsmid);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
>> index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
>> @@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> + &landlock_lsmid);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
>> index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
>> @@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> + &landlock_lsmid);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
>> index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
>> @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
>> };
>> +struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
>> +};
>> +
>> static int __init landlock_init(void)
>> {
>> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
>> index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
>> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
>> @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
>> extern bool landlock_initialized;
>> extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
>> +extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
>> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
>> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
>> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
>> @@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
>> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "loadpin",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
>> @@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
>> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
>> enforce ? "" : "not ");
>> parse_exclude();
>> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
>> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
>> + &loadpin_lsmid);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
>> index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
>> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
>> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
>> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
>> };
>> +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "lockdown",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
>> {
>> #if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
>> @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
>> lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
>> #endif
>> security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
>> - "lockdown");
>> + &lockdown_lsmid);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
>> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
>> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
>> return -EACCES;
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "safesetid",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
>> @@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
>> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
>> {
>> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
>> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
>> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
>> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
>> safesetid_initialized = 1;
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index f2d4b20613c8..2bf21c726ba0 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
>> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
>> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
>> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>> /*
>> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
>> @@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
>> return 0;
>> }
>> +/*
>> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
>> + */
>> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
>> +
>> /**
>> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
>> * @hooks: the hooks to add
>> * @count: the number of hooks to add
>> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
>> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
>> *
>> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
>> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
>> + * for it in the lsmblob.
>> */
>> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> - char *lsm)
>> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
>> {
>> int i;
>> + WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
>> +
>> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
>> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
>> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
>> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
>> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
>> + lsmid->slot);
>> + }
>> +
>> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
>> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
>> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
>> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
>> }
>> @@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>> * and fix this up afterwards.
>> */
>> if (slab_is_available()) {
>> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
>> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -2075,7 +2093,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
>> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>> }
>> @@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
>> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>> }
>> @@ -2579,9 +2597,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
>> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + bool one_is_good = false;
>> + int rc = 0;
>> + int trc;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
>> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + if (trc == 0)
>> + one_is_good = true;
>> + else
>> + rc = trc;
>> + }
>> + if (one_is_good)
>> + return 0;
>> + return rc;
>> }
>> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> @@ -2589,14 +2625,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
>> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
>> }
>> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
>> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
>> + continue;
>> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + }
>> }
>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
>> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + int rc;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> + continue;
>> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
>> + continue;
>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
>> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index dffde40d367e..d67bcd1aeaf5 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -7009,6 +7009,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "selinux",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
>> * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
>> @@ -7324,7 +7329,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>> hashtab_cache_init();
>> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
>> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
>> + &selinux_lsmid);
>> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
>> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index d58b50006e79..ff832d47479f 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
>> };
>> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "smack",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
>> /*
>> * Register with LSM
>> */
>> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
>> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
>> smack_enabled = 1;
>> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
>> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
>> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
>> @@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>> }
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> /*
>> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
>> * registering TOMOYO.
>> @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
>> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
>> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
>> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
>> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
>> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
>> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
>> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
>> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
>> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
>> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
>> return rc;
>> }
>> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lsm = "yama",
>> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
>> +};
>> +
>> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
>> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
>> static int __init yama_init(void)
>> {
>> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
>> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
>> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
>> yama_init_sysctl();
>> return 0;
>> }
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 04/28] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Provide interfaces to map LSM slot numbers and LSM names.
Update the LSM registration code to save this information.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1a7e5bf36a82..6da0c12c9170 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/* Map lsm names to blob slot numbers */
+extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
+extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2bf21c726ba0..03a0af7e9e81 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -477,6 +477,50 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_slot - Report the slot number for a security module
+ * @name: name of the security module
+ *
+ * Look up the slot number for the named security module.
+ * Returns the slot number or LSMBLOB_INVALID if @name is not
+ * a registered security module name.
+ */
+int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < lsm_slot; i++)
+ if (strcmp(lsm_slotlist[i]->lsm, name) == 0)
+ return i;
+
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_slot_to_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a interface LSM slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 04/28] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
@ 2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Provide interfaces to map LSM slot numbers and LSM names.
Update the LSM registration code to save this information.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1a7e5bf36a82..6da0c12c9170 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/* Map lsm names to blob slot numbers */
+extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
+extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2bf21c726ba0..03a0af7e9e81 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -477,6 +477,50 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_slot - Report the slot number for a security module
+ * @name: name of the security module
+ *
+ * Look up the slot number for the named security module.
+ * Returns the slot number or LSMBLOB_INVALID if @name is not
+ * a registered security module name.
+ */
+int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < lsm_slot; i++)
+ if (strcmp(lsm_slotlist[i]->lsm, name) == 0)
+ return i;
+
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_slot_to_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a interface LSM slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 05/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
+ module specified is not active on the system the rule
+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6da0c12c9170..1edbb362ee72 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1977,25 +1977,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 320ca80aacab..22952efcc0b0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
int pcr;
unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
+ int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
@@ -286,6 +287,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+ ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+ if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+ ima_rules_lsm = 0;
+ pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
{
struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -357,7 +372,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -408,7 +423,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -624,14 +640,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
default:
break;
@@ -1026,7 +1044,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
- Opt_label, Opt_err
+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1074,6 +1092,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -1092,7 +1111,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1781,6 +1801,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
&(template_desc->num_fields));
entry->template = template_desc;
break;
+ case Opt_lsm:
+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+ if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ entry->which = result;
+ result = 0;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1817,6 +1850,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
+ int i;
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1834,6 +1868,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
+
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -2151,6 +2188,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+ if (entry->which >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
rcu_read_unlock();
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 03a0af7e9e81..29fc50322b1f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2708,19 +2708,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
* The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
* the audit subsystem.
*/
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 05/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
+ module specified is not active on the system the rule
+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6da0c12c9170..1edbb362ee72 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1977,25 +1977,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 320ca80aacab..22952efcc0b0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
int pcr;
unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
+ int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
@@ -286,6 +287,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+ ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+ if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+ ima_rules_lsm = 0;
+ pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
{
struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -357,7 +372,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -408,7 +423,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -624,14 +640,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
default:
break;
@@ -1026,7 +1044,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
- Opt_label, Opt_err
+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1074,6 +1092,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -1092,7 +1111,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1781,6 +1801,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
&(template_desc->num_fields));
entry->template = template_desc;
break;
+ case Opt_lsm:
+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+ if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ entry->which = result;
+ result = 0;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1817,6 +1850,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
+ int i;
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1834,6 +1868,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
+
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -2151,6 +2188,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+ if (entry->which >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
rcu_read_unlock();
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 03a0af7e9e81..29fc50322b1f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2708,19 +2708,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
* The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
* the audit subsystem.
*/
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 05/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
@ 2022-02-22 23:20 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-22 23:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar; +Cc: Casey Schaufler
On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
> allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
> security module to use for a particular rule.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Is there a chance that someone from the integrity team
could have a review off this patch in particular and the
set in general? Please?
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
> 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
> [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
> lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
> - [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
> option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
> [appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
> base:
> @@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
>
> measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
>
> + It is possible to explicitly specify which security
> + module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
> + module specified is not active on the system the rule
> + will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
> + security module registered on the system will be assumed.
> +
> Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
>
> measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 6da0c12c9170..1edbb362ee72 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1977,25 +1977,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> { }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 320ca80aacab..22952efcc0b0 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
> int pcr;
> unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
> + int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
> struct {
> void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
> char *args_p; /* audit value */
> @@ -286,6 +287,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> }
> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>
> +static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
> +
> +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
> +{
> + ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
> + if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
> + ima_rules_lsm = 0;
> + pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
> + }
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
> +
> static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
> {
> struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
> @@ -357,7 +372,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> int i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
> kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> }
> }
> @@ -408,7 +423,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>
> ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
> - &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
> + &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
> @@ -624,14 +640,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> default:
> break;
> @@ -1026,7 +1044,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
> Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
> Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
> Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> - Opt_label, Opt_err
> + Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
> };
>
> static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -1074,6 +1092,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
> {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
> + {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
> {Opt_err, NULL}
> };
>
> @@ -1092,7 +1111,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
> result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
> - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
> + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
> @@ -1781,6 +1801,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> &(template_desc->num_fields));
> entry->template = template_desc;
> break;
> + case Opt_lsm:
> + result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
> + if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
> + entry->which = result;
> + result = 0;
> + break;
> case Opt_err:
> ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
> result = -EINVAL;
> @@ -1817,6 +1850,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> ssize_t result, len;
> int audit_info = 0;
> + int i;
>
> p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
> len = strlen(p) + 1;
> @@ -1834,6 +1868,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
>
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
>
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
> +
> result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
> if (result) {
> ima_free_rule(entry);
> @@ -2151,6 +2188,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
> if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
> seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
> + if (entry->which >= 0)
> + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
> rcu_read_unlock();
> seq_puts(m, "\n");
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 03a0af7e9e81..29fc50322b1f 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2708,19 +2708,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> * the audit subsystem.
> */
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
> + return;
> + }
> + }
> }
>
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1edbb362ee72..3b734ebb7e29 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1946,7 +1946,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
@@ -1963,7 +1963,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
@@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f1c26a322f9d..e5ca89160b5f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 29fc50322b1f..5b2dc867c57d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
@@ -2694,7 +2694,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
continue;
if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1edbb362ee72..3b734ebb7e29 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1946,7 +1946,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
@@ -1963,7 +1963,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
@@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f1c26a322f9d..e5ca89160b5f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 29fc50322b1f..5b2dc867c57d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
@@ -2694,7 +2694,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
continue;
if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 07/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index fcbc6885cc09..eb02e8514239 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3b734ebb7e29..4a256d302d97 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
@@ -1104,7 +1104,8 @@ static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*secid = 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 473d17c431f3..e5e41bd4efc3 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -772,14 +772,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -795,6 +795,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -802,7 +803,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5b2dc867c57d..2178235529eb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1803,9 +1803,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 07/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index fcbc6885cc09..eb02e8514239 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3b734ebb7e29..4a256d302d97 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
@@ -1104,7 +1104,8 @@ static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*secid = 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 473d17c431f3..e5e41bd4efc3 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -772,14 +772,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -795,6 +795,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -802,7 +803,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5b2dc867c57d..2178235529eb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1803,9 +1803,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel
Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4a256d302d97..085565914515 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -198,6 +198,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -528,7 +549,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1383,7 +1405,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e5e41bd4efc3..a112ea708b6e 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -796,14 +796,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 5ab4df56c945..6763188169a3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -861,21 +861,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 498a0bf6f044..87ca3a537d1c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8490e46359ae..f3e2cde76919 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -904,13 +904,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -931,7 +936,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -953,13 +958,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2178235529eb..0fc75d355e9d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2198,10 +2198,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2352,10 +2364,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
+ * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
+ * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel, sds
Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4a256d302d97..085565914515 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -198,6 +198,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -528,7 +549,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1383,7 +1405,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e5e41bd4efc3..a112ea708b6e 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -796,14 +796,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 5ab4df56c945..6763188169a3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -861,21 +861,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 498a0bf6f044..87ca3a537d1c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8490e46359ae..f3e2cde76919 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -904,13 +904,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -931,7 +936,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -953,13 +958,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2178235529eb..0fc75d355e9d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2198,10 +2198,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2352,10 +2364,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
+ * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
+ * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-
kernel/audit.c | 21 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++----
12 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8351c5638880..381a4fddd4a5 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2981,10 +2981,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 085565914515..44843d665f35 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1398,7 +1398,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..23a35ff1b3f2 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,12 +92,17 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one security module using the secid,
+ * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index e4bbe2c70c26..40d8cb824eae 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1440,7 +1440,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2146,12 +2155,20 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e5ca89160b5f..5edb16cb12e0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -679,6 +679,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
@@ -695,6 +702,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -1118,6 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1127,7 +1142,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1371,8 +1387,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1533,9 +1551,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 445a9ecaefa1..933a8f94f93a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
@@ -138,7 +139,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index ac438370f94a..073510c94b56 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -341,8 +341,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -650,8 +655,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3e1afd10a9b6..bba3a66f5636 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index ea2d9c2a44cf..a9f7c9418ad3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f3e2cde76919..0a99663e6edb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -493,8 +499,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -536,6 +547,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -553,8 +565,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1080,6 +1097,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1134,7 +1152,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0fc75d355e9d..ffdd366d2098 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2179,17 +2179,16 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
- /*
- * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
- * LSM hook is not "stackable").
- */
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
return rc;
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel, sds
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-
kernel/audit.c | 21 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++----
12 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8351c5638880..381a4fddd4a5 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2981,10 +2981,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 085565914515..44843d665f35 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1398,7 +1398,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..23a35ff1b3f2 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,12 +92,17 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one security module using the secid,
+ * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index e4bbe2c70c26..40d8cb824eae 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1440,7 +1440,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2146,12 +2155,20 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e5ca89160b5f..5edb16cb12e0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -679,6 +679,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
@@ -695,6 +702,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -1118,6 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1127,7 +1142,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1371,8 +1387,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1533,9 +1551,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 445a9ecaefa1..933a8f94f93a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
@@ -138,7 +139,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index ac438370f94a..073510c94b56 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -341,8 +341,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -650,8 +655,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3e1afd10a9b6..bba3a66f5636 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index ea2d9c2a44cf..a9f7c9418ad3 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f3e2cde76919..0a99663e6edb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -493,8 +499,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -536,6 +547,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -553,8 +565,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1080,6 +1097,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1134,7 +1152,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0fc75d355e9d..ffdd366d2098 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2179,17 +2179,16 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
- /*
- * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
- * LSM hook is not "stackable").
- */
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
return rc;
}
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 44843d665f35..62178dd4ec08 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1276,9 +1276,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5edb16cb12e0..598e0de45b04 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2610,12 +2610,17 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ffdd366d2098..815200684bcf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1999,10 +1999,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 44843d665f35..62178dd4ec08 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1276,9 +1276,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5edb16cb12e0..598e0de45b04 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2610,12 +2610,17 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ffdd366d2098..815200684bcf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1999,10 +1999,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, linux-integrity,
netdev
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +--
include/linux/security.h | 13 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 16 +++-----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 55 +++++++++++++++------------
security/security.c | 25 +++++++++---
10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 381a4fddd4a5..bae8440ffc73 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2980,16 +2980,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
+ u32 secid;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
/*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
* provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
* is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
* which means that the one expected by
* security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 62178dd4ec08..d7781bda147f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -501,8 +501,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob);
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1198,14 +1198,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 40d8cb824eae..17ac6e74b5bd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2154,19 +2154,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
@@ -2375,6 +2368,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2385,7 +2379,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 15cd4fe35e9c..39ded5cb2429 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1339,7 +1339,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1369,8 +1368,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 598e0de45b04..2570bf5979e0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -676,17 +675,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* here even though it always refs
* @current's creds
*/
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
@@ -2712,12 +2703,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2733,6 +2727,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2744,7 +2739,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2765,7 +2762,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 0a99663e6edb..c86df6ead742 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1562,11 +1562,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb..3d5610ed5f0e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
*/
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..217d20c60e1d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -71,15 +71,17 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
- func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+ blob.secid[0], func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8c6e4514d494..6abbaa97bbeb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -436,9 +437,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -446,11 +447,11 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+ current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
+ MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -486,10 +487,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -510,10 +513,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -689,7 +693,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -709,8 +713,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
0, MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -739,7 +744,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -752,9 +757,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+ size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -882,7 +888,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -905,9 +911,10 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 815200684bcf..e33fa677181d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1909,17 +1909,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.current_getsecid_subj,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.current_getsecid_subj(&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity, sds
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +--
include/linux/security.h | 13 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 16 +++-----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 55 +++++++++++++++------------
security/security.c | 25 +++++++++---
10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 381a4fddd4a5..bae8440ffc73 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2980,16 +2980,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
+ u32 secid;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
/*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
* provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
* is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
* which means that the one expected by
* security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 62178dd4ec08..d7781bda147f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -501,8 +501,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob);
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1198,14 +1198,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 40d8cb824eae..17ac6e74b5bd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2154,19 +2154,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
@@ -2375,6 +2368,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2385,7 +2379,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 15cd4fe35e9c..39ded5cb2429 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1339,7 +1339,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1369,8 +1368,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 598e0de45b04..2570bf5979e0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -676,17 +675,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* here even though it always refs
* @current's creds
*/
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
@@ -2712,12 +2703,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2733,6 +2727,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2744,7 +2739,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2765,7 +2762,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 0a99663e6edb..c86df6ead742 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1562,11 +1562,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
+ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb..3d5610ed5f0e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
*/
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..217d20c60e1d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -71,15 +71,17 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
- func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+ blob.secid[0], func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8c6e4514d494..6abbaa97bbeb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -436,9 +437,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -446,11 +447,11 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+ current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
+ MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -486,10 +487,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -510,10 +513,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -689,7 +693,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -709,8 +713,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
0, MAY_READ, func);
}
@@ -739,7 +744,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -752,9 +757,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
+ size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -882,7 +888,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -905,9 +911,10 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 815200684bcf..e33fa677181d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1909,17 +1909,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.current_getsecid_subj,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.current_getsecid_subj(&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, linux-integrity
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ++++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d7781bda147f..b0d1abd082a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -1001,9 +1001,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 2570bf5979e0..6cd15abb99c7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2248,13 +2248,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = blob.secid[0];
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 22952efcc0b0..34ecdd7b01f5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -637,8 +637,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(lsmdata.secid[rule->which],
+ rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
rule->which);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e33fa677181d..0253c925a272 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1553,9 +1553,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity, sds
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ++++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d7781bda147f..b0d1abd082a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -1001,9 +1001,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 2570bf5979e0..6cd15abb99c7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2248,13 +2248,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = blob.secid[0];
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 22952efcc0b0..34ecdd7b01f5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -637,8 +637,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(lsmdata.secid[rule->which],
+ rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
rule->which);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e33fa677181d..0253c925a272 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1553,9 +1553,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, linux-integrity
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +----------
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index bae8440ffc73..26838061defb 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2982,18 +2982,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- u32 secid;
- security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b0d1abd082a8..821e6011c8fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 17ac6e74b5bd..c7cd039e258b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-static u32 audit_sig_sid;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1439,29 +1439,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2368,7 +2360,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2379,9 +2370,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index c4498090a5bd..527d4c4acb12 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6cd15abb99c7..c4c3666576c3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
ctx->target_pid = 0;
ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
- ctx->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&ctx->target_lsm, 0);
ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
@@ -1116,14 +1116,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1132,9 +1132,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1762,7 +1761,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1771,7 +1770,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -2707,15 +2706,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2731,7 +2727,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2743,9 +2738,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2766,9 +2759,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 6abbaa97bbeb..93c6addd8389 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -486,7 +486,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
@@ -496,9 +495,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0253c925a272..27154c39d109 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1803,10 +1803,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity, sds
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +----------
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index bae8440ffc73..26838061defb 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2982,18 +2982,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- u32 secid;
- security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b0d1abd082a8..821e6011c8fe 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 17ac6e74b5bd..c7cd039e258b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-static u32 audit_sig_sid;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1439,29 +1439,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2368,7 +2360,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2379,9 +2370,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index c4498090a5bd..527d4c4acb12 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6cd15abb99c7..c4c3666576c3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
ctx->target_pid = 0;
ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
- ctx->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&ctx->target_lsm, 0);
ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
@@ -1116,14 +1116,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1132,9 +1132,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1762,7 +1761,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1771,7 +1770,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -2707,15 +2706,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2731,7 +2727,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2743,9 +2738,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2766,9 +2759,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 6abbaa97bbeb..93c6addd8389 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -486,7 +486,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
@@ -496,9 +495,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0253c925a272..27154c39d109 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1803,10 +1803,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-03 5:23 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 5:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler; +Cc: llvm, kbuild-all
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test ERROR on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2 next-20220202]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: s390-randconfig-r044-20220131 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220203/202202031330.WMTPFP6i-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project a73e4ce6a59b01f0e37037761c1e6889d539d233)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install s390 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-s390x-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/b49b8b5cf8bdf606d1027636cf5ad2fd1cf20cb4
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout b49b8b5cf8bdf606d1027636cf5ad2fd1cf20cb4
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=s390 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/android/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> drivers/android/binder.c:2986:38: error: incompatible pointer types passing 'struct lsmblob *' to parameter of type 'u32 *' (aka 'unsigned int *') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1125:70: note: passing argument to parameter 'secid' here
static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
^
1 error generated.
vim +2986 drivers/android/binder.c
2699
2700 static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
2701 struct binder_thread *thread,
2702 struct binder_transaction_data *tr, int reply,
2703 binder_size_t extra_buffers_size)
2704 {
2705 int ret;
2706 struct binder_transaction *t;
2707 struct binder_work *w;
2708 struct binder_work *tcomplete;
2709 binder_size_t buffer_offset = 0;
2710 binder_size_t off_start_offset, off_end_offset;
2711 binder_size_t off_min;
2712 binder_size_t sg_buf_offset, sg_buf_end_offset;
2713 binder_size_t user_offset = 0;
2714 struct binder_proc *target_proc = NULL;
2715 struct binder_thread *target_thread = NULL;
2716 struct binder_node *target_node = NULL;
2717 struct binder_transaction *in_reply_to = NULL;
2718 struct binder_transaction_log_entry *e;
2719 uint32_t return_error = 0;
2720 uint32_t return_error_param = 0;
2721 uint32_t return_error_line = 0;
2722 binder_size_t last_fixup_obj_off = 0;
2723 binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
2724 struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
2725 int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
2726 char *secctx = NULL;
2727 u32 secctx_sz = 0;
2728 struct list_head sgc_head;
2729 struct list_head pf_head;
2730 const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
2731 (uintptr_t)tr->data.ptr.buffer;
2732 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgc_head);
2733 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pf_head);
2734
2735 e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
2736 e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
2737 e->call_type = reply ? 2 : !!(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY);
2738 e->from_proc = proc->pid;
2739 e->from_thread = thread->pid;
2740 e->target_handle = tr->target.handle;
2741 e->data_size = tr->data_size;
2742 e->offsets_size = tr->offsets_size;
2743 strscpy(e->context_name, proc->context->name, BINDERFS_MAX_NAME);
2744
2745 if (reply) {
2746 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
2747 in_reply_to = thread->transaction_stack;
2748 if (in_reply_to == NULL) {
2749 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2750 binder_user_error("%d:%d got reply transaction with no transaction stack\n",
2751 proc->pid, thread->pid);
2752 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2753 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2754 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2755 goto err_empty_call_stack;
2756 }
2757 if (in_reply_to->to_thread != thread) {
2758 spin_lock(&in_reply_to->lock);
2759 binder_user_error("%d:%d got reply transaction with bad transaction stack, transaction %d has target %d:%d\n",
2760 proc->pid, thread->pid, in_reply_to->debug_id,
2761 in_reply_to->to_proc ?
2762 in_reply_to->to_proc->pid : 0,
2763 in_reply_to->to_thread ?
2764 in_reply_to->to_thread->pid : 0);
2765 spin_unlock(&in_reply_to->lock);
2766 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2767 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2768 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2769 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2770 in_reply_to = NULL;
2771 goto err_bad_call_stack;
2772 }
2773 thread->transaction_stack = in_reply_to->to_parent;
2774 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2775 binder_set_nice(in_reply_to->saved_priority);
2776 target_thread = binder_get_txn_from_and_acq_inner(in_reply_to);
2777 if (target_thread == NULL) {
2778 /* annotation for sparse */
2779 __release(&target_thread->proc->inner_lock);
2780 return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
2781 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2782 goto err_dead_binder;
2783 }
2784 if (target_thread->transaction_stack != in_reply_to) {
2785 binder_user_error("%d:%d got reply transaction with bad target transaction stack %d, expected %d\n",
2786 proc->pid, thread->pid,
2787 target_thread->transaction_stack ?
2788 target_thread->transaction_stack->debug_id : 0,
2789 in_reply_to->debug_id);
2790 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_thread->proc);
2791 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2792 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2793 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2794 in_reply_to = NULL;
2795 target_thread = NULL;
2796 goto err_dead_binder;
2797 }
2798 target_proc = target_thread->proc;
2799 target_proc->tmp_ref++;
2800 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_thread->proc);
2801 } else {
2802 if (tr->target.handle) {
2803 struct binder_ref *ref;
2804
2805 /*
2806 * There must already be a strong ref
2807 * on this node. If so, do a strong
2808 * increment on the node to ensure it
2809 * stays alive until the transaction is
2810 * done.
2811 */
2812 binder_proc_lock(proc);
2813 ref = binder_get_ref_olocked(proc, tr->target.handle,
2814 true);
2815 if (ref) {
2816 target_node = binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
2817 ref->node, &target_proc,
2818 &return_error);
2819 } else {
2820 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to invalid handle, %u\n",
2821 proc->pid, thread->pid, tr->target.handle);
2822 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2823 }
2824 binder_proc_unlock(proc);
2825 } else {
2826 mutex_lock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
2827 target_node = context->binder_context_mgr_node;
2828 if (target_node)
2829 target_node = binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
2830 target_node, &target_proc,
2831 &return_error);
2832 else
2833 return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
2834 mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
2835 if (target_node && target_proc->pid == proc->pid) {
2836 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to context manager from process owning it\n",
2837 proc->pid, thread->pid);
2838 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2839 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
2840 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2841 goto err_invalid_target_handle;
2842 }
2843 }
2844 if (!target_node) {
2845 /*
2846 * return_error is set above
2847 */
2848 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
2849 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2850 goto err_dead_binder;
2851 }
2852 e->to_node = target_node->debug_id;
2853 if (WARN_ON(proc == target_proc)) {
2854 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2855 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
2856 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2857 goto err_invalid_target_handle;
2858 }
2859 if (security_binder_transaction(proc->cred,
2860 target_proc->cred) < 0) {
2861 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2862 return_error_param = -EPERM;
2863 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2864 goto err_invalid_target_handle;
2865 }
2866 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
2867
2868 w = list_first_entry_or_null(&thread->todo,
2869 struct binder_work, entry);
2870 if (!(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY) && w &&
2871 w->type == BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION) {
2872 /*
2873 * Do not allow new outgoing transaction from a
2874 * thread that has a transaction at the head of
2875 * its todo list. Only need to check the head
2876 * because binder_select_thread_ilocked picks a
2877 * thread from proc->waiting_threads to enqueue
2878 * the transaction, and nothing is queued to the
2879 * todo list while the thread is on waiting_threads.
2880 */
2881 binder_user_error("%d:%d new transaction not allowed when there is a transaction on thread todo\n",
2882 proc->pid, thread->pid);
2883 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2884 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2885 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2886 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2887 goto err_bad_todo_list;
2888 }
2889
2890 if (!(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY) && thread->transaction_stack) {
2891 struct binder_transaction *tmp;
2892
2893 tmp = thread->transaction_stack;
2894 if (tmp->to_thread != thread) {
2895 spin_lock(&tmp->lock);
2896 binder_user_error("%d:%d got new transaction with bad transaction stack, transaction %d has target %d:%d\n",
2897 proc->pid, thread->pid, tmp->debug_id,
2898 tmp->to_proc ? tmp->to_proc->pid : 0,
2899 tmp->to_thread ?
2900 tmp->to_thread->pid : 0);
2901 spin_unlock(&tmp->lock);
2902 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2903 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2904 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2905 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2906 goto err_bad_call_stack;
2907 }
2908 while (tmp) {
2909 struct binder_thread *from;
2910
2911 spin_lock(&tmp->lock);
2912 from = tmp->from;
2913 if (from && from->proc == target_proc) {
2914 atomic_inc(&from->tmp_ref);
2915 target_thread = from;
2916 spin_unlock(&tmp->lock);
2917 break;
2918 }
2919 spin_unlock(&tmp->lock);
2920 tmp = tmp->from_parent;
2921 }
2922 }
2923 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2924 }
2925 if (target_thread)
2926 e->to_thread = target_thread->pid;
2927 e->to_proc = target_proc->pid;
2928
2929 /* TODO: reuse incoming transaction for reply */
2930 t = kzalloc(sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL);
2931 if (t == NULL) {
2932 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2933 return_error_param = -ENOMEM;
2934 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2935 goto err_alloc_t_failed;
2936 }
2937 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&t->fd_fixups);
2938 binder_stats_created(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
2939 spin_lock_init(&t->lock);
2940
2941 tcomplete = kzalloc(sizeof(*tcomplete), GFP_KERNEL);
2942 if (tcomplete == NULL) {
2943 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2944 return_error_param = -ENOMEM;
2945 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2946 goto err_alloc_tcomplete_failed;
2947 }
2948 binder_stats_created(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
2949
2950 t->debug_id = t_debug_id;
2951
2952 if (reply)
2953 binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION,
2954 "%d:%d BC_REPLY %d -> %d:%d, data %016llx-%016llx size %lld-%lld-%lld\n",
2955 proc->pid, thread->pid, t->debug_id,
2956 target_proc->pid, target_thread->pid,
2957 (u64)tr->data.ptr.buffer,
2958 (u64)tr->data.ptr.offsets,
2959 (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
2960 (u64)extra_buffers_size);
2961 else
2962 binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION,
2963 "%d:%d BC_TRANSACTION %d -> %d - node %d, data %016llx-%016llx size %lld-%lld-%lld\n",
2964 proc->pid, thread->pid, t->debug_id,
2965 target_proc->pid, target_node->debug_id,
2966 (u64)tr->data.ptr.buffer,
2967 (u64)tr->data.ptr.offsets,
2968 (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
2969 (u64)extra_buffers_size);
2970
2971 if (!reply && !(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY))
2972 t->from = thread;
2973 else
2974 t->from = NULL;
2975 t->sender_euid = task_euid(proc->tsk);
2976 t->to_proc = target_proc;
2977 t->to_thread = target_thread;
2978 t->code = tr->code;
2979 t->flags = tr->flags;
2980 t->priority = task_nice(current);
2981
2982 if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
2983 struct lsmblob blob;
2984 size_t added_size;
2985
> 2986 security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
2987 ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
2988 if (ret) {
2989 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2990 return_error_param = ret;
2991 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2992 goto err_get_secctx_failed;
2993 }
2994 added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
2995 extra_buffers_size += added_size;
2996 if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
2997 /* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
2998 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2999 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3000 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3001 goto err_bad_extra_size;
3002 }
3003 }
3004
3005 trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
3006
3007 t->buffer = binder_alloc_new_buf(&target_proc->alloc, tr->data_size,
3008 tr->offsets_size, extra_buffers_size,
3009 !reply && (t->flags & TF_ONE_WAY), current->tgid);
3010 if (IS_ERR(t->buffer)) {
3011 /*
3012 * -ESRCH indicates VMA cleared. The target is dying.
3013 */
3014 return_error_param = PTR_ERR(t->buffer);
3015 return_error = return_error_param == -ESRCH ?
3016 BR_DEAD_REPLY : BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3017 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3018 t->buffer = NULL;
3019 goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
3020 }
3021 if (secctx) {
3022 int err;
3023 size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
3024 ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
3025 ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
3026 ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
3027
3028 t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
3029 err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3030 t->buffer, buf_offset,
3031 secctx, secctx_sz);
3032 if (err) {
3033 t->security_ctx = 0;
3034 WARN_ON(1);
3035 }
3036 security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
3037 secctx = NULL;
3038 }
3039 t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
3040 t->buffer->transaction = t;
3041 t->buffer->target_node = target_node;
3042 t->buffer->clear_on_free = !!(t->flags & TF_CLEAR_BUF);
3043 trace_binder_transaction_alloc_buf(t->buffer);
3044
3045 if (binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(
3046 &target_proc->alloc,
3047 t->buffer,
3048 ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)),
3049 (const void __user *)
3050 (uintptr_t)tr->data.ptr.offsets,
3051 tr->offsets_size)) {
3052 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offsets ptr\n",
3053 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3054 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3055 return_error_param = -EFAULT;
3056 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3057 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3058 }
3059 if (!IS_ALIGNED(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(binder_size_t))) {
3060 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offsets size, %lld\n",
3061 proc->pid, thread->pid, (u64)tr->offsets_size);
3062 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3063 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3064 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3065 goto err_bad_offset;
3066 }
3067 if (!IS_ALIGNED(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(u64))) {
3068 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with unaligned buffers size, %lld\n",
3069 proc->pid, thread->pid,
3070 (u64)extra_buffers_size);
3071 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3072 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3073 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3074 goto err_bad_offset;
3075 }
3076 off_start_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *));
3077 buffer_offset = off_start_offset;
3078 off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
3079 sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
3080 sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
3081 ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
3082 off_min = 0;
3083 for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
3084 buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
3085 struct binder_object_header *hdr;
3086 size_t object_size;
3087 struct binder_object object;
3088 binder_size_t object_offset;
3089 binder_size_t copy_size;
3090
3091 if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3092 &object_offset,
3093 t->buffer,
3094 buffer_offset,
3095 sizeof(object_offset))) {
3096 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3097 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3098 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3099 goto err_bad_offset;
3100 }
3101
3102 /*
3103 * Copy the source user buffer up to the next object
3104 * that will be processed.
3105 */
3106 copy_size = object_offset - user_offset;
3107 if (copy_size && (user_offset > object_offset ||
3108 binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(
3109 &target_proc->alloc,
3110 t->buffer, user_offset,
3111 user_buffer + user_offset,
3112 copy_size))) {
3113 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid data ptr\n",
3114 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3115 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3116 return_error_param = -EFAULT;
3117 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3118 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3119 }
3120 object_size = binder_get_object(target_proc, user_buffer,
3121 t->buffer, object_offset, &object);
3122 if (object_size == 0 || object_offset < off_min) {
3123 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offset (%lld, min %lld max %lld) or object.\n",
3124 proc->pid, thread->pid,
3125 (u64)object_offset,
3126 (u64)off_min,
3127 (u64)t->buffer->data_size);
3128 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3129 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3130 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3131 goto err_bad_offset;
3132 }
3133 /*
3134 * Set offset to the next buffer fragment to be
3135 * copied
3136 */
3137 user_offset = object_offset + object_size;
3138
3139 hdr = &object.hdr;
3140 off_min = object_offset + object_size;
3141 switch (hdr->type) {
3142 case BINDER_TYPE_BINDER:
3143 case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER: {
3144 struct flat_binder_object *fp;
3145
3146 fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
3147 ret = binder_translate_binder(fp, t, thread);
3148
3149 if (ret < 0 ||
3150 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3151 t->buffer,
3152 object_offset,
3153 fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
3154 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3155 return_error_param = ret;
3156 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3157 goto err_translate_failed;
3158 }
3159 } break;
3160 case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
3161 case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
3162 struct flat_binder_object *fp;
3163
3164 fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
3165 ret = binder_translate_handle(fp, t, thread);
3166 if (ret < 0 ||
3167 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3168 t->buffer,
3169 object_offset,
3170 fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
3171 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3172 return_error_param = ret;
3173 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3174 goto err_translate_failed;
3175 }
3176 } break;
3177
3178 case BINDER_TYPE_FD: {
3179 struct binder_fd_object *fp = to_binder_fd_object(hdr);
3180 binder_size_t fd_offset = object_offset +
3181 (uintptr_t)&fp->fd - (uintptr_t)fp;
3182 int ret = binder_translate_fd(fp->fd, fd_offset, t,
3183 thread, in_reply_to);
3184
3185 fp->pad_binder = 0;
3186 if (ret < 0 ||
3187 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3188 t->buffer,
3189 object_offset,
3190 fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
3191 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3192 return_error_param = ret;
3193 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3194 goto err_translate_failed;
3195 }
3196 } break;
3197 case BINDER_TYPE_FDA: {
3198 struct binder_object ptr_object;
3199 binder_size_t parent_offset;
3200 struct binder_object user_object;
3201 size_t user_parent_size;
3202 struct binder_fd_array_object *fda =
3203 to_binder_fd_array_object(hdr);
3204 size_t num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) /
3205 sizeof(binder_size_t);
3206 struct binder_buffer_object *parent =
3207 binder_validate_ptr(target_proc, t->buffer,
3208 &ptr_object, fda->parent,
3209 off_start_offset,
3210 &parent_offset,
3211 num_valid);
3212 if (!parent) {
3213 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid parent offset or type\n",
3214 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3215 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3216 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3217 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3218 goto err_bad_parent;
3219 }
3220 if (!binder_validate_fixup(target_proc, t->buffer,
3221 off_start_offset,
3222 parent_offset,
3223 fda->parent_offset,
3224 last_fixup_obj_off,
3225 last_fixup_min_off)) {
3226 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with out-of-order buffer fixup\n",
3227 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3228 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3229 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3230 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3231 goto err_bad_parent;
3232 }
3233 /*
3234 * We need to read the user version of the parent
3235 * object to get the original user offset
3236 */
3237 user_parent_size =
3238 binder_get_object(proc, user_buffer, t->buffer,
3239 parent_offset, &user_object);
3240 if (user_parent_size != sizeof(user_object.bbo)) {
3241 binder_user_error("%d:%d invalid ptr object size: %zd vs %zd\n",
3242 proc->pid, thread->pid,
3243 user_parent_size,
3244 sizeof(user_object.bbo));
3245 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3246 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3247 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3248 goto err_bad_parent;
3249 }
3250 ret = binder_translate_fd_array(&pf_head, fda,
3251 user_buffer, parent,
3252 &user_object.bbo, t,
3253 thread, in_reply_to);
3254 if (!ret)
3255 ret = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3256 t->buffer,
3257 object_offset,
3258 fda, sizeof(*fda));
3259 if (ret) {
3260 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3261 return_error_param = ret > 0 ? -EINVAL : ret;
3262 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3263 goto err_translate_failed;
3264 }
3265 last_fixup_obj_off = parent_offset;
3266 last_fixup_min_off =
3267 fda->parent_offset + sizeof(u32) * fda->num_fds;
3268 } break;
3269 case BINDER_TYPE_PTR: {
3270 struct binder_buffer_object *bp =
3271 to_binder_buffer_object(hdr);
3272 size_t buf_left = sg_buf_end_offset - sg_buf_offset;
3273 size_t num_valid;
3274
3275 if (bp->length > buf_left) {
3276 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with too large buffer\n",
3277 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3278 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3279 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3280 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3281 goto err_bad_offset;
3282 }
3283 ret = binder_defer_copy(&sgc_head, sg_buf_offset,
3284 (const void __user *)(uintptr_t)bp->buffer,
3285 bp->length);
3286 if (ret) {
3287 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3288 return_error_param = ret;
3289 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3290 goto err_translate_failed;
3291 }
3292 /* Fixup buffer pointer to target proc address space */
3293 bp->buffer = (uintptr_t)
3294 t->buffer->user_data + sg_buf_offset;
3295 sg_buf_offset += ALIGN(bp->length, sizeof(u64));
3296
3297 num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) /
3298 sizeof(binder_size_t);
3299 ret = binder_fixup_parent(&pf_head, t,
3300 thread, bp,
3301 off_start_offset,
3302 num_valid,
3303 last_fixup_obj_off,
3304 last_fixup_min_off);
3305 if (ret < 0 ||
3306 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3307 t->buffer,
3308 object_offset,
3309 bp, sizeof(*bp))) {
3310 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3311 return_error_param = ret;
3312 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3313 goto err_translate_failed;
3314 }
3315 last_fixup_obj_off = object_offset;
3316 last_fixup_min_off = 0;
3317 } break;
3318 default:
3319 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid object type, %x\n",
3320 proc->pid, thread->pid, hdr->type);
3321 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3322 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3323 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3324 goto err_bad_object_type;
3325 }
3326 }
3327 /* Done processing objects, copy the rest of the buffer */
3328 if (binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(
3329 &target_proc->alloc,
3330 t->buffer, user_offset,
3331 user_buffer + user_offset,
3332 tr->data_size - user_offset)) {
3333 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid data ptr\n",
3334 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3335 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3336 return_error_param = -EFAULT;
3337 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3338 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3339 }
3340
3341 ret = binder_do_deferred_txn_copies(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer,
3342 &sgc_head, &pf_head);
3343 if (ret) {
3344 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offsets ptr\n",
3345 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3346 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3347 return_error_param = ret;
3348 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3349 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3350 }
3351 if (t->buffer->oneway_spam_suspect)
3352 tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT;
3353 else
3354 tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
3355 t->work.type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION;
3356
3357 if (reply) {
3358 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, tcomplete);
3359 binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
3360 if (target_thread->is_dead) {
3361 return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
3362 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
3363 goto err_dead_proc_or_thread;
3364 }
3365 BUG_ON(t->buffer->async_transaction != 0);
3366 binder_pop_transaction_ilocked(target_thread, in_reply_to);
3367 binder_enqueue_thread_work_ilocked(target_thread, &t->work);
3368 target_proc->outstanding_txns++;
3369 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
3370 wake_up_interruptible_sync(&target_thread->wait);
3371 binder_free_transaction(in_reply_to);
3372 } else if (!(t->flags & TF_ONE_WAY)) {
3373 BUG_ON(t->buffer->async_transaction != 0);
3374 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
3375 /*
3376 * Defer the TRANSACTION_COMPLETE, so we don't return to
3377 * userspace immediately; this allows the target process to
3378 * immediately start processing this transaction, reducing
3379 * latency. We will then return the TRANSACTION_COMPLETE when
3380 * the target replies (or there is an error).
3381 */
3382 binder_enqueue_deferred_thread_work_ilocked(thread, tcomplete);
3383 t->need_reply = 1;
3384 t->from_parent = thread->transaction_stack;
3385 thread->transaction_stack = t;
3386 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
3387 return_error = binder_proc_transaction(t,
3388 target_proc, target_thread);
3389 if (return_error) {
3390 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
3391 binder_pop_transaction_ilocked(thread, t);
3392 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
3393 goto err_dead_proc_or_thread;
3394 }
3395 } else {
3396 BUG_ON(target_node == NULL);
3397 BUG_ON(t->buffer->async_transaction != 1);
3398 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, tcomplete);
3399 return_error = binder_proc_transaction(t, target_proc, NULL);
3400 if (return_error)
3401 goto err_dead_proc_or_thread;
3402 }
3403 if (target_thread)
3404 binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
3405 binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);
3406 if (target_node)
3407 binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
3408 /*
3409 * write barrier to synchronize with initialization
3410 * of log entry
3411 */
3412 smp_wmb();
3413 WRITE_ONCE(e->debug_id_done, t_debug_id);
3414 return;
3415
3416 err_dead_proc_or_thread:
3417 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3418 binder_dequeue_work(proc, tcomplete);
3419 err_translate_failed:
3420 err_bad_object_type:
3421 err_bad_offset:
3422 err_bad_parent:
3423 err_copy_data_failed:
3424 binder_cleanup_deferred_txn_lists(&sgc_head, &pf_head);
3425 binder_free_txn_fixups(t);
3426 trace_binder_transaction_failed_buffer_release(t->buffer);
3427 binder_transaction_buffer_release(target_proc, NULL, t->buffer,
3428 buffer_offset, true);
3429 if (target_node)
3430 binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
3431 target_node = NULL;
3432 t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
3433 binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
3434 err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
3435 err_bad_extra_size:
3436 if (secctx)
3437 security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
3438 err_get_secctx_failed:
3439 kfree(tcomplete);
3440 binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
3441 err_alloc_tcomplete_failed:
3442 if (trace_binder_txn_latency_free_enabled())
3443 binder_txn_latency_free(t);
3444 kfree(t);
3445 binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
3446 err_alloc_t_failed:
3447 err_bad_todo_list:
3448 err_bad_call_stack:
3449 err_empty_call_stack:
3450 err_dead_binder:
3451 err_invalid_target_handle:
3452 if (target_thread)
3453 binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
3454 if (target_proc)
3455 binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);
3456 if (target_node) {
3457 binder_dec_node(target_node, 1, 0);
3458 binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
3459 }
3460
3461 binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_FAILED_TRANSACTION,
3462 "%d:%d transaction failed %d/%d, size %lld-%lld line %d\n",
3463 proc->pid, thread->pid, return_error, return_error_param,
3464 (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
3465 return_error_line);
3466
3467 {
3468 struct binder_transaction_log_entry *fe;
3469
3470 e->return_error = return_error;
3471 e->return_error_param = return_error_param;
3472 e->return_error_line = return_error_line;
3473 fe = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log_failed);
3474 *fe = *e;
3475 /*
3476 * write barrier to synchronize with initialization
3477 * of log entry
3478 */
3479 smp_wmb();
3480 WRITE_ONCE(e->debug_id_done, t_debug_id);
3481 WRITE_ONCE(fe->debug_id_done, t_debug_id);
3482 }
3483
3484 BUG_ON(thread->return_error.cmd != BR_OK);
3485 if (in_reply_to) {
3486 thread->return_error.cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
3487 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, &thread->return_error.work);
3488 binder_send_failed_reply(in_reply_to, return_error);
3489 } else {
3490 thread->return_error.cmd = return_error;
3491 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, &thread->return_error.work);
3492 }
3493 }
3494
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2022-02-03 5:23 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 5:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 34434 bytes --]
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test ERROR on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2 next-20220202]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: s390-randconfig-r044-20220131 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220203/202202031330.WMTPFP6i-lkp(a)intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project a73e4ce6a59b01f0e37037761c1e6889d539d233)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install s390 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-s390x-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/b49b8b5cf8bdf606d1027636cf5ad2fd1cf20cb4
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout b49b8b5cf8bdf606d1027636cf5ad2fd1cf20cb4
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=s390 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/android/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> drivers/android/binder.c:2986:38: error: incompatible pointer types passing 'struct lsmblob *' to parameter of type 'u32 *' (aka 'unsigned int *') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1125:70: note: passing argument to parameter 'secid' here
static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
^
1 error generated.
vim +2986 drivers/android/binder.c
2699
2700 static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
2701 struct binder_thread *thread,
2702 struct binder_transaction_data *tr, int reply,
2703 binder_size_t extra_buffers_size)
2704 {
2705 int ret;
2706 struct binder_transaction *t;
2707 struct binder_work *w;
2708 struct binder_work *tcomplete;
2709 binder_size_t buffer_offset = 0;
2710 binder_size_t off_start_offset, off_end_offset;
2711 binder_size_t off_min;
2712 binder_size_t sg_buf_offset, sg_buf_end_offset;
2713 binder_size_t user_offset = 0;
2714 struct binder_proc *target_proc = NULL;
2715 struct binder_thread *target_thread = NULL;
2716 struct binder_node *target_node = NULL;
2717 struct binder_transaction *in_reply_to = NULL;
2718 struct binder_transaction_log_entry *e;
2719 uint32_t return_error = 0;
2720 uint32_t return_error_param = 0;
2721 uint32_t return_error_line = 0;
2722 binder_size_t last_fixup_obj_off = 0;
2723 binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
2724 struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
2725 int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
2726 char *secctx = NULL;
2727 u32 secctx_sz = 0;
2728 struct list_head sgc_head;
2729 struct list_head pf_head;
2730 const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
2731 (uintptr_t)tr->data.ptr.buffer;
2732 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgc_head);
2733 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pf_head);
2734
2735 e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
2736 e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
2737 e->call_type = reply ? 2 : !!(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY);
2738 e->from_proc = proc->pid;
2739 e->from_thread = thread->pid;
2740 e->target_handle = tr->target.handle;
2741 e->data_size = tr->data_size;
2742 e->offsets_size = tr->offsets_size;
2743 strscpy(e->context_name, proc->context->name, BINDERFS_MAX_NAME);
2744
2745 if (reply) {
2746 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
2747 in_reply_to = thread->transaction_stack;
2748 if (in_reply_to == NULL) {
2749 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2750 binder_user_error("%d:%d got reply transaction with no transaction stack\n",
2751 proc->pid, thread->pid);
2752 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2753 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2754 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2755 goto err_empty_call_stack;
2756 }
2757 if (in_reply_to->to_thread != thread) {
2758 spin_lock(&in_reply_to->lock);
2759 binder_user_error("%d:%d got reply transaction with bad transaction stack, transaction %d has target %d:%d\n",
2760 proc->pid, thread->pid, in_reply_to->debug_id,
2761 in_reply_to->to_proc ?
2762 in_reply_to->to_proc->pid : 0,
2763 in_reply_to->to_thread ?
2764 in_reply_to->to_thread->pid : 0);
2765 spin_unlock(&in_reply_to->lock);
2766 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2767 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2768 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2769 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2770 in_reply_to = NULL;
2771 goto err_bad_call_stack;
2772 }
2773 thread->transaction_stack = in_reply_to->to_parent;
2774 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2775 binder_set_nice(in_reply_to->saved_priority);
2776 target_thread = binder_get_txn_from_and_acq_inner(in_reply_to);
2777 if (target_thread == NULL) {
2778 /* annotation for sparse */
2779 __release(&target_thread->proc->inner_lock);
2780 return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
2781 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2782 goto err_dead_binder;
2783 }
2784 if (target_thread->transaction_stack != in_reply_to) {
2785 binder_user_error("%d:%d got reply transaction with bad target transaction stack %d, expected %d\n",
2786 proc->pid, thread->pid,
2787 target_thread->transaction_stack ?
2788 target_thread->transaction_stack->debug_id : 0,
2789 in_reply_to->debug_id);
2790 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_thread->proc);
2791 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2792 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2793 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2794 in_reply_to = NULL;
2795 target_thread = NULL;
2796 goto err_dead_binder;
2797 }
2798 target_proc = target_thread->proc;
2799 target_proc->tmp_ref++;
2800 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_thread->proc);
2801 } else {
2802 if (tr->target.handle) {
2803 struct binder_ref *ref;
2804
2805 /*
2806 * There must already be a strong ref
2807 * on this node. If so, do a strong
2808 * increment on the node to ensure it
2809 * stays alive until the transaction is
2810 * done.
2811 */
2812 binder_proc_lock(proc);
2813 ref = binder_get_ref_olocked(proc, tr->target.handle,
2814 true);
2815 if (ref) {
2816 target_node = binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
2817 ref->node, &target_proc,
2818 &return_error);
2819 } else {
2820 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to invalid handle, %u\n",
2821 proc->pid, thread->pid, tr->target.handle);
2822 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2823 }
2824 binder_proc_unlock(proc);
2825 } else {
2826 mutex_lock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
2827 target_node = context->binder_context_mgr_node;
2828 if (target_node)
2829 target_node = binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
2830 target_node, &target_proc,
2831 &return_error);
2832 else
2833 return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
2834 mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
2835 if (target_node && target_proc->pid == proc->pid) {
2836 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to context manager from process owning it\n",
2837 proc->pid, thread->pid);
2838 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2839 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
2840 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2841 goto err_invalid_target_handle;
2842 }
2843 }
2844 if (!target_node) {
2845 /*
2846 * return_error is set above
2847 */
2848 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
2849 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2850 goto err_dead_binder;
2851 }
2852 e->to_node = target_node->debug_id;
2853 if (WARN_ON(proc == target_proc)) {
2854 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2855 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
2856 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2857 goto err_invalid_target_handle;
2858 }
2859 if (security_binder_transaction(proc->cred,
2860 target_proc->cred) < 0) {
2861 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2862 return_error_param = -EPERM;
2863 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2864 goto err_invalid_target_handle;
2865 }
2866 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
2867
2868 w = list_first_entry_or_null(&thread->todo,
2869 struct binder_work, entry);
2870 if (!(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY) && w &&
2871 w->type == BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION) {
2872 /*
2873 * Do not allow new outgoing transaction from a
2874 * thread that has a transaction at the head of
2875 * its todo list. Only need to check the head
2876 * because binder_select_thread_ilocked picks a
2877 * thread from proc->waiting_threads to enqueue
2878 * the transaction, and nothing is queued to the
2879 * todo list while the thread is on waiting_threads.
2880 */
2881 binder_user_error("%d:%d new transaction not allowed when there is a transaction on thread todo\n",
2882 proc->pid, thread->pid);
2883 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2884 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2885 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2886 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2887 goto err_bad_todo_list;
2888 }
2889
2890 if (!(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY) && thread->transaction_stack) {
2891 struct binder_transaction *tmp;
2892
2893 tmp = thread->transaction_stack;
2894 if (tmp->to_thread != thread) {
2895 spin_lock(&tmp->lock);
2896 binder_user_error("%d:%d got new transaction with bad transaction stack, transaction %d has target %d:%d\n",
2897 proc->pid, thread->pid, tmp->debug_id,
2898 tmp->to_proc ? tmp->to_proc->pid : 0,
2899 tmp->to_thread ?
2900 tmp->to_thread->pid : 0);
2901 spin_unlock(&tmp->lock);
2902 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2903 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2904 return_error_param = -EPROTO;
2905 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2906 goto err_bad_call_stack;
2907 }
2908 while (tmp) {
2909 struct binder_thread *from;
2910
2911 spin_lock(&tmp->lock);
2912 from = tmp->from;
2913 if (from && from->proc == target_proc) {
2914 atomic_inc(&from->tmp_ref);
2915 target_thread = from;
2916 spin_unlock(&tmp->lock);
2917 break;
2918 }
2919 spin_unlock(&tmp->lock);
2920 tmp = tmp->from_parent;
2921 }
2922 }
2923 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
2924 }
2925 if (target_thread)
2926 e->to_thread = target_thread->pid;
2927 e->to_proc = target_proc->pid;
2928
2929 /* TODO: reuse incoming transaction for reply */
2930 t = kzalloc(sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL);
2931 if (t == NULL) {
2932 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2933 return_error_param = -ENOMEM;
2934 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2935 goto err_alloc_t_failed;
2936 }
2937 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&t->fd_fixups);
2938 binder_stats_created(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
2939 spin_lock_init(&t->lock);
2940
2941 tcomplete = kzalloc(sizeof(*tcomplete), GFP_KERNEL);
2942 if (tcomplete == NULL) {
2943 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2944 return_error_param = -ENOMEM;
2945 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2946 goto err_alloc_tcomplete_failed;
2947 }
2948 binder_stats_created(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
2949
2950 t->debug_id = t_debug_id;
2951
2952 if (reply)
2953 binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION,
2954 "%d:%d BC_REPLY %d -> %d:%d, data %016llx-%016llx size %lld-%lld-%lld\n",
2955 proc->pid, thread->pid, t->debug_id,
2956 target_proc->pid, target_thread->pid,
2957 (u64)tr->data.ptr.buffer,
2958 (u64)tr->data.ptr.offsets,
2959 (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
2960 (u64)extra_buffers_size);
2961 else
2962 binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION,
2963 "%d:%d BC_TRANSACTION %d -> %d - node %d, data %016llx-%016llx size %lld-%lld-%lld\n",
2964 proc->pid, thread->pid, t->debug_id,
2965 target_proc->pid, target_node->debug_id,
2966 (u64)tr->data.ptr.buffer,
2967 (u64)tr->data.ptr.offsets,
2968 (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
2969 (u64)extra_buffers_size);
2970
2971 if (!reply && !(tr->flags & TF_ONE_WAY))
2972 t->from = thread;
2973 else
2974 t->from = NULL;
2975 t->sender_euid = task_euid(proc->tsk);
2976 t->to_proc = target_proc;
2977 t->to_thread = target_thread;
2978 t->code = tr->code;
2979 t->flags = tr->flags;
2980 t->priority = task_nice(current);
2981
2982 if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
2983 struct lsmblob blob;
2984 size_t added_size;
2985
> 2986 security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
2987 ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
2988 if (ret) {
2989 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2990 return_error_param = ret;
2991 return_error_line = __LINE__;
2992 goto err_get_secctx_failed;
2993 }
2994 added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
2995 extra_buffers_size += added_size;
2996 if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
2997 /* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
2998 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
2999 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3000 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3001 goto err_bad_extra_size;
3002 }
3003 }
3004
3005 trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
3006
3007 t->buffer = binder_alloc_new_buf(&target_proc->alloc, tr->data_size,
3008 tr->offsets_size, extra_buffers_size,
3009 !reply && (t->flags & TF_ONE_WAY), current->tgid);
3010 if (IS_ERR(t->buffer)) {
3011 /*
3012 * -ESRCH indicates VMA cleared. The target is dying.
3013 */
3014 return_error_param = PTR_ERR(t->buffer);
3015 return_error = return_error_param == -ESRCH ?
3016 BR_DEAD_REPLY : BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3017 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3018 t->buffer = NULL;
3019 goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
3020 }
3021 if (secctx) {
3022 int err;
3023 size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
3024 ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
3025 ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
3026 ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
3027
3028 t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
3029 err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3030 t->buffer, buf_offset,
3031 secctx, secctx_sz);
3032 if (err) {
3033 t->security_ctx = 0;
3034 WARN_ON(1);
3035 }
3036 security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
3037 secctx = NULL;
3038 }
3039 t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
3040 t->buffer->transaction = t;
3041 t->buffer->target_node = target_node;
3042 t->buffer->clear_on_free = !!(t->flags & TF_CLEAR_BUF);
3043 trace_binder_transaction_alloc_buf(t->buffer);
3044
3045 if (binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(
3046 &target_proc->alloc,
3047 t->buffer,
3048 ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)),
3049 (const void __user *)
3050 (uintptr_t)tr->data.ptr.offsets,
3051 tr->offsets_size)) {
3052 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offsets ptr\n",
3053 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3054 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3055 return_error_param = -EFAULT;
3056 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3057 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3058 }
3059 if (!IS_ALIGNED(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(binder_size_t))) {
3060 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offsets size, %lld\n",
3061 proc->pid, thread->pid, (u64)tr->offsets_size);
3062 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3063 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3064 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3065 goto err_bad_offset;
3066 }
3067 if (!IS_ALIGNED(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(u64))) {
3068 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with unaligned buffers size, %lld\n",
3069 proc->pid, thread->pid,
3070 (u64)extra_buffers_size);
3071 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3072 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3073 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3074 goto err_bad_offset;
3075 }
3076 off_start_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *));
3077 buffer_offset = off_start_offset;
3078 off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
3079 sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
3080 sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
3081 ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
3082 off_min = 0;
3083 for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
3084 buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
3085 struct binder_object_header *hdr;
3086 size_t object_size;
3087 struct binder_object object;
3088 binder_size_t object_offset;
3089 binder_size_t copy_size;
3090
3091 if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3092 &object_offset,
3093 t->buffer,
3094 buffer_offset,
3095 sizeof(object_offset))) {
3096 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3097 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3098 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3099 goto err_bad_offset;
3100 }
3101
3102 /*
3103 * Copy the source user buffer up to the next object
3104 * that will be processed.
3105 */
3106 copy_size = object_offset - user_offset;
3107 if (copy_size && (user_offset > object_offset ||
3108 binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(
3109 &target_proc->alloc,
3110 t->buffer, user_offset,
3111 user_buffer + user_offset,
3112 copy_size))) {
3113 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid data ptr\n",
3114 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3115 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3116 return_error_param = -EFAULT;
3117 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3118 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3119 }
3120 object_size = binder_get_object(target_proc, user_buffer,
3121 t->buffer, object_offset, &object);
3122 if (object_size == 0 || object_offset < off_min) {
3123 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offset (%lld, min %lld max %lld) or object.\n",
3124 proc->pid, thread->pid,
3125 (u64)object_offset,
3126 (u64)off_min,
3127 (u64)t->buffer->data_size);
3128 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3129 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3130 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3131 goto err_bad_offset;
3132 }
3133 /*
3134 * Set offset to the next buffer fragment to be
3135 * copied
3136 */
3137 user_offset = object_offset + object_size;
3138
3139 hdr = &object.hdr;
3140 off_min = object_offset + object_size;
3141 switch (hdr->type) {
3142 case BINDER_TYPE_BINDER:
3143 case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER: {
3144 struct flat_binder_object *fp;
3145
3146 fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
3147 ret = binder_translate_binder(fp, t, thread);
3148
3149 if (ret < 0 ||
3150 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3151 t->buffer,
3152 object_offset,
3153 fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
3154 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3155 return_error_param = ret;
3156 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3157 goto err_translate_failed;
3158 }
3159 } break;
3160 case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
3161 case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
3162 struct flat_binder_object *fp;
3163
3164 fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
3165 ret = binder_translate_handle(fp, t, thread);
3166 if (ret < 0 ||
3167 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3168 t->buffer,
3169 object_offset,
3170 fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
3171 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3172 return_error_param = ret;
3173 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3174 goto err_translate_failed;
3175 }
3176 } break;
3177
3178 case BINDER_TYPE_FD: {
3179 struct binder_fd_object *fp = to_binder_fd_object(hdr);
3180 binder_size_t fd_offset = object_offset +
3181 (uintptr_t)&fp->fd - (uintptr_t)fp;
3182 int ret = binder_translate_fd(fp->fd, fd_offset, t,
3183 thread, in_reply_to);
3184
3185 fp->pad_binder = 0;
3186 if (ret < 0 ||
3187 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3188 t->buffer,
3189 object_offset,
3190 fp, sizeof(*fp))) {
3191 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3192 return_error_param = ret;
3193 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3194 goto err_translate_failed;
3195 }
3196 } break;
3197 case BINDER_TYPE_FDA: {
3198 struct binder_object ptr_object;
3199 binder_size_t parent_offset;
3200 struct binder_object user_object;
3201 size_t user_parent_size;
3202 struct binder_fd_array_object *fda =
3203 to_binder_fd_array_object(hdr);
3204 size_t num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) /
3205 sizeof(binder_size_t);
3206 struct binder_buffer_object *parent =
3207 binder_validate_ptr(target_proc, t->buffer,
3208 &ptr_object, fda->parent,
3209 off_start_offset,
3210 &parent_offset,
3211 num_valid);
3212 if (!parent) {
3213 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid parent offset or type\n",
3214 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3215 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3216 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3217 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3218 goto err_bad_parent;
3219 }
3220 if (!binder_validate_fixup(target_proc, t->buffer,
3221 off_start_offset,
3222 parent_offset,
3223 fda->parent_offset,
3224 last_fixup_obj_off,
3225 last_fixup_min_off)) {
3226 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with out-of-order buffer fixup\n",
3227 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3228 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3229 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3230 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3231 goto err_bad_parent;
3232 }
3233 /*
3234 * We need to read the user version of the parent
3235 * object to get the original user offset
3236 */
3237 user_parent_size =
3238 binder_get_object(proc, user_buffer, t->buffer,
3239 parent_offset, &user_object);
3240 if (user_parent_size != sizeof(user_object.bbo)) {
3241 binder_user_error("%d:%d invalid ptr object size: %zd vs %zd\n",
3242 proc->pid, thread->pid,
3243 user_parent_size,
3244 sizeof(user_object.bbo));
3245 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3246 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3247 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3248 goto err_bad_parent;
3249 }
3250 ret = binder_translate_fd_array(&pf_head, fda,
3251 user_buffer, parent,
3252 &user_object.bbo, t,
3253 thread, in_reply_to);
3254 if (!ret)
3255 ret = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3256 t->buffer,
3257 object_offset,
3258 fda, sizeof(*fda));
3259 if (ret) {
3260 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3261 return_error_param = ret > 0 ? -EINVAL : ret;
3262 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3263 goto err_translate_failed;
3264 }
3265 last_fixup_obj_off = parent_offset;
3266 last_fixup_min_off =
3267 fda->parent_offset + sizeof(u32) * fda->num_fds;
3268 } break;
3269 case BINDER_TYPE_PTR: {
3270 struct binder_buffer_object *bp =
3271 to_binder_buffer_object(hdr);
3272 size_t buf_left = sg_buf_end_offset - sg_buf_offset;
3273 size_t num_valid;
3274
3275 if (bp->length > buf_left) {
3276 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with too large buffer\n",
3277 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3278 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3279 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3280 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3281 goto err_bad_offset;
3282 }
3283 ret = binder_defer_copy(&sgc_head, sg_buf_offset,
3284 (const void __user *)(uintptr_t)bp->buffer,
3285 bp->length);
3286 if (ret) {
3287 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3288 return_error_param = ret;
3289 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3290 goto err_translate_failed;
3291 }
3292 /* Fixup buffer pointer to target proc address space */
3293 bp->buffer = (uintptr_t)
3294 t->buffer->user_data + sg_buf_offset;
3295 sg_buf_offset += ALIGN(bp->length, sizeof(u64));
3296
3297 num_valid = (buffer_offset - off_start_offset) /
3298 sizeof(binder_size_t);
3299 ret = binder_fixup_parent(&pf_head, t,
3300 thread, bp,
3301 off_start_offset,
3302 num_valid,
3303 last_fixup_obj_off,
3304 last_fixup_min_off);
3305 if (ret < 0 ||
3306 binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
3307 t->buffer,
3308 object_offset,
3309 bp, sizeof(*bp))) {
3310 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3311 return_error_param = ret;
3312 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3313 goto err_translate_failed;
3314 }
3315 last_fixup_obj_off = object_offset;
3316 last_fixup_min_off = 0;
3317 } break;
3318 default:
3319 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid object type, %x\n",
3320 proc->pid, thread->pid, hdr->type);
3321 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3322 return_error_param = -EINVAL;
3323 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3324 goto err_bad_object_type;
3325 }
3326 }
3327 /* Done processing objects, copy the rest of the buffer */
3328 if (binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(
3329 &target_proc->alloc,
3330 t->buffer, user_offset,
3331 user_buffer + user_offset,
3332 tr->data_size - user_offset)) {
3333 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid data ptr\n",
3334 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3335 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3336 return_error_param = -EFAULT;
3337 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3338 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3339 }
3340
3341 ret = binder_do_deferred_txn_copies(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer,
3342 &sgc_head, &pf_head);
3343 if (ret) {
3344 binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid offsets ptr\n",
3345 proc->pid, thread->pid);
3346 return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
3347 return_error_param = ret;
3348 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3349 goto err_copy_data_failed;
3350 }
3351 if (t->buffer->oneway_spam_suspect)
3352 tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT;
3353 else
3354 tcomplete->type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
3355 t->work.type = BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION;
3356
3357 if (reply) {
3358 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, tcomplete);
3359 binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
3360 if (target_thread->is_dead) {
3361 return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
3362 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
3363 goto err_dead_proc_or_thread;
3364 }
3365 BUG_ON(t->buffer->async_transaction != 0);
3366 binder_pop_transaction_ilocked(target_thread, in_reply_to);
3367 binder_enqueue_thread_work_ilocked(target_thread, &t->work);
3368 target_proc->outstanding_txns++;
3369 binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
3370 wake_up_interruptible_sync(&target_thread->wait);
3371 binder_free_transaction(in_reply_to);
3372 } else if (!(t->flags & TF_ONE_WAY)) {
3373 BUG_ON(t->buffer->async_transaction != 0);
3374 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
3375 /*
3376 * Defer the TRANSACTION_COMPLETE, so we don't return to
3377 * userspace immediately; this allows the target process to
3378 * immediately start processing this transaction, reducing
3379 * latency. We will then return the TRANSACTION_COMPLETE when
3380 * the target replies (or there is an error).
3381 */
3382 binder_enqueue_deferred_thread_work_ilocked(thread, tcomplete);
3383 t->need_reply = 1;
3384 t->from_parent = thread->transaction_stack;
3385 thread->transaction_stack = t;
3386 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
3387 return_error = binder_proc_transaction(t,
3388 target_proc, target_thread);
3389 if (return_error) {
3390 binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
3391 binder_pop_transaction_ilocked(thread, t);
3392 binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
3393 goto err_dead_proc_or_thread;
3394 }
3395 } else {
3396 BUG_ON(target_node == NULL);
3397 BUG_ON(t->buffer->async_transaction != 1);
3398 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, tcomplete);
3399 return_error = binder_proc_transaction(t, target_proc, NULL);
3400 if (return_error)
3401 goto err_dead_proc_or_thread;
3402 }
3403 if (target_thread)
3404 binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
3405 binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);
3406 if (target_node)
3407 binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
3408 /*
3409 * write barrier to synchronize with initialization
3410 * of log entry
3411 */
3412 smp_wmb();
3413 WRITE_ONCE(e->debug_id_done, t_debug_id);
3414 return;
3415
3416 err_dead_proc_or_thread:
3417 return_error_line = __LINE__;
3418 binder_dequeue_work(proc, tcomplete);
3419 err_translate_failed:
3420 err_bad_object_type:
3421 err_bad_offset:
3422 err_bad_parent:
3423 err_copy_data_failed:
3424 binder_cleanup_deferred_txn_lists(&sgc_head, &pf_head);
3425 binder_free_txn_fixups(t);
3426 trace_binder_transaction_failed_buffer_release(t->buffer);
3427 binder_transaction_buffer_release(target_proc, NULL, t->buffer,
3428 buffer_offset, true);
3429 if (target_node)
3430 binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
3431 target_node = NULL;
3432 t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
3433 binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
3434 err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
3435 err_bad_extra_size:
3436 if (secctx)
3437 security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
3438 err_get_secctx_failed:
3439 kfree(tcomplete);
3440 binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
3441 err_alloc_tcomplete_failed:
3442 if (trace_binder_txn_latency_free_enabled())
3443 binder_txn_latency_free(t);
3444 kfree(t);
3445 binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
3446 err_alloc_t_failed:
3447 err_bad_todo_list:
3448 err_bad_call_stack:
3449 err_empty_call_stack:
3450 err_dead_binder:
3451 err_invalid_target_handle:
3452 if (target_thread)
3453 binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
3454 if (target_proc)
3455 binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);
3456 if (target_node) {
3457 binder_dec_node(target_node, 1, 0);
3458 binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
3459 }
3460
3461 binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_FAILED_TRANSACTION,
3462 "%d:%d transaction failed %d/%d, size %lld-%lld line %d\n",
3463 proc->pid, thread->pid, return_error, return_error_param,
3464 (u64)tr->data_size, (u64)tr->offsets_size,
3465 return_error_line);
3466
3467 {
3468 struct binder_transaction_log_entry *fe;
3469
3470 e->return_error = return_error;
3471 e->return_error_param = return_error_param;
3472 e->return_error_line = return_error_line;
3473 fe = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log_failed);
3474 *fe = *e;
3475 /*
3476 * write barrier to synchronize with initialization
3477 * of log entry
3478 */
3479 smp_wmb();
3480 WRITE_ONCE(e->debug_id_done, t_debug_id);
3481 WRITE_ONCE(fe->debug_id_done, t_debug_id);
3482 }
3483
3484 BUG_ON(thread->return_error.cmd != BR_OK);
3485 if (in_reply_to) {
3486 thread->return_error.cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE;
3487 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, &thread->return_error.work);
3488 binder_send_failed_reply(in_reply_to, return_error);
3489 } else {
3490 thread->return_error.cmd = return_error;
3491 binder_enqueue_thread_work(thread, &thread->return_error.work);
3492 }
3493 }
3494
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
(?)
@ 2022-02-03 14:07 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2821 bytes --]
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test WARNING on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: x86_64-randconfig-s021 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220203/202202032247.KiuQ0dHH-lkp(a)intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/b49b8b5cf8bdf606d1027636cf5ad2fd1cf20cb4
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout b49b8b5cf8bdf606d1027636cf5ad2fd1cf20cb4
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> kernel/audit.c:128:25: sparse: sparse: symbol 'audit_sig_lsm' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:2197:9: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
kernel/audit.c:2197:9: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
kernel/audit.c:2197:9: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
kernel/audit.c:2200:40: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
kernel/audit.c:2200:40: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
kernel/audit.c:2200:40: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
vim +/audit_sig_lsm +128 kernel/audit.c
124
125 /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
126 static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
127 static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
> 128 struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
129
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 14/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
linux-api, linux-doc
Create a new entry "interface_lsm" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "interface_lsm" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"interface_lsm". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_ilsm() is
provided to get the interface lsm slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "interface_lsm" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +++
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 17 ++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++
security/security.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +
10 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f60005c235c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+What: /proc/*/attr/lsm_display
+Contact: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
+Description: The name of the Linux security module (LSM) that will
+ provide information in the /proc/*/attr/current,
+ /proc/*/attr/prev and /proc/*/attr/exec interfaces.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ A process cannot write to this interface unless it
+ refers to itself.
+ The other details of permissions required to write to
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ The format of the data used by this interface is a
+ text string identifying the name of an LSM. The values
+ accepted are:
+ selinux - the SELinux LSM
+ smack - the Smack LSM
+ apparmor - The AppArmor LSM
+ By convention the LSM names are lower case and do not
+ contain special characters.
+Users: LSM user-space
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index 6a2a2e973080..b77b4a540391 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered.
The capabilities security module does not use the general security
blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index d654ce7150fd..e0d41adb38ba 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2828,6 +2828,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 821e6011c8fe..735e39fa510d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -219,6 +219,23 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_task_ilsm - the "interface_lsm" for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's interface LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_ilsm(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ int *ilsm = task->security;
+
+ if (ilsm)
+ return *ilsm;
+#endif
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1e53fea61335..29181bc8c693 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -621,6 +621,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_interface_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -632,6 +651,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of interface_lsm if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set interface lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_interface_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 27154c39d109..0bca482166d8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -78,7 +78,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "interface_lsm" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ * Using a long to avoid potential alignment issues with
+ * module assigned task blobs.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(long),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -672,6 +681,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *ilsm;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -680,6 +691,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "interface" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ ilsm = task->security;
+ *ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1739,14 +1759,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *oilsm = current->security;
+ int *nilsm;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (oilsm) {
+ nilsm = task->security;
+ if (nilsm)
+ *nilsm = *oilsm;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2178,23 +2210,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' interface_lsm.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * interface_lsm and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(p);
+ if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = ilsm;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *ilsm = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "interface_lsm" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *ilsm = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
@@ -2214,15 +2333,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
@@ -2233,16 +2352,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2250,7 +2368,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2391,8 +2516,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d67bcd1aeaf5..3469ffe195e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6405,6 +6405,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting interface_lsm, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the interface_lsm value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETINTERFACE_LSM, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35aac62a662e..79b480983bdc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setinterface_lsm",
+ NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ff832d47479f..3c1cf65cac87 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3516,6 +3516,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "interface_lsm"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "interface_lsm") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 14/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-doc, Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel,
linux-audit, linux-api, sds
Create a new entry "interface_lsm" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "interface_lsm" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"interface_lsm". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_ilsm() is
provided to get the interface lsm slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "interface_lsm" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +++
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 17 ++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++
security/security.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +
10 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f60005c235c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+What: /proc/*/attr/lsm_display
+Contact: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
+Description: The name of the Linux security module (LSM) that will
+ provide information in the /proc/*/attr/current,
+ /proc/*/attr/prev and /proc/*/attr/exec interfaces.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ A process cannot write to this interface unless it
+ refers to itself.
+ The other details of permissions required to write to
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ The format of the data used by this interface is a
+ text string identifying the name of an LSM. The values
+ accepted are:
+ selinux - the SELinux LSM
+ smack - the Smack LSM
+ apparmor - The AppArmor LSM
+ By convention the LSM names are lower case and do not
+ contain special characters.
+Users: LSM user-space
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index 6a2a2e973080..b77b4a540391 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered.
The capabilities security module does not use the general security
blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index d654ce7150fd..e0d41adb38ba 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2828,6 +2828,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 821e6011c8fe..735e39fa510d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -219,6 +219,23 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_task_ilsm - the "interface_lsm" for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's interface LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_ilsm(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ int *ilsm = task->security;
+
+ if (ilsm)
+ return *ilsm;
+#endif
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1e53fea61335..29181bc8c693 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -621,6 +621,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_interface_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -632,6 +651,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of interface_lsm if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set interface lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_interface_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 27154c39d109..0bca482166d8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -78,7 +78,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "interface_lsm" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ * Using a long to avoid potential alignment issues with
+ * module assigned task blobs.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(long),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -672,6 +681,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *ilsm;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -680,6 +691,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "interface" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ ilsm = task->security;
+ *ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1739,14 +1759,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *oilsm = current->security;
+ int *nilsm;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (oilsm) {
+ nilsm = task->security;
+ if (nilsm)
+ *nilsm = *oilsm;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2178,23 +2210,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' interface_lsm.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * interface_lsm and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(p);
+ if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = ilsm;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *ilsm = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "interface_lsm" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *ilsm = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
@@ -2214,15 +2333,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
@@ -2233,16 +2352,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2250,7 +2368,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2391,8 +2516,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d67bcd1aeaf5..3469ffe195e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6405,6 +6405,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting interface_lsm, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the interface_lsm value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETINTERFACE_LSM, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35aac62a662e..79b480983bdc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setinterface_lsm",
+ NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ff832d47479f..3c1cf65cac87 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3516,6 +3516,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "interface_lsm"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "interface_lsm") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 15/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, Chuck Lever,
linux-integrity, netdev, netfilter-devel, linux-nfs
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 26838061defb..2125b4b795da 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2725,6 +2725,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -3033,7 +3034,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3433,8 +3435,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index fcf7dfdecf96..df2b3bf46364 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1374,12 +1374,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index b18f31b2c9e7..c6237b5ddd93 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -133,8 +133,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 899de438e529..fedc4b0292d6 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2830,6 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -3331,8 +3332,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 735e39fa510d..72da145c1aad 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -135,6 +135,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -568,7 +599,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1431,7 +1462,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 23a35ff1b3f2..f273c4d777ec 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -106,7 +107,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c7cd039e258b..5aa2ee06c9e4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1447,15 +1448,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
@@ -2147,6 +2151,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2161,7 +2166,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c4c3666576c3..1626d8aabe83 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,6 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -1138,7 +1139,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1351,6 +1353,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1385,7 +1388,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1542,6 +1546,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1550,7 +1555,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 933a8f94f93a..70ca4510ea35 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 073510c94b56..212e12b53adb 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -362,7 +363,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index bba3a66f5636..3b6ba86783f6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a9f7c9418ad3..d986bae1587b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
@@ -627,8 +628,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -636,8 +639,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c86df6ead742..a8e9ee202245 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -508,7 +512,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -545,6 +551,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -574,7 +581,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1093,6 +1101,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1163,7 +1172,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0bca482166d8..163cf0ae2429 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2366,16 +2366,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 15/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: linux-nfs, john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit,
netfilter-devel, Chuck Lever, linux-integrity, sds
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 26838061defb..2125b4b795da 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2725,6 +2725,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -3033,7 +3034,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3433,8 +3435,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index fcf7dfdecf96..df2b3bf46364 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1374,12 +1374,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index b18f31b2c9e7..c6237b5ddd93 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -133,8 +133,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 899de438e529..fedc4b0292d6 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2830,6 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -3331,8 +3332,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 735e39fa510d..72da145c1aad 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -135,6 +135,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -568,7 +599,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1431,7 +1462,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 23a35ff1b3f2..f273c4d777ec 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -106,7 +107,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c7cd039e258b..5aa2ee06c9e4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1447,15 +1448,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
@@ -2147,6 +2151,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2161,7 +2166,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c4c3666576c3..1626d8aabe83 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,6 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -1138,7 +1139,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1351,6 +1353,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1385,7 +1388,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1542,6 +1546,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1550,7 +1555,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 933a8f94f93a..70ca4510ea35 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 073510c94b56..212e12b53adb 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -362,7 +363,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index bba3a66f5636..3b6ba86783f6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a9f7c9418ad3..d986bae1587b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
@@ -627,8 +628,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -636,8 +639,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c86df6ead742..a8e9ee202245 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -508,7 +512,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -545,6 +551,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -574,7 +581,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1093,6 +1101,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1163,7 +1172,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0bca482166d8..163cf0ae2429 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2366,16 +2366,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 16/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() will now return the length value
if the passed lsmcontext pointer is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 9 ++----
kernel/audit.c | 42 +++++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++-----------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 ++++-------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 +++++++----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 2125b4b795da..b0b0c132a247 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2723,9 +2723,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -2985,14 +2983,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3019,24 +3017,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3080,7 +3076,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3435,10 +3431,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 72da145c1aad..79554e5adb4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index f273c4d777ec..b77a52f93389 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
@@ -103,12 +101,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5aa2ee06c9e4..03824cca058c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1188,9 +1188,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1438,33 +1435,33 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
kfree(new);
break;
}
- case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
+ case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: {
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
+
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
- audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
+ audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data,
+ struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len));
kfree(sig_data);
break;
+ }
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
struct audit_tty_status s;
unsigned int t;
@@ -2147,17 +2144,15 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2165,9 +2160,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 1626d8aabe83..7858da40a767 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,9 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1134,13 +1132,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1353,7 +1350,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1378,17 +1374,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1543,20 +1537,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 70ca4510ea35..ad5be7707bca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 secid;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
@@ -141,12 +140,11 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 212e12b53adb..9626e2b0ef12 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -348,7 +347,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -357,13 +356,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -656,15 +654,11 @@ static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- int len, ret;
+ int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
- if (ret)
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ if (len <= 0)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3b6ba86783f6..36338660df3c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,19 +176,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index d986bae1587b..625cd787ffc1 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index a8e9ee202245..46706889a6f7 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -509,11 +502,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -552,8 +543,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -578,10 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1104,8 +1092,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1165,15 +1151,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 163cf0ae2429..d56fcb794ff4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2330,18 +2330,41 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+/**
+ * security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
+ * @blob: set of secids
+ * @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ *
+ * Translate secid information into a secctx string.
+ * Return a negative value on error.
+ * If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
+ * Otherwise, return 0.
+ */
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ if (cp)
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ if (!cp) {
+ int len;
+ int rc;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ NULL, &len);
+ return rc ? rc : len;
+ }
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 16/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel, sds
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() will now return the length value
if the passed lsmcontext pointer is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 9 ++----
kernel/audit.c | 42 +++++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++-----------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 ++++-------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 +++++++----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 2125b4b795da..b0b0c132a247 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2723,9 +2723,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -2985,14 +2983,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3019,24 +3017,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3080,7 +3076,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3435,10 +3431,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 72da145c1aad..79554e5adb4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index f273c4d777ec..b77a52f93389 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
@@ -103,12 +101,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5aa2ee06c9e4..03824cca058c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1188,9 +1188,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1438,33 +1435,33 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
kfree(new);
break;
}
- case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
+ case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: {
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
+
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
- audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
+ audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data,
+ struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len));
kfree(sig_data);
break;
+ }
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
struct audit_tty_status s;
unsigned int t;
@@ -2147,17 +2144,15 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2165,9 +2160,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 1626d8aabe83..7858da40a767 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,9 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1134,13 +1132,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1353,7 +1350,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1378,17 +1374,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1543,20 +1537,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 70ca4510ea35..ad5be7707bca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 secid;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
@@ -141,12 +140,11 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 212e12b53adb..9626e2b0ef12 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -348,7 +347,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -357,13 +356,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -656,15 +654,11 @@ static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- int len, ret;
+ int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
- if (ret)
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ if (len <= 0)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3b6ba86783f6..36338660df3c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,19 +176,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index d986bae1587b..625cd787ffc1 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index a8e9ee202245..46706889a6f7 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -509,11 +502,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -552,8 +543,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -578,10 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1104,8 +1092,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1165,15 +1151,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 163cf0ae2429..d56fcb794ff4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2330,18 +2330,41 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+/**
+ * security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
+ * @blob: set of secids
+ * @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ *
+ * Translate secid information into a secctx string.
+ * Return a negative value on error.
+ * If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
+ * Otherwise, return 0.
+ */
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ if (cp)
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ if (!cp) {
+ int len;
+ int rc;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ NULL, &len);
+ return rc ? rc : len;
+ }
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, Chuck Lever, linux-nfs
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index fedc4b0292d6..4b77e6a13e78 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2713,11 +2713,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2727,13 +2727,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2830,9 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2890,7 +2888,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -3310,8 +3308,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -3332,10 +3329,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 79554e5adb4c..e2939418789f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1478,7 +1478,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d56fcb794ff4..c9459c4754f3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2421,9 +2421,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: linux-nfs, john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Chuck Lever, sds
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index fedc4b0292d6..4b77e6a13e78 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2713,11 +2713,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2727,13 +2727,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2830,9 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2890,7 +2888,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -3310,8 +3308,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -3332,10 +3329,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 79554e5adb4c..e2939418789f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1478,7 +1478,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d56fcb794ff4..c9459c4754f3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2421,9 +2421,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 18/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, Pablo Neira Ayuso,
netdev, netfilter-devel
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 37 +++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 625cd787ffc1..2aff40578045 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,15 +301,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
- return 0;
+ return;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -318,14 +316,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
#endif
- return seclen;
+ return;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -397,12 +393,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
struct net_device *indev;
struct net_device *outdev;
struct nf_conn *ct = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr))
@@ -470,9 +464,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
+ if (context.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(context.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -603,7 +597,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (context.len &&
+ nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -631,10 +626,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -642,10 +635,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 18/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit,
netfilter-devel, sds, Pablo Neira Ayuso
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 37 +++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 625cd787ffc1..2aff40578045 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,15 +301,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
- return 0;
+ return;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -318,14 +316,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
#endif
- return seclen;
+ return;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -397,12 +393,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
struct net_device *indev;
struct net_device *outdev;
struct nf_conn *ct = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr))
@@ -470,9 +464,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
+ if (context.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(context.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -603,7 +597,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (context.len &&
+ nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -631,10 +626,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -642,10 +635,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 19/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley, netdev
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 ++--
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
13 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 62d5f99760aa..bb9c900da6b0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1460,7 +1462,11 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1480,7 +1486,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index beb0e573266d..158bab993e32 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 46706889a6f7..3aab71ba3841 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -496,13 +490,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -543,7 +532,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -561,13 +549,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -921,14 +904,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -975,11 +952,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1091,8 +1065,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1130,7 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1144,14 +1117,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1510,7 +1479,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1523,7 +1492,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3469ffe195e6..7b9cb4d263c0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7020,7 +7020,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ac0ece01305a..9f856f2cd277 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/*
* type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 800ab4b4239e..0b8f99703462 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8e92af7dd284..23a45c9dcf04 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3899,7 +3899,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index ef9d0b7b1954..ac79313ea95d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled __initdata;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index d2186e2757be..c6dcafe18912 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp)
{
int slen;
- skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid;
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skp->smk_netlabel.cache != NULL) {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3c1cf65cac87..46d81f638a2b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3728,11 +3728,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
- /*
- * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
- */
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
/*
@@ -4751,7 +4752,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 658eab05599e..13c2fa728054 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1274,10 +1275,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 19/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 ++--
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
13 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 62d5f99760aa..bb9c900da6b0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1460,7 +1462,11 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1480,7 +1486,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index beb0e573266d..158bab993e32 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 46706889a6f7..3aab71ba3841 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -496,13 +490,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -543,7 +532,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -561,13 +549,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -921,14 +904,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -975,11 +952,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1091,8 +1065,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1130,7 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1144,14 +1117,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1510,7 +1479,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1523,7 +1492,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3469ffe195e6..7b9cb4d263c0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7020,7 +7020,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ac0ece01305a..9f856f2cd277 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/*
* type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 800ab4b4239e..0b8f99703462 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8e92af7dd284..23a45c9dcf04 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3899,7 +3899,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index ef9d0b7b1954..ac79313ea95d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled __initdata;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index d2186e2757be..c6dcafe18912 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp)
{
int slen;
- skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid;
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skp->smk_netlabel.cache != NULL) {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3c1cf65cac87..46d81f638a2b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3728,11 +3728,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
- /*
- * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
- */
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
/*
@@ -4751,7 +4752,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 658eab05599e..13c2fa728054 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1274,10 +1275,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 20/28] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Send an identifier for the security module interface_lsm
along with the security context. This allows the receiver
to verify that the receiver and the sender agree on which
security module's context is being used. If they don't
agree the message is rejected.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b0b0c132a247..259f5e38e6ba 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3024,6 +3024,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
+ t->security_interface = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
@@ -4453,6 +4454,26 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
tr.secctx = t->security_ctx;
if (t->security_ctx) {
+ int to_ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int from_ilsm = t->security_interface;
+
+ if (to_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_ilsm = 0;
+ if (from_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_ilsm = 0;
+ /*
+ * The sender provided a security context from
+ * a different security module than the one this
+ * process wants to report if these don't match.
+ */
+ if (from_ilsm != to_ilsm) {
+ if (t_from)
+ binder_thread_dec_tmpref(t_from);
+
+ binder_cleanup_transaction(t, "security context mismatch",
+ BR_FAILED_REPLY);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX;
trsize = sizeof(tr);
}
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
index d6b6b8cb7346..e3a0718ce17c 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
@@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ struct binder_transaction {
long saved_priority;
kuid_t sender_euid;
struct list_head fd_fixups;
+ int security_interface;
binder_uintptr_t security_ctx;
/**
* @lock: protects @from, @to_proc, and @to_thread
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 20/28] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Send an identifier for the security module interface_lsm
along with the security context. This allows the receiver
to verify that the receiver and the sender agree on which
security module's context is being used. If they don't
agree the message is rejected.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b0b0c132a247..259f5e38e6ba 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3024,6 +3024,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
+ t->security_interface = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
@@ -4453,6 +4454,26 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
tr.secctx = t->security_ctx;
if (t->security_ctx) {
+ int to_ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int from_ilsm = t->security_interface;
+
+ if (to_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_ilsm = 0;
+ if (from_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_ilsm = 0;
+ /*
+ * The sender provided a security context from
+ * a different security module than the one this
+ * process wants to report if these don't match.
+ */
+ if (from_ilsm != to_ilsm) {
+ if (t_from)
+ binder_thread_dec_tmpref(t_from);
+
+ binder_cleanup_transaction(t, "security context mismatch",
+ BR_FAILED_REPLY);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX;
trsize = sizeof(tr);
}
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
index d6b6b8cb7346..e3a0718ce17c 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
@@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ struct binder_transaction {
long saved_priority;
kuid_t sender_euid;
struct list_head fd_fixups;
+ int security_interface;
binder_uintptr_t security_ctx;
/**
* @lock: protects @from, @to_proc, and @to_thread
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 21/28] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Add a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx() to identify
which of the security modules that may be active should
provide the security context. If the parameter is greater
than or equal to zero, the security module associated with
that LSM "slot" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_DISPLAY
the "interface lsm" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_FIRST
the first security module providing a hook is used.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 259f5e38e6ba..d59c4ebf7e22 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e2939418789f..39e113574ba7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "interface_lsm" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the first slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
@@ -596,7 +598,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1450,7 +1453,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int ilsm)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 03824cca058c..0fad7317cb09 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2152,7 +2152,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7858da40a767..e091d03f9184 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1378,7 +1378,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1541,7 +1542,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index ad5be7707bca..9b5c44dec1e9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 9626e2b0ef12..e919c35f85fd 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (len <= 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 36338660df3c..cb4b8b636f6a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 2aff40578045..6babdf5fce18 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 3aab71ba3841..b53cf90bb6f4 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -550,7 +552,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1120,7 +1123,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c9459c4754f3..b694eca9d4f1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2334,20 +2334,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
* security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
* @blob: set of secids
* @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ * @ilsm: which security module to report
*
* Translate secid information into a secctx string.
* Return a negative value on error.
* If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
* Otherwise, return 0.
*/
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
if (cp)
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (ilsm < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 21/28] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Add a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx() to identify
which of the security modules that may be active should
provide the security context. If the parameter is greater
than or equal to zero, the security module associated with
that LSM "slot" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_DISPLAY
the "interface lsm" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_FIRST
the first security module providing a hook is used.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 259f5e38e6ba..d59c4ebf7e22 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e2939418789f..39e113574ba7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "interface_lsm" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the first slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure
@@ -596,7 +598,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1450,7 +1453,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int ilsm)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 03824cca058c..0fad7317cb09 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2152,7 +2152,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7858da40a767..e091d03f9184 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1378,7 +1378,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1541,7 +1542,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index ad5be7707bca..9b5c44dec1e9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 9626e2b0ef12..e919c35f85fd 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (len <= 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 36338660df3c..cb4b8b636f6a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 2aff40578045..6babdf5fce18 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 3aab71ba3841..b53cf90bb6f4 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -550,7 +552,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1120,7 +1123,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c9459c4754f3..b694eca9d4f1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2334,20 +2334,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
* security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
* @blob: set of secids
* @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ * @ilsm: which security module to report
*
* Translate secid information into a secctx string.
* Return a negative value on error.
* If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
* Otherwise, return 0.
*/
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
if (cp)
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (ilsm < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 22/28] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
security_inode_getsecid().
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 527d4c4acb12..a2fca1134519 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e091d03f9184..47d34433b91e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* lsmblob, which happens later in
* this patch set.
*/
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob,
+ &name->lsmblob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ &n->lsmblob,
+ f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -1537,13 +1536,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -2245,17 +2243,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->lsmblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 22/28] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
security_inode_getsecid().
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 527d4c4acb12..a2fca1134519 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e091d03f9184..47d34433b91e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* lsmblob, which happens later in
* this patch set.
*/
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob,
+ &name->lsmblob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ &n->lsmblob,
+ f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -1537,13 +1536,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -2245,17 +2243,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = blob.secid[0];
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->lsmblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 23/28] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
with a structure containing the two elements.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0fad7317cb09..f012c3786264 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1798,11 +1798,11 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
}
static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
- if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, t, serial)) {
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(t);
- *serial = audit_serial();
+ if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, stamp)) {
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&stamp->ctime);
+ stamp->serial = audit_serial();
}
}
@@ -1825,8 +1825,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct timespec64 t;
- unsigned int serial;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1881,12 +1880,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
+ (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index a2fca1134519..56560846f3b0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
char *value; /* the cmdline field */
};
+/* A timestamp/serial pair to identify an event */
+struct audit_stamp {
+ struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
+ unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
+};
+
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
@@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
} context;
enum audit_state state, current_state;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
int major; /* syscall number */
int uring_op; /* uring operation */
- struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
long return_code;/* syscall return code */
u64 prio;
@@ -261,7 +267,7 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp);
extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
@@ -302,7 +308,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx);
extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
-#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
+#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, s) 0
#define audit_put_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_get_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 47d34433b91e..7848e7351cf9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
*/
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ctx->serial = 0;
+ ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
ctx->major = 0;
ctx->uring_op = 0;
- ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
+ ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
ctx->return_code = 0;
ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
@@ -1898,7 +1898,7 @@ void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2014,7 +2014,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
context->argv[3] = a4;
context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
context->current_state = state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2483,21 +2483,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/**
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
* @ctx: audit_context for the task
- * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
- * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ * @stamp: timestamp to record
*
* Also sets the context as auditable.
*/
-int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
return 0;
- if (!ctx->serial)
- ctx->serial = audit_serial();
- t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
- t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
- *serial = ctx->serial;
+ if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
+ ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
+ *stamp = ctx->stamp;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 23/28] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
with a structure containing the two elements.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0fad7317cb09..f012c3786264 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1798,11 +1798,11 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
}
static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
- if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, t, serial)) {
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(t);
- *serial = audit_serial();
+ if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, stamp)) {
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&stamp->ctime);
+ stamp->serial = audit_serial();
}
}
@@ -1825,8 +1825,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct timespec64 t;
- unsigned int serial;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1881,12 +1880,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
+ (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index a2fca1134519..56560846f3b0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
char *value; /* the cmdline field */
};
+/* A timestamp/serial pair to identify an event */
+struct audit_stamp {
+ struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
+ unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
+};
+
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
@@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
} context;
enum audit_state state, current_state;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
int major; /* syscall number */
int uring_op; /* uring operation */
- struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
long return_code;/* syscall return code */
u64 prio;
@@ -261,7 +267,7 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp);
extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
@@ -302,7 +308,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx);
extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
-#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
+#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, s) 0
#define audit_put_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_get_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 47d34433b91e..7848e7351cf9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
*/
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ctx->serial = 0;
+ ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
ctx->major = 0;
ctx->uring_op = 0;
- ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
+ ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
ctx->return_code = 0;
ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
@@ -1898,7 +1898,7 @@ void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2014,7 +2014,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
context->argv[3] = a4;
context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
context->current_state = state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2483,21 +2483,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/**
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
* @ctx: audit_context for the task
- * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
- * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ * @stamp: timestamp to record
*
* Also sets the context as auditable.
*/
-int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
return 0;
- if (!ctx->serial)
- ctx->serial = audit_serial();
- t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
- t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
- *serial = ctx->serial;
+ if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
+ ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
+ *stamp = ctx->stamp;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
* should be at least that large. */
#define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
+/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
+ * auxiliary record.
+ */
+struct audit_context_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ int type; /* Audit record type */
+};
+
/* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
* locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
* buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
* to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
* use simultaneously. */
struct audit_buffer {
- struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
- struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
- gfp_t gfp_mask;
+ struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
+ struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
+ struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
+ gfp_t gfp_mask;
};
struct audit_reply {
@@ -1765,6 +1775,7 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
ab->ctx = ctx;
ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ab->aux_records);
return ab;
@@ -1825,7 +1836,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1880,14 +1890,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
- stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
- stamp.serial);
+ (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ ab->stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
@@ -2378,7 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
}
/**
- * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * __audit_log_end - end one audit record
* @ab: the audit_buffer
*
* We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
@@ -2386,7 +2396,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
* queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
* irq context. May be called in any context.
*/
-void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
@@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
} else
audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ *
+ * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
+ * is done here.
+ * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
+ * create them here.
+ */
+void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ struct audit_context_entry *entry;
+ struct audit_context mcontext;
+ struct audit_context *mctx;
+ struct audit_buffer *mab;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct list_head *n;
+
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ __audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
+ audit_buffer_free(ab);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
+ mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
+ mctx = &mcontext;
+ } else
+ mctx = ab->ctx;
+
+ list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
+ entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
+ mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
+ if (!mab) {
+ audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (entry->type) {
+ /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
+ default:
+ audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
+ break;
+ }
+ __audit_log_end(mab);
+ audit_buffer_free(mab);
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
* should be at least that large. */
#define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
+/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
+ * auxiliary record.
+ */
+struct audit_context_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ int type; /* Audit record type */
+};
+
/* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
* locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
* buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
* to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
* use simultaneously. */
struct audit_buffer {
- struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
- struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
- gfp_t gfp_mask;
+ struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
+ struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
+ struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
+ gfp_t gfp_mask;
};
struct audit_reply {
@@ -1765,6 +1775,7 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
ab->ctx = ctx;
ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ab->aux_records);
return ab;
@@ -1825,7 +1836,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1880,14 +1890,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
- stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
- stamp.serial);
+ (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ ab->stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
@@ -2378,7 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
}
/**
- * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * __audit_log_end - end one audit record
* @ab: the audit_buffer
*
* We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
@@ -2386,7 +2396,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
* queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
* irq context. May be called in any context.
*/
-void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
@@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
} else
audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ *
+ * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
+ * is done here.
+ * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
+ * create them here.
+ */
+void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ struct audit_context_entry *entry;
+ struct audit_context mcontext;
+ struct audit_context *mctx;
+ struct audit_buffer *mab;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct list_head *n;
+
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ __audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
+ audit_buffer_free(ab);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
+ mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
+ mctx = &mcontext;
+ } else
+ mctx = ab->ctx;
+
+ list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
+ entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
+ mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
+ if (!mab) {
+ audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (entry->type) {
+ /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
+ default:
+ audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
+ break;
+ }
+ __audit_log_end(mab);
+ audit_buffer_free(mab);
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
@ 2022-02-03 6:34 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 6:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4040 bytes --]
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test WARNING on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: arc-randconfig-r043-20220131 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220203/202202031436.8ZZBmoEC-lkp(a)intel.com/config)
compiler: arc-elf-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/25bd76f704528c053f7260a22eeecbd214b11982
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout 25bd76f704528c053f7260a22eeecbd214b11982
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=arc SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
kernel/audit.c:1804:14: warning: no previous prototype for 'audit_serial' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1804 | unsigned int audit_serial(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/audit.c: In function 'audit_log_vformat':
kernel/audit.c:1954:9: warning: function 'audit_log_vformat' might be a candidate for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]
1954 | len = vsnprintf(skb_tail_pointer(skb), avail, fmt, args);
| ^~~
kernel/audit.c:1963:17: warning: function 'audit_log_vformat' might be a candidate for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]
1963 | len = vsnprintf(skb_tail_pointer(skb), avail, fmt, args2);
| ^~~
kernel/audit.c: At top level:
>> kernel/audit.c:2399:6: warning: no previous prototype for '__audit_log_end' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
2399 | void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +/__audit_log_end +2399 kernel/audit.c
2389
2390 /**
2391 * __audit_log_end - end one audit record
2392 * @ab: the audit_buffer
2393 *
2394 * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
2395 * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
2396 * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
2397 * irq context. May be called in any context.
2398 */
> 2399 void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2400 {
2401 struct sk_buff *skb;
2402 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
2403
2404 if (!ab)
2405 return;
2406
2407 if (audit_rate_check()) {
2408 skb = ab->skb;
2409 ab->skb = NULL;
2410
2411 /* setup the netlink header, see the comments in
2412 * kauditd_send_multicast_skb() for length quirks */
2413 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
2414 nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len - NLMSG_HDRLEN;
2415
2416 /* queue the netlink packet and poke the kauditd thread */
2417 skb_queue_tail(&audit_queue, skb);
2418 wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
2419 } else
2420 audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
2421 }
2422
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [RFC PATCH] Audit: __audit_log_end() can be static
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
(?)
@ 2022-02-03 22:33 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 22:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 773 bytes --]
kernel/audit.c:2399:6: warning: symbol '__audit_log_end' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
---
audit.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 559fb14e038067..8edfa8208d4b7e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2396,7 +2396,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
* queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
* irq context. May be called in any context.
*/
-void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
(?)
@ 2022-02-04 1:30 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-04 1:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2716 bytes --]
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test WARNING on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: x86_64-randconfig-s021 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220204/202202040634.ao3svjIm-lkp(a)intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/25bd76f704528c053f7260a22eeecbd214b11982
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout 25bd76f704528c053f7260a22eeecbd214b11982
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
kernel/audit.c:128:25: sparse: sparse: symbol 'audit_sig_lsm' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:2208:9: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
kernel/audit.c:2208:9: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
kernel/audit.c:2208:9: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
kernel/audit.c:2211:40: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
kernel/audit.c:2211:40: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
kernel/audit.c:2211:40: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
>> kernel/audit.c:2399:6: sparse: sparse: symbol '__audit_log_end' was not declared. Should it be static?
Please review and possibly fold the followup patch.
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-02 22:32 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-02 22:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux, Paul Moore
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel
On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> * should be at least that large. */
> #define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
>
> +/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
> + * auxiliary record.
> + */
> +struct audit_context_entry {
> + struct list_head list;
> + int type; /* Audit record type */
> +};
> +
> /* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
> * locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
> * buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> * use simultaneously. */
> struct audit_buffer {
> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> - struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> - gfp_t gfp_mask;
> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> + struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> + struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
> + gfp_t gfp_mask;
> };
>
> struct audit_reply {
> @@ -1765,6 +1775,7 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
>
> ab->ctx = ctx;
> ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ab->aux_records);
>
> return ab;
>
> @@ -1825,7 +1836,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> int type)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct audit_stamp stamp;
>
> if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
> return NULL;
> @@ -1880,14 +1890,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
> + audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
> /* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
> if (ctx)
> ctx->dummy = 0;
> audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> - (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> - stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> - stamp.serial);
> + (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + ab->stamp.serial);
>
> return ab;
> }
> @@ -2378,7 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> }
>
> /**
> - * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * __audit_log_end - end one audit record
> * @ab: the audit_buffer
> *
> * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
> @@ -2386,7 +2396,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
> * irq context. May be called in any context.
> */
> -void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> struct sk_buff *skb;
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
> @@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> } else
> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
> + *
> + * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
> + * is done here.
> + * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
> + * create them here.
> + */
> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + struct audit_context_entry *entry;
> + struct audit_context mcontext;
> + struct audit_context *mctx;
> + struct audit_buffer *mab;
> + struct list_head *l;
> + struct list_head *n;
> +
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> + __audit_log_end(ab);
> +
> + if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
> + audit_buffer_free(ab);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
> + mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
> + mctx = &mcontext;
> + } else
> + mctx = ab->ctx;
> +
> + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
> + entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
> + mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
> + if (!mab) {
> + audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
> + continue;
> + }
> + switch (entry->type) {
> + /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
> + default:
> + audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
> + break;
> + }
> + __audit_log_end(mab);
> + audit_buffer_free(mab);
> + list_del(&entry->list);
> + kfree(entry);
> + }
>
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-02 22:32 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-02 22:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux, Paul Moore
Cc: linux-audit, john.johansen
On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> * should be at least that large. */
> #define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
>
> +/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
> + * auxiliary record.
> + */
> +struct audit_context_entry {
> + struct list_head list;
> + int type; /* Audit record type */
> +};
> +
> /* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
> * locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
> * buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> * use simultaneously. */
> struct audit_buffer {
> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> - struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> - gfp_t gfp_mask;
> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> + struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> + struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
> + gfp_t gfp_mask;
> };
>
> struct audit_reply {
> @@ -1765,6 +1775,7 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
>
> ab->ctx = ctx;
> ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ab->aux_records);
>
> return ab;
>
> @@ -1825,7 +1836,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> int type)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct audit_stamp stamp;
>
> if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
> return NULL;
> @@ -1880,14 +1890,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
> + audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
> /* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
> if (ctx)
> ctx->dummy = 0;
> audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> - (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> - stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> - stamp.serial);
> + (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + ab->stamp.serial);
>
> return ab;
> }
> @@ -2378,7 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> }
>
> /**
> - * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * __audit_log_end - end one audit record
> * @ab: the audit_buffer
> *
> * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
> @@ -2386,7 +2396,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
> * irq context. May be called in any context.
> */
> -void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +void __audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> struct sk_buff *skb;
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
> @@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> } else
> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
> + *
> + * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
> + * is done here.
> + * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
> + * create them here.
> + */
> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + struct audit_context_entry *entry;
> + struct audit_context mcontext;
> + struct audit_context *mctx;
> + struct audit_buffer *mab;
> + struct list_head *l;
> + struct list_head *n;
> +
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> + __audit_log_end(ab);
> +
> + if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
> + audit_buffer_free(ab);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
> + mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
> + mctx = &mcontext;
> + } else
> + mctx = ab->ctx;
> +
> + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
> + entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
> + mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
> + if (!mab) {
> + audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
> + continue;
> + }
> + switch (entry->type) {
> + /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
> + default:
> + audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
> + break;
> + }
> + __audit_log_end(mab);
> + audit_buffer_free(mab);
> + list_del(&entry->list);
> + kfree(entry);
> + }
>
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-03-02 22:32 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-03 22:27 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 22:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel
On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> > Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> > guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> > associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> > records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-03 22:27 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 22:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> > Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> > guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> > associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> > records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-03-03 22:27 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-03-03 22:33 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-03 22:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
Casey Schaufler
On 3/3/2022 2:27 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
>>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
>>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
>>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
> The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
> is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
Yes.
I think that the container ID record could use it as well.
I haven't looked deeply, but it should be usable for any aux record type.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-03 22:33 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-03 22:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On 3/3/2022 2:27 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
>>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
>>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
>>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
> The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
> is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
Yes.
I think that the container ID record could use it as well.
I haven't looked deeply, but it should be usable for any aux record type.
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-03-03 22:33 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-03 22:43 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 22:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel
On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 5:33 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 3/3/2022 2:27 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> >>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> >>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> >>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> >>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
> > The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
> > is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
>
> Yes.
Thanks. I just wanted to make sure you weren't planning on any
additional callers in a future revision. I understand that things may
change, but I just wanted to make sure there wasn't already something
pending.
> I think that the container ID record could use it as well.
> I haven't looked deeply, but it should be usable for any aux record type.
Possibly, but I'm intentionally trying to keep that separated at this
stage as the ordering is uncertain. If/when both bits of
functionality land we can reconcile things as needed; it's all
internal implementation details so we don't have to worry too much
about changing it later.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-03 22:43 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 22:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 5:33 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 3/3/2022 2:27 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> >>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> >>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> >>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> >>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
> > The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
> > is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
>
> Yes.
Thanks. I just wanted to make sure you weren't planning on any
additional callers in a future revision. I understand that things may
change, but I just wanted to make sure there wasn't already something
pending.
> I think that the container ID record could use it as well.
> I haven't looked deeply, but it should be usable for any aux record type.
Possibly, but I'm intentionally trying to keep that separated at this
stage as the ordering is uncertain. If/when both bits of
functionality land we can reconcile things as needed; it's all
internal implementation details so we don't have to worry too much
about changing it later.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-03-03 22:43 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-03-03 22:55 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-03 22:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
Casey Schaufler
On 3/3/2022 2:43 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 5:33 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 3/3/2022 2:27 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>>> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
>>>>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
>>>>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
>>>>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>>>>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
>>> The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
>>> is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
>> Yes.
> Thanks. I just wanted to make sure you weren't planning on any
> additional callers in a future revision. I understand that things may
> change, but I just wanted to make sure there wasn't already something
> pending.
I don't have anything I know about. It's possible that something
could be needed when the stacking changes for networking come in,
but that's not going to come in for "some time" yet.
>> I think that the container ID record could use it as well.
>> I haven't looked deeply, but it should be usable for any aux record type.
> Possibly, but I'm intentionally trying to keep that separated at this
> stage as the ordering is uncertain. If/when both bits of
> functionality land we can reconcile things as needed; it's all
> internal implementation details so we don't have to worry too much
> about changing it later.
Agreed, although I'd hate to duplicate mechanism if someone else
has an equally functional proposal.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-03 22:55 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-03 22:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-security-module,
linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On 3/3/2022 2:43 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 5:33 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 3/3/2022 2:27 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Wed, Mar 2, 2022 at 5:32 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>>> On 2/2/2022 3:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
>>>>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
>>>>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
>>>>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>>>>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>> I'm really hoping for either Acks or feedback on this approach.
>>> The only callers that make use of this functionality in this patchset
>>> is in kernel/audit*.c in patches 25/28 and 26/28, yes?
>> Yes.
> Thanks. I just wanted to make sure you weren't planning on any
> additional callers in a future revision. I understand that things may
> change, but I just wanted to make sure there wasn't already something
> pending.
I don't have anything I know about. It's possible that something
could be needed when the stacking changes for networking come in,
but that's not going to come in for "some time" yet.
>> I think that the container ID record could use it as well.
>> I haven't looked deeply, but it should be usable for any aux record type.
> Possibly, but I'm intentionally trying to keep that separated at this
> stage as the ordering is uncertain. If/when both bits of
> functionality land we can reconcile things as needed; it's all
> internal implementation details so we don't have to worry too much
> about changing it later.
Agreed, although I'd hate to duplicate mechanism if someone else
has an equally functional proposal.
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 23:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, sds,
linux-kernel
On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:20 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> * should be at least that large. */
> #define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
>
> +/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
> + * auxiliary record.
> + */
> +struct audit_context_entry {
> + struct list_head list;
> + int type; /* Audit record type */
> +};
Looking at how this ends up being used later in the patchset I think
we would be better off if we stored a fully formed audit_buffer in the
struct above instead of data fields which we would use to generate an
audit_buffer in audit_log_end(). This helps tie the buffer generation
logic in with the existing code with which it is most closely related,
it allows us to report errors back to the caller as audit_log_end()
doesn't historically return an error code, and it helps us get ahead
of any future data lifetime issues we might run into by storing the
data in this audit struct.
This would also simplify things with respect to the audit_buffer
struct. Instead of having a dedicated struct for the aux data, you
could simply leverage the existing sk_buff list mechanisms:
struct audit_buffer {
struct sk_buff *skb; /* part of @skb_list, kept for audit_log funcs */
struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
struct audit_context *ctx;
struct audit_stamp stamp;
gfp_t gfp_mask;
}
The only sneaky bit in the struct above is that we likely want to
preserve audit_buffer::skb as a dedicated skb pointer so we don't have
to modify all of the audit_log_*() functions; you could of course, but
I'm guessing there is little appetite for that in the context of this
patchset.
Adding a new aux record would involve calling some private audit
function (no one outside of the audit subsystem should need access)
that would allocate a new skb similar to what we do in
audit_buffer_alloc() and add it to the end of the sk_buff_head list
via skb_queue_tail() and resetting audit_buffer::skb to point to the
newly allocated skb. This would allow all of the existing
audit_log*() functions to work correctly, and when you are done you
can restore the "main" skb with skb_peek(). If for some reason you
need to fail the new aux record mid-creation you just dequeue the list
tail, free the skb, and skb_peek() the "main" skb back into place.
> /* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
> * locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
> * buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> * use simultaneously. */
> struct audit_buffer {
> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> - struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> - gfp_t gfp_mask;
> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> + struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> + struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
> + gfp_t gfp_mask;
> };
...
> @@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> } else
> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
> + *
> + * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
> + * is done here.
> + * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
> + * create them here.
> + */
> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + struct audit_context_entry *entry;
> + struct audit_context mcontext;
> + struct audit_context *mctx;
> + struct audit_buffer *mab;
> + struct list_head *l;
> + struct list_head *n;
> +
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> + __audit_log_end(ab);
> +
> + if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
> + audit_buffer_free(ab);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
> + mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
> + mctx = &mcontext;
> + } else
> + mctx = ab->ctx;
> +
> + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
> + entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
> + mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
> + if (!mab) {
> + audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
> + continue;
> + }
> + switch (entry->type) {
> + /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
> + default:
> + audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
> + break;
> + }
> + __audit_log_end(mab);
> + audit_buffer_free(mab);
> + list_del(&entry->list);
> + kfree(entry);
> + }
>
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
This would also allow you to simplify audit_log_end() greatly, I'm
sure I'm missing a detail or two, but I suspect it would end up
looking something like this:
void __audit_log_end(skb)
{
/* ... current audit_log_end() but with only the sk_buff ... */
}
void audit_log_end(ab)
{
if (!ab)
return;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(ab->skb_list)))
__audit_log_end(skb);
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 23:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:20 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> * should be at least that large. */
> #define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
>
> +/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
> + * auxiliary record.
> + */
> +struct audit_context_entry {
> + struct list_head list;
> + int type; /* Audit record type */
> +};
Looking at how this ends up being used later in the patchset I think
we would be better off if we stored a fully formed audit_buffer in the
struct above instead of data fields which we would use to generate an
audit_buffer in audit_log_end(). This helps tie the buffer generation
logic in with the existing code with which it is most closely related,
it allows us to report errors back to the caller as audit_log_end()
doesn't historically return an error code, and it helps us get ahead
of any future data lifetime issues we might run into by storing the
data in this audit struct.
This would also simplify things with respect to the audit_buffer
struct. Instead of having a dedicated struct for the aux data, you
could simply leverage the existing sk_buff list mechanisms:
struct audit_buffer {
struct sk_buff *skb; /* part of @skb_list, kept for audit_log funcs */
struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
struct audit_context *ctx;
struct audit_stamp stamp;
gfp_t gfp_mask;
}
The only sneaky bit in the struct above is that we likely want to
preserve audit_buffer::skb as a dedicated skb pointer so we don't have
to modify all of the audit_log_*() functions; you could of course, but
I'm guessing there is little appetite for that in the context of this
patchset.
Adding a new aux record would involve calling some private audit
function (no one outside of the audit subsystem should need access)
that would allocate a new skb similar to what we do in
audit_buffer_alloc() and add it to the end of the sk_buff_head list
via skb_queue_tail() and resetting audit_buffer::skb to point to the
newly allocated skb. This would allow all of the existing
audit_log*() functions to work correctly, and when you are done you
can restore the "main" skb with skb_peek(). If for some reason you
need to fail the new aux record mid-creation you just dequeue the list
tail, free the skb, and skb_peek() the "main" skb back into place.
> /* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
> * locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
> * buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> * use simultaneously. */
> struct audit_buffer {
> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> - struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> - gfp_t gfp_mask;
> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> + struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> + struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
> + gfp_t gfp_mask;
> };
...
> @@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> } else
> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
> + *
> + * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
> + * is done here.
> + * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
> + * create them here.
> + */
> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + struct audit_context_entry *entry;
> + struct audit_context mcontext;
> + struct audit_context *mctx;
> + struct audit_buffer *mab;
> + struct list_head *l;
> + struct list_head *n;
> +
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> + __audit_log_end(ab);
> +
> + if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
> + audit_buffer_free(ab);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
> + mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
> + mctx = &mcontext;
> + } else
> + mctx = ab->ctx;
> +
> + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
> + entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
> + mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
> + if (!mab) {
> + audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
> + continue;
> + }
> + switch (entry->type) {
> + /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
> + default:
> + audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
> + break;
> + }
> + __audit_log_end(mab);
> + audit_buffer_free(mab);
> + list_del(&entry->list);
> + kfree(entry);
> + }
>
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
This would also allow you to simplify audit_log_end() greatly, I'm
sure I'm missing a detail or two, but I suspect it would end up
looking something like this:
void __audit_log_end(skb)
{
/* ... current audit_log_end() but with only the sk_buff ... */
}
void audit_log_end(ab)
{
if (!ab)
return;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(ab->skb_list)))
__audit_log_end(skb);
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
--
paul-moore.com
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-03-04 2:13 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-04 2:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, sds,
linux-kernel, Casey Schaufler
On 3/3/2022 3:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:20 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
>> * should be at least that large. */
>> #define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
>>
>> +/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
>> + * auxiliary record.
>> + */
>> +struct audit_context_entry {
>> + struct list_head list;
>> + int type; /* Audit record type */
>> +};
> Looking at how this ends up being used later in the patchset I think
> we would be better off if we stored a fully formed audit_buffer in the
> struct above instead of data fields which we would use to generate an
> audit_buffer in audit_log_end(). This helps tie the buffer generation
> logic in with the existing code with which it is most closely related,
> it allows us to report errors back to the caller as audit_log_end()
> doesn't historically return an error code, and it helps us get ahead
> of any future data lifetime issues we might run into by storing the
> data in this audit struct.
OK, I'll buy that.
> This would also simplify things with respect to the audit_buffer
> struct. Instead of having a dedicated struct for the aux data, you
> could simply leverage the existing sk_buff list mechanisms:
I can't say that "simply" is the adverb I'd choose, but sure,
I can do this.
> struct audit_buffer {
> struct sk_buff *skb; /* part of @skb_list, kept for audit_log funcs */
> struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
> struct audit_context *ctx;
> struct audit_stamp stamp;
> gfp_t gfp_mask;
> }
>
> The only sneaky bit in the struct above is that we likely want to
> preserve audit_buffer::skb as a dedicated skb pointer so we don't have
> to modify all of the audit_log_*() functions; you could of course, but
> I'm guessing there is little appetite for that in the context of this
> patchset.
I will give it a go without making the massive interface change.
> Adding a new aux record would involve calling some private audit
> function (no one outside of the audit subsystem should need access)
> that would allocate a new skb similar to what we do in
> audit_buffer_alloc() and add it to the end of the sk_buff_head list
> via skb_queue_tail() and resetting audit_buffer::skb to point to the
> newly allocated skb.
Good naming may be tricky as we need to indicate that a new buffer is
being allocated for an attached aux record and that the buffer to which
it's being attached is going to temporarily be in a curious state.
audit_buffer_add_aux() seems wordy, but it's what I'll start with lacking
a better suggestion.
> This would allow all of the existing
> audit_log*() functions to work correctly, and when you are done you
> can restore the "main" skb with skb_peek().
audit_buffer_close_aux()
> If for some reason you
> need to fail the new aux record mid-creation you just dequeue the list
> tail, free the skb, and skb_peek() the "main" skb back into place.
Why do I always get nervous when I hear "just" and "skb" in the
same sentence?
>> /* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
>> * locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
>> * buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
>> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
>> * use simultaneously. */
>> struct audit_buffer {
>> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
>> - struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
>> - gfp_t gfp_mask;
>> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
>> + struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
>> + struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
>> + gfp_t gfp_mask;
>> };
> ...
>
>> @@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
>> } else
>> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
>> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
>> + *
>> + * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
>> + * is done here.
>> + * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
>> + * create them here.
>> + */
>> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> +{
>> + struct audit_context_entry *entry;
>> + struct audit_context mcontext;
>> + struct audit_context *mctx;
>> + struct audit_buffer *mab;
>> + struct list_head *l;
>> + struct list_head *n;
>> +
>> + if (!ab)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + __audit_log_end(ab);
>> +
>> + if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
>> + audit_buffer_free(ab);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
>> + mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
>> + mctx = &mcontext;
>> + } else
>> + mctx = ab->ctx;
>> +
>> + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
>> + entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
>> + mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
>> + if (!mab) {
>> + audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> + switch (entry->type) {
>> + /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
>> + default:
>> + audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
>> + break;
>> + }
>> + __audit_log_end(mab);
>> + audit_buffer_free(mab);
>> + list_del(&entry->list);
>> + kfree(entry);
>> + }
>>
>> audit_buffer_free(ab);
>> }
> This would also allow you to simplify audit_log_end() greatly, I'm
> sure I'm missing a detail or two, but I suspect it would end up
> looking something like this:
Agreed. That is a much better fit for the existing code flow.
>
> void __audit_log_end(skb)
> {
> /* ... current audit_log_end() but with only the sk_buff ... */
> }
>
> void audit_log_end(ab)
> {
> if (!ab)
> return;
> while ((skb = skb_dequeue(ab->skb_list)))
> __audit_log_end(skb);
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
>
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-04 2:13 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-04 2:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On 3/3/2022 3:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:20 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Add a list for auxiliary record data to the audit_buffer structure.
>> Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as there's no
>> guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing the stamp
>> associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added to the list.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> kernel/audit.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>> 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index f012c3786264..559fb14e0380 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -191,15 +191,25 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
>> * should be at least that large. */
>> #define AUDIT_BUFSIZ 1024
>>
>> +/* The audit_context_entry contains data required to create an
>> + * auxiliary record.
>> + */
>> +struct audit_context_entry {
>> + struct list_head list;
>> + int type; /* Audit record type */
>> +};
> Looking at how this ends up being used later in the patchset I think
> we would be better off if we stored a fully formed audit_buffer in the
> struct above instead of data fields which we would use to generate an
> audit_buffer in audit_log_end(). This helps tie the buffer generation
> logic in with the existing code with which it is most closely related,
> it allows us to report errors back to the caller as audit_log_end()
> doesn't historically return an error code, and it helps us get ahead
> of any future data lifetime issues we might run into by storing the
> data in this audit struct.
OK, I'll buy that.
> This would also simplify things with respect to the audit_buffer
> struct. Instead of having a dedicated struct for the aux data, you
> could simply leverage the existing sk_buff list mechanisms:
I can't say that "simply" is the adverb I'd choose, but sure,
I can do this.
> struct audit_buffer {
> struct sk_buff *skb; /* part of @skb_list, kept for audit_log funcs */
> struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
> struct audit_context *ctx;
> struct audit_stamp stamp;
> gfp_t gfp_mask;
> }
>
> The only sneaky bit in the struct above is that we likely want to
> preserve audit_buffer::skb as a dedicated skb pointer so we don't have
> to modify all of the audit_log_*() functions; you could of course, but
> I'm guessing there is little appetite for that in the context of this
> patchset.
I will give it a go without making the massive interface change.
> Adding a new aux record would involve calling some private audit
> function (no one outside of the audit subsystem should need access)
> that would allocate a new skb similar to what we do in
> audit_buffer_alloc() and add it to the end of the sk_buff_head list
> via skb_queue_tail() and resetting audit_buffer::skb to point to the
> newly allocated skb.
Good naming may be tricky as we need to indicate that a new buffer is
being allocated for an attached aux record and that the buffer to which
it's being attached is going to temporarily be in a curious state.
audit_buffer_add_aux() seems wordy, but it's what I'll start with lacking
a better suggestion.
> This would allow all of the existing
> audit_log*() functions to work correctly, and when you are done you
> can restore the "main" skb with skb_peek().
audit_buffer_close_aux()
> If for some reason you
> need to fail the new aux record mid-creation you just dequeue the list
> tail, free the skb, and skb_peek() the "main" skb back into place.
Why do I always get nervous when I hear "just" and "skb" in the
same sentence?
>> /* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
>> * locks briefly to get the record off the freelist or to allocate the
>> * buffer, and locks briefly to send the buffer to the netlink layer or
>> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
>> * use simultaneously. */
>> struct audit_buffer {
>> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
>> - struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
>> - gfp_t gfp_mask;
>> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
>> + struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
>> + struct list_head aux_records; /* aux record data */
>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event stamp */
>> + gfp_t gfp_mask;
>> };
> ...
>
>> @@ -2408,6 +2418,60 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
>> } else
>> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
>> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
>> + *
>> + * Let __audit_log_end() handle the message while the buffer housekeeping
>> + * is done here.
>> + * If there are other records that have been deferred for the event
>> + * create them here.
>> + */
>> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> +{
>> + struct audit_context_entry *entry;
>> + struct audit_context mcontext;
>> + struct audit_context *mctx;
>> + struct audit_buffer *mab;
>> + struct list_head *l;
>> + struct list_head *n;
>> +
>> + if (!ab)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + __audit_log_end(ab);
>> +
>> + if (list_empty(&ab->aux_records)) {
>> + audit_buffer_free(ab);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
>> + mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
>> + mctx = &mcontext;
>> + } else
>> + mctx = ab->ctx;
>> +
>> + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &ab->aux_records) {
>> + entry = list_entry(l, struct audit_context_entry, list);
>> + mab = audit_log_start(mctx, ab->gfp_mask, entry->type);
>> + if (!mab) {
>> + audit_panic("alloc error in audit_log_end");
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> + switch (entry->type) {
>> + /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
>> + default:
>> + audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
>> + break;
>> + }
>> + __audit_log_end(mab);
>> + audit_buffer_free(mab);
>> + list_del(&entry->list);
>> + kfree(entry);
>> + }
>>
>> audit_buffer_free(ab);
>> }
> This would also allow you to simplify audit_log_end() greatly, I'm
> sure I'm missing a detail or two, but I suspect it would end up
> looking something like this:
Agreed. That is a much better fit for the existing code flow.
>
> void __audit_log_end(skb)
> {
> /* ... current audit_log_end() but with only the sk_buff ... */
> }
>
> void audit_log_end(ab)
> {
> if (!ab)
> return;
> while ((skb = skb_dequeue(ab->skb_list)))
> __audit_log_end(skb);
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
>
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
2022-03-04 2:13 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-04 14:43 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-04 14:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, sds,
linux-kernel
On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 9:13 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 3/3/2022 3:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Adding a new aux record would involve calling some private audit
> > function (no one outside of the audit subsystem should need access)
> > that would allocate a new skb similar to what we do in
> > audit_buffer_alloc() and add it to the end of the sk_buff_head list
> > via skb_queue_tail() and resetting audit_buffer::skb to point to the
> > newly allocated skb.
>
> Good naming may be tricky as we need to indicate that a new buffer is
> being allocated for an attached aux record and that the buffer to which
> it's being attached is going to temporarily be in a curious state.
> audit_buffer_add_aux() seems wordy, but it's what I'll start with lacking
> a better suggestion.
I agree that it will leave the audit_buffer in an odd state, at least
with the current definition of the audit_buffer. However, this is
mitigated by the restriction that the only callers should be within
the audit subsystem. Here is some quick pseudo-code mockup of what
I'm thinking:
/* on success, ab->skb will point to the new aux record */
static int audit_buffer_aux_new(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type)
{
WARN_ON(ab->skb != skb_peek(&ab->skb_list));
ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, ab->gfp_mask);
if (!ab->skb)
goto err;
if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
goto err;
skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list);
return 0;
err:
kfree_skb(&ab->skb);
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* restores the "main" record into ab->skb */
static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
}
/* free the current aux record and reset ab->skb to the "main" */
static void audit_buffer_aux_cancel(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
if (ab->skb != skb_peek_tail(&ab->skb_list)) {
BUG();
return;
}
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
kfree_skb(skb_dequeue_tail(&ab->skb_list));
}
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records
@ 2022-03-04 14:43 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-04 14:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 9:13 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 3/3/2022 3:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Adding a new aux record would involve calling some private audit
> > function (no one outside of the audit subsystem should need access)
> > that would allocate a new skb similar to what we do in
> > audit_buffer_alloc() and add it to the end of the sk_buff_head list
> > via skb_queue_tail() and resetting audit_buffer::skb to point to the
> > newly allocated skb.
>
> Good naming may be tricky as we need to indicate that a new buffer is
> being allocated for an attached aux record and that the buffer to which
> it's being attached is going to temporarily be in a curious state.
> audit_buffer_add_aux() seems wordy, but it's what I'll start with lacking
> a better suggestion.
I agree that it will leave the audit_buffer in an odd state, at least
with the current definition of the audit_buffer. However, this is
mitigated by the restriction that the only callers should be within
the audit subsystem. Here is some quick pseudo-code mockup of what
I'm thinking:
/* on success, ab->skb will point to the new aux record */
static int audit_buffer_aux_new(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type)
{
WARN_ON(ab->skb != skb_peek(&ab->skb_list));
ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, ab->gfp_mask);
if (!ab->skb)
goto err;
if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
goto err;
skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list);
return 0;
err:
kfree_skb(&ab->skb);
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* restores the "main" record into ab->skb */
static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
}
/* free the current aux record and reset ab->skb to the "main" */
static void audit_buffer_aux_cancel(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
if (ab->skb != skb_peek_tail(&ab->skb_list)) {
BUG();
return;
}
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
kfree_skb(skb_dequeue_tail(&ab->skb_list));
}
--
paul-moore.com
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 25/28] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor=unconfined
subj_smack=_
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on a subject security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 39e113574ba7..280ea8d4778f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -231,6 +231,15 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ return lsm_slot_to_name(1) != NULL;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
/**
* lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
* @blob: Pointer to the data
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 8eda133ca4c1..af0aaccfaf57 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 559fb14e0380..e8744e80ef21 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -197,6 +197,9 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
struct audit_context_entry {
struct list_head list;
int type; /* Audit record type */
+ union {
+ struct lsmblob lsm_subjs;
+ };
};
/* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
@@ -2163,16 +2166,31 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ struct audit_context_entry *ace;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
+ if (!ace) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
goto error_path;
- return 0;
+ }
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
+ ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS;
+ ace->lsm_subjs = blob;
+ list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
}
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
- security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
@@ -2434,9 +2452,12 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
struct audit_context_entry *entry;
struct audit_context mcontext;
struct audit_context *mctx;
+ struct lsmcontext lcontext;
struct audit_buffer *mab;
struct list_head *l;
struct list_head *n;
+ int rc;
+ int i;
if (!ab)
return;
@@ -2449,6 +2470,7 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
+ mcontext.context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
mctx = &mcontext;
} else
@@ -2462,7 +2484,27 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
continue;
}
switch (entry->type) {
- /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
+ case AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS:
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (entry->lsm_subjs.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsm_subjs,
+ &lcontext, i);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_end");
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%ssubj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ lcontext.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lcontext);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
default:
audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
break;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 25/28] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor=unconfined
subj_smack=_
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on a subject security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 39e113574ba7..280ea8d4778f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -231,6 +231,15 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ return lsm_slot_to_name(1) != NULL;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
/**
* lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
* @blob: Pointer to the data
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 8eda133ca4c1..af0aaccfaf57 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 559fb14e0380..e8744e80ef21 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -197,6 +197,9 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
struct audit_context_entry {
struct list_head list;
int type; /* Audit record type */
+ union {
+ struct lsmblob lsm_subjs;
+ };
};
/* The audit_buffer is used when formatting an audit record. The caller
@@ -2163,16 +2166,31 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ struct audit_context_entry *ace;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
+ if (!ace) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
goto error_path;
- return 0;
+ }
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
+ ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS;
+ ace->lsm_subjs = blob;
+ list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
}
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
- security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
@@ -2434,9 +2452,12 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
struct audit_context_entry *entry;
struct audit_context mcontext;
struct audit_context *mctx;
+ struct lsmcontext lcontext;
struct audit_buffer *mab;
struct list_head *l;
struct list_head *n;
+ int rc;
+ int i;
if (!ab)
return;
@@ -2449,6 +2470,7 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
if (ab->ctx == NULL) {
+ mcontext.context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
mcontext.stamp = ab->stamp;
mctx = &mcontext;
} else
@@ -2462,7 +2484,27 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
continue;
}
switch (entry->type) {
- /* Don't know of any quite yet. */
+ case AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS:
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (entry->lsm_subjs.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsm_subjs,
+ &lcontext, i);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_end");
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%ssubj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ lcontext.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lcontext);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
default:
audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
break;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on an object security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 37 ++++--------------------
4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 14849d5f84b4..94c87ec043c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
@@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
+{ }
static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index e8744e80ef21..3b9ce617b150 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ struct audit_context_entry {
int type; /* Audit record type */
union {
struct lsmblob lsm_subjs;
+ struct lsmblob lsm_objs;
};
};
@@ -2199,6 +2200,43 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct audit_context_entry *ace;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
+ if (!ace)
+ goto error_path;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
+ ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS;
+ ace->lsm_objs = *blob;
+ list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
+ }
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
+
void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
@@ -2505,6 +2543,27 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS:
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (entry->lsm_objs.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsm_objs,
+ &lcontext, i);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_end");
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%sobj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ lcontext.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lcontext);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
default:
audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7848e7351cf9..41111b607c78 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1120,7 +1120,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1130,15 +1129,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1373,18 +1365,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob);
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1536,19 +1520,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob);
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on an object security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 37 ++++--------------------
4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 14849d5f84b4..94c87ec043c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
@@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
+{ }
static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{ }
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index e8744e80ef21..3b9ce617b150 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ struct audit_context_entry {
int type; /* Audit record type */
union {
struct lsmblob lsm_subjs;
+ struct lsmblob lsm_objs;
};
};
@@ -2199,6 +2200,43 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ struct audit_context_entry *ace;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If there is more than one security module that has a
+ * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
+ * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
+ */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
+ if (!ace)
+ goto error_path;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
+ ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS;
+ ace->lsm_objs = *blob;
+ list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
+ }
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
+
void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
@@ -2505,6 +2543,27 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS:
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (entry->lsm_objs.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsm_objs,
+ &lcontext, i);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_end");
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%sobj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(mab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ lcontext.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lcontext);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
default:
audit_panic("Unknown type in audit_log_end");
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7848e7351cf9..41111b607c78 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1120,7 +1120,6 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1130,15 +1129,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1373,18 +1365,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob);
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1536,19 +1520,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob);
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
@ 2022-02-03 5:23 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 5:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 9614 bytes --]
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test ERROR on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2 next-20220202]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: um-i386_defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220203/202202031346.FyJ9aWIH-lkp(a)intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/a1d8d5f6af21550809605bec3238537224a83ba6
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout a1d8d5f6af21550809605bec3238537224a83ba6
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=um SUBARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from init/init_task.c:12:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/fork.c:64:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
kernel/fork.c:162:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'arch_release_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
162 | void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/fork.c:764:20: warning: no previous prototype for 'arch_task_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
764 | void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/fork.c:859:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'arch_dup_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
859 | int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from kernel/fork.c:64:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/exit.c:49:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
kernel/exit.c:1824:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'abort' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1824 | __weak void abort(void)
| ^~~~~
In file included from kernel/exit.c:49:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from fs/pipe.c:23:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
fs/pipe.c:756:15: warning: no previous prototype for 'account_pipe_buffers' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
756 | unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:762:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'too_many_pipe_buffers_soft' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
762 | bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:769:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'too_many_pipe_buffers_hard' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
769 | bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:776:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'pipe_is_unprivileged_user' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
776 | bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:1246:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'pipe_resize_ring' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1246 | int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from fs/pipe.c:23:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from fs/io_uring.c:74:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
fs/io_uring.c: In function '__io_submit_flush_completions':
fs/io_uring.c:2523:33: warning: variable 'prev' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
2523 | struct io_wq_work_node *node, *prev;
| ^~~~
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from fs/io_uring.c:74:
fs/io_uring.c: At top level:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from net/socket.c:82:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
net/socket.c: In function '__sys_getsockopt':
net/socket.c:2206:6: warning: variable 'max_optlen' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
2206 | int max_optlen;
| ^~~~~~~~~~
In file included from net/socket.c:82:
net/socket.c: At top level:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/net/xfrm.h:15,
from net/ipv4/route.c:96:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
net/ipv4/route.c: In function 'ip_rt_send_redirect':
net/ipv4/route.c:870:6: warning: variable 'log_martians' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
870 | int log_martians;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/net/xfrm.h:15,
from net/ipv4/route.c:96:
net/ipv4/route.c: At top level:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +262 include/linux/audit.h
220
221 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
222 static inline __printf(4, 5)
223 void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
224 const char *fmt, ...)
225 { }
226 static inline struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx,
227 gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
228 {
229 return NULL;
230 }
231 static inline __printf(2, 3)
232 void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
233 { }
234 static inline void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
235 { }
236 static inline void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab,
237 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
238 { }
239 static inline void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab,
240 const char *buf, size_t n)
241 { }
242 static inline void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
243 const char *string, size_t n)
244 { }
245 static inline void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
246 const char *string)
247 { }
248 static inline void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
249 const char *prefix,
250 const struct path *path)
251 { }
252 static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
253 { }
254 static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
255 { }
256 static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
257 {
258 return 0;
259 }
260 static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
261 struct lsmblob *blob);
> 262 { }
263 static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
264 { }
265
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
(?)
@ 2022-02-03 5:43 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-02-03 5:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 10025 bytes --]
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-audit/next]
[also build test ERROR on nf-next/master nf/master linus/master v5.17-rc2 next-20220202]
[cannot apply to jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git next
config: riscv-randconfig-r042-20220130 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220203/202202031345.IMqZIIpG-lkp(a)intel.com/config)
compiler: riscv64-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/a1d8d5f6af21550809605bec3238537224a83ba6
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220203-085302
git checkout a1d8d5f6af21550809605bec3238537224a83ba6
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=riscv SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from fs/debugfs/inode.c:23:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/fork.c:64:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
kernel/fork.c:162:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'arch_release_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
162 | void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/fork.c:764:20: warning: no previous prototype for 'arch_task_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
764 | void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from kernel/fork.c:64:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/exit.c:49:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
kernel/exit.c:1824:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'abort' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1824 | __weak void abort(void)
| ^~~~~
In file included from kernel/exit.c:49:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/module.c:59:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
kernel/module.c:4817:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'module_layout' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
4817 | void module_layout(struct module *mod,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from kernel/module.c:59:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from fs/pipe.c:23:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
fs/pipe.c:756:15: warning: no previous prototype for 'account_pipe_buffers' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
756 | unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:762:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'too_many_pipe_buffers_soft' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
762 | bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:769:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'too_many_pipe_buffers_hard' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
769 | bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:776:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'pipe_is_unprivileged_user' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
776 | bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/pipe.c:1246:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'pipe_resize_ring' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1246 | int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from fs/pipe.c:23:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from fs/io_uring.c:74:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
fs/io_uring.c: In function '__io_submit_flush_completions':
fs/io_uring.c:2523:40: warning: variable 'prev' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
2523 | struct io_wq_work_node *node, *prev;
| ^~~~
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from fs/io_uring.c:74:
fs/io_uring.c: At top level:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from kernel/trace/trace.c:49:
>> include/linux/audit.h:262:1: error: expected identifier or '(' before '{' token
262 | { }
| ^
kernel/trace/trace.c: In function 'trace_check_vprintf':
kernel/trace/trace.c:3822:17: warning: function 'trace_check_vprintf' might be a candidate for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]
3822 | trace_seq_vprintf(&iter->seq, iter->fmt, ap);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/trace/trace.c:3889:17: warning: function 'trace_check_vprintf' might be a candidate for 'gnu_printf' format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format]
3889 | trace_seq_vprintf(&iter->seq, p, ap);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from include/linux/fsnotify.h:16,
from kernel/trace/trace.c:49:
kernel/trace/trace.c: At top level:
include/linux/audit.h:260:20: warning: 'audit_log_object_context' declared 'static' but never defined [-Wunused-function]
260 | static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
vim +262 include/linux/audit.h
220
221 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
222 static inline __printf(4, 5)
223 void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type,
224 const char *fmt, ...)
225 { }
226 static inline struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx,
227 gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
228 {
229 return NULL;
230 }
231 static inline __printf(2, 3)
232 void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
233 { }
234 static inline void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
235 { }
236 static inline void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab,
237 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
238 { }
239 static inline void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab,
240 const char *buf, size_t n)
241 { }
242 static inline void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
243 const char *string, size_t n)
244 { }
245 static inline void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
246 const char *string)
247 { }
248 static inline void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
249 const char *prefix,
250 const struct path *path)
251 { }
252 static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
253 { }
254 static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
255 { }
256 static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
257 {
258 return 0;
259 }
260 static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
261 struct lsmblob *blob);
> 262 { }
263 static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
264 { }
265
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 23:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, sds,
linux-kernel
On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:23 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>
> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on an object security context.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 37 ++++--------------------
> 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index e8744e80ef21..3b9ce617b150 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2199,6 +2200,43 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>
> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + struct audit_context_entry *ace;
> + struct lsmcontext context;
> + int error;
> +
> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (error) {
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + goto error_path;
> + return;
> + }
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
> + * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
> + */
I know this is nitpicky, but I'm going to say it anyway ... the
separate record isn't purely for compatibility reasons, it's for size
reasons. There is a fear that multiple LSM labels could blow past the
record size limit when combined with other fields, so putting them in
their own dedicated record gives us more room. If that wasn't the
case we could just tack them on the end of existing records.
However, converting the existing "obj=" field into "obj=?" when
multiple LSM labels are present *is* a compatibility nod as it allows
existing userspace tooling that expects a single "obj=" field to
continue to work.
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> + ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
> + if (!ace)
> + goto error_path;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
> + ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS;
> + ace->lsm_objs = *blob;
> + list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
> + }
> + return;
> +
> +error_path:
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
> +
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
@ 2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-03-03 23:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:23 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>
> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on an object security context.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 37 ++++--------------------
> 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index e8744e80ef21..3b9ce617b150 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2199,6 +2200,43 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>
> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + struct audit_context_entry *ace;
> + struct lsmcontext context;
> + int error;
> +
> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (error) {
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + goto error_path;
> + return;
> + }
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
> + * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
> + */
I know this is nitpicky, but I'm going to say it anyway ... the
separate record isn't purely for compatibility reasons, it's for size
reasons. There is a fear that multiple LSM labels could blow past the
record size limit when combined with other fields, so putting them in
their own dedicated record gives us more room. If that wasn't the
case we could just tack them on the end of existing records.
However, converting the existing "obj=" field into "obj=?" when
multiple LSM labels are present *is* a compatibility nod as it allows
existing userspace tooling that expects a single "obj=" field to
continue to work.
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> + ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
> + if (!ace)
> + goto error_path;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
> + ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS;
> + ace->lsm_objs = *blob;
> + list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
> + }
> + return;
> +
> +error_path:
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
> +
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
2022-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-03-04 1:26 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-04 1:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, sds,
linux-kernel, Casey Schaufler
On 3/3/2022 3:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:23 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
>> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>>
>> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
>> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
>> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>>
>> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
>> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
>> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
>> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
>> on an object security context.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++
>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
>> kernel/audit.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 37 ++++--------------------
>> 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index e8744e80ef21..3b9ce617b150 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -2199,6 +2200,43 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>>
>> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
>> +{
>> + struct audit_context_entry *ace;
>> + struct lsmcontext context;
>> + int error;
>> +
>> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>> + if (error) {
>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>> + goto error_path;
>> + return;
>> + }
>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>> + } else {
>> + /*
>> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
>> + * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
>> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
>> + */
> I know this is nitpicky, but I'm going to say it anyway ... the
> separate record isn't purely for compatibility reasons, it's for size
> reasons. There is a fear that multiple LSM labels could blow past the
> record size limit when combined with other fields, so putting them in
> their own dedicated record gives us more room. If that wasn't the
> case we could just tack them on the end of existing records.
Fair enough. I have no objection to adding commentary that will
help the next developer who comes into this code.
>
> However, converting the existing "obj=" field into "obj=?" when
> multiple LSM labels are present *is* a compatibility nod as it allows
> existing userspace tooling that expects a single "obj=" field to
> continue to work.
Likewise here.
>
>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>> + ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
>> + if (!ace)
>> + goto error_path;
>> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
>> + ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS;
>> + ace->lsm_objs = *blob;
>> + list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
>> + }
>> + return;
>> +
>> +error_path:
>> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
>> +
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v32 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object security contexts
@ 2022-03-04 1:26 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-03-04 1:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler, sds
On 3/3/2022 3:36 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:23 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
>> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>>
>> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
>> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
>> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>>
>> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
>> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
>> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
>> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
>> on an object security context.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++
>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
>> kernel/audit.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 37 ++++--------------------
>> 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index e8744e80ef21..3b9ce617b150 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -2199,6 +2200,43 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
>>
>> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
>> +{
>> + struct audit_context_entry *ace;
>> + struct lsmcontext context;
>> + int error;
>> +
>> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>> + if (error) {
>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>> + goto error_path;
>> + return;
>> + }
>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>> + } else {
>> + /*
>> + * If there is more than one security module that has a
>> + * object "context" it's necessary to put the object data
>> + * into a separate record to maintain compatibility.
>> + */
> I know this is nitpicky, but I'm going to say it anyway ... the
> separate record isn't purely for compatibility reasons, it's for size
> reasons. There is a fear that multiple LSM labels could blow past the
> record size limit when combined with other fields, so putting them in
> their own dedicated record gives us more room. If that wasn't the
> case we could just tack them on the end of existing records.
Fair enough. I have no objection to adding commentary that will
help the next developer who comes into this code.
>
> However, converting the existing "obj=" field into "obj=?" when
> multiple LSM labels are present *is* a compatibility nod as it allows
> existing userspace tooling that expects a single "obj=" field to
> continue to work.
Likewise here.
>
>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>> + ace = kzalloc(sizeof(*ace), ab->gfp_mask);
>> + if (!ace)
>> + goto error_path;
>> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ace->list);
>> + ace->type = AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS;
>> + ace->lsm_objs = *blob;
>> + list_add(&ace->list, &ab->aux_records);
>> + }
>> + return;
>> +
>> +error_path:
>> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_object_context);
>> +
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, linux-api, linux-doc
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
information will be displayed.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 +++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++----
security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e0d41adb38ba..324370d048b1 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2829,6 +2829,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2c2d0ef59a41..51b5acff7f0e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1396,6 +1396,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 29181bc8c693..1ee58c1491ab 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -609,11 +610,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index fde332e0ea7d..172550f67fc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Requires: profile != NULL
*
@@ -28,20 +29,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -50,19 +52,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b694eca9d4f1..b1a95ede7fc2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -802,6 +802,57 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ size_t llen;
+ size_t nlen;
+ size_t flen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ /*
+ * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
+ * when returning a security context. There is no definition
+ * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
+ * each way.
+ */
+ nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
+
+ flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
+ final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
+
+ kfree(*ctx);
+
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = flen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
@@ -2210,6 +2261,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2237,6 +2292,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7b9cb4d263c0..beb0e1cf02b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6363,7 +6363,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 46d81f638a2b..d1677339e677 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3485,7 +3485,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-doc, linux-api, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
information will be displayed.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 +++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++----
security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e0d41adb38ba..324370d048b1 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2829,6 +2829,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2c2d0ef59a41..51b5acff7f0e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1396,6 +1396,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 29181bc8c693..1ee58c1491ab 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -609,11 +610,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index fde332e0ea7d..172550f67fc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Requires: profile != NULL
*
@@ -28,20 +29,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -50,19 +52,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b694eca9d4f1..b1a95ede7fc2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -802,6 +802,57 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ size_t llen;
+ size_t nlen;
+ size_t flen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ /*
+ * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
+ * when returning a security context. There is no definition
+ * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
+ * each way.
+ */
+ nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
+
+ flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
+ final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
+
+ kfree(*ctx);
+
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = flen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
@@ -2210,6 +2261,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2237,6 +2292,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7b9cb4d263c0..beb0e1cf02b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6363,7 +6363,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 46d81f638a2b..d1677339e677 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3485,7 +3485,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v32 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
2022-02-02 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, sds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
With the inclusion of the interface LSM process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1ee58c1491ab..388298a15556 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1145,22 +1145,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1264,8 +1248,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1919,7 +1901,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread* [PATCH v32 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
@ 2022-02-02 23:53 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-02-02 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, sds
With the inclusion of the interface LSM process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1ee58c1491ab..388298a15556 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1145,22 +1145,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1264,8 +1248,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1919,7 +1901,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread