* [PATCH v35 00/29] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
[not found] <20220418145945.38797-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v35: Rebase to 5.18-rc2
Address the case where CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled but
no security modules that use secid slots are included.
The resulting blob.secid[0] instances, although never
present in a call path, raised concerns.
Address the case in interface_lsm where the BPF module
returns -EINVAL, resulting in a failed setting of the
value that would be otherwise allowed.
v34: Rebase to 5.18-rc1
Incorporate feedback on the audit generation.
v33: Rework the supplimental audit record generation once more,
this time taking pseudo-code provided by Paul Moore as a
basis. The resulting code is considerably simpler and fits
better with the existing code flow.
v32: Rebase to 5.17-rc2
Incorporate additional feedback from v30.
v31: Rebase to 5.16-rc4
Incorporate feedback from Paul Moore on the audit
component changes.
v30: Rebase to 5.16-rc1
Replace the integrity sub-system reuse of the audit
subsystem event matching functions with IMA specific
functions. This is done because audit needs to maintain
information about multiple security modules in audit
rules while IMA to restricts the information to a single
security module.
The binder hooks have been changed and are no longer
called with sufficient information to identify the
interface_lsm. Pass that information in the binder
message, and use that in the compatibility decision.
Refactor the audit changes.
v29: Rebase to 5.15-rc1
Rework the supplimental audit record generation. Attach
a list of supplimental data to the audit_buffer and
generate the auxiliary records as needed on event end.
This should be usable for other auxiliary data, such as
container IDs. There is other ongoing audit work that
will require integration with this.
v28: Rebase to 5.14-rc2
Provide IMA rules bounds checking (patch 04)
Quote contexts in MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS and MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
audit records because of AppArmor's use of '=' in context
values. (patch 22,23)
v27: Fixes for landlock (patch 02)
Rework the subject audit record generation. This version is
simpler and reflects feedback from Paul Moore. (patch 22)
v26: Rebase to 5.13-rc1
Include the landlock security module.
Accomodate change from security_task_getsecid() to
security_task_getsecid_obj() and security_task_getsecid_subj().
v25: Rebase to 5.12-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v24
- The IMA team suggested improvements to the integrity rule
processing.
v24: Rebase to 5.11-rc1
Incorporate feedback from v23
- Address the IMA team's concerns about "label collisions".
A label collision occurs when there is ambiguity about
which of multiple LSMs is being targeted in the definition
of an integrity check rule. A system with Smack and
AppArmor would be unable to distinguish which LSM is
important to an integrity rule referrencing the label
"unconfined" as that label is meaningful to both.
Provide a boot option to specify which LSM will be used in
IMA rules when multiple LSMs are present. (patch 04)
Pull LSM "slot" identification from later audit patches in
in support of this (patch 03).
- Pick up a few audit events that need to include supplimental
subject context records that had been missed in the
previous version.
v23: Rebase to 5.10-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v22
- Change /proc/*/attr/display to /proc/*/attr/interface_lsm to
make the purpose clearer. (patch 0012)
- Include ABI documentation. (patch 0012, 0022)
- Introduce LSM documentation updates with the patches where
the interfaces are added rather than at the end. (patch 0012, 0022)
Include more maintainers and mail lists in To: and Cc: directives.
v22: Rebase to 5.10-rc1
v21: Rebase to 5.9-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v20
- Further revert UDS SO_PEERSEC to use scaffolding around
the interfaces that use lsmblobs and store only a single
secid. The possibility of multiple security modules
requiring data here is still a future problem.
- Incorporate Richard Guy Briggs' non-syscall auxiliary
records patch (patch 0019-0021) in place of my "supplimental"
records implementation. [I'm not sure I've given proper
attestation. I will correct as appropriate]
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002)
Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015)
Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020)
Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs
directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct
treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case
is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005)
Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit
records so that there's always exactly one when it's
appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial
change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond
syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 01 separates the audit rule processing from the
integrity rule processing. They were never really the
same, but void pointers could hide that. The changes
following use the rule pointers differently in audit
and IMA, so keeping the code common is not a good idea.
Patch 02 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 03-04 introduce a structure "lsmblob" that will gradually
replace the "secid" as a shorthand for security module information.
At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that
used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests
one.
Patch 05 provides mechanism for the IMA subsystem to identify
explicitly which LSM is subject to IMA policy. This includes
a boot option for specifying the default and an additional option
in IMA rules "lsm=".
Patches 06-15 change LSM interfaces to use the lsmblob instead
of secids. It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 15 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which
security module's hooks should be used when displaying or
converting a security context string. A new interface
/proc/self/attr/interface_lsm contains the name of the security
module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of
the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names
of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name
is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module
which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The interface LSM of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for
reading the interface LSM of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 16 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 17-18 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 19. This is not strictly
necessary as there can only be one security module that
uses Netlabel at this point. Using a lsmblob is much
cleaner, as the interfaces that use the data have all
been converted.
Patch 20 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that both ends of a transaction use the same interface LSM.
Patch 21 adds a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx()
that indicates which of the security modules should be used
to provide the context.
Patches 22-25 provide mechanism to keeping a list of auxiliary
record data in an audit_buffer. The list is read when the
audit record is ended, and supplimental records are created
as needed.
Patch 26 adds a supplimental audit record for subject
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a
"subj=?" field to identify the subject data. The
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: subj_selinux=xyz_t subj_apparmor=abc.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor==unconfined
subj_smack=_
Patch 27 adds a supplimental audit record for object
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction The
with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: obj_selinux="xyz_t obj_apparmor="abc". While
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain an entry
for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
records will only contain entries for security modules for
which the object in question has data.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Patch 28 adds a new interface for getting the compound security
contexts, /proc/self/attr/context. An example of the content
of this file is:
selinux\0one_u:one_r:one_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023\0apparmor\0unconfined\0
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed,
Patch 29 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary
stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in
their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise".
The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8%
difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.18-rc2-v35
Casey Schaufler (29):
integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
LSM: Specify which LSM to display
LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +-
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +
drivers/android/binder.c | 47 +-
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +
include/linux/audit.h | 15 +-
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 19 +-
include/linux/security.h | 263 +++++++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-
include/net/scm.h | 15 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 253 +++++--
kernel/audit.h | 17 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 160 ++---
kernel/cred.c | 12 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 24 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 +-
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 100 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 105 +--
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +-
security/commoncap.c | 7 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 -
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 71 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 58 +-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 +-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +-
security/security.c | 615 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 103 +--
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 91 +--
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
66 files changed, 1776 insertions(+), 659 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
base-commit: ce522ba9ef7e2d9fb22a39eb3371c0c64e2a433e
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 00/29] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v35: Rebase to 5.18-rc2
Address the case where CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled but
no security modules that use secid slots are included.
The resulting blob.secid[0] instances, although never
present in a call path, raised concerns.
Address the case in interface_lsm where the BPF module
returns -EINVAL, resulting in a failed setting of the
value that would be otherwise allowed.
v34: Rebase to 5.18-rc1
Incorporate feedback on the audit generation.
v33: Rework the supplimental audit record generation once more,
this time taking pseudo-code provided by Paul Moore as a
basis. The resulting code is considerably simpler and fits
better with the existing code flow.
v32: Rebase to 5.17-rc2
Incorporate additional feedback from v30.
v31: Rebase to 5.16-rc4
Incorporate feedback from Paul Moore on the audit
component changes.
v30: Rebase to 5.16-rc1
Replace the integrity sub-system reuse of the audit
subsystem event matching functions with IMA specific
functions. This is done because audit needs to maintain
information about multiple security modules in audit
rules while IMA to restricts the information to a single
security module.
The binder hooks have been changed and are no longer
called with sufficient information to identify the
interface_lsm. Pass that information in the binder
message, and use that in the compatibility decision.
Refactor the audit changes.
v29: Rebase to 5.15-rc1
Rework the supplimental audit record generation. Attach
a list of supplimental data to the audit_buffer and
generate the auxiliary records as needed on event end.
This should be usable for other auxiliary data, such as
container IDs. There is other ongoing audit work that
will require integration with this.
v28: Rebase to 5.14-rc2
Provide IMA rules bounds checking (patch 04)
Quote contexts in MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS and MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
audit records because of AppArmor's use of '=' in context
values. (patch 22,23)
v27: Fixes for landlock (patch 02)
Rework the subject audit record generation. This version is
simpler and reflects feedback from Paul Moore. (patch 22)
v26: Rebase to 5.13-rc1
Include the landlock security module.
Accomodate change from security_task_getsecid() to
security_task_getsecid_obj() and security_task_getsecid_subj().
v25: Rebase to 5.12-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v24
- The IMA team suggested improvements to the integrity rule
processing.
v24: Rebase to 5.11-rc1
Incorporate feedback from v23
- Address the IMA team's concerns about "label collisions".
A label collision occurs when there is ambiguity about
which of multiple LSMs is being targeted in the definition
of an integrity check rule. A system with Smack and
AppArmor would be unable to distinguish which LSM is
important to an integrity rule referrencing the label
"unconfined" as that label is meaningful to both.
Provide a boot option to specify which LSM will be used in
IMA rules when multiple LSMs are present. (patch 04)
Pull LSM "slot" identification from later audit patches in
in support of this (patch 03).
- Pick up a few audit events that need to include supplimental
subject context records that had been missed in the
previous version.
v23: Rebase to 5.10-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v22
- Change /proc/*/attr/display to /proc/*/attr/interface_lsm to
make the purpose clearer. (patch 0012)
- Include ABI documentation. (patch 0012, 0022)
- Introduce LSM documentation updates with the patches where
the interfaces are added rather than at the end. (patch 0012, 0022)
Include more maintainers and mail lists in To: and Cc: directives.
v22: Rebase to 5.10-rc1
v21: Rebase to 5.9-rc4
Incorporate feedback from v20
- Further revert UDS SO_PEERSEC to use scaffolding around
the interfaces that use lsmblobs and store only a single
secid. The possibility of multiple security modules
requiring data here is still a future problem.
- Incorporate Richard Guy Briggs' non-syscall auxiliary
records patch (patch 0019-0021) in place of my "supplimental"
records implementation. [I'm not sure I've given proper
attestation. I will correct as appropriate]
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002)
Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015)
Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020)
Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs
directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct
treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case
is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005)
Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit
records so that there's always exactly one when it's
appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial
change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond
syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 01 separates the audit rule processing from the
integrity rule processing. They were never really the
same, but void pointers could hide that. The changes
following use the rule pointers differently in audit
and IMA, so keeping the code common is not a good idea.
Patch 02 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 03-04 introduce a structure "lsmblob" that will gradually
replace the "secid" as a shorthand for security module information.
At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that
used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests
one.
Patch 05 provides mechanism for the IMA subsystem to identify
explicitly which LSM is subject to IMA policy. This includes
a boot option for specifying the default and an additional option
in IMA rules "lsm=".
Patches 06-15 change LSM interfaces to use the lsmblob instead
of secids. It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 15 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which
security module's hooks should be used when displaying or
converting a security context string. A new interface
/proc/self/attr/interface_lsm contains the name of the security
module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of
the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names
of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name
is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module
which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The interface LSM of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for
reading the interface LSM of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 16 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 17-18 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 19. This is not strictly
necessary as there can only be one security module that
uses Netlabel at this point. Using a lsmblob is much
cleaner, as the interfaces that use the data have all
been converted.
Patch 20 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that both ends of a transaction use the same interface LSM.
Patch 21 adds a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx()
that indicates which of the security modules should be used
to provide the context.
Patches 22-25 provide mechanism to keeping a list of auxiliary
record data in an audit_buffer. The list is read when the
audit record is ended, and supplimental records are created
as needed.
Patch 26 adds a supplimental audit record for subject
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a
"subj=?" field to identify the subject data. The
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: subj_selinux=xyz_t subj_apparmor=abc.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor==unconfined
subj_smack=_
Patch 27 adds a supplimental audit record for object
LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction The
with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data.
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module
with the data: obj_selinux="xyz_t obj_apparmor="abc". While
AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain an entry
for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
records will only contain entries for security modules for
which the object in question has data.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=UNKNOWN[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
Patch 28 adds a new interface for getting the compound security
contexts, /proc/self/attr/context. An example of the content
of this file is:
selinux\0one_u:one_r:one_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023\0apparmor\0unconfined\0
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed,
Patch 29 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary
stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in
their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise".
The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8%
difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.18-rc2-v35
Casey Schaufler (29):
integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
LSM: Specify which LSM to display
LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +-
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 +
drivers/android/binder.c | 47 +-
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +
include/linux/audit.h | 15 +-
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 19 +-
include/linux/security.h | 263 +++++++-
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-
include/net/scm.h | 15 +-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 +
kernel/audit.c | 253 +++++--
kernel/audit.h | 17 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 160 ++---
kernel/cred.c | 12 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 24 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 +-
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 100 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 105 +--
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +-
security/commoncap.c | 7 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 -
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 71 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 58 +-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 +-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +-
security/security.c | 615 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 103 +--
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 91 +--
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
66 files changed, 1776 insertions(+), 659 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
base-commit: ce522ba9ef7e2d9fb22a39eb3371c0c64e2a433e
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because
they use security module registered hooks that we don't
want exported.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 25b3ef71f495..2986342dad41 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1917,6 +1917,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
-/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-
-#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
-#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
-
-#else
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
#else
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b7cf5cbfdc67..22543fdb6041 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2586,6 +2586,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+/*
+ * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
+ * the audit subsystem.
+ */
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
{
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because
they use security module registered hooks that we don't
want exported.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 25b3ef71f495..2986342dad41 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1917,6 +1917,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
-/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-
-#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
-#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
-
-#else
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
#else
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b7cf5cbfdc67..22543fdb6041 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2586,6 +2586,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+/*
+ * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
+ * the audit subsystem.
+ */
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
{
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 02/29] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 82 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 66 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
10 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 419b5febc3ca..14d88e1312eb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1605,6 +1605,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index aadb4b29fb66..fac8999ba7a3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4f0eecb67dde..be8976c407f4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -782,33 +782,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -817,8 +799,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
if (new->label)
aa_put_label(new->label);
@@ -874,7 +856,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1059,7 +1041,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1072,7 +1054,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1156,7 +1138,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1166,7 +1148,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1183,6 +1165,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1219,7 +1202,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1771,7 +1753,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22543fdb6041..d956912741d5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -659,6 +662,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2276,12 +2301,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e9e959343de9..7aca813b5826 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4535,7 +4535,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4592,7 +4592,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4608,8 +4608,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4624,7 +4624,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4759,7 +4759,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4938,9 +4938,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4972,8 +4972,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5015,7 +5015,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5048,7 +5048,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5116,13 +5116,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5182,34 +5184,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5223,7 +5218,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5233,7 +5228,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5250,7 +5245,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -5308,7 +5303,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
u32 conn_sid;
int err;
@@ -5341,7 +5336,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
return 0;
@@ -5440,8 +5435,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5458,7 +5453,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5479,7 +5474,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5496,7 +5491,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5580,7 +5575,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5709,7 +5704,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5732,7 +5727,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5825,7 +5820,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5854,7 +5849,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5903,7 +5898,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
u32 perm;
@@ -6903,6 +6898,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 2953132408bf..007d1ae7ee27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1321f15799e2..800ab4b4239e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -373,8 +374,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -507,7 +508,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index fc837dcebf96..ef9d0b7b1954 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -363,6 +363,11 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6207762dbdb1..2689486160a2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2237,11 +2237,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2255,11 +2251,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2268,7 +2263,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2281,9 +2275,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2396,7 +2389,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
*/
static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
int rc;
@@ -2428,7 +2421,7 @@ static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
*/
static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Take the label off the socket if one is set.
@@ -2460,7 +2453,7 @@ static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
struct smack_known *skp;
int rc = 0;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2533,7 +2526,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2621,7 +2614,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2715,7 +2708,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2763,7 +2756,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2788,8 +2781,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2852,7 +2845,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3583,9 +3576,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3631,8 +3624,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3669,7 +3662,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3881,7 +3874,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
if (sk)
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
@@ -3903,7 +3896,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
*/
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -4007,7 +4000,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4056,7 +4049,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4105,7 +4098,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4125,7 +4118,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
struct smack_known *hskp;
@@ -4211,7 +4204,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4747,6 +4740,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4857,7 +4851,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index b945c1d3a743..bad71b7e648d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 02/29] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 82 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 66 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 4 +-
10 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 419b5febc3ca..14d88e1312eb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1605,6 +1605,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index aadb4b29fb66..fac8999ba7a3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4f0eecb67dde..be8976c407f4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -782,33 +782,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -817,8 +799,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
if (new->label)
aa_put_label(new->label);
@@ -874,7 +856,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1059,7 +1041,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1072,7 +1054,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1156,7 +1138,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1166,7 +1148,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1183,6 +1165,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1219,7 +1202,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1771,7 +1753,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22543fdb6041..d956912741d5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -659,6 +662,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
* @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2276,12 +2301,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e9e959343de9..7aca813b5826 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4535,7 +4535,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4592,7 +4592,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4608,8 +4608,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4624,7 +4624,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4759,7 +4759,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4938,9 +4938,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4972,8 +4972,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5015,7 +5015,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -5048,7 +5048,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -5116,13 +5116,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -5182,34 +5184,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -5223,7 +5218,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5233,7 +5228,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5250,7 +5245,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -5308,7 +5303,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
u32 conn_sid;
int err;
@@ -5341,7 +5336,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
return 0;
@@ -5440,8 +5435,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5458,7 +5453,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5479,7 +5474,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5496,7 +5491,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5580,7 +5575,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5709,7 +5704,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5732,7 +5727,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5825,7 +5820,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5854,7 +5849,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -5903,7 +5898,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
unsigned char *data = skb->data;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
u32 perm;
@@ -6903,6 +6898,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 2953132408bf..007d1ae7ee27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1321f15799e2..800ab4b4239e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -236,7 +237,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -373,8 +374,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -507,7 +508,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index fc837dcebf96..ef9d0b7b1954 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -363,6 +363,11 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6207762dbdb1..2689486160a2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2237,11 +2237,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2255,11 +2251,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2268,7 +2263,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2281,9 +2275,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2396,7 +2389,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
*/
static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
int rc;
@@ -2428,7 +2421,7 @@ static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
*/
static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Take the label off the socket if one is set.
@@ -2460,7 +2453,7 @@ static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
struct smack_known *skp;
int rc = 0;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2533,7 +2526,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2621,7 +2614,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2715,7 +2708,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2763,7 +2756,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2788,8 +2781,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2852,7 +2845,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
if (rsp != NULL) {
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
SMK_CONNECTING);
@@ -3583,9 +3576,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3631,8 +3624,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3669,7 +3662,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3881,7 +3874,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
if (sk)
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
@@ -3903,7 +3896,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
*/
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -4007,7 +4000,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -4056,7 +4049,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -4105,7 +4098,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4125,7 +4118,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
struct smack_known *hskp;
@@ -4211,7 +4204,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4747,6 +4740,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4857,7 +4851,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index b945c1d3a743..bad71b7e648d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, Mickaël Salaün, linux-audit
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
void ** parameters.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
include/linux/security.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
21 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/audit_arch.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
+struct audit_lsm_rules {
+ void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
union {
@@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
- char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ bool lsm_isset;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 14d88e1312eb..fd63ae215104 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1587,6 +1587,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#undef LSM_HOOK
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -1595,7 +1603,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -1631,7 +1639,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2986342dad41..ed51baa94a30 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
struct sembuf;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
struct audit_context;
+struct audit_lsm_rules;
struct super_block;
struct inode;
struct dentry;
@@ -134,6 +135,66 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is a value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ const struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
+ const struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1887,15 +1948,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
#else
static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1906,12 +1969,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ &df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ea2ee1181921..d272b5cf18a8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
if (need_sid) {
/* @tsk should always be equal to
* @current with the exception of
@@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
- f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ &f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
};
+/*
+ * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
+ * supplied by this module require a slot.
+ */
+struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "bpf",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
@@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
+struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
+};
+
static int __init landlock_init(void)
{
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.h
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
extern bool landlock_initialized;
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
@@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d956912741d5..49fa61028da2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
+
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -2101,7 +2119,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2599,9 +2617,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2609,14 +2645,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7aca813b5826..429309d8a910 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6992,6 +6992,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7308,7 +7313,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2689486160a2..6e0eaecd8256 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel,
Mickaël Salaün
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
security modules built into the system that would
use secids if active. The system assigns the module
a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
compiled in but not registered there will be unused
slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
security module data rather than a single instance.
A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
void ** parameters.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
include/linux/security.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
21 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/audit_arch.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
/* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
+struct audit_lsm_rules {
+ void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
struct audit_field {
u32 type;
union {
@@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
- char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ bool lsm_isset;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 14d88e1312eb..fd63ae215104 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1587,6 +1587,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
#undef LSM_HOOK
} __randomize_layout;
+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */
+struct lsm_id {
+ const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
+ int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
+};
+
/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -1595,7 +1603,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
struct hlist_node list;
struct hlist_head *head;
union security_list_options hook;
- char *lsm;
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid;
} __randomize_layout;
/*
@@ -1631,7 +1639,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
extern char *lsm_names;
extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm);
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2986342dad41..ed51baa94a30 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
struct sembuf;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
struct audit_context;
+struct audit_lsm_rules;
struct super_block;
struct inode;
struct dentry;
@@ -134,6 +135,66 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */
+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
+
+struct lsmblob {
+ u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
+#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
+#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ * @secid: The initial secid value
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ blob->secid[i] = secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is a value in the lsmblob
+ * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ const struct lsmblob empty = {};
+
+ return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
+ * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
+ * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
+ const struct lsmblob *blobb)
+{
+ return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1887,15 +1948,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
#else
static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -1906,12 +1969,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
f->lsm_str = str;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ &df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ea2ee1181921..d272b5cf18a8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
if (need_sid) {
/* @tsk should always be equal to
* @current with the exception of
@@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ &f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
- f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ &f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
+static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "apparmor",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
};
+/*
+ * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
+ * supplied by this module require a slot.
+ */
+struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "bpf",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "capability",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
@@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
+struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
+};
+
static int __init landlock_init(void)
{
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.h
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
extern bool landlock_initialized;
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
+static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "loadpin",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforce ? "" : "not ");
parse_exclude();
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "lockdown",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
return -EACCES;
}
+static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "safesetid",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
@@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d956912741d5..49fa61028da2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */
+static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
+
+ if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
+ lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
@@ -2101,7 +2119,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
- if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
@@ -2599,9 +2617,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2609,14 +2645,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7aca813b5826..429309d8a910 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6992,6 +6992,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "selinux",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7308,7 +7313,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2689486160a2..6e0eaecd8256 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
+static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "smack",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
smack_enabled = 1;
pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
}
+static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "tomoyo",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
@@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
+ &tomoyo_lsmid);
pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
return rc;
}
+static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lsm = "yama",
+ .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
static int __init yama_init(void)
{
pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
- security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
yama_init_sysctl();
return 0;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Provide interfaces to map LSM slot numbers and LSM names.
Update the LSM registration code to save this information.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ed51baa94a30..d00870d2b416 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/* Map lsm names to blob slot numbers */
+extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
+extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 49fa61028da2..d1ddbb857af1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -477,6 +477,50 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_slot - Report the slot number for a security module
+ * @name: name of the security module
+ *
+ * Look up the slot number for the named security module.
+ * Returns the slot number or LSMBLOB_INVALID if @name is not
+ * a registered security module name.
+ */
+int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < lsm_slot; i++)
+ if (strcmp(lsm_slotlist[i]->lsm, name) == 0)
+ return i;
+
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_slot_to_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a interface LSM slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Provide interfaces to map LSM slot numbers and LSM names.
Update the LSM registration code to save this information.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ed51baa94a30..d00870d2b416 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
}
+/* Map lsm names to blob slot numbers */
+extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
+extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 49fa61028da2..d1ddbb857af1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -477,6 +477,50 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
*/
static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_slot - Report the slot number for a security module
+ * @name: name of the security module
+ *
+ * Look up the slot number for the named security module.
+ * Returns the slot number or LSMBLOB_INVALID if @name is not
+ * a registered security module name.
+ */
+int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < lsm_slot; i++)
+ if (strcmp(lsm_slotlist[i]->lsm, name) == 0)
+ return i;
+
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_slot_to_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
+ * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
+ *
+ * Provide the name of the security module associated with
+ * a interface LSM slot.
+ *
+ * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
+ * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
+ */
+const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot)
+{
+ if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = 0;
+ else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
+}
/**
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
lsmid->slot);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
+ module specified is not active on the system the rule
+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d00870d2b416..3666eddad59a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1985,25 +1985,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{ }
#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
int pcr;
unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
+ int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
@@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+ ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+ if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+ ima_rules_lsm = 0;
+ pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
{
struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -407,7 +422,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -623,14 +639,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
default:
break;
@@ -1025,7 +1043,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
- Opt_label, Opt_err
+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1073,6 +1091,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -1091,7 +1110,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1780,6 +1800,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
&(template_desc->num_fields));
entry->template = template_desc;
break;
+ case Opt_lsm:
+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+ if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ entry->which = result;
+ result = 0;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1816,6 +1849,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
+ int i;
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1833,6 +1867,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
+
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -2158,6 +2195,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+ if (entry->which >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
rcu_read_unlock();
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d1ddbb857af1..9e0139b0d346 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2728,19 +2728,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
* The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
* the audit subsystem.
*/
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
@@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
+ module specified is not active on the system the rule
+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d00870d2b416..3666eddad59a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1985,25 +1985,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{ }
#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
int pcr;
unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
+ int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
@@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+ ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+ if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+ ima_rules_lsm = 0;
+ pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
{
struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -407,7 +422,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -623,14 +639,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->which);
break;
default:
break;
@@ -1025,7 +1043,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
- Opt_label, Opt_err
+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1073,6 +1091,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -1091,7 +1110,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+ entry->which);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1780,6 +1800,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
&(template_desc->num_fields));
entry->template = template_desc;
break;
+ case Opt_lsm:
+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+ if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ entry->which = result;
+ result = 0;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1816,6 +1849,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
+ int i;
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1833,6 +1867,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
+
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -2158,6 +2195,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+ if (entry->which >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
rcu_read_unlock();
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d1ddbb857af1..9e0139b0d346 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2728,19 +2728,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
* The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
* the audit subsystem.
*/
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3666eddad59a..ee5d14dac65f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
@@ -1972,7 +1972,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
@@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d272b5cf18a8..a9d5bfa37cb3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9e0139b0d346..ced1c76a380f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
@@ -2714,7 +2714,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
continue;
if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3666eddad59a..ee5d14dac65f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
@@ -1972,7 +1972,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
@@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d272b5cf18a8..a9d5bfa37cb3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &blob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules))
++result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9e0139b0d346..ced1c76a380f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
}
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
@@ -2714,7 +2714,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
continue;
if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ field, op,
&lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc)
return rc;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 07/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 9ed9232af934..610f70a99f60 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ee5d14dac65f..68ab0add23d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
@@ -1105,7 +1105,8 @@ static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*secid = 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e10c15f51c1f..3925d38f49f4 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -767,14 +767,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -790,6 +790,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -797,7 +798,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ced1c76a380f..e9f1487af0e5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1816,9 +1816,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 07/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 9ed9232af934..610f70a99f60 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ee5d14dac65f..68ab0add23d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
@@ -1105,7 +1105,8 @@ static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*secid = 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index e10c15f51c1f..3925d38f49f4 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -767,14 +767,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -790,6 +790,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -797,7 +798,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ced1c76a380f..e9f1487af0e5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1816,9 +1816,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel
Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 68ab0add23d3..57879f0b9f89 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -199,6 +199,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -529,7 +550,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1384,7 +1406,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 3925d38f49f4..adea727744f4 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -791,14 +791,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index ac4859241e17..fc0028c9e33d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -860,21 +860,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 498a0bf6f044..87ca3a537d1c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8490e46359ae..f3e2cde76919 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -904,13 +904,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -931,7 +936,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -953,13 +958,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e9f1487af0e5..f814a41c5d9f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2211,10 +2211,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2365,10 +2377,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
+ * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
+ * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, netdev,
netfilter-devel
Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 68ab0add23d3..57879f0b9f89 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -199,6 +199,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+/**
+ * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
+ * it is appropriate are rare.
+ *
+ * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
+ * There should only be one.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i])
+ return blob->secid[i];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -529,7 +550,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1384,7 +1406,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 3925d38f49f4..adea727744f4 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -791,14 +791,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsmblob blob;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index ac4859241e17..fc0028c9e33d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -860,21 +860,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
- u32 tmp_secid = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!tmp_secid)
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return -ENOENT;
- err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
if (err)
return err;
- priv->secid = tmp_secid;
+ priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 498a0bf6f044..87ca3a537d1c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ &blob);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
return err;
}
+ /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
+ * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
+ * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
+ info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8490e46359ae..f3e2cde76919 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -904,13 +904,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
+ * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
+ * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
+ * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
+
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -931,7 +936,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -953,13 +958,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &blob);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
+ * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e9f1487af0e5..f814a41c5d9f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2211,10 +2211,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2365,10 +2377,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
+ * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
+ * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 09/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-
kernel/audit.c | 21 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++----
12 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8351c5638880..381a4fddd4a5 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2981,10 +2981,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 57879f0b9f89..6ce44b9ae464 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1399,7 +1399,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..23a35ff1b3f2 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,12 +92,17 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one security module using the secid,
+ * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 7690c29d4ee4..2acf95cf9895 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1464,7 +1464,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2170,12 +2179,20 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index a9d5bfa37cb3..10b9dc253555 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -679,6 +679,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
@@ -695,6 +702,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -1118,6 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1127,7 +1142,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1418,8 +1434,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1585,9 +1603,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 445a9ecaefa1..933a8f94f93a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
@@ -138,7 +139,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 1ea2ad732d57..a28e275981d4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -347,8 +347,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -656,8 +661,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3e1afd10a9b6..bba3a66f5636 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a364f8e5e698..6269fe122345 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f3e2cde76919..0a99663e6edb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -493,8 +499,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -536,6 +547,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -553,8 +565,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1080,6 +1097,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1134,7 +1152,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f814a41c5d9f..6e6e44213d80 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2192,17 +2192,16 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
- /*
- * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
- * LSM hook is not "stackable").
- */
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
return rc;
}
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 09/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, netdev,
netfilter-devel
Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
possibility that more than one module may be called upon
to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
audit code.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-
kernel/audit.c | 21 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++----
12 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8351c5638880..381a4fddd4a5 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2981,10 +2981,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ /*
+ * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+ * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 57879f0b9f89..6ce44b9ae464 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1399,7 +1399,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..23a35ff1b3f2 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,12 +92,17 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ /* There can only be one security module using the secid,
+ * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 7690c29d4ee4..2acf95cf9895 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1464,7 +1464,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
+ * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
+ * happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2170,12 +2179,20 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+ * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+ * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+ */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index a9d5bfa37cb3..10b9dc253555 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -679,6 +679,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+ * to sid. This is temporary until
+ * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+ * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
@@ -695,6 +702,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_str) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ /*
+ * lsmblob_init sets all values in the
+ * lsmblob to sid. This is temporary
+ * until name->osid is converted to a
+ * lsmblob, which happens later in
+ * this patch set.
+ */
lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob,
@@ -1118,6 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1127,7 +1142,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1418,8 +1434,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1585,9 +1603,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 445a9ecaefa1..933a8f94f93a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
@@ -138,7 +139,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 1ea2ad732d57..a28e275981d4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -347,8 +347,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -656,8 +661,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3e1afd10a9b6..bba3a66f5636 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a364f8e5e698..6269fe122345 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in
+ * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
+ * module to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f3e2cde76919..0a99663e6edb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -493,8 +499,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -536,6 +547,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -553,8 +565,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
+ /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
+ * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
+ * security module to use to create the secctx. */
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1080,6 +1097,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1134,7 +1152,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
+ * to use to create the secctx. */
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f814a41c5d9f..6e6e44213d80 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2192,17 +2192,16 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
- /*
- * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
- * LSM hook is not "stackable").
- */
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
return rc;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 10/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6ce44b9ae464..4cfeb5eb29fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1277,9 +1277,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 10b9dc253555..d125dba69a76 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2662,12 +2662,17 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6e6e44213d80..131c851dd681 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2012,10 +2012,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 10/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6ce44b9ae464..4cfeb5eb29fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1277,9 +1277,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 10b9dc253555..d125dba69a76 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2662,12 +2662,17 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6e6e44213d80..131c851dd681 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2012,10 +2012,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 11/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +--
include/linux/security.h | 31 ++++++++++---
kernel/audit.c | 16 +++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 4 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++-----------
security/security.c | 25 ++++++++---
10 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 381a4fddd4a5..bae8440ffc73 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2980,16 +2980,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
+ u32 secid;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
/*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
* provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
* is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
* which means that the one expected by
* security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4cfeb5eb29fc..d11dfa33c1c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -220,6 +220,24 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsmblob_first - secid value for the first LSM slot
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * Return the secid value from the first LSM slot.
+ * There may not be any LSM slots.
+ *
+ * Return the value in secid[0] if there are any slots, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_first(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+#if LSMBLOB_ENTRIES > 0
+ return blob->secid[0];
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -502,8 +520,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob);
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1199,14 +1217,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2acf95cf9895..2834e55844db 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2178,19 +2178,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
@@ -2399,6 +2392,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2409,7 +2403,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 15cd4fe35e9c..39ded5cb2429 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1339,7 +1339,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1369,8 +1368,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d125dba69a76..b7bfc934436d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -676,17 +675,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* here even though it always refs
* @current's creds
*/
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
@@ -2764,12 +2755,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2785,6 +2779,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2796,7 +2791,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2817,7 +2814,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = lsmblob_first(&blob);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 0a99663e6edb..bbb3b6a4f0d7 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1562,11 +1562,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ audit_info.secid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb..34bb6572f33b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
*/
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..f9eadbf53cb6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -71,15 +71,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
- func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3d3f8c5c502b..3d8d9162a5e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -405,12 +405,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(),
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -437,9 +439,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -447,11 +449,12 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+ current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL,
+ NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -487,10 +490,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+ BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -511,10 +517,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -710,7 +718,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -730,9 +738,10 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func);
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -760,7 +769,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -773,9 +782,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ buf, size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -900,7 +910,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -923,10 +933,11 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
- func_data, NULL);
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), 0, func, &pcr,
+ &template, func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 131c851dd681..eae5b7f3a0db 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1922,17 +1922,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.current_getsecid_subj,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.current_getsecid_subj(&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 11/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, linux-integrity,
netdev
Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +--
include/linux/security.h | 31 ++++++++++---
kernel/audit.c | 16 +++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 4 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++-----------
security/security.c | 25 ++++++++---
10 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 381a4fddd4a5..bae8440ffc73 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2980,16 +2980,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
+ u32 secid;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
/*
- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+ * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
* provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
* is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+ * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
* which means that the one expected by
* security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4cfeb5eb29fc..d11dfa33c1c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -220,6 +220,24 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsmblob_first - secid value for the first LSM slot
+ * @blob: Pointer to the data
+ *
+ * Return the secid value from the first LSM slot.
+ * There may not be any LSM slots.
+ *
+ * Return the value in secid[0] if there are any slots, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline u32 lsmblob_first(const struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+#if LSMBLOB_ENTRIES > 0
+ return blob->secid[0];
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -502,8 +520,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob);
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1199,14 +1217,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2acf95cf9895..2834e55844db 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2178,19 +2178,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- if (!sid)
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
@@ -2399,6 +2392,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2409,7 +2403,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
+ audit_sig_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 15cd4fe35e9c..39ded5cb2429 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1339,7 +1339,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
struct lsmblob blob;
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1369,8 +1368,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_str) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d125dba69a76..b7bfc934436d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsmblob blob;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -676,17 +675,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* here even though it always refs
* @current's creds
*/
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
need_sid = 0;
}
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to sid. This is temporary until
- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
- * this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
@@ -2764,12 +2755,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
+ context->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2785,6 +2779,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2796,7 +2791,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ ctx->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2817,7 +2814,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
+ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = lsmblob_first(&blob);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 0a99663e6edb..bbb3b6a4f0d7 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1562,11 +1562,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ audit_info.secid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb..34bb6572f33b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
*/
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
+ audit_info->secid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..f9eadbf53cb6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -71,15 +71,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
- func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), func, mask,
+ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3d3f8c5c502b..3d8d9162a5e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -405,12 +405,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(),
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
return 0;
@@ -437,9 +439,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
struct inode *inode;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
int result = 0;
int action;
- u32 secid;
int pcr;
/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -447,11 +449,12 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
!(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
return 0;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+ current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL,
+ NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -487,10 +490,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
+ BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -511,10 +517,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -710,7 +718,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -730,9 +738,10 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
- 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func);
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -760,7 +769,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -773,9 +782,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
- MAY_READ, func);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), lsmblob_first(&blob),
+ buf, size, MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -900,7 +910,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
int violation = 0;
int action = 0;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -923,10 +933,11 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
* buffer measurements.
*/
if (func) {
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ /* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
- func_data, NULL);
+ lsmblob_first(&blob), 0, func, &pcr,
+ &template, func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 131c851dd681..eae5b7f3a0db 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1922,17 +1922,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.current_getsecid_subj,
+ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.current_getsecid_subj(&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 12/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ++++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d11dfa33c1c7..781b1a2374c0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -1020,9 +1020,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b7bfc934436d..fb8c4c61189d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2300,13 +2300,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 97470354c8ae..3deedfb2775f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -636,8 +636,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(lsmdata.secid[rule->which],
+ rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
rule->which);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index eae5b7f3a0db..297a6be2e23a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1566,9 +1566,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 12/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
for IMA and audit.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ++++---
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d11dfa33c1c7..781b1a2374c0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -1020,9 +1020,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b7bfc934436d..fb8c4c61189d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2300,13 +2300,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
+ name->osid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 97470354c8ae..3deedfb2775f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmdata;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -636,8 +636,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(lsmdata.secid[rule->which],
+ rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
rule->which);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index eae5b7f3a0db..297a6be2e23a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1566,9 +1566,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +----------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
7 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index bae8440ffc73..26838061defb 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2982,18 +2982,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- u32 secid;
- security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 781b1a2374c0..fa413a5a2ccb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
@@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
*secid = 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2834e55844db..2b670ac129be 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-static u32 audit_sig_sid;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1463,29 +1463,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2392,7 +2384,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2403,9 +2394,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 58b66543b4d5..316fac62d5f7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fb8c4c61189d..52ea8da8462f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
ctx->target_pid = 0;
ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
- ctx->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&ctx->target_lsm, 0);
ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
@@ -1116,14 +1116,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1132,9 +1132,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1814,7 +1813,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1823,7 +1822,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -2759,15 +2758,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2783,7 +2779,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2795,9 +2790,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2818,9 +2811,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3d8d9162a5e3..b9ef0f493041 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -489,7 +489,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
@@ -500,9 +499,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 297a6be2e23a..2ad0d4eb24b3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1816,10 +1816,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a
lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements
in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob
to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +----------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++----------------
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++--------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---
7 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index bae8440ffc73..26838061defb 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2982,18 +2982,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
struct lsmblob blob;
size_t added_size;
- u32 secid;
- security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
- /*
- * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
- * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
- * which means that the one expected by
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 781b1a2374c0..fa413a5a2ccb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
@@ -1141,7 +1141,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
*secid = 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2834e55844db..2b670ac129be 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-static u32 audit_sig_sid;
+struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1463,29 +1463,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
- /*
- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
- * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until
- * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which
- * happens later in this patch set.
- */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
@@ -2392,7 +2384,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2403,9 +2394,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
- /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
- audit_sig_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
}
return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 58b66543b4d5..316fac62d5f7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index fb8c4c61189d..52ea8da8462f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
ctx->target_pid = 0;
ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
- ctx->target_sid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(&ctx->target_lsm, 0);
ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
@@ -1116,14 +1116,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsmblob blob;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -1132,9 +1132,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1814,7 +1813,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1823,7 +1822,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -2759,15 +2758,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsmblob blob;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
- context->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2783,7 +2779,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2795,9 +2790,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- ctx->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2818,9 +2811,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
- axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3d8d9162a5e3..b9ef0f493041 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -489,7 +489,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsmblob blob;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
@@ -500,9 +499,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
- MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
+ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
+ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 297a6be2e23a..2ad0d4eb24b3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1816,10 +1816,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 14/29] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-doc, Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel,
linux-audit, linux-api
Create a new entry "interface_lsm" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "interface_lsm" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"interface_lsm". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_ilsm() is
provided to get the interface lsm slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "interface_lsm" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +++
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 17 ++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++
security/security.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +
10 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f60005c235c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+What: /proc/*/attr/lsm_display
+Contact: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
+Description: The name of the Linux security module (LSM) that will
+ provide information in the /proc/*/attr/current,
+ /proc/*/attr/prev and /proc/*/attr/exec interfaces.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ A process cannot write to this interface unless it
+ refers to itself.
+ The other details of permissions required to write to
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ The format of the data used by this interface is a
+ text string identifying the name of an LSM. The values
+ accepted are:
+ selinux - the SELinux LSM
+ smack - the Smack LSM
+ apparmor - The AppArmor LSM
+ By convention the LSM names are lower case and do not
+ contain special characters.
+Users: LSM user-space
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index 6a2a2e973080..b77b4a540391 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered.
The capabilities security module does not use the general security
blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c1031843cc6a..f2d15348bdff 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2827,6 +2827,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fa413a5a2ccb..a6574d13c6fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -238,6 +238,23 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_first(const struct lsmblob *blob)
#endif
}
+/**
+ * lsm_task_ilsm - the "interface_lsm" for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's interface LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_ilsm(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ int *ilsm = task->security;
+
+ if (ilsm)
+ return *ilsm;
+#endif
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1e53fea61335..29181bc8c693 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -621,6 +621,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_interface_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -632,6 +651,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of interface_lsm if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set interface lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_interface_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2ad0d4eb24b3..ec4d1b3026d8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -78,7 +78,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "interface_lsm" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ * Using a long to avoid potential alignment issues with
+ * module assigned task blobs.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(long),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -672,6 +681,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *ilsm;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -680,6 +691,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "interface" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ ilsm = task->security;
+ *ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1752,14 +1772,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *oilsm = current->security;
+ int *nilsm;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (oilsm) {
+ nilsm = task->security;
+ if (nilsm)
+ *nilsm = *oilsm;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2191,23 +2223,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' interface_lsm.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * interface_lsm and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(p);
+ if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = ilsm;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *ilsm = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "interface_lsm" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr))
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *ilsm = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
@@ -2227,15 +2346,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
@@ -2246,16 +2365,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2263,7 +2381,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2404,8 +2529,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 429309d8a910..3098a6459b68 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6388,6 +6388,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting interface_lsm, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the interface_lsm value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETINTERFACE_LSM, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35aac62a662e..79b480983bdc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setinterface_lsm",
+ NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6e0eaecd8256..552c4d4d8fac 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3516,6 +3516,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "interface_lsm"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "interface_lsm") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 14/29] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
linux-api, linux-doc
Create a new entry "interface_lsm" in the procfs attr directory for
controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
human readable data may be written to "interface_lsm" to set the
value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
"interface_lsm". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
of display active. A helper function lsm_task_ilsm() is
provided to get the interface lsm slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "interface_lsm" requires that all security modules using
setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
.../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +++
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 17 ++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++
security/security.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +
10 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f60005c235c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+What: /proc/*/attr/lsm_display
+Contact: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
+Description: The name of the Linux security module (LSM) that will
+ provide information in the /proc/*/attr/current,
+ /proc/*/attr/prev and /proc/*/attr/exec interfaces.
+ The details of permissions required to read from
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ A process cannot write to this interface unless it
+ refers to itself.
+ The other details of permissions required to write to
+ this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
+ system.
+ The format of the data used by this interface is a
+ text string identifying the name of an LSM. The values
+ accepted are:
+ selinux - the SELinux LSM
+ smack - the Smack LSM
+ apparmor - The AppArmor LSM
+ By convention the LSM names are lower case and do not
+ contain special characters.
+Users: LSM user-space
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index 6a2a2e973080..b77b4a540391 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered.
The capabilities security module does not use the general security
blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require.
+
+The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
+separated list of the active security modules.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
+apply. This interface can be written to.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c1031843cc6a..f2d15348bdff 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2827,6 +2827,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fa413a5a2ccb..a6574d13c6fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -238,6 +238,23 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_first(const struct lsmblob *blob)
#endif
}
+/**
+ * lsm_task_ilsm - the "interface_lsm" for this task
+ * @task: The task to report on
+ *
+ * Returns the task's interface LSM slot.
+ */
+static inline int lsm_task_ilsm(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ int *ilsm = task->security;
+
+ if (ilsm)
+ return *ilsm;
+#endif
+ return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
#define AA_CLASS_NET 14
#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
+#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1e53fea61335..29181bc8c693 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -621,6 +621,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
+
+static int profile_interface_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
+ if (state) {
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
@@ -632,6 +651,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of interface_lsm if allowed */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ aad(&sa)->info = "set interface lsm";
+ label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_interface_lsm(profile, &sa));
+ end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+ return error;
+ }
+
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2ad0d4eb24b3..ec4d1b3026d8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -78,7 +78,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * The task blob includes the "interface_lsm" slot used for
+ * chosing which module presents contexts.
+ * Using a long to avoid potential alignment issues with
+ * module assigned task blobs.
+ */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_task = sizeof(long),
+};
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
@@ -672,6 +681,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
{
+ int *ilsm;
+
if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
task->security = NULL;
return 0;
@@ -680,6 +691,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
if (task->security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * The start of the task blob contains the "interface" LSM slot number.
+ * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
+ * default first registered LSM be displayed.
+ */
+ ilsm = task->security;
+ *ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1752,14 +1772,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
+ int *oilsm = current->security;
+ int *nilsm;
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
- if (rc)
+ if (unlikely(rc))
return rc;
+
rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
- if (unlikely(rc))
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
security_task_free(task);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (oilsm) {
+ nilsm = task->security;
+ if (nilsm)
+ *nilsm = *oilsm;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2191,23 +2223,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
+ */
+ if (lsm_slot == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow getting the current process' interface_lsm.
+ * There are too few reasons to get another process'
+ * interface_lsm and too many LSM policy issues.
+ */
+ if (current != p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(p);
+ if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ slot = ilsm;
+ *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*value)
+ return strlen(*value);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
}
+/**
+ * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
+ * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value to set the attribute to
+ * @size: size of the value
+ *
+ * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
+ * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
+ * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
+ * The /proc code has already done this check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
+ */
int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *termed;
+ char *copy;
+ int *ilsm = current->security;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+ int slot = 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
+ /*
+ * Change the "interface_lsm" value only if all the security
+ * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
+ * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
+ * cooperative.
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr))
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ termed = strsep(©, " \n");
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
+ if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
+ *ilsm = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
+ rc = size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(termed);
+ return rc;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
+ if (lsm == NULL && *ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
+ *ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
+ continue;
return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
@@ -2227,15 +2346,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
- if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ secdata, seclen);
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
@@ -2246,16 +2365,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int rc;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
- &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
+ &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -2263,7 +2381,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ return;
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2404,8 +2529,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ list)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
+ optlen, len);
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 429309d8a910..3098a6459b68 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6388,6 +6388,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
+
+ /*
+ * For setting interface_lsm, we only perform a permission check;
+ * the actual update to the interface_lsm value is handled by the
+ * LSM framework.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm"))
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
+ PROCESS2__SETINTERFACE_LSM, NULL);
+
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35aac62a662e..79b480983bdc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
{ "process2",
- { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setinterface_lsm",
+ NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6e0eaecd8256..552c4d4d8fac 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3516,6 +3516,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "interface_lsm"
+ * to be reset at will.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, "interface_lsm") == 0)
+ return 0;
+
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 15/29] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: linux-nfs, john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit,
netfilter-devel, Chuck Lever, linux-integrity
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 26838061defb..2125b4b795da 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2725,6 +2725,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -3033,7 +3034,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3433,8 +3435,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index afec84088471..8ac30a5c05ef 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1383,12 +1383,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 16106f805ffa..dc8bdcdd2d2a 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -133,8 +133,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index da92e7d2ab6a..77388b5ece56 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2830,6 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -3341,8 +3342,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a6574d13c6fb..5a681f60fd50 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -135,6 +135,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -587,7 +618,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1451,7 +1482,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 23a35ff1b3f2..f273c4d777ec 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -106,7 +107,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2b670ac129be..0eff57959b4e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1214,6 +1214,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1471,15 +1472,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
@@ -2171,6 +2175,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2185,7 +2190,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 52ea8da8462f..1503fb281278 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,6 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -1138,7 +1139,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1398,6 +1400,7 @@ static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1432,7 +1435,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1594,6 +1598,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1602,7 +1607,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 933a8f94f93a..70ca4510ea35 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index a28e275981d4..f053d7544355 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -368,7 +369,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index bba3a66f5636..3b6ba86783f6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 6269fe122345..f69d5e997da2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
ktime_t tstamp;
@@ -634,8 +635,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -643,8 +646,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index bbb3b6a4f0d7..b3e3d920034d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -508,7 +512,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -545,6 +551,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -574,7 +581,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1093,6 +1101,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1163,7 +1172,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ec4d1b3026d8..407852be43da 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2379,16 +2379,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 15/29] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, Chuck Lever,
linux-integrity, netdev, netfilter-devel, linux-nfs
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information
about a "security context", including the string, its size and
which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is
necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the
lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys
them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry
in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++--
include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 5 +++-
kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++-
security/security.c | 11 ++++----
15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 26838061defb..2125b4b795da 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2725,6 +2725,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -3033,7 +3034,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
secctx = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3433,8 +3435,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (secctx) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index afec84088471..8ac30a5c05ef 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -1383,12 +1383,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->acl);
posix_acl_release(as_ctx->default_acl);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL
- security_release_secctx(as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
#endif
if (as_ctx->pagelist)
ceph_pagelist_release(as_ctx->pagelist);
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 16106f805ffa..dc8bdcdd2d2a 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -133,8 +133,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, label->label, label->len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index da92e7d2ab6a..77388b5ece56 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2830,6 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
void *context = NULL;
int contextlen;
#endif
@@ -3341,8 +3342,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (context) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a6574d13c6fb..5a681f60fd50 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -135,6 +135,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
+/*
+ * A "security context" is the text representation of
+ * the information used by LSMs.
+ * This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM
+ * it is useful for.
+ */
+struct lsmcontext {
+ char *context; /* Provided by the module */
+ u32 len;
+ int slot; /* Identifies the module */
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure.
+ * @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize
+ * @context: Initial context, or NULL
+ * @size: Size of context, or 0
+ * @slot: Which LSM provided the context
+ *
+ * Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
+ * This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when
+ * lsmcontext integration is complete.
+ */
+static inline void lsmcontext_init(struct lsmcontext *cp, char *context,
+ u32 size, int slot)
+{
+ cp->slot = slot;
+ cp->context = context;
+ cp->len = size;
+}
+
/*
* Data exported by the security modules
*
@@ -587,7 +618,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1451,7 +1482,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 23a35ff1b3f2..f273c4d777ec 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
@@ -106,7 +107,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ /*scaffolding*/
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2b670ac129be..0eff57959b4e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1214,6 +1214,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1471,15 +1472,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
@@ -2171,6 +2175,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
@@ -2185,7 +2190,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 52ea8da8462f..1503fb281278 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,6 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -1138,7 +1139,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
rc = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1398,6 +1400,7 @@ static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1432,7 +1435,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1594,6 +1598,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1602,7 +1607,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 933a8f94f93a..70ca4510ea35 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
@@ -145,7 +146,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index a28e275981d4..f053d7544355 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -368,7 +369,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index bba3a66f5636..3b6ba86783f6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
u32 len;
char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 6269fe122345..f69d5e997da2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
+ struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
char *secdata = NULL;
u32 seclen = 0;
ktime_t tstamp;
@@ -634,8 +635,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -643,8 +646,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (seclen) {
+ lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index bbb3b6a4f0d7..b3e3d920034d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -508,7 +512,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -545,6 +551,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -574,7 +581,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1093,6 +1101,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
@@ -1163,7 +1172,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
secctx_len,
secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ /* scaffolding */
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 893301ae0131..ef139d8ae7cd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ec4d1b3026d8..407852be43da 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2379,16 +2379,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
- hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
- return;
+ if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ hp->hook.release_secctx(cp->context, cp->len);
+ break;
}
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 16/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() will now return the length value
if the passed lsmcontext pointer is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 9 ++----
kernel/audit.c | 42 +++++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++-----------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 ++++-------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 +++++++----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 2125b4b795da..b0b0c132a247 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2723,9 +2723,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -2985,14 +2983,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3019,24 +3017,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3080,7 +3076,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3435,10 +3431,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5a681f60fd50..945b21f6ffa4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index f273c4d777ec..b77a52f93389 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
@@ -103,12 +101,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0eff57959b4e..a885ebdbb91e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1212,9 +1212,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1462,33 +1459,33 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
kfree(new);
break;
}
- case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
+ case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: {
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
+
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
- audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
+ audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data,
+ struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len));
kfree(sig_data);
break;
+ }
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
struct audit_tty_status s;
unsigned int t;
@@ -2171,17 +2168,15 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2189,9 +2184,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 1503fb281278..802de65259d8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,9 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1134,13 +1132,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1400,7 +1397,6 @@ static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1425,17 +1421,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1595,20 +1589,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 70ca4510ea35..ad5be7707bca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 secid;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
@@ -141,12 +140,11 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index f053d7544355..07660c7dd342 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -354,7 +353,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -363,13 +362,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -662,15 +660,11 @@ static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- int len, ret;
+ int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
- if (ret)
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ if (len <= 0)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3b6ba86783f6..36338660df3c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,19 +176,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index f69d5e997da2..35c3cde6bacd 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index b3e3d920034d..12e5d508bd08 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -509,11 +502,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -552,8 +543,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -578,10 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1104,8 +1092,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1165,15 +1151,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 407852be43da..91e9c8341a55 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2343,18 +2343,41 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+/**
+ * security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
+ * @blob: set of secids
+ * @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ *
+ * Translate secid information into a secctx string.
+ * Return a negative value on error.
+ * If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
+ * Otherwise, return 0.
+ */
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ if (cp)
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ if (!cp) {
+ int len;
+ int rc;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ NULL, &len);
+ return rc ? rc : len;
+ }
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 16/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, netdev,
netfilter-devel
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() will now return the length value
if the passed lsmcontext pointer is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 9 ++----
kernel/audit.c | 42 +++++++++++--------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++-----------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 ++++-------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 ++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 +++++++----------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 2125b4b795da..b0b0c132a247 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2723,9 +2723,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { };
struct list_head sgc_head;
struct list_head pf_head;
const void __user *user_buffer = (const void __user *)
@@ -2985,14 +2983,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- added_size = ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ added_size = ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
extra_buffers_size += added_size;
if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {
/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3019,24 +3017,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lsmctx.context) {
int err;
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
+ lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);
if (err) {
t->security_ctx = 0;
WARN_ON(1);
}
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- secctx = NULL;
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3080,7 +3076,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size;
sg_buf_offset = ALIGN(off_end_offset, sizeof(void *));
sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
off_min = 0;
for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset;
buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3435,10 +3431,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
err_bad_extra_size:
- if (secctx) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmctx.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5a681f60fd50..945b21f6ffa4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index f273c4d777ec..b77a52f93389 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
@@ -103,12 +101,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- /*scaffolding*/
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0eff57959b4e..a885ebdbb91e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1212,9 +1212,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1462,33 +1459,33 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
kfree(new);
break;
}
- case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
+ case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: {
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
+
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &context);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
}
- audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len));
+ audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data,
+ struct_size(sig_data, ctx, context.len));
kfree(sig_data);
break;
+ }
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
struct audit_tty_status s;
unsigned int t;
@@ -2171,17 +2168,15 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
+ struct lsmcontext context;
security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
@@ -2189,9 +2184,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, ctx, len, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 1503fb281278..802de65259d8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1121,9 +1121,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -1134,13 +1132,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1400,7 +1397,6 @@ static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
{
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int i;
@@ -1425,17 +1421,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
}
}
@@ -1595,20 +1589,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
+ struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&lsmcxt, ctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 70ca4510ea35..ad5be7707bca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsmcontext context;
struct lsmblob lb;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 secid;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
@@ -141,12 +140,11 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secdata, seclen, 0); /* scaffolding */
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, context.len, context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index f053d7544355..07660c7dd342 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -354,7 +353,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -363,13 +362,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
return ret;
}
@@ -662,15 +660,11 @@ static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- int len, ret;
+ int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- /* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
- if (ret)
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ if (len <= 0)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 3b6ba86783f6..36338660df3c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -176,19 +176,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", context.context);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, len, 0); /* scaffolding */
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index f69d5e997da2..35c3cde6bacd 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ *secdata = context.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ seclen = context.len;
#endif
return seclen;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index b3e3d920034d..12e5d508bd08 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -509,11 +502,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -552,8 +543,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -578,10 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (entry != NULL)
lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
@@ -1104,8 +1092,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
u32 secid;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1165,15 +1151,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- /* scaffolding */
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);
+ context.len,
+ context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index ef139d8ae7cd..951ba0639d20 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct lsmcontext context;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsmblob blob;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- lsmcontext_init(&context, secctx, secctx_len, 0);/*scaffolding*/
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 407852be43da..91e9c8341a55 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2343,18 +2343,41 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+/**
+ * security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
+ * @blob: set of secids
+ * @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ *
+ * Translate secid information into a secctx string.
+ * Return a negative value on error.
+ * If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
+ * Otherwise, return 0.
+ */
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ if (cp)
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
- if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
+ if (!cp) {
+ int len;
+ int rc;
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
+ blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+ NULL, &len);
+ return rc ? rc : len;
+ }
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
+ }
}
return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 17/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: linux-nfs, john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit, Chuck Lever
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 77388b5ece56..b1505fbfb2e9 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2713,11 +2713,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2727,13 +2727,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2830,9 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2893,7 +2891,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -3320,8 +3318,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -3342,10 +3339,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 945b21f6ffa4..dc66f3f48456 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1498,7 +1498,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 91e9c8341a55..64073d807240 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2434,9 +2434,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 17/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, Chuck Lever, linux-nfs
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
This provides the information about which LSM created the
context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
correct hook.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 77388b5ece56..b1505fbfb2e9 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2713,11 +2713,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{
__be32 *p;
- p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, len + 4 + 4 + 4);
+ p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, context->len + 4 + 4 + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2727,13 +2727,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* lfs */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* pi */
- p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context, len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, context->context, context->len);
return 0;
}
#else
static inline __be32
nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- void *context, int len)
+ struct lsmcontext *context)
{ return 0; }
#endif
@@ -2830,9 +2830,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
#endif
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2893,7 +2891,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ &context);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -3320,8 +3318,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, &context);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -3342,10 +3339,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, context, contextlen, 0); /*scaffolding*/
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 945b21f6ffa4..dc66f3f48456 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1498,7 +1498,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 91e9c8341a55..64073d807240 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2434,9 +2434,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsmcontext *cp)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) {
+ cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;
+ return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx(inode, (void **)&cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 18/29] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit,
netfilter-devel, Pablo Neira Ayuso
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 37 +++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 35c3cde6bacd..f60a0b6240ff 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,15 +301,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
- return 0;
+ return;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -318,14 +316,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
#endif
- return seclen;
+ return;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -397,12 +393,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
struct net_device *indev;
struct net_device *outdev;
struct nf_conn *ct = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
ktime_t tstamp;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
@@ -473,9 +467,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
+ if (context.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(context.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -610,7 +604,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (context.len &&
+ nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -638,10 +633,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -649,10 +642,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 18/29] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, Pablo Neira Ayuso,
netdev, netfilter-devel
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext
pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 37 +++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 35c3cde6bacd..f60a0b6240ff 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -301,15 +301,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
return -1;
}
-static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
+static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsmblob blob;
- struct lsmcontext context = { };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
- return 0;
+ return;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -318,14 +316,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
- *secdata = context.context;
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- seclen = context.len;
#endif
- return seclen;
+ return;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -397,12 +393,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
struct net_device *indev;
struct net_device *outdev;
struct nf_conn *ct = NULL;
+ struct lsmcontext context = { };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo = 0;
const struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- struct lsmcontext scaff; /* scaffolding */
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
ktime_t tstamp;
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
@@ -473,9 +467,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &context);
+ if (context.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(context.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -610,7 +604,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (context.len &&
+ nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, context.len, context.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -638,10 +633,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -649,10 +642,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen) {
- lsmcontext_init(&scaff, secdata, seclen, 0);
- security_release_secctx(&scaff);
- }
+ if (context.len)
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
return NULL;
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 19/29] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 ++--
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
13 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 62d5f99760aa..bb9c900da6b0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1460,7 +1462,11 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1480,7 +1486,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 54c083003947..14ebe0424811 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 12e5d508bd08..910a03f15b0d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -496,13 +490,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -543,7 +532,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -561,13 +549,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -921,14 +904,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -975,11 +952,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1091,8 +1065,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1130,7 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1144,14 +1117,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1510,7 +1479,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1523,7 +1492,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3098a6459b68..653dd2e236f1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7003,7 +7003,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ace4bd13e808..f60cd964da62 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/*
* type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 800ab4b4239e..0b8f99703462 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 6901dc07680d..fac287237495 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3897,7 +3897,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3975,7 +3975,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index ef9d0b7b1954..ac79313ea95d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled __initdata;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index d2186e2757be..c6dcafe18912 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp)
{
int slen;
- skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid;
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skp->smk_netlabel.cache != NULL) {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 552c4d4d8fac..2190c03ae3d0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3728,11 +3728,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
- /*
- * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
- */
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
/*
@@ -4751,7 +4752,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 658eab05599e..13c2fa728054 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1274,10 +1275,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 19/29] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, netdev
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and
the internal storage is used to pass information between
these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid
to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their
callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the
modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the
correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +--
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 26 ++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++--------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 1 +
security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 ++--
security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++--
13 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 43ae50337685..73fc25b4042b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
} attr;
};
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 62d5f99760aa..bb9c900da6b0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag).
* Tag definition (may change between kernel versions)
*
- * 0 8 16 24 32
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
- * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
- * +----------+----------+
- *
+ * 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob)
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data |
+ * +----------+----------+---------------------+
+ *
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
+ * The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which
+ * Linux security modules are built in the kernel.
+ * The data is opaque.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1460,7 +1462,11 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ /* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header
+ * for the LSM data. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN > CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX);
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.lsmblob,
+ sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1480,7 +1486,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 54c083003947..14ebe0424811 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
* @family: address family
- * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ lsmblob, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 12e5d508bd08..910a03f15b0d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
* @iface: the associated interface entry
* @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order
* @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order
- * @secid: LSM secid value for entry
+ * @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry
*
* Description:
* Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -408,7 +407,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -421,7 +420,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -438,11 +437,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- /* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -477,7 +472,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -496,13 +490,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -543,7 +532,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
- struct lsmblob blob;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -561,13 +549,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
- /* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids
- * in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which
- * security module to use to create the secctx. */
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -921,14 +904,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
- * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
- * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
- * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
-
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ &blob, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -975,11 +952,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
- * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
- return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
- lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net, NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob,
+ &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1091,8 +1065,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct net_device *dev;
struct lsmcontext context;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ struct lsmblob *lsmb;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1130,7 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1144,14 +1117,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- /* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob.
- * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
- * to use to create the secctx. */
- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1510,7 +1479,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -1523,7 +1492,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->lsmblob;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 058e3a285d56..168920780994 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsmblob *lsmblob,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3098a6459b68..653dd2e236f1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7003,7 +7003,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
-static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "selinux",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ace4bd13e808..f60cd964da62 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
extern int selinux_enabled_boot;
+extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;
/*
* type_datum properties
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 800ab4b4239e..0b8f99703462 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 6901dc07680d..fac287237495 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3897,7 +3897,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3975,7 +3975,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index ef9d0b7b1954..ac79313ea95d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_enabled __initdata;
+extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index d2186e2757be..c6dcafe18912 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp)
{
int slen;
- skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid;
skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
skp->smk_netlabel.cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skp->smk_netlabel.cache != NULL) {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 552c4d4d8fac..2190c03ae3d0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3728,11 +3728,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
- /*
- * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
- */
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(
+ sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
/*
@@ -4751,7 +4752,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
-static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lsm = "smack",
.slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
};
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 658eab05599e..13c2fa728054 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1274,10 +1275,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsmblob_init(&lsmblob, 0);
+ lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
- &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET, &lsmblob,
+ &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 20/29] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Send an identifier for the security module interface_lsm
along with the security context. This allows the receiver
to verify that the receiver and the sender agree on which
security module's context is being used. If they don't
agree the message is rejected.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b0b0c132a247..259f5e38e6ba 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3024,6 +3024,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
+ t->security_interface = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
@@ -4453,6 +4454,26 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
tr.secctx = t->security_ctx;
if (t->security_ctx) {
+ int to_ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int from_ilsm = t->security_interface;
+
+ if (to_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_ilsm = 0;
+ if (from_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_ilsm = 0;
+ /*
+ * The sender provided a security context from
+ * a different security module than the one this
+ * process wants to report if these don't match.
+ */
+ if (from_ilsm != to_ilsm) {
+ if (t_from)
+ binder_thread_dec_tmpref(t_from);
+
+ binder_cleanup_transaction(t, "security context mismatch",
+ BR_FAILED_REPLY);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX;
trsize = sizeof(tr);
}
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
index d6b6b8cb7346..e3a0718ce17c 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
@@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ struct binder_transaction {
long saved_priority;
kuid_t sender_euid;
struct list_head fd_fixups;
+ int security_interface;
binder_uintptr_t security_ctx;
/**
* @lock: protects @from, @to_proc, and @to_thread
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 20/29] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Send an identifier for the security module interface_lsm
along with the security context. This allows the receiver
to verify that the receiver and the sender agree on which
security module's context is being used. If they don't
agree the message is rejected.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/android/binder_internal.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index b0b0c132a247..259f5e38e6ba 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3024,6 +3024,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
ALIGN(lsmctx.len, sizeof(u64));
+ t->security_interface = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
@@ -4453,6 +4454,26 @@ static int binder_thread_read(struct binder_proc *proc,
tr.secctx = t->security_ctx;
if (t->security_ctx) {
+ int to_ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ int from_ilsm = t->security_interface;
+
+ if (to_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ to_ilsm = 0;
+ if (from_ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+ from_ilsm = 0;
+ /*
+ * The sender provided a security context from
+ * a different security module than the one this
+ * process wants to report if these don't match.
+ */
+ if (from_ilsm != to_ilsm) {
+ if (t_from)
+ binder_thread_dec_tmpref(t_from);
+
+ binder_cleanup_transaction(t, "security context mismatch",
+ BR_FAILED_REPLY);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX;
trsize = sizeof(tr);
}
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
index d6b6b8cb7346..e3a0718ce17c 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_internal.h
@@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ struct binder_transaction {
long saved_priority;
kuid_t sender_euid;
struct list_head fd_fixups;
+ int security_interface;
binder_uintptr_t security_ctx;
/**
* @lock: protects @from, @to_proc, and @to_thread
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Add a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx() to identify
which of the security modules that may be active should
provide the security context. If the parameter is greater
than or equal to zero, the security module associated with
that LSM "slot" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_DISPLAY
the "interface lsm" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_FIRST
the first security module providing a hook is used.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 259f5e38e6ba..d59c4ebf7e22 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dc66f3f48456..2150016492be 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "interface_lsm" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the first slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
@@ -615,7 +617,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1470,7 +1473,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int ilsm)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index a885ebdbb91e..28ff7a5f90bd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2176,7 +2176,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 802de65259d8..231631f61550 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1425,7 +1425,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1593,7 +1594,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index ad5be7707bca..9b5c44dec1e9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 07660c7dd342..5d72d2f41562 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (len <= 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 36338660df3c..cb4b8b636f6a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index f60a0b6240ff..844955b2e163 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 910a03f15b0d..8deee7e176a9 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -550,7 +552,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1120,7 +1123,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 64073d807240..be6682768760 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2347,20 +2347,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
* security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
* @blob: set of secids
* @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ * @ilsm: which security module to report
*
* Translate secid information into a secctx string.
* Return a negative value on error.
* If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
* Otherwise, return 0.
*/
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
if (cp)
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (ilsm < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
--
2.35.1
--
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Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Add a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx() to identify
which of the security modules that may be active should
provide the security context. If the parameter is greater
than or equal to zero, the security module associated with
that LSM "slot" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_DISPLAY
the "interface lsm" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_FIRST
the first security module providing a hook is used.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
12 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 259f5e38e6ba..d59c4ebf7e22 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
size_t added_size;
security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dc66f3f48456..2150016492be 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
+#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "interface_lsm" slot */
+#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the first slot */
/**
* lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
@@ -615,7 +617,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsmblob *blob);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1470,7 +1473,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
- struct lsmcontext *cp)
+ struct lsmcontext *cp, int ilsm)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
* and the infrastructure will know which it is.
*/
lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index a885ebdbb91e..28ff7a5f90bd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &context);
+ &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2176,7 +2176,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 802de65259d8..231631f61550 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1425,7 +1425,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1593,7 +1594,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index ad5be7707bca..9b5c44dec1e9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
return;
lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 07660c7dd342..5d72d2f41562 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
* to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len;
struct lsmblob blob;
- len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
+ len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (len <= 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 36338660df3c..cb4b8b636f6a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct lsmcontext context;
lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index f60a0b6240ff..844955b2e163 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
* module to use to create the secctx. */
lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 910a03f15b0d..8deee7e176a9 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -550,7 +552,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
@@ -1120,7 +1123,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
security_release_secctx(&context);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 64073d807240..be6682768760 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2347,20 +2347,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
* security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
* @blob: set of secids
* @cp: lsm context into which result is put
+ * @ilsm: which security module to report
*
* Translate secid information into a secctx string.
* Return a negative value on error.
* If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
* Otherwise, return 0.
*/
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
+ int ilsm)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
- int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
if (cp)
memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+ /*
+ * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
+ * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
+ */
+ if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
+ ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
+ else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ else if (ilsm < 0) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
+ WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
+ ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+ }
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
security_inode_getsecid().
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 316fac62d5f7..4af63e7dde17 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 231631f61550..6fe9f2525fc1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* lsmblob, which happens later in
* this patch set.
*/
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob,
+ &name->lsmblob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ &n->lsmblob,
+ f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -1589,13 +1588,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -2297,17 +2295,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->lsmblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
security_inode_getsecid().
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 316fac62d5f7..4af63e7dde17 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsmblob lsmblob;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 231631f61550..6fe9f2525fc1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
* lsmblob, which happens later in
* this patch set.
*/
- lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob,
+ &name->lsmblob,
f->type,
f->op,
&f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ &n->lsmblob,
+ f->type, f->op,
&f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
@@ -1589,13 +1588,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- struct lsmblob blob;
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
- lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -2297,17 +2295,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsmblob blob;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
- name->osid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->lsmblob);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
with a structure containing the two elements.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 28ff7a5f90bd..6b6c089512f7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1822,11 +1822,11 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
}
static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
- if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, t, serial)) {
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(t);
- *serial = audit_serial();
+ if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, stamp)) {
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&stamp->ctime);
+ stamp->serial = audit_serial();
}
}
@@ -1849,8 +1849,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct timespec64 t;
- unsigned int serial;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1905,12 +1904,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
+ (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
char *value; /* the cmdline field */
};
+/* A timestamp/serial pair to identify an event */
+struct audit_stamp {
+ struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
+ unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
+};
+
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
@@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
} context;
enum audit_state state, current_state;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
int major; /* syscall number */
int uring_op; /* uring operation */
- struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
long return_code;/* syscall return code */
u64 prio;
@@ -265,7 +271,7 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp);
extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
@@ -306,7 +312,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx);
extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
-#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
+#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, s) 0
#define audit_put_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_get_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6fe9f2525fc1..557713954a69 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
*/
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ctx->serial = 0;
+ ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
ctx->major = 0;
ctx->uring_op = 0;
- ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
+ ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
ctx->return_code = 0;
ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2066,7 +2066,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
context->argv[3] = a4;
context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
context->current_state = state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2535,21 +2535,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/**
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
* @ctx: audit_context for the task
- * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
- * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ * @stamp: timestamp to record
*
* Also sets the context as auditable.
*/
-int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
return 0;
- if (!ctx->serial)
- ctx->serial = audit_serial();
- t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
- t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
- *serial = ctx->serial;
+ if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
+ ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
+ *stamp = ctx->stamp;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
with a structure containing the two elements.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 28ff7a5f90bd..6b6c089512f7 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1822,11 +1822,11 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
}
static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
- if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, t, serial)) {
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(t);
- *serial = audit_serial();
+ if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, stamp)) {
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&stamp->ctime);
+ stamp->serial = audit_serial();
}
}
@@ -1849,8 +1849,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct timespec64 t;
- unsigned int serial;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1905,12 +1904,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
+ (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
char *value; /* the cmdline field */
};
+/* A timestamp/serial pair to identify an event */
+struct audit_stamp {
+ struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
+ unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
+};
+
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
int dummy; /* must be the first element */
@@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
} context;
enum audit_state state, current_state;
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
int major; /* syscall number */
int uring_op; /* uring operation */
- struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
long return_code;/* syscall return code */
u64 prio;
@@ -265,7 +271,7 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
+ struct audit_stamp *stamp);
extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
@@ -306,7 +312,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx);
extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
-#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
+#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, s) 0
#define audit_put_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_get_watch(w) do { } while (0)
#define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 6fe9f2525fc1..557713954a69 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
*/
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ctx->serial = 0;
+ ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
ctx->major = 0;
ctx->uring_op = 0;
- ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
+ ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
ctx->return_code = 0;
ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2066,7 +2066,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
context->argv[3] = a4;
context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
context->current_state = state;
- ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
+ ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
}
/**
@@ -2535,21 +2535,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/**
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
* @ctx: audit_context for the task
- * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
- * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ * @stamp: timestamp to record
*
* Also sets the context as auditable.
*/
-int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
+int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
{
if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
return 0;
- if (!ctx->serial)
- ctx->serial = audit_serial();
- t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
- t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
- *serial = ctx->serial;
+ if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
+ ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
+ *stamp = ctx->stamp;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Add a new boolean function lsm_multiple_contexts() to
identify when multiple security modules provide security
context strings.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2150016492be..3fab84220f88 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -232,6 +232,15 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ return lsm_slot_to_name(1) != NULL;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
/**
* lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
* @blob: Pointer to the data
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Add a new boolean function lsm_multiple_contexts() to
identify when multiple security modules provide security
context strings.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2150016492be..3fab84220f88 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -232,6 +232,15 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
+static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ return lsm_slot_to_name(1) != NULL;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
/**
* lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
* @blob: Pointer to the data
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
records (none are currently defined) as have been added
to the list.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
* to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
* use simultaneously. */
struct audit_buffer {
- struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
+ struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
+ struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
gfp_t gfp_mask;
};
@@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
if (!ab)
return;
- kfree_skb(ab->skb);
+ while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
+ kfree_skb(skb);
kmem_cache_free(audit_buffer_cache, ab);
}
@@ -1784,8 +1789,12 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, gfp_mask);
if (!ab->skb)
goto err;
+
+ skb_queue_head_init(&ab->skb_list);
+ skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
+
if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
- goto err;
+ kfree_skb(ab->skb);
ab->ctx = ctx;
ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
@@ -1849,7 +1858,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1904,14 +1912,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
- stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
- stamp.serial);
+ (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ ab->stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
@@ -2402,26 +2410,14 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
}
/**
- * audit_log_end - end one audit record
- * @ab: the audit_buffer
- *
- * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
- * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
- * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
- * irq context. May be called in any context.
+ * __audit_log_end - enqueue one audit record
+ * @skb: the buffer to send
*/
-void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void __audit_log_end(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- if (!ab)
- return;
-
if (audit_rate_check()) {
- skb = ab->skb;
- ab->skb = NULL;
-
/* setup the netlink header, see the comments in
* kauditd_send_multicast_skb() for length quirks */
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
@@ -2432,6 +2428,26 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
} else
audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ *
+ * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
+ * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
+ * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
+ * irq context. May be called in any context.
+ */
+void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
+ __audit_log_end(skb);
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
records (none are currently defined) as have been added
to the list.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
* to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
* use simultaneously. */
struct audit_buffer {
- struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
+ struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
+ struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
+ struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
gfp_t gfp_mask;
};
@@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
if (!ab)
return;
- kfree_skb(ab->skb);
+ while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
+ kfree_skb(skb);
kmem_cache_free(audit_buffer_cache, ab);
}
@@ -1784,8 +1789,12 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, gfp_mask);
if (!ab->skb)
goto err;
+
+ skb_queue_head_init(&ab->skb_list);
+ skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
+
if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
- goto err;
+ kfree_skb(ab->skb);
ab->ctx = ctx;
ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
@@ -1849,7 +1858,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int type)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct audit_stamp stamp;
if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
return NULL;
@@ -1904,14 +1912,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
return NULL;
}
- audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
+ audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
/* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
if (ctx)
ctx->dummy = 0;
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
- (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
- stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
- stamp.serial);
+ (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ ab->stamp.serial);
return ab;
}
@@ -2402,26 +2410,14 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
}
/**
- * audit_log_end - end one audit record
- * @ab: the audit_buffer
- *
- * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
- * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
- * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
- * irq context. May be called in any context.
+ * __audit_log_end - enqueue one audit record
+ * @skb: the buffer to send
*/
-void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void __audit_log_end(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- if (!ab)
- return;
-
if (audit_rate_check()) {
- skb = ab->skb;
- ab->skb = NULL;
-
/* setup the netlink header, see the comments in
* kauditd_send_multicast_skb() for length quirks */
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
@@ -2432,6 +2428,26 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
} else
audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_end - end one audit record
+ * @ab: the audit_buffer
+ *
+ * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
+ * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
+ * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
+ * irq context. May be called in any context.
+ */
+void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
+ __audit_log_end(skb);
audit_buffer_free(ab);
}
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor=unconfined
subj_smack=_
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on a subject security context.
Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 8eda133ca4c1..af0aaccfaf57 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2175,8 +2175,61 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
}
+/**
+ * audit_buffer_aux_new - Add an aux record buffer to the skb list
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @type: message type
+ *
+ * Aux records are allocated and added to the skb list of
+ * the "main" record. The ab->skb is reset to point to the
+ * aux record on its creation. When the aux record in complete
+ * ab->skb has to be reset to point to the "main" record.
+ * This allows the audit_log_ functions to be ignorant of
+ * which kind of record it is logging to. It also avoids adding
+ * special data for aux records.
+ *
+ * On success ab->skb will point to the new aux record.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM should allocation fail.
+ */
+static int audit_buffer_aux_new(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type)
+{
+ WARN_ON(ab->skb != skb_peek(&ab->skb_list));
+
+ ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, ab->gfp_mask);
+ if (!ab->skb)
+ goto err;
+ if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
+ (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ ab->stamp.serial);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ kfree_skb(ab->skb);
+ ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_buffer_aux_end - Switch back to the "main" record from an aux record
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ *
+ * Restores the "main" audit record to ab->skb.
+ */
+static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
+}
+
+
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ int i;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
+ if (error)
goto error_path;
- return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, i);
+ if (error) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ }
+ }
+ audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
- security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
subj_apparmor=unconfined
subj_smack=_
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on a subject security context.
Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 8eda133ca4c1..af0aaccfaf57 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2175,8 +2175,61 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
}
+/**
+ * audit_buffer_aux_new - Add an aux record buffer to the skb list
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ * @type: message type
+ *
+ * Aux records are allocated and added to the skb list of
+ * the "main" record. The ab->skb is reset to point to the
+ * aux record on its creation. When the aux record in complete
+ * ab->skb has to be reset to point to the "main" record.
+ * This allows the audit_log_ functions to be ignorant of
+ * which kind of record it is logging to. It also avoids adding
+ * special data for aux records.
+ *
+ * On success ab->skb will point to the new aux record.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM should allocation fail.
+ */
+static int audit_buffer_aux_new(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type)
+{
+ WARN_ON(ab->skb != skb_peek(&ab->skb_list));
+
+ ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, ab->gfp_mask);
+ if (!ab->skb)
+ goto err;
+ if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
+ (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
+ ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
+ ab->stamp.serial);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ kfree_skb(ab->skb);
+ ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_buffer_aux_end - Switch back to the "main" record from an aux record
+ * @ab: audit_buffer
+ *
+ * Restores the "main" audit record to ab->skb.
+ */
+static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
+}
+
+
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
+ int i;
int error;
struct lsmblob blob;
struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
+ LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (error) {
- if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
+ error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
+ if (error)
goto error_path;
- return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, i);
+ if (error) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ }
+ }
+ audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
- security_release_secctx(&context);
return 0;
error_path:
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on an object security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 14849d5f84b4..1b05eb2dbe77 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
const char *operation);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
@@ -251,6 +253,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
{ }
static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
{ }
+static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{ }
static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
}
+void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+ int error;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
+
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
+ if (error)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
+ if (error) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ }
+ }
+
+ audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
+ }
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+}
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1114,36 +1114,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
kfree(context);
}
-static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
- unsigned int sessionid,
- struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
+static void audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
- int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
- return rc;
+ return;
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
-
- return rc;
}
static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
@@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob);
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1588,19 +1569,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob);
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
@@ -1805,21 +1775,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
- if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
- axs->target_auid[i],
- axs->target_uid[i],
- axs->target_sessionid[i],
- &axs->target_lsm[i],
- axs->target_comm[i]))
- call_panic = 1;
- }
-
- if (context->target_pid &&
- audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
- context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
- context->target_sessionid,
- &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
- call_panic = 1;
+ audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
+ axs->target_auid[i],
+ axs->target_uid[i],
+ axs->target_sessionid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
+ axs->target_comm[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (context->target_pid)
+ audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
+ context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+ context->target_sessionid,
+ &context->target_lsm,
+ context->target_comm);
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
on an object security context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 14849d5f84b4..1b05eb2dbe77 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
const char *operation);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob);
extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
@@ -251,6 +253,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
{ }
static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
{ }
+static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+{ }
static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
}
+void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
+{
+ int i;
+ int error;
+ struct lsmcontext context;
+
+ if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
+ error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
+ if (error)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
+ if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
+ if (error) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i));
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
+ i ? " " : "",
+ lsm_slot_to_name(i),
+ context.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&context);
+ }
+ }
+
+ audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
+ }
+ return;
+
+error_path:
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
+}
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1114,36 +1114,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
kfree(context);
}
-static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
- unsigned int sessionid,
- struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
+static void audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
- int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
- return rc;
+ return;
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
- rc = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
-
- return rc;
}
static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
@@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (osid) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
struct lsmblob blob;
lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
- *call_panic = 1;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
- }
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob);
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1588,19 +1569,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
- struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
-
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
- LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
- if (call_panic)
- *call_panic = 2;
- } else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
- security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
- }
- }
+ if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob))
+ audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob);
/* log the audit_names record type */
switch (n->type) {
@@ -1805,21 +1775,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
- if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
- axs->target_auid[i],
- axs->target_uid[i],
- axs->target_sessionid[i],
- &axs->target_lsm[i],
- axs->target_comm[i]))
- call_panic = 1;
- }
-
- if (context->target_pid &&
- audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
- context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
- context->target_sessionid,
- &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
- call_panic = 1;
+ audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
+ axs->target_auid[i],
+ axs->target_uid[i],
+ axs->target_sessionid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
+ axs->target_comm[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (context->target_pid)
+ audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
+ context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
+ context->target_sessionid,
+ &context->target_lsm,
+ context->target_comm);
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-doc, linux-api, linux-kernel, linux-audit
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
information will be displayed.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 +++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++----
security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index f2d15348bdff..f8aed4404e7e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2828,6 +2828,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index fd63ae215104..425538ebc606 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1401,6 +1401,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 29181bc8c693..1ee58c1491ab 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -609,11 +610,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index fde332e0ea7d..172550f67fc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Requires: profile != NULL
*
@@ -28,20 +29,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -50,19 +52,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index be6682768760..4c6d4171ded6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -802,6 +802,57 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ size_t llen;
+ size_t nlen;
+ size_t flen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ /*
+ * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
+ * when returning a security context. There is no definition
+ * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
+ * each way.
+ */
+ nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
+
+ flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
+ final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
+
+ kfree(*ctx);
+
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = flen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
@@ -2223,6 +2274,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2250,6 +2305,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 653dd2e236f1..cd977493f734 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6346,7 +6346,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2190c03ae3d0..9e442c4495bf 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3485,7 +3485,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, linux-api, linux-doc
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
information will be displayed.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 +++++
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++----
security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
apply. This interface can be written to.
+
+The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
+This is provided in compound context format.
+
+- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
+
+The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
+The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
+
+The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index f2d15348bdff..f8aed4404e7e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2828,6 +2828,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
+ ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
DIR("smack", 0555,
proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index fd63ae215104..425538ebc606 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1401,6 +1401,12 @@
* @pages contains the number of pages.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @getprocattr:
+ * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
+ * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
+ * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
+ * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
+ * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
* @ismaclabel:
* Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
* represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 29181bc8c693..1ee58c1491ab 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ bool newline = true;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
@@ -609,11 +610,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
- else
+ else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
+ newline = false;
+ } else
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index fde332e0ea7d..172550f67fc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
* @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
*
* Requires: profile != NULL
*
@@ -28,20 +29,21 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+ int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
int len;
if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (newline)
+ flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
- len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
AA_BUG(len < 0);
*string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -50,19 +52,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
- FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
- FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
+ len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
if (len < 0) {
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline) {
+ (*string)[len] = '\n';
+ (*string)[++len] = 0;
+ }
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index be6682768760..4c6d4171ded6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -802,6 +802,57 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+ int newlen)
+{
+ char *final;
+ size_t llen;
+ size_t nlen;
+ size_t flen;
+
+ llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+ /*
+ * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
+ * when returning a security context. There is no definition
+ * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
+ * each way.
+ */
+ nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
+
+ flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
+ final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (*ctxlen)
+ memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+ memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
+
+ kfree(*ctx);
+
+ *ctx = final;
+ *ctxlen = flen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
@@ -2223,6 +2274,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
char **value)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ char *final = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int finallen = 0;
int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
int slot = 0;
@@ -2250,6 +2305,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL)
+ continue;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+ cp, rc);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(final);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (final == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *value = final;
+ return finallen;
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 653dd2e236f1..cd977493f734 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6346,7 +6346,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
sid = __tsec->osid;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2190c03ae3d0..9e442c4495bf 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3485,7 +3485,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
char *cp;
int slen;
- if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 29/29] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: john.johansen, linux-kernel, linux-audit
With the inclusion of the interface LSM process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1ee58c1491ab..388298a15556 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1145,22 +1145,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1264,8 +1248,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1919,7 +1901,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.35.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v35 29/29] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
@ 2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-18 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
With the inclusion of the interface LSM process attribute
mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an
"exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates
it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor
hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and
interferes in the multiple LSM case.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +-------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1ee58c1491ab..388298a15556 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1145,22 +1145,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
- * @sock: the peer socket
- * @skb: packet data
- * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
- *
- * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
- */
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
@@ -1264,8 +1248,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1919,7 +1901,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
.name = "apparmor",
- .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR,
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
.init = apparmor_init,
--
2.35.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-18 18:02 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-04-18 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: kbuild-all, casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen,
penguin-kernel, paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel,
linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.18-rc3 next-20220414]
[cannot apply to pcmoore-audit/next jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
config: i386-tinyconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220419/202204190104.VspbI376-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.2.0-19) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
git checkout 2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash kernel/sched/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61,
from include/linux/trace_events.h:10,
from include/trace/syscall.h:7,
from include/linux/syscalls.h:88,
from include/linux/syscalls_api.h:1,
from kernel/sched/core.c:13:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
kernel/sched/core.c: At top level:
kernel/sched/core.c:5235:20: warning: no previous prototype for 'task_sched_runtime' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
5235 | unsigned long long task_sched_runtime(struct task_struct *p)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/core.c:9420:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sched_init_smp' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
9420 | void __init sched_init_smp(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/core.c:9448:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sched_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
9448 | void __init sched_init(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61,
from include/linux/trace_events.h:10,
from include/trace/syscall.h:7,
from include/linux/syscalls.h:88,
from include/linux/syscalls_api.h:1,
from kernel/sched/sched.h:60,
from kernel/sched/fair.c:53:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
kernel/sched/fair.c: At top level:
kernel/sched/fair.c:5530:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'init_cfs_bandwidth' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
5530 | void init_cfs_bandwidth(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b) {}
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11757:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'free_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11757 | void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11759:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'alloc_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11759 | int alloc_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, struct task_group *parent)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11764:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'online_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11764 | void online_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11766:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'unregister_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11766 | void unregister_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61,
from include/linux/trace_events.h:10,
from include/trace/syscall.h:7,
from include/linux/syscalls.h:88,
from include/linux/syscalls_api.h:1,
from kernel/sched/sched.h:60,
from kernel/sched/build_policy.c:33:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
In file included from kernel/sched/build_policy.c:43:
kernel/sched/rt.c: At top level:
kernel/sched/rt.c:259:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'unregister_rt_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
259 | void unregister_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/rt.c:261:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'free_rt_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
261 | void free_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/rt.c:263:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'alloc_rt_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
263 | int alloc_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, struct task_group *parent)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/rt.c:666:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'sched_rt_bandwidth_account' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
666 | bool sched_rt_bandwidth_account(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/sched/build_utility.c:39:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
vim +/secid +1147 include/linux/security.h
ee18d64c1f6320 David Howells 2009-09-02 1143
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1144 static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1145 struct lsmblob *blob)
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1146 {
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 @1147 *secid = 0;
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1148 }
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1149
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2022-04-18 18:02 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-04-18 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: john.johansen, kbuild-all, linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.18-rc3 next-20220414]
[cannot apply to pcmoore-audit/next jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
config: i386-tinyconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220419/202204190104.VspbI376-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.2.0-19) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
git checkout 2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
make W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=i386 SHELL=/bin/bash kernel/sched/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61,
from include/linux/trace_events.h:10,
from include/trace/syscall.h:7,
from include/linux/syscalls.h:88,
from include/linux/syscalls_api.h:1,
from kernel/sched/core.c:13:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
kernel/sched/core.c: At top level:
kernel/sched/core.c:5235:20: warning: no previous prototype for 'task_sched_runtime' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
5235 | unsigned long long task_sched_runtime(struct task_struct *p)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/core.c:9420:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sched_init_smp' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
9420 | void __init sched_init_smp(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/core.c:9448:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'sched_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
9448 | void __init sched_init(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61,
from include/linux/trace_events.h:10,
from include/trace/syscall.h:7,
from include/linux/syscalls.h:88,
from include/linux/syscalls_api.h:1,
from kernel/sched/sched.h:60,
from kernel/sched/fair.c:53:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
kernel/sched/fair.c: At top level:
kernel/sched/fair.c:5530:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'init_cfs_bandwidth' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
5530 | void init_cfs_bandwidth(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b) {}
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11757:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'free_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11757 | void free_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11759:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'alloc_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11759 | int alloc_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, struct task_group *parent)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11764:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'online_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11764 | void online_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/fair.c:11766:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'unregister_fair_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
11766 | void unregister_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61,
from include/linux/trace_events.h:10,
from include/trace/syscall.h:7,
from include/linux/syscalls.h:88,
from include/linux/syscalls_api.h:1,
from kernel/sched/sched.h:60,
from kernel/sched/build_policy.c:33:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
In file included from kernel/sched/build_policy.c:43:
kernel/sched/rt.c: At top level:
kernel/sched/rt.c:259:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'unregister_rt_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
259 | void unregister_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/rt.c:261:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'free_rt_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
261 | void free_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg) { }
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/rt.c:263:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'alloc_rt_sched_group' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
263 | int alloc_rt_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, struct task_group *parent)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/rt.c:666:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'sched_rt_bandwidth_account' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
666 | bool sched_rt_bandwidth_account(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
In file included from kernel/sched/build_utility.c:39:
include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_cred_getsecid':
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:10: error: 'secid' undeclared (first use in this function)
1147 | *secid = 0;
| ^~~~~
include/linux/security.h:1147:10: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
vim +/secid +1147 include/linux/security.h
ee18d64c1f6320 David Howells 2009-09-02 1143
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1144 static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1145 struct lsmblob *blob)
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1146 {
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 @1147 *secid = 0;
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1148 }
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1149
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-19 0:41 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-04-19 0:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: llvm, kbuild-all, casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen,
penguin-kernel, paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel,
linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.18-rc3 next-20220414]
[cannot apply to pcmoore-audit/next jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
config: arm-milbeaut_m10v_defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220419/202204190850.dXILQlrb-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 429cbac0390654f90bba18a41799464adf31a5ec)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install arm cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-arm-linux-gnueabi
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
git checkout 2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=arm SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:33:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:169:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'efi_attr_is_visible' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
umode_t __weak efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
^
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:169:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
umode_t __weak efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
^
static
1 warning and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from fs/iomap/trace.c:12:
In file included from fs/iomap/./trace.h:190:
In file included from include/trace/define_trace.h:102:
In file included from include/trace/trace_events.h:21:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
1 error generated.
--
In file included from init/main.c:21:
In file included from include/linux/syscalls.h:88:
In file included from include/trace/syscall.h:7:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
init/main.c:769:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_post_acpi_subsys_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(void) { }
^
init/main.c:769:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(void) { }
^
static
init/main.c:781:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'mem_encrypt_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
^
init/main.c:781:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
^
static
init/main.c:783:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'poking_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
^
init/main.c:783:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
^
static
3 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:17:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:852:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'syscall_trace_enter' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:852:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:880:17: warning: no previous prototype for function 'syscall_trace_exit' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:880:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:14:
In file included from include/linux/syscalls.h:88:
In file included from include/trace/syscall.h:7:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:186:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'sys_sigreturn' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage int sys_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:186:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int sys_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:216:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'sys_rt_sigreturn' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage int sys_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:216:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int sys_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:601:1: warning: no previous prototype for function 'do_work_pending' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
do_work_pending(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int thread_flags, int syscall)
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:600:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int
^
static
3 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:20:
In file included from include/linux/syscalls.h:88:
In file included from include/trace/syscall.h:7:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:21:
include/linux/mman.h:158:9: warning: division by zero is undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
_calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_SYNC, VM_SYNC ) |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/mman.h:136:21: note: expanded from macro '_calc_vm_trans'
: ((x) & (bit1)) / ((bit1) / (bit2))))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:32:17: warning: no previous prototype for function 'sys_arm_fadvise64_64' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage long sys_arm_fadvise64_64(int fd, int advice,
^
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:32:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage long sys_arm_fadvise64_64(int fd, int advice,
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:52:
In file included from include/trace/events/ipi.h:90:
In file included from include/trace/define_trace.h:102:
In file included from include/trace/trace_events.h:21:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:582:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_irq_work_raise' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
^
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:582:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:793:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'setup_profiling_timer' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int setup_profiling_timer(unsigned int multiplier)
^
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:793:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int setup_profiling_timer(unsigned int multiplier)
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/mm/fault.c:19:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:535:1: warning: no previous prototype for function 'do_DataAbort' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
do_DataAbort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:534:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage void
^
static
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:565:1: warning: no previous prototype for function 'do_PrefetchAbort' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
do_PrefetchAbort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int ifsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:564:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage void
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from kernel/fork.c:51:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
kernel/fork.c:163:13: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_release_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
^
kernel/fork.c:163:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
^
static
kernel/fork.c:853:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_task_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
^
kernel/fork.c:853:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
^
static
kernel/fork.c:948:12: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_dup_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
^
kernel/fork.c:948:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
^
static
3 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from kernel/signal.c:29:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
kernel/signal.c:137:37: warning: array index 3 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
case 4: ready = signal->sig[3] &~ blocked->sig[3];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
kernel/signal.c:137:19: warning: array index 3 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
case 4: ready = signal->sig[3] &~ blocked->sig[3];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
kernel/signal.c:138:30: warning: array index 2 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
ready |= signal->sig[2] &~ blocked->sig[2];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
kernel/signal.c:138:12: warning: array index 2 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
ready |= signal->sig[2] &~ blocked->sig[2];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
4 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from kernel/kallsyms.c:25:
In file included from include/linux/filter.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_vlan.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
kernel/kallsyms.c:591:12: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_get_kallsym' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int __weak arch_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value,
^
kernel/kallsyms.c:591:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int __weak arch_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value,
^
static
1 warning and 1 error generated.
..
vim +/secid +1147 include/linux/security.h
ee18d64c1f6320 David Howells 2009-09-02 1143
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1144 static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1145 struct lsmblob *blob)
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1146 {
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 @1147 *secid = 0;
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1148 }
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1149
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2022-04-19 0:41 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-04-19 0:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: john.johansen, kbuild-all, llvm, linux-kernel, linux-audit,
linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.18-rc3 next-20220414]
[cannot apply to pcmoore-audit/next jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
config: arm-milbeaut_m10v_defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220419/202204190850.dXILQlrb-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 429cbac0390654f90bba18a41799464adf31a5ec)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install arm cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-arm-linux-gnueabi
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
git checkout 2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=arm SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:33:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:169:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'efi_attr_is_visible' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
umode_t __weak efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
^
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:169:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
umode_t __weak efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
^
static
1 warning and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from fs/iomap/trace.c:12:
In file included from fs/iomap/./trace.h:190:
In file included from include/trace/define_trace.h:102:
In file included from include/trace/trace_events.h:21:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
1 error generated.
--
In file included from init/main.c:21:
In file included from include/linux/syscalls.h:88:
In file included from include/trace/syscall.h:7:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
init/main.c:769:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_post_acpi_subsys_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(void) { }
^
init/main.c:769:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(void) { }
^
static
init/main.c:781:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'mem_encrypt_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
^
init/main.c:781:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
^
static
init/main.c:783:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'poking_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
^
init/main.c:783:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
^
static
3 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:17:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:852:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'syscall_trace_enter' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:852:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:880:17: warning: no previous prototype for function 'syscall_trace_exit' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c:880:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:14:
In file included from include/linux/syscalls.h:88:
In file included from include/trace/syscall.h:7:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:186:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'sys_sigreturn' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage int sys_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:186:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int sys_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:216:16: warning: no previous prototype for function 'sys_rt_sigreturn' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage int sys_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:216:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int sys_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:601:1: warning: no previous prototype for function 'do_work_pending' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
do_work_pending(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int thread_flags, int syscall)
^
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c:600:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage int
^
static
3 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:20:
In file included from include/linux/syscalls.h:88:
In file included from include/trace/syscall.h:7:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:21:
include/linux/mman.h:158:9: warning: division by zero is undefined [-Wdivision-by-zero]
_calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_SYNC, VM_SYNC ) |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/mman.h:136:21: note: expanded from macro '_calc_vm_trans'
: ((x) & (bit1)) / ((bit1) / (bit2))))
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:32:17: warning: no previous prototype for function 'sys_arm_fadvise64_64' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
asmlinkage long sys_arm_fadvise64_64(int fd, int advice,
^
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:32:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage long sys_arm_fadvise64_64(int fd, int advice,
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:52:
In file included from include/trace/events/ipi.h:90:
In file included from include/trace/define_trace.h:102:
In file included from include/trace/trace_events.h:21:
In file included from include/linux/trace_events.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:582:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_irq_work_raise' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
^
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:582:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
^
static
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:793:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'setup_profiling_timer' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int setup_profiling_timer(unsigned int multiplier)
^
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:793:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int setup_profiling_timer(unsigned int multiplier)
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from arch/arm/mm/fault.c:19:
In file included from include/linux/perf_event.h:61:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:535:1: warning: no previous prototype for function 'do_DataAbort' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
do_DataAbort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:534:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage void
^
static
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:565:1: warning: no previous prototype for function 'do_PrefetchAbort' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
do_PrefetchAbort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int ifsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
^
arch/arm/mm/fault.c:564:12: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
asmlinkage void
^
static
2 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from kernel/fork.c:51:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
kernel/fork.c:163:13: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_release_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
^
kernel/fork.c:163:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __weak arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
^
static
kernel/fork.c:853:20: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_task_cache_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
^
kernel/fork.c:853:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
^
static
kernel/fork.c:948:12: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_dup_task_struct' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
^
kernel/fork.c:948:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
^
static
3 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from kernel/signal.c:29:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
kernel/signal.c:137:37: warning: array index 3 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
case 4: ready = signal->sig[3] &~ blocked->sig[3];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
kernel/signal.c:137:19: warning: array index 3 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
case 4: ready = signal->sig[3] &~ blocked->sig[3];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
kernel/signal.c:138:30: warning: array index 2 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
ready |= signal->sig[2] &~ blocked->sig[2];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
kernel/signal.c:138:12: warning: array index 2 is past the end of the array (which contains 2 elements) [-Warray-bounds]
ready |= signal->sig[2] &~ blocked->sig[2];
^ ~
arch/arm/include/asm/signal.h:17:2: note: array 'sig' declared here
unsigned long sig[_NSIG_WORDS];
^
4 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from kernel/kallsyms.c:25:
In file included from include/linux/filter.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_vlan.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
kernel/kallsyms.c:591:12: warning: no previous prototype for function 'arch_get_kallsym' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
int __weak arch_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value,
^
kernel/kallsyms.c:591:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
int __weak arch_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value,
^
static
1 warning and 1 error generated.
..
vim +/secid +1147 include/linux/security.h
ee18d64c1f6320 David Howells 2009-09-02 1143
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1144 static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1145 struct lsmblob *blob)
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1146 {
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 @1147 *secid = 0;
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1148 }
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1149
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-19 0:51 ` kernel test robot
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-04-19 0:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: llvm, kbuild-all, casey, linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen,
penguin-kernel, paul, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel,
linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.18-rc3 next-20220414]
[cannot apply to pcmoore-audit/next jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
config: s390-randconfig-r044-20220418 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220419/202204190819.XVXsdhdo-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 429cbac0390654f90bba18a41799464adf31a5ec)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install s390 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-s390x-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
git checkout 2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=s390 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/ drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/ drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/ drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/ drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:31:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:31:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:31:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:34:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:13117:49: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
rc = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&bp->pdev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
>> drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:15204:26: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
bp->cyclecounter.mask = CYCLECOUNTER_MASK(64);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/timecounter.h:14:59: note: expanded from macro 'CYCLECOUNTER_MASK'
#define CYCLECOUNTER_MASK(bits) (u64)((bits) < 64 ? ((1ULL<<(bits))-1) : -1)
^ ~~~~~~
14 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:23:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:23:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:23:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:24:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
12 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:38:
In file included from include/net/net_namespace.h:40:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:38:
In file included from include/net/net_namespace.h:40:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:38:
In file included from include/net/net_namespace.h:40:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
>> drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:200:48: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if (!dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dsaf_dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64ULL)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
13 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_ether.h:19:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_ether.h:19:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_ether.h:19:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:21:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:2355:38: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if (!dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
13 warnings and 1 error generated.
..
vim +/secid +1147 include/linux/security.h
ee18d64c1f6320 David Howells 2009-09-02 1143
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1144 static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1145 struct lsmblob *blob)
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1146 {
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 @1147 *secid = 0;
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1148 }
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1149
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://01.org/lkp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
@ 2022-04-19 0:51 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-04-19 0:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: john.johansen, kbuild-all, llvm, linux-kernel, linux-audit,
linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v5.18-rc3 next-20220414]
[cannot apply to pcmoore-audit/next jmorris-security/next-testing]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
config: s390-randconfig-r044-20220418 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220419/202204190819.XVXsdhdo-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 429cbac0390654f90bba18a41799464adf31a5ec)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install s390 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-s390x-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Casey-Schaufler/integrity-disassociate-ima_filter_rule-from-security_audit_rule/20220419-000109
git checkout 2fa01492487f9135e9ea9e59924289cc23a66576
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=s390 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/ drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/ drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/ drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/ drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:31:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:31:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:31:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:34:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:13117:49: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
rc = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&bp->pdev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
>> drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c:15204:26: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
bp->cyclecounter.mask = CYCLECOUNTER_MASK(64);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/timecounter.h:14:59: note: expanded from macro 'CYCLECOUNTER_MASK'
#define CYCLECOUNTER_MASK(bits) (u64)((bits) < 64 ? ((1ULL<<(bits))-1) : -1)
^ ~~~~~~
14 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:23:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:23:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:23:
In file included from include/linux/pci.h:39:
In file included from include/linux/io.h:13:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c:24:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
12 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:38:
In file included from include/net/net_namespace.h:40:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:38:
In file included from include/net/net_namespace.h:40:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:38:
In file included from include/net/net_namespace.h:40:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:12:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
>> drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_main.c:200:48: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if (!dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dsaf_dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64ULL)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
13 warnings and 1 error generated.
--
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_ether.h:19:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:464:31: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __raw_readb(PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:477:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:37:59: note: expanded from macro '__le16_to_cpu'
#define __le16_to_cpu(x) __swab16((__force __u16)(__le16)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab16'
#define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_ether.h:19:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:490:61: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(PCI_IOBASE + addr));
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:35:59: note: expanded from macro '__le32_to_cpu'
#define __le32_to_cpu(x) __swab32((__force __u32)(__le32)(x))
^
include/uapi/linux/swab.h:115:54: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
#define __swab32(x) (__u32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x))
^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:20:
In file included from include/linux/if_ether.h:19:
In file included from include/linux/skbuff.h:31:
In file included from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:10:
In file included from include/linux/scatterlist.h:9:
In file included from arch/s390/include/asm/io.h:75:
include/asm-generic/io.h:501:33: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writeb(value, PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:511:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:521:59: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
__raw_writel((u32 __force)cpu_to_le32(value), PCI_IOBASE + addr);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:609:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:617:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:625:20: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
readsl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:634:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesb(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:643:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesw(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
include/asm-generic/io.h:652:21: warning: performing pointer arithmetic on a null pointer has undefined behavior [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
writesl(PCI_IOBASE + addr, buffer, count);
~~~~~~~~~~ ^
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:8:
In file included from include/linux/etherdevice.h:21:
In file included from include/linux/netdevice.h:46:
In file included from include/uapi/linux/neighbour.h:6:
In file included from include/linux/netlink.h:9:
In file included from include/net/scm.h:8:
>> include/linux/security.h:1147:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'secid'
*secid = 0;
^
drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_enet.c:2355:38: warning: shift count >= width of type [-Wshift-count-overflow]
if (!dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~
13 warnings and 1 error generated.
..
vim +/secid +1147 include/linux/security.h
ee18d64c1f6320 David Howells 2009-09-02 1143
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1144 static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c,
2fa01492487f91 Casey Schaufler 2022-04-18 1145 struct lsmblob *blob)
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1146 {
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 @1147 *secid = 0;
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1148 }
4d5b5539742d25 Todd Kjos 2021-10-12 1149
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
(?)
@ 2022-04-19 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-20 19:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-04-21 3:22 ` Mimi Zohar
-1 siblings, 2 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-19 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity; +Cc: Casey Schaufler
On 4/18/2022 7:59 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
> allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
> security module to use for a particular rule.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Would it be possible to get feedback on the IMA portions
of the stacking patch set? I believe that I have addressed
previous issues. I need to wrap this up before too long.
Thank you.
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
> 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
> [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
> lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
> - [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
> option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
> [appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
> base:
> @@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
>
> measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
>
> + It is possible to explicitly specify which security
> + module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
> + module specified is not active on the system the rule
> + will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
> + security module registered on the system will be assumed.
> +
> Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
>
> measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d00870d2b416..3666eddad59a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1985,25 +1985,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> { }
>
> #endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
> int pcr;
> unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
> + int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
> struct {
> void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
> char *args_p; /* audit value */
> @@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> }
> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>
> +static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
> +
> +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
> +{
> + ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
> + if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
> + ima_rules_lsm = 0;
> + pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
> + }
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
> +
> static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
> {
> struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
> @@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> int i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
> kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> }
> }
> @@ -407,7 +422,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>
> ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
> - &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
> + &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
> @@ -623,14 +639,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> default:
> break;
> @@ -1025,7 +1043,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
> Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
> Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
> Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> - Opt_label, Opt_err
> + Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
> };
>
> static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -1073,6 +1091,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
> {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
> + {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
> {Opt_err, NULL}
> };
>
> @@ -1091,7 +1110,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
> result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
> - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
> + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
> @@ -1780,6 +1800,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> &(template_desc->num_fields));
> entry->template = template_desc;
> break;
> + case Opt_lsm:
> + result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
> + if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
> + entry->which = result;
> + result = 0;
> + break;
> case Opt_err:
> ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
> result = -EINVAL;
> @@ -1816,6 +1849,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> ssize_t result, len;
> int audit_info = 0;
> + int i;
>
> p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
> len = strlen(p) + 1;
> @@ -1833,6 +1867,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
>
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
>
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
> +
> result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
> if (result) {
> ima_free_rule(entry);
> @@ -2158,6 +2195,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
> if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
> seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
> + if (entry->which >= 0)
> + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
> rcu_read_unlock();
> seq_puts(m, "\n");
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d1ddbb857af1..9e0139b0d346 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2728,19 +2728,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> * the audit subsystem.
> */
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
> + return;
> + }
> + }
> }
>
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-04-19 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-20 19:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-04-20 21:15 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-21 3:22 ` Mimi Zohar
1 sibling, 1 reply; 132+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2022-04-20 19:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, linux-integrity
Hi Casey,
Below are a few initial comments/questions from a high level...
On Tue, 2022-04-19 at 09:50 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 4/18/2022 7:59 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> > bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
> > int pcr;
> > unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
> > + int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
If "which" was defined in the lsm[] structure, it would be clear
reading the code that "which" refers to an LSM (e.g. entry-
>lsm[i].which). Perhaps rename "which" to "which_lsm", "lsm_slot", or
"rules_lsm".
> > struct {
> > void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
> > char *args_p; /* audit value */
> > @@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> > }
> > __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
> >
> > +static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
> > +
> > +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
> > +{
> > + ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
> > + if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
> > + ima_rules_lsm = 0;
> > + pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
> > + }
Specific IMA policy rules could be independent of the default one being
initialized here. Probably "ima_rules_lsm" should be renamed
"default_rules_lsm" or "default_ima_rules_lsm". The pr_err() message
should indicate setting the default rule LSM failed with an indication
of which LSM is set as the default.
Assuming 0 is guaranteed to be a valid LSM, then something like:
"default rule lsm \"%s\" not registered, using \"%s"\", str,
lsm_slot_to_name(0));
> > +
> > + return 1;
> > +}
> > +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
> > +
> > static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
> > {
> > struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
> > @@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > int i;
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> > - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> > + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
> > kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> > }
> > }
ima_rules_lsm is initialized to 0, If it isn't guranteed to be a valid
LSM, then ima_rules_lsm_init() needs to be called from ima_init.c:
ima_init(), so that it can be reset to an invalid value. Then
ima_filter_rule_init()/free() could check it.
thanks,
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-04-20 19:23 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2022-04-20 21:15 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-20 21:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity; +Cc: Casey Schaufler
On 4/20/2022 12:23 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Casey,
>
> Below are a few initial comments/questions from a high level...
>
> On Tue, 2022-04-19 at 09:50 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/18/2022 7:59 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>>> index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>>> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>>> bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
>>> int pcr;
>>> unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
>>> + int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
> If "which" was defined in the lsm[] structure, it would be clear
> reading the code that "which" refers to an LSM (e.g. entry-
>> lsm[i].which). Perhaps rename "which" to "which_lsm", "lsm_slot", or
> "rules_lsm".
Both fine suggestions. I will incorporate them.
>
>>> struct {
>>> void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
>>> char *args_p; /* audit value */
>>> @@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
>>> }
>>> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>>>
>>> +static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
>>> +
>>> +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
>>> +{
>>> + ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
>>> + if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
>>> + ima_rules_lsm = 0;
>>> + pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
>>> + }
> Specific IMA policy rules could be independent of the default one being
> initialized here. Probably "ima_rules_lsm" should be renamed
> "default_rules_lsm" or "default_ima_rules_lsm".
Sure. No problem to change.
> The pr_err() message
> should indicate setting the default rule LSM failed with an indication
> of which LSM is set as the default.
>
> Assuming 0 is guaranteed to be a valid LSM,
Unfortunately, it's possible for there to be no LSMs,
in which case 0 won't match any LSM when the hooks are
being invoked.
> then something like:
> "default rule lsm \"%s\" not registered, using \"%s"\", str,
> lsm_slot_to_name(0));
>
>>> +
>>> + return 1;
>>> +}
>>> +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
>>> +
>>> static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
>>> {
>>> struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
>>> @@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>> int i;
>>>
>>> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
>>> - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
>>> + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
>>> kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
>>> }
>>> }
> ima_rules_lsm is initialized to 0, If it isn't guranteed to be a valid
> LSM, then ima_rules_lsm_init() needs to be called from ima_init.c:
> ima_init(), so that it can be reset to an invalid value. Then
> ima_filter_rule_init()/free() could check it.
If there is no LSM in slot 0 that implies there are no LSMs
suppling the hooks. Since the list of hooks to invoke will be
empty it doesn't matter what value is in default_rules_lsm.
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-04-19 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-20 19:23 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2022-04-21 3:22 ` Mimi Zohar
1 sibling, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2022-04-21 3:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, linux-integrity
On Tue, 2022-04-19 at 09:50 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> > @@ -1025,7 +1043,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
> > Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
> > Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
> > Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> > - Opt_label, Opt_err
> > + Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
> > };
> >
> > static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > @@ -1073,6 +1091,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
> > {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> > {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
> > + {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
> > {Opt_err, NULL}
> > };
The ordering of "Opt_lsm" and "Opt_label" are reversed here. They need
to be in sync. Displaying the policy rules results in "label=selinux",
as opposed to "lsm=selinux".
> > @@ -2158,6 +2195,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> > seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
> > if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
> > seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
> > + if (entry->which >= 0)
> > + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
Please only include the LSM name on those rules which are LSM specific.
I would move this statement to the "for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
{" loop.
None of the builtin policy rules are LSM specific. To test, add
"ima_policy=tcb" to the boot command line. Then to view the policy,
cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy.
Also, unless the IMA policy rule explicitly indicated a specific LSM, I
would place the LSM name in parenthesis.
> > rcu_read_unlock();
> > seq_puts(m, "\n");
> > return 0;
thanks,
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-21 16:49 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
>
> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
> fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
> it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
> the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
> will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
> At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
> security/security.c | 5 +++--
> 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 3666eddad59a..ee5d14dac65f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>
> @@ -1972,7 +1972,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
> + u32 field, u32 op,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>
> for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
> struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> pid_t pid;
> u32 sid;
>
> @@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> if (f->lsm_str) {
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + result = security_audit_rule_match(
> + &blob, f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d272b5cf18a8..a9d5bfa37cb3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> const struct cred *cred;
> int i, need_sid = 1;
> u32 sid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> unsigned int sessionid;
>
> if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
> @@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> - f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> + f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
> @@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (f->lsm_str) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> - name->osid,
> + &blob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid, f->type, f->op,
> + &blob, f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> @@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> break;
> - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 9e0139b0d346..ced1c76a380f 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> }
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> @@ -2714,7 +2714,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> continue;
> if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> continue;
> - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> + field, op,
> &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
@ 2022-04-21 16:49 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
>
> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
> fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
> it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
> the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
> will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
> At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
> security/security.c | 5 +++--
> 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 3666eddad59a..ee5d14dac65f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>
> @@ -1972,7 +1972,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
> + u32 field, u32 op,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>
> for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
> struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> pid_t pid;
> u32 sid;
>
> @@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> if (f->lsm_str) {
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + result = security_audit_rule_match(
> + &blob, f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d272b5cf18a8..a9d5bfa37cb3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> const struct cred *cred;
> int i, need_sid = 1;
> u32 sid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> unsigned int sessionid;
>
> if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
> @@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> - f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> + f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
> @@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (f->lsm_str) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> - name->osid,
> + &blob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid, f->type, f->op,
> + &blob, f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> @@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> break;
> - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 9e0139b0d346..ced1c76a380f 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> }
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> @@ -2714,7 +2714,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> continue;
> if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> continue;
> - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> + field, op,
> &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
> allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
> security module to use for a particular rule.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
> 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
> [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
> lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
> - [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
> option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
> [appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
> base:
> @@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
>
> measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
>
> + It is possible to explicitly specify which security
> + module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
> + module specified is not active on the system the rule
> + will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
> + security module registered on the system will be assumed.
> +
> Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
>
> measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d00870d2b416..3666eddad59a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1985,25 +1985,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> { }
>
> #endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
> int pcr;
> unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
> + int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
> struct {
> void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
> char *args_p; /* audit value */
> @@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> }
> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>
> +static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
> +
> +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
> +{
> + ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
> + if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
> + ima_rules_lsm = 0;
> + pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
> + }
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
> +
> static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
> {
> struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
> @@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> int i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
> kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> }
> }
> @@ -407,7 +422,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>
> ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
> - &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
> + &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
> @@ -623,14 +639,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> default:
> break;
> @@ -1025,7 +1043,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
> Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
> Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
> Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> - Opt_label, Opt_err
> + Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
> };
>
> static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -1073,6 +1091,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
> {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
> + {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
> {Opt_err, NULL}
> };
>
> @@ -1091,7 +1110,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
> result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
> - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
> + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
> @@ -1780,6 +1800,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> &(template_desc->num_fields));
> entry->template = template_desc;
> break;
> + case Opt_lsm:
> + result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
> + if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
> + entry->which = result;
> + result = 0;
> + break;
> case Opt_err:
> ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
> result = -EINVAL;
> @@ -1816,6 +1849,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> ssize_t result, len;
> int audit_info = 0;
> + int i;
>
> p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
> len = strlen(p) + 1;
> @@ -1833,6 +1867,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
>
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
>
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
> +
> result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
> if (result) {
> ima_free_rule(entry);
> @@ -2158,6 +2195,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
> if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
> seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
> + if (entry->which >= 0)
> + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
> rcu_read_unlock();
> seq_puts(m, "\n");
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d1ddbb857af1..9e0139b0d346 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2728,19 +2728,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> * the audit subsystem.
> */
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
> + return;
> + }
> + }
> }
>
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
@ 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
> and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
> modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
> allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
> filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
> that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
> to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
> security module to use for a particular rule.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++----
> 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 839fab811b18..64863e9d87ea 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
> [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
> lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
> - [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] [lsm=]
> option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
> [appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
> base:
> @@ -126,6 +126,12 @@ Description:
>
> measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
>
> + It is possible to explicitly specify which security
> + module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
> + module specified is not active on the system the rule
> + will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
> + security module registered on the system will be assumed.
> +
> Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
>
> measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d00870d2b416..3666eddad59a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1985,25 +1985,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot);
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> { }
>
> #endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index eea6e92500b8..97470354c8ae 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> bool (*fgroup_op)(kgid_t cred_gid, kgid_t rule_gid); /* gid_eq(), gid_gt(), gid_lt() */
> int pcr;
> unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
> + int which; /* which LSM rule applies to */
> struct {
> void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
> char *args_p; /* audit value */
> @@ -285,6 +286,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> }
> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>
> +static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
> +
> +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
> +{
> + ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
> + if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
> + ima_rules_lsm = 0;
> + pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
> + }
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
> +
> static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
> {
> struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
> @@ -356,7 +371,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> int i;
>
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule, entry->which);
> kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> }
> }
> @@ -407,7 +422,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>
> ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
> - &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
> + &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
> @@ -623,14 +639,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule);
> + rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + rule->which);
> break;
> default:
> break;
> @@ -1025,7 +1043,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
> Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
> Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
> Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> - Opt_label, Opt_err
> + Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
> };
>
> static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -1073,6 +1091,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
> {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
> + {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
> {Opt_err, NULL}
> };
>
> @@ -1091,7 +1110,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
> result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
> - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
> + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
> + entry->which);
> if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
> pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
> @@ -1780,6 +1800,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> &(template_desc->num_fields));
> entry->template = template_desc;
> break;
> + case Opt_lsm:
> + result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
> + if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
> + entry->which = result;
> + result = 0;
> + break;
> case Opt_err:
> ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
> result = -EINVAL;
> @@ -1816,6 +1849,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> ssize_t result, len;
> int audit_info = 0;
> + int i;
>
> p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
> len = strlen(p) + 1;
> @@ -1833,6 +1867,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
>
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
>
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> + entry->which = ima_rules_lsm;
> +
> result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
> if (result) {
> ima_free_rule(entry);
> @@ -2158,6 +2195,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
> if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
> seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
> + if (entry->which >= 0)
> + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm), lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which));
> rcu_read_unlock();
> seq_puts(m, "\n");
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d1ddbb857af1..9e0139b0d346 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2728,19 +2728,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> * the audit subsystem.
> */
> -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
>
> -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
> + return;
> + }
> + }
> }
>
> -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> + int lsmslot)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
> + if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
> + return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + lsmrule);
> +
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
>
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Provide interfaces to map LSM slot numbers and LSM names.
> Update the LSM registration code to save this information.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
> security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ed51baa94a30..d00870d2b416 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> }
>
> +/* Map lsm names to blob slot numbers */
> +extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
> +extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 49fa61028da2..d1ddbb857af1 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -477,6 +477,50 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> */
> static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_name_to_slot - Report the slot number for a security module
> + * @name: name of the security module
> + *
> + * Look up the slot number for the named security module.
> + * Returns the slot number or LSMBLOB_INVALID if @name is not
> + * a registered security module name.
> + */
> +int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < lsm_slot; i++)
> + if (strcmp(lsm_slotlist[i]->lsm, name) == 0)
> + return i;
> +
> + return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_slot_to_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
> + * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
> + *
> + * Provide the name of the security module associated with
> + * a interface LSM slot.
> + *
> + * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
> + * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
> + */
> +const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot)
> +{
> + if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + slot = 0;
> + else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
> + return NULL;
> + return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
> +}
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
> lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> lsmid->slot);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings
@ 2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Provide interfaces to map LSM slot numbers and LSM names.
> Update the LSM registration code to save this information.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
> security/security.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index ed51baa94a30..d00870d2b416 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> }
>
> +/* Map lsm names to blob slot numbers */
> +extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
> +extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 49fa61028da2..d1ddbb857af1 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -477,6 +477,50 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> */
> static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_name_to_slot - Report the slot number for a security module
> + * @name: name of the security module
> + *
> + * Look up the slot number for the named security module.
> + * Returns the slot number or LSMBLOB_INVALID if @name is not
> + * a registered security module name.
> + */
> +int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < lsm_slot; i++)
> + if (strcmp(lsm_slotlist[i]->lsm, name) == 0)
> + return i;
> +
> + return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_slot_to_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot
> + * @slot: index into the interface LSM slot list.
> + *
> + * Provide the name of the security module associated with
> + * a interface LSM slot.
> + *
> + * If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value
> + * for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL.
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL.
> + */
> +const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot)
> +{
> + if (slot == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + slot = 0;
> + else if (slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot < 0)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + if (lsm_slotlist[slot] == NULL)
> + return NULL;
> + return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm;
> +}
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid;
> lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> lsmid->slot);
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-21 16:51 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
> These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
> interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because
> they use security module registered hooks that we don't
> want exported.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
> security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 25b3ef71f495..2986342dad41 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1917,6 +1917,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + void **lsmrule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{ }
> +
> +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
>
> extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
>
> -/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
> -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> -
> -#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
> -#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
> -#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
> -
> -#else
> -
> -static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> -{
> - return -EINVAL;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> -{
> - return -EINVAL;
> -}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
> #define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
> #else
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b7cf5cbfdc67..22543fdb6041 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2586,6 +2586,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> +/*
> + * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> + * the audit subsystem.
> + */
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> +}
> +
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> +}
> +
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
> {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
@ 2022-04-21 16:51 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-21 16:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
> These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
> interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because
> they use security module registered hooks that we don't
> want exported.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
> security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 25b3ef71f495..2986342dad41 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1917,6 +1917,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + void **lsmrule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{ }
> +
> +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
>
> extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
>
> -/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
> -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> -
> -#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
> -#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
> -#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
> -
> -#else
> -
> -static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> -{
> - return -EINVAL;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> -{
> - return -EINVAL;
> -}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
> #define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
> #else
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b7cf5cbfdc67..22543fdb6041 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2586,6 +2586,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> +/*
> + * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> + * the audit subsystem.
> + */
> +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> +}
> +
> +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> +}
> +
> +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
> {
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-22 8:37 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-22 8:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, linux-api, linux-doc
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
> process security "context" in compound format:
> lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
> This entry is not writable.
>
> A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
> this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
> information will be displayed.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 +++++
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
> security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
> security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++----
> security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> @@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
> The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
> module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
> apply. This interface can be written to.
> +
> +The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
> +case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
> +This is provided in compound context format.
> +
> +- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
> +
> +The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
> +Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
> +The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
> +The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
> +
> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
> +context of the identified process.
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index f2d15348bdff..f8aed4404e7e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2828,6 +2828,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index fd63ae215104..425538ebc606 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1401,6 +1401,12 @@
> * @pages contains the number of pages.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> + * @getprocattr:
> + * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
> + * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
> + * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
> + * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
> + * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
> * @ismaclabel:
> * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
> * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
> #ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
> #define __AA_PROCATTR_H
>
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
> int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
>
> #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 29181bc8c693..1ee58c1491ab 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
> struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
> struct aa_label *label = NULL;
> + bool newline = true;
>
> if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> @@ -609,11 +610,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
> else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
> - else
> + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
> + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> + newline = false;
> + } else
> error = -EINVAL;
>
> if (label)
> - error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
> + error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
>
> aa_put_label(label);
> put_cred(cred);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> index fde332e0ea7d..172550f67fc0 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
> * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
> * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
> + * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
> *
> * Requires: profile != NULL
> *
> @@ -28,20 +29,21 @@
> *
> * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
> */
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
> {
> struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
> struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
> + int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
> int len;
>
> if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return -EACCES;
> }
> + if (newline)
> + flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
> AA_BUG(len < 0);
>
> *string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -50,19 +52,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
> if (len < 0) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return len;
> }
>
> - (*string)[len] = '\n';
> - (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
> + if (newline) {
> + (*string)[len] = '\n';
> + (*string)[++len] = 0;
> + }
>
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> - return len + 1;
> + return len;
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index be6682768760..4c6d4171ded6 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -802,6 +802,57 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
> + * @ctx: the existing compound context
> + * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
> + * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
> + * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
> + * @newlen: maximum size of @new
> + *
> + * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
> + * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
> + * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
> + */
> +static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
> + int newlen)
> +{
> + char *final;
> + size_t llen;
> + size_t nlen;
> + size_t flen;
> +
> + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
> + /*
> + * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
> + * when returning a security context. There is no definition
> + * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
> + * each way.
> + */
> + nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
> +
> + flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
> + final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + if (*ctxlen)
> + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
> +
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
> +
> + kfree(*ctx);
> +
> + *ctx = final;
> + *ctxlen = flen;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
> * can be accessed with:
> @@ -2223,6 +2274,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + char *final = NULL;
> + char *cp;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int finallen = 0;
> int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
> int slot = 0;
>
> @@ -2250,6 +2305,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
> + if (rc == -EINVAL)
> + continue;
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
> + cp, rc);
> + kfree(cp);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + }
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *value = final;
> + return finallen;
> + }
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 653dd2e236f1..cd977493f734 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6346,7 +6346,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
> goto bad;
> }
>
> - if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
> + if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
> sid = __tsec->sid;
> else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
> sid = __tsec->osid;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 2190c03ae3d0..9e442c4495bf 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3485,7 +3485,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
> char *cp;
> int slen;
>
> - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
> + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
@ 2022-04-22 8:37 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-22 8:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-doc, linux-api, linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
> process security "context" in compound format:
> lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
> This entry is not writable.
>
> A security module may decide that its policy does not allow
> this information to be displayed. In this case none of the
> information will be displayed.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 +++++
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++
> security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++-
> security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++----
> security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
> 9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> index b77b4a540391..070225ae6ceb 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
> @@ -143,3 +143,17 @@ separated list of the active security modules.
> The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
> module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
> apply. This interface can be written to.
> +
> +The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
> +case where multiple security modules provide a process context.
> +This is provided in compound context format.
> +
> +- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0`
> +
> +The `lsm` and `value` fields are NUL-terminated bytestrings.
> +Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters.
> +The NUL bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
> +The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23.
> +
> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
> +context of the identified process.
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index f2d15348bdff..f8aed4404e7e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2828,6 +2828,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
> ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
> + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0444),
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> DIR("smack", 0555,
> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index fd63ae215104..425538ebc606 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1401,6 +1401,12 @@
> * @pages contains the number of pages.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> + * @getprocattr:
> + * Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in
> + * the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed
> + * is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the
> + * "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the
> + * task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
> * @ismaclabel:
> * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
> * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
> @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
> #ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
> #define __AA_PROCATTR_H
>
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
> int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
>
> #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 29181bc8c693..1ee58c1491ab 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
> struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
> struct aa_label *label = NULL;
> + bool newline = true;
>
> if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> @@ -609,11 +610,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
> else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
> label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
> - else
> + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
> + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
> + newline = false;
> + } else
> error = -EINVAL;
>
> if (label)
> - error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
> + error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline);
>
> aa_put_label(label);
> put_cred(cred);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> index fde332e0ea7d..172550f67fc0 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
> * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
> * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
> + * @newline: Should a newline be added to @string.
> *
> * Requires: profile != NULL
> *
> @@ -28,20 +29,21 @@
> *
> * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
> */
> -int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
> {
> struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
> struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
> + int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED;
> int len;
>
> if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns, true)) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return -EACCES;
> }
> + if (newline)
> + flags |= FLAG_SHOW_MODE;
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(NULL, 0, current_ns, label, flags);
> AA_BUG(len < 0);
>
> *string = kmalloc(len + 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -50,19 +52,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> - len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label,
> - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
> - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
> + len = aa_label_snxprint(*string, len + 2, current_ns, label, flags);
> if (len < 0) {
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> return len;
> }
>
> - (*string)[len] = '\n';
> - (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
> + if (newline) {
> + (*string)[len] = '\n';
> + (*string)[++len] = 0;
> + }
>
> aa_put_ns(current_ns);
> - return len + 1;
> + return len;
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index be6682768760..4c6d4171ded6 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -802,6 +802,57 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
> + * @ctx: the existing compound context
> + * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
> + * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
> + * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
> + * @newlen: maximum size of @new
> + *
> + * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
> + * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
> + * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
> + */
> +static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
> + int newlen)
> +{
> + char *final;
> + size_t llen;
> + size_t nlen;
> + size_t flen;
> +
> + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
> + /*
> + * A security module may or may not provide a trailing nul on
> + * when returning a security context. There is no definition
> + * of which it should be, and there are modules that do it
> + * each way.
> + */
> + nlen = strnlen(new, newlen);
> +
> + flen = *ctxlen + llen + nlen + 1;
> + final = kzalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + if (*ctxlen)
> + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
> +
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
> + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, nlen);
> +
> + kfree(*ctx);
> +
> + *ctx = final;
> + *ctxlen = flen;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
> * can be accessed with:
> @@ -2223,6 +2274,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> char **value)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + char *final = NULL;
> + char *cp;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int finallen = 0;
> int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
> int slot = 0;
>
> @@ -2250,6 +2305,30 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
> + list) {
> + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &cp);
> + if (rc == -EINVAL)
> + continue;
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
> + cp, rc);
> + kfree(cp);
> + if (rc < 0) {
> + kfree(final);
> + return rc;
> + }
> + }
> + if (final == NULL)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *value = final;
> + return finallen;
> + }
> +
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 653dd2e236f1..cd977493f734 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6346,7 +6346,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
> goto bad;
> }
>
> - if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
> + if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context"))
> sid = __tsec->sid;
> else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
> sid = __tsec->osid;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 2190c03ae3d0..9e442c4495bf 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3485,7 +3485,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
> char *cp;
> int slen;
>
> - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
> + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-22 16:26 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:12 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Add a new boolean function lsm_multiple_contexts() to
> identify when multiple security modules provide security
> context strings.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
@ 2022-04-22 16:26 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:12 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Add a new boolean function lsm_multiple_contexts() to
> identify when multiple security modules provide security
> context strings.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:12 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
> a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
> to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
> will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
> with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added
> to the list.
>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
I believe the audit_buffer_aux_new() and audit_buffer_aux_end()
functions from patch 26/29 belong in this patch, but otherwise it
looks okay to me.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
@ 2022-04-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:12 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
> a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
> to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
> will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
> with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added
> to the list.
>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
I believe the audit_buffer_aux_new() and audit_buffer_aux_end()
functions from patch 26/29 belong in this patch, but otherwise it
looks okay to me.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-22 16:28 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:12 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
>
> type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
> msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
> subj_apparmor=unconfined
> subj_smack=_
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on a subject security context.
>
> Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
The audit_buffer_aux_new() and audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in patch
25/29, but otherwise this looks okay.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
@ 2022-04-22 16:28 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:12 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
>
> type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
> msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
> subj_apparmor=unconfined
> subj_smack=_
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on a subject security context.
>
> Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
The audit_buffer_aux_new() and audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in patch
25/29, but otherwise this looks okay.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-22 16:29 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:14 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>
> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on an object security context.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
> 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
@ 2022-04-22 16:29 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-22 16:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: john.johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit, casey.schaufler
On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 11:14 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>
> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on an object security context.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
> 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> with a structure containing the two elements.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 28ff7a5f90bd..6b6c089512f7 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1822,11 +1822,11 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
> }
>
> static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
> + struct audit_stamp *stamp)
> {
> - if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, t, serial)) {
> - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(t);
> - *serial = audit_serial();
> + if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, stamp)) {
> + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&stamp->ctime);
> + stamp->serial = audit_serial();
> }
> }
>
> @@ -1849,8 +1849,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> int type)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct timespec64 t;
> - unsigned int serial;
> + struct audit_stamp stamp;
>
> if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
> return NULL;
> @@ -1905,12 +1904,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
> + audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
> /* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
> if (ctx)
> ctx->dummy = 0;
> audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> - (unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
> + (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + stamp.serial);
>
> return ab;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
> char *value; /* the cmdline field */
> };
>
> +/* A timestamp/serial pair to identify an event */
> +struct audit_stamp {
> + struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
> + unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
> +};
> +
> /* The per-task audit context. */
> struct audit_context {
> int dummy; /* must be the first element */
> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> } context;
> enum audit_state state, current_state;
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
moved it into the audit_stamp?
> int major; /* syscall number */
> int uring_op; /* uring operation */
> - struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
> unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
> long return_code;/* syscall return code */
> u64 prio;
> @@ -265,7 +271,7 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
> extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
> + struct audit_stamp *stamp);
>
> extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
> extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
> @@ -306,7 +312,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
> struct audit_context *ctx);
> extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
> -#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
> +#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, s) 0
> #define audit_put_watch(w) do { } while (0)
> #define audit_get_watch(w) do { } while (0)
> #define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 6fe9f2525fc1..557713954a69 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
> */
>
> ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
> - ctx->serial = 0;
> + ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
> ctx->major = 0;
> ctx->uring_op = 0;
> - ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
> + ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
> memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
> ctx->return_code = 0;
> ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
> @@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
>
> ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
> ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
> - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
> + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2066,7 +2066,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
> context->argv[3] = a4;
> context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
> context->current_state = state;
> - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
> + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2535,21 +2535,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
> /**
> * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
> * @ctx: audit_context for the task
> - * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
> - * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
> + * @stamp: timestamp to record
> *
> * Also sets the context as auditable.
> */
> -int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
> +int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
> {
> if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
> return 0;
> - if (!ctx->serial)
> - ctx->serial = audit_serial();
> - t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
> - t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
> - *serial = ctx->serial;
> + if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
> + ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
> + *stamp = ctx->stamp;
> if (!ctx->prio) {
> ctx->prio = 1;
> ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> with a structure containing the two elements.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 28ff7a5f90bd..6b6c089512f7 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1822,11 +1822,11 @@ unsigned int audit_serial(void)
> }
>
> static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
> + struct audit_stamp *stamp)
> {
> - if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, t, serial)) {
> - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(t);
> - *serial = audit_serial();
> + if (!ctx || !auditsc_get_stamp(ctx, stamp)) {
> + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&stamp->ctime);
> + stamp->serial = audit_serial();
> }
> }
>
> @@ -1849,8 +1849,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> int type)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct timespec64 t;
> - unsigned int serial;
> + struct audit_stamp stamp;
>
> if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
> return NULL;
> @@ -1905,12 +1904,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
> + audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
> /* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
> if (ctx)
> ctx->dummy = 0;
> audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> - (unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
> + (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + stamp.serial);
>
> return ab;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ struct audit_proctitle {
> char *value; /* the cmdline field */
> };
>
> +/* A timestamp/serial pair to identify an event */
> +struct audit_stamp {
> + struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
> + unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
> +};
> +
> /* The per-task audit context. */
> struct audit_context {
> int dummy; /* must be the first element */
> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> } context;
> enum audit_state state, current_state;
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
moved it into the audit_stamp?
> int major; /* syscall number */
> int uring_op; /* uring operation */
> - struct timespec64 ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
> unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
> long return_code;/* syscall return code */
> u64 prio;
> @@ -265,7 +271,7 @@ extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty);
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
> extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
> + struct audit_stamp *stamp);
>
> extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
> extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch);
> @@ -306,7 +312,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
> struct audit_context *ctx);
> extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
> -#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
> +#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, s) 0
> #define audit_put_watch(w) do { } while (0)
> #define audit_get_watch(w) do { } while (0)
> #define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 6fe9f2525fc1..557713954a69 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
> */
>
> ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
> - ctx->serial = 0;
> + ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
> ctx->major = 0;
> ctx->uring_op = 0;
> - ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
> + ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
> memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
> ctx->return_code = 0;
> ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
> @@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
>
> ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
> ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
> - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
> + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2066,7 +2066,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
> context->argv[3] = a4;
> context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
> context->current_state = state;
> - ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
> + ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2535,21 +2535,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
> /**
> * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
> * @ctx: audit_context for the task
> - * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
> - * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
> + * @stamp: timestamp to record
> *
> * Also sets the context as auditable.
> */
> -int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
> - struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
> +int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp)
> {
> if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
> return 0;
> - if (!ctx->serial)
> - ctx->serial = audit_serial();
> - t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
> - t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
> - *serial = ctx->serial;
> + if (!ctx->stamp.serial)
> + ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial();
> + *stamp = ctx->stamp;
> if (!ctx->prio) {
> ctx->prio = 1;
> ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
> with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
> of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
> security_inode_getsecid().
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
> 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 316fac62d5f7..4af63e7dde17 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> dev_t rdev;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob;
> struct audit_cap_data fcap;
> unsigned int fcap_ver;
> unsigned char type; /* record type */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 231631f61550..6fe9f2525fc1 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> * lsmblob, which happens later in
> * this patch set.
> */
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> - &blob,
> + &name->lsmblob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - &blob, f->type, f->op,
> + &n->lsmblob,
> + f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> @@ -1589,13 +1588,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (n->osid != 0) {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
is there something better we can do here? This feels like a regression
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> } else {
> @@ -2297,17 +2295,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> name->mode = inode->i_mode;
> name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> - /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> - name->osid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->lsmblob);
> if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> name->fcap_ver = -1;
> return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
@ 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
> with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
> of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
> security_inode_getsecid().
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
> 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 316fac62d5f7..4af63e7dde17 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> dev_t rdev;
> - u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob;
> struct audit_cap_data fcap;
> unsigned int fcap_ver;
> unsigned char type; /* record type */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 231631f61550..6fe9f2525fc1 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> * lsmblob, which happens later in
> * this patch set.
> */
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> - &blob,
> + &name->lsmblob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - &blob, f->type, f->op,
> + &n->lsmblob,
> + f->type, f->op,
> &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> @@ -1589,13 +1588,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (n->osid != 0) {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
is there something better we can do here? This feels like a regression
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> } else {
> @@ -2297,17 +2295,13 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> - struct lsmblob blob;
> -
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> name->mode = inode->i_mode;
> name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> - /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> - name->osid = lsmblob_first(&blob);
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->lsmblob);
> if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> name->fcap_ver = -1;
> return;
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx() to identify
> which of the security modules that may be active should
> provide the security context. If the parameter is greater
> than or equal to zero, the security module associated with
> that LSM "slot" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_DISPLAY
> the "interface lsm" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_FIRST
> the first security module providing a hook is used.
>
So the patch does change behavior from previously doing
effectively LSMBLOB_DISPLAY everywhere to using LSMBLOB_FIRST
in certain cases. I think the reason for the change needs
to called out. I think a note in the patch description
would do.
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
> include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
> kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++--
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++++++----
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
> 12 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 259f5e38e6ba..d59c4ebf7e22 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index dc66f3f48456..2150016492be 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
> #define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "interface_lsm" slot */
> +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the first slot */
>
> /**
> * lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
> @@ -615,7 +617,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int ilsm);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1470,7 +1473,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
>
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> - struct lsmcontext *cp)
> + struct lsmcontext *cp, int ilsm)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
> */
> lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index a885ebdbb91e..28ff7a5f90bd 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> - &context);
> + &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> @@ -2176,7 +2176,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 802de65259d8..231631f61550 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1425,7 +1425,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1593,7 +1594,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index ad5be7707bca..9b5c44dec1e9 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return;
>
> lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 07660c7dd342..5d72d2f41562 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> int len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
> + len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (len <= 0)
> return 0;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 36338660df3c..cb4b8b636f6a 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index f60a0b6240ff..844955b2e163 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
> * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
> * module to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 910a03f15b0d..8deee7e176a9 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> unlhsh_add_return:
> rcu_read_unlock();
> if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -550,7 +552,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> addr, mask);
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -1120,7 +1123,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
> }
>
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 64073d807240..be6682768760 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2347,20 +2347,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
> * security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
> * @blob: set of secids
> * @cp: lsm context into which result is put
> + * @ilsm: which security module to report
> *
> * Translate secid information into a secctx string.
> * Return a negative value on error.
> * If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
> * Otherwise, return 0.
> */
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int ilsm)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>
> if (cp)
> memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
>
> + /*
> + * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
> + * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
> + */
> + if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
> + ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
> + else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
> + ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + else if (ilsm < 0) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
> + ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
> + ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + }
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection
@ 2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add a parameter to security_secid_to_secctx() to identify
> which of the security modules that may be active should
> provide the security context. If the parameter is greater
> than or equal to zero, the security module associated with
> that LSM "slot" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_DISPLAY
> the "interface lsm" is used. If the value is LSMBLOB_FIRST
> the first security module providing a hook is used.
>
So the patch does change behavior from previously doing
effectively LSMBLOB_DISPLAY everywhere to using LSMBLOB_FIRST
in certain cases. I think the reason for the change needs
to called out. I think a note in the patch description
would do.
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
> include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
> kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++--
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 +++++++----
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
> 12 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 259f5e38e6ba..d59c4ebf7e22 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index dc66f3f48456..2150016492be 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct lsmblob {
> #define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4 /* Use the "interface_lsm" slot */
> +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5 /* Use the first slot */
>
> /**
> * lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
> @@ -615,7 +617,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int ilsm);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);
> @@ -1470,7 +1473,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
>
> static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> - struct lsmcontext *cp)
> + struct lsmcontext *cp, int ilsm)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index b77a52f93389..f4d567d4885e 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> * and the infrastructure will know which it is.
> */
> lsmblob_init(&lb, scm->secid);
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, context.len,
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index a885ebdbb91e..28ff7a5f90bd 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
>
> if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
> err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
> - &context);
> + &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> @@ -2176,7 +2176,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 802de65259d8..231631f61550 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1425,7 +1425,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1593,7 +1594,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index ad5be7707bca..9b5c44dec1e9 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return;
>
> lsmblob_init(&lb, secid);
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index 07660c7dd342..5d72d2f41562 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
> * to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> int len;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL);
> + len = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (len <= 0)
> return 0;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 36338660df3c..cb4b8b636f6a 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct lsmcontext context;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index f60a0b6240ff..844955b2e163 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)
> * blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security
> * module to use to create the secctx. */
> lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context, LSMBLOB_DISPLAY);
> }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 910a03f15b0d..8deee7e176a9 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> unlhsh_add_return:
> rcu_read_unlock();
> if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -550,7 +552,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> addr, mask);
> dev_put(dev);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->lsmblob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s",
> context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> @@ -1120,7 +1123,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob;
> }
>
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lsmb, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 951ba0639d20..1941877fd16f 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", context.context);
> security_release_secctx(&context);
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 64073d807240..be6682768760 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2347,20 +2347,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
> * security_secid_to_secctx - convert secid to secctx
> * @blob: set of secids
> * @cp: lsm context into which result is put
> + * @ilsm: which security module to report
> *
> * Translate secid information into a secctx string.
> * Return a negative value on error.
> * If cp is NULL return the length of the string.
> * Otherwise, return 0.
> */
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, struct lsmcontext *cp,
> + int ilsm)
> {
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
> - int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>
> if (cp)
> memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
>
> + /*
> + * ilsm either is the slot number use for formatting
> + * or an instruction on which relative slot to use.
> + */
> + if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_DISPLAY)
> + ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
> + else if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_FIRST)
> + ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + else if (ilsm < 0) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s unknown interface LSM\n", __func__);
> + ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + } else if (ilsm >= lsm_slot) {
> + WARN_ONCE(true, "LSM: %s invalid interface LSM\n", __func__);
> + ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
> + }
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> continue;
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-25 23:33 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add a new boolean function lsm_multiple_contexts() to
> identify when multiple security modules provide security
> context strings.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2150016492be..3fab84220f88 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -232,6 +232,15 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
> extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
>
> +static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> + return lsm_slot_to_name(1) != NULL;
> +#else
> + return false;
> +#endif
> +}
> +
> /**
> * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
> * @blob: Pointer to the data
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs
@ 2022-04-25 23:33 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-25 23:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Add a new boolean function lsm_multiple_contexts() to
> identify when multiple security modules provide security
> context strings.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2150016492be..3fab84220f88 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -232,6 +232,15 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
> extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
>
> +static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts(void)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> + return lsm_slot_to_name(1) != NULL;
> +#else
> + return false;
> +#endif
> +}
> +
> /**
> * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
> * @blob: Pointer to the data
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 1:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
> a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
> to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
> will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
> with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added
> to the list.
>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
I agree with Paul that audit_buffer_aux_new() and
audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in this patch
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> * use simultaneously. */
> struct audit_buffer {
> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
> + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
> struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
> gfp_t gfp_mask;
> };
>
> @@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
>
> static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> if (!ab)
> return;
>
> - kfree_skb(ab->skb);
> + while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
> + kfree_skb(skb);
we still have and ab->skb can we have a debug check that its freed by walking the queue?
> kmem_cache_free(audit_buffer_cache, ab);
> }
>
> @@ -1784,8 +1789,12 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
> ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, gfp_mask);
> if (!ab->skb)
> goto err;
> +
> + skb_queue_head_init(&ab->skb_list);
> + skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
> +
> if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
> - goto err;
> + kfree_skb(ab->skb);
why is this no longer an error?
>
> ab->ctx = ctx;
> ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
> @@ -1849,7 +1858,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> int type)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct audit_stamp stamp;
>
> if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
> return NULL;
> @@ -1904,14 +1912,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
> + audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
> /* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
> if (ctx)
> ctx->dummy = 0;
> audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> - (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> - stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> - stamp.serial);
> + (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + ab->stamp.serial);
>
> return ab;
> }
> @@ -2402,26 +2410,14 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> }
>
> /**
> - * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> - * @ab: the audit_buffer
> - *
> - * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
> - * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
> - * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
> - * irq context. May be called in any context.
> + * __audit_log_end - enqueue one audit record
> + * @skb: the buffer to send
> */
> -void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +static void __audit_log_end(struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - struct sk_buff *skb;
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
>
> - if (!ab)
> - return;
> -
> if (audit_rate_check()) {
> - skb = ab->skb;
> - ab->skb = NULL;
> -
> /* setup the netlink header, see the comments in
> * kauditd_send_multicast_skb() for length quirks */
> nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
> @@ -2432,6 +2428,26 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> } else
> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
> + *
> + * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
> + * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
> + * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
> + * irq context. May be called in any context.
> + */
> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> + while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
> + __audit_log_end(skb);
>
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
@ 2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 1:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
> a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
> to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
> will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
> with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> records (none are currently defined) as have been added
> to the list.
>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
I agree with Paul that audit_buffer_aux_new() and
audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in this patch
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> * use simultaneously. */
> struct audit_buffer {
> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
> + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
> struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
> gfp_t gfp_mask;
> };
>
> @@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
>
> static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> if (!ab)
> return;
>
> - kfree_skb(ab->skb);
> + while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
> + kfree_skb(skb);
we still have and ab->skb can we have a debug check that its freed by walking the queue?
> kmem_cache_free(audit_buffer_cache, ab);
> }
>
> @@ -1784,8 +1789,12 @@ static struct audit_buffer *audit_buffer_alloc(struct audit_context *ctx,
> ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, gfp_mask);
> if (!ab->skb)
> goto err;
> +
> + skb_queue_head_init(&ab->skb_list);
> + skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
> +
> if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
> - goto err;
> + kfree_skb(ab->skb);
why is this no longer an error?
>
> ab->ctx = ctx;
> ab->gfp_mask = gfp_mask;
> @@ -1849,7 +1858,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> int type)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct audit_stamp stamp;
>
> if (audit_initialized != AUDIT_INITIALIZED)
> return NULL;
> @@ -1904,14 +1912,14 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &stamp);
> + audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &ab->stamp);
> /* cancel dummy context to enable supporting records */
> if (ctx)
> ctx->dummy = 0;
> audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> - (unsigned long long)stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> - stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> - stamp.serial);
> + (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + ab->stamp.serial);
>
> return ab;
> }
> @@ -2402,26 +2410,14 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> }
>
> /**
> - * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> - * @ab: the audit_buffer
> - *
> - * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
> - * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
> - * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
> - * irq context. May be called in any context.
> + * __audit_log_end - enqueue one audit record
> + * @skb: the buffer to send
> */
> -void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +static void __audit_log_end(struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - struct sk_buff *skb;
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
>
> - if (!ab)
> - return;
> -
> if (audit_rate_check()) {
> - skb = ab->skb;
> - ab->skb = NULL;
> -
> /* setup the netlink header, see the comments in
> * kauditd_send_multicast_skb() for length quirks */
> nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
> @@ -2432,6 +2428,26 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
> } else
> audit_log_lost("rate limit exceeded");
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> + * @ab: the audit_buffer
> + *
> + * We can not do a netlink send inside an irq context because it blocks (last
> + * arg, flags, is not set to MSG_DONTWAIT), so the audit buffer is placed on a
> + * queue and a kthread is scheduled to remove them from the queue outside the
> + * irq context. May be called in any context.
> + */
> +void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> + if (!ab)
> + return;
> +
> + while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
> + __audit_log_end(skb);
>
> audit_buffer_free(ab);
> }
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 1:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
>
> type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
> msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
> subj_apparmor=unconfined
> subj_smack=_
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on a subject security context.
>
> Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Besides moving the aux fns, and the whining below
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 8eda133ca4c1..af0aaccfaf57 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2175,8 +2175,61 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
> audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
> }
>
> +/**
> + * audit_buffer_aux_new - Add an aux record buffer to the skb list
> + * @ab: audit_buffer
> + * @type: message type
> + *
> + * Aux records are allocated and added to the skb list of
> + * the "main" record. The ab->skb is reset to point to the
> + * aux record on its creation. When the aux record in complete
> + * ab->skb has to be reset to point to the "main" record.
> + * This allows the audit_log_ functions to be ignorant of
> + * which kind of record it is logging to. It also avoids adding
> + * special data for aux records.
> + *
> + * On success ab->skb will point to the new aux record.
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM should allocation fail.
> + */
> +static int audit_buffer_aux_new(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type)
> +{
> + WARN_ON(ab->skb != skb_peek(&ab->skb_list));
> +
> + ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, ab->gfp_mask);
> + if (!ab->skb)
> + goto err;
> + if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
> + goto err;
> + skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> + (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + ab->stamp.serial);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +err:
> + kfree_skb(ab->skb);
> + ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_buffer_aux_end - Switch back to the "main" record from an aux record
> + * @ab: audit_buffer
> + *
> + * Restores the "main" audit record to ab->skb.
> + */
> +static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> +}
> +
> +
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> + int i;
> int error;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> @@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (error) {
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + goto error_path;
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> - if (error) {
> - if (error != -EINVAL)
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + } else {
> + /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
just me whining, you sure we can't just drop subj= here
> + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
> + if (error)
> goto error_path;
> - return 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, i);
> + if (error) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=?",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
> + context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + }
> + }
> + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
> }
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&context);
> return 0;
>
> error_path:
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
@ 2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 1:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
>
> type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
> msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
> subj_apparmor=unconfined
> subj_smack=_
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on a subject security context.
>
> Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Besides moving the aux fns, and the whining below
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 8eda133ca4c1..af0aaccfaf57 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2175,8 +2175,61 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
> audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
> }
>
> +/**
> + * audit_buffer_aux_new - Add an aux record buffer to the skb list
> + * @ab: audit_buffer
> + * @type: message type
> + *
> + * Aux records are allocated and added to the skb list of
> + * the "main" record. The ab->skb is reset to point to the
> + * aux record on its creation. When the aux record in complete
> + * ab->skb has to be reset to point to the "main" record.
> + * This allows the audit_log_ functions to be ignorant of
> + * which kind of record it is logging to. It also avoids adding
> + * special data for aux records.
> + *
> + * On success ab->skb will point to the new aux record.
> + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM should allocation fail.
> + */
> +static int audit_buffer_aux_new(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type)
> +{
> + WARN_ON(ab->skb != skb_peek(&ab->skb_list));
> +
> + ab->skb = nlmsg_new(AUDIT_BUFSIZ, ab->gfp_mask);
> + if (!ab->skb)
> + goto err;
> + if (!nlmsg_put(ab->skb, 0, 0, type, 0, 0))
> + goto err;
> + skb_queue_tail(&ab->skb_list, ab->skb);
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
> + (unsigned long long)ab->stamp.ctime.tv_sec,
> + ab->stamp.ctime.tv_nsec/1000000,
> + ab->stamp.serial);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +err:
> + kfree_skb(ab->skb);
> + ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * audit_buffer_aux_end - Switch back to the "main" record from an aux record
> + * @ab: audit_buffer
> + *
> + * Restores the "main" audit record to ab->skb.
> + */
> +static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> +}
> +
> +
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> + int i;
> int error;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> struct lsmcontext context;
> @@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
> + LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (error) {
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + goto error_path;
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> - if (error) {
> - if (error != -EINVAL)
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + } else {
> + /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
just me whining, you sure we can't just drop subj= here
> + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
> + if (error)
> goto error_path;
> - return 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob.secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, i);
> + if (error) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=?",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
> + context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + }
> + }
> + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
> }
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&context);
> return 0;
>
> error_path:
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 3:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>
> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on an object security context.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
> 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 14849d5f84b4..1b05eb2dbe77 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
> const char *operation);
> extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
>
> +extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
> extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>
> @@ -251,6 +253,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
> { }
> static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
> { }
> +static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{ }
> static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> }
>
> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> + int error;
> + struct lsmcontext context;
> +
> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (error) {
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + goto error_path;
> + return;
> + }
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
> + if (error)
> + goto error_path;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
> + if (error) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
> + context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
> + }
> + return;
> +
> +error_path:
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
This moves the audit_panic around, so certain operations are not
done before the call. I am currently not sure of the implications.
Paul?
> +}
>
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1114,36 +1114,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
> kfree(context);
> }
>
> -static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> - kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> - unsigned int sessionid,
> - struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> +static void audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> + kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> + unsigned int sessionid,
> + struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> - int rc = 0;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> if (!ab)
> - return rc;
> + return;
>
> audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> - rc = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
> + audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
> audit_log_end(ab);
> -
> - return rc;
> }
>
> static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
> @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
If pushing audit_panic into audit_log_object_context() is acceptable then this call_panic arg is
no longer needed. The same goes for the call_panic arg in audit_log_name(). And call_panic can
be dropped from audit_log_exit()
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> if (osid) {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> - *call_panic = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> - }
> + audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob);
> }
> if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
> audit_log_end(ab);
> @@ -1588,19 +1569,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> -
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
> - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
> - if (call_panic)
> - *call_panic = 2;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob))
> + audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob);
>
> /* log the audit_names record type */
> switch (n->type) {
> @@ -1805,21 +1775,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
> struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
>
> for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
> - if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
> - axs->target_auid[i],
> - axs->target_uid[i],
> - axs->target_sessionid[i],
> - &axs->target_lsm[i],
> - axs->target_comm[i]))
> - call_panic = 1;
> - }
> -
> - if (context->target_pid &&
> - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
> - context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
> - context->target_sessionid,
> - &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
> - call_panic = 1;
> + audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
> + axs->target_auid[i],
> + axs->target_uid[i],
> + axs->target_sessionid[i],
> + &axs->target_lsm[i],
> + axs->target_comm[i]);
> + }
> +
> + if (context->target_pid)
> + audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
> + context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
> + context->target_sessionid,
> + &context->target_lsm,
> + context->target_comm);
>
> if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
@ 2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 3:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>
> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on an object security context.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
> 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 14849d5f84b4..1b05eb2dbe77 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,
> const char *operation);
> extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
>
> +extern void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> extern int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab);
> extern void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>
> @@ -251,6 +253,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
> { }
> static inline void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)
> { }
> +static inline void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{ }
> static inline int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index af0aaccfaf57..d25d76b29e3c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
> #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420 /* Multiple LSM task contexts */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421 /* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
>
> #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
> #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> }
>
> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> + int error;
> + struct lsmcontext context;
> +
> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> + if (error) {
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + goto error_path;
> + return;
> + }
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
> + if (error)
> + goto error_path;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
> + continue;
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
> + if (error) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
> + if (error != -EINVAL)
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
> + i ? " " : "",
> + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
> + context.context);
> + security_release_secctx(&context);
> + }
> + }
> +
> + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
> + }
> + return;
> +
> +error_path:
> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
This moves the audit_panic around, so certain operations are not
done before the call. I am currently not sure of the implications.
Paul?
> +}
>
> int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> {
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1114,36 +1114,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
> kfree(context);
> }
>
> -static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> - kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> - unsigned int sessionid,
> - struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> +static void audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> + kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
> + unsigned int sessionid,
> + struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> - int rc = 0;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> if (!ab)
> - return rc;
> + return;
>
> audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> - rc = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(blob))
> + audit_log_object_context(ab, blob);
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
> audit_log_end(ab);
> -
> - return rc;
> }
>
> static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
> @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
If pushing audit_panic into audit_log_object_context() is acceptable then this call_panic arg is
no longer needed. The same goes for the call_panic arg in audit_log_name(). And call_panic can
be dropped from audit_log_exit()
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
> context->ipc.mode);
> if (osid) {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmcxt,
> - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> - *call_panic = 1;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmcxt.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmcxt);
> - }
> + audit_log_object_context(ab, &blob);
> }
> if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
> audit_log_end(ab);
> @@ -1588,19 +1569,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> MAJOR(n->rdev),
> MINOR(n->rdev));
> - if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
> - struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> -
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
> - LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
> - if (call_panic)
> - *call_panic = 2;
> - } else {
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lsmctx.context);
> - security_release_secctx(&lsmctx);
> - }
> - }
> + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob))
> + audit_log_object_context(ab, &n->lsmblob);
>
> /* log the audit_names record type */
> switch (n->type) {
> @@ -1805,21 +1775,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
> struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
>
> for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
> - if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
> - axs->target_auid[i],
> - axs->target_uid[i],
> - axs->target_sessionid[i],
> - &axs->target_lsm[i],
> - axs->target_comm[i]))
> - call_panic = 1;
> - }
> -
> - if (context->target_pid &&
> - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
> - context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
> - context->target_sessionid,
> - &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
> - call_panic = 1;
> + audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
> + axs->target_auid[i],
> + axs->target_uid[i],
> + axs->target_sessionid[i],
> + &axs->target_lsm[i],
> + axs->target_comm[i]);
> + }
> +
> + if (context->target_pid)
> + audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
> + context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
> + context->target_sessionid,
> + &context->target_lsm,
> + context->target_comm);
>
> if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
@ 2022-04-26 17:57 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:32 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
> > with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
> > of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
> > security_inode_getsecid().
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
> > 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 231631f61550..6fe9f2525fc1 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > * lsmblob, which happens later in
> > * this patch set.
> > */
> > - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> > result = security_audit_rule_match(
> > - &blob,
> > + &name->lsmblob,
> > f->type,
> > f->op,
> > &f->lsm_rules);
> > } else if (ctx) {
> > list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> > - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> > if (security_audit_rule_match(
> > - &blob, f->type, f->op,
> > + &n->lsmblob,
> > + f->type, f->op,
> > &f->lsm_rules)) {
> > ++result;
> > break;
> > @@ -1589,13 +1588,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> > from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> > MAJOR(n->rdev),
> > MINOR(n->rdev));
> > - if (n->osid != 0) {
> > - struct lsmblob blob;
> > + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
> > struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> >
> > - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> > - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> > - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> > + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
> > + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
>
> is there something better we can do here? This feels like a regression
Unfortunately no, or at least nothing has been suggested that is an
improvement on this approach. We could overload the existing field,
but that runs the risk of confusing userspace tooling and potentially
bumping into the buffer limit in some more complex configurations.
The "?" value was chosen as it is a commonly accepted way for the
audit subsystem to indicate that a value is "missing" and in the case
of new/updated userspace tooling this would be an indication to look
for the new record type which provides all of the necessary LSM
labels. In the case of old/unaware userspace tooling it would serve
as a graceful indicator that something is awry, i.e. you are using new
kernel functionality without updating your userspace.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names
@ 2022-04-26 17:57 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:32 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Replace the osid field in the audit_names structure
> > with a lsmblob structure. This accomodates the use
> > of an lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match() and
> > security_inode_getsecid().
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++--------------
> > 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 231631f61550..6fe9f2525fc1 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -700,17 +700,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > * lsmblob, which happens later in
> > * this patch set.
> > */
> > - lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> > result = security_audit_rule_match(
> > - &blob,
> > + &name->lsmblob,
> > f->type,
> > f->op,
> > &f->lsm_rules);
> > } else if (ctx) {
> > list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> > - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> > if (security_audit_rule_match(
> > - &blob, f->type, f->op,
> > + &n->lsmblob,
> > + f->type, f->op,
> > &f->lsm_rules)) {
> > ++result;
> > break;
> > @@ -1589,13 +1588,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> > from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
> > MAJOR(n->rdev),
> > MINOR(n->rdev));
> > - if (n->osid != 0) {
> > - struct lsmblob blob;
> > + if (lsmblob_is_set(&n->lsmblob)) {
> > struct lsmcontext lsmctx;
> >
> > - lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> > - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &lsmctx, LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> > - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> > + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->lsmblob, &lsmctx,
> > + LSMBLOB_FIRST)) {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " osid=?");
>
> is there something better we can do here? This feels like a regression
Unfortunately no, or at least nothing has been suggested that is an
improvement on this approach. We could overload the existing field,
but that runs the risk of confusing userspace tooling and potentially
bumping into the buffer limit in some more complex configurations.
The "?" value was chosen as it is a commonly accepted way for the
audit subsystem to indicate that a value is "missing" and in the case
of new/updated userspace tooling this would be an indication to look
for the new record type which provides all of the necessary LSM
labels. In the case of old/unaware userspace tooling it would serve
as a graceful indicator that something is awry, i.e. you are using new
kernel functionality without updating your userspace.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen
@ 2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> > with a structure containing the two elements.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> > kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> > 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> > index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.h
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> > @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> > AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> > } context;
> > enum audit_state state, current_state;
> > + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> > unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>
> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
> moved it into the audit_stamp?
Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
groups multiple records into a single "event").
FWIW, I'm working on some patches which will make a lot of this better
in the future, but they aren't ready yet and would almost surely land
after the stacking patches. Audit will get better at some point in
the future, I promise :)
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> > with a structure containing the two elements.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> > kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> > 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> > index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.h
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> > @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> > AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> > } context;
> > enum audit_state state, current_state;
> > + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> > unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>
> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
> moved it into the audit_stamp?
Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
groups multiple records into a single "event").
FWIW, I'm working on some patches which will make a lot of this better
in the future, but they aren't ready yet and would almost surely land
after the stacking patches. Audit will get better at some point in
the future, I promise :)
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen
@ 2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:06 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
> > a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
> > to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
> > will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
> > with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> > records (none are currently defined) as have been added
> > to the list.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> I agree with Paul that audit_buffer_aux_new() and
> audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in this patch
>
>
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> > 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> > * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> > * use simultaneously. */
> > struct audit_buffer {
> > - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> > + struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
> > + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
> > struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> > + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
> > gfp_t gfp_mask;
> > };
> >
> > @@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
> >
> > static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> > {
> > + struct sk_buff *skb;
> > +
> > if (!ab)
> > return;
> >
> > - kfree_skb(ab->skb);
> > + while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
> > + kfree_skb(skb);
>
> we still have and ab->skb can we have a debug check that its freed by walking the queue?
By definition ab->skb is always going to point at something on the
list, if it doesn't we are likely to have failures elsewhere. The
structure definition is private to kernel/audit.c and the
allocation/creation is handled by an allocator function which always
adds the new skb to the list so I think we're okay.
We could add additional checks, but with audit performance already a
hot topic I would prefer to draw the debug-check line at input coming
from outside the audit subsystem.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
@ 2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:06 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
> > a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
> > to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
> > will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
> > with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
> > records (none are currently defined) as have been added
> > to the list.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> I agree with Paul that audit_buffer_aux_new() and
> audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in this patch
>
>
> > ---
> > kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> > 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
> > * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
> > * use simultaneously. */
> > struct audit_buffer {
> > - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
> > + struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
> > + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
> > struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
> > + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
> > gfp_t gfp_mask;
> > };
> >
> > @@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
> >
> > static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> > {
> > + struct sk_buff *skb;
> > +
> > if (!ab)
> > return;
> >
> > - kfree_skb(ab->skb);
> > + while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
> > + kfree_skb(skb);
>
> we still have and ab->skb can we have a debug check that its freed by walking the queue?
By definition ab->skb is always going to point at something on the
list, if it doesn't we are likely to have failures elsewhere. The
structure definition is private to kernel/audit.c and the
allocation/creation is handled by an allocator function which always
adds the new skb to the list so I think we're okay.
We could add additional checks, but with audit performance already a
hot topic I would prefer to draw the debug-check line at input coming
from outside the audit subsystem.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen
@ 2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:08 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> > An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
> >
> > type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
> > msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
> > subj_apparmor=unconfined
> > subj_smack=_
> >
> > When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> > the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> > An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> > multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> > on a subject security context.
> >
> > Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> Besides moving the aux fns, and the whining below
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> > if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> > return 0;
> >
> > - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> > + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> > + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
> > + LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> > + if (error) {
> > + if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + goto error_path;
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> >
> > - if (error) {
> > - if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> > + security_release_secctx(&context);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
>
> just me whining, you sure we can't just drop subj= here
Have I recently given you my "the audit code is crap" speech? ;)
I more or less answered this with my comments on the earlier patch,
but we need to keep this around for compatibility. It will get better
in the future.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
@ 2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:08 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> > An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
> >
> > type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
> > msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
> > subj_apparmor=unconfined
> > subj_smack=_
> >
> > When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> > the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> > An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> > multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> > on a subject security context.
> >
> > Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> Besides moving the aux fns, and the whining below
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> > if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> > return 0;
> >
> > - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> > + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> > + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
> > + LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> > + if (error) {
> > + if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + goto error_path;
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> >
> > - if (error) {
> > - if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
> > + security_release_secctx(&context);
> > + } else {
> > + /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
>
> just me whining, you sure we can't just drop subj= here
Have I recently given you my "the audit code is crap" speech? ;)
I more or less answered this with my comments on the earlier patch,
but we need to keep this around for compatibility. It will get better
in the future.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen
@ 2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 11:38 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> > An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
> >
> > type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> > msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> > obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
> >
> > When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> > the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> > An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> > multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> > on an object security context.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
> > 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> > ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> > }
> >
> > +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > + int error;
> > + struct lsmcontext context;
> > +
> > + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> > + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> > + if (error) {
> > + if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + goto error_path;
> > + return;
> > + }
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
> > + security_release_secctx(&context);
> > + } else {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> > + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
> > + if (error)
> > + goto error_path;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> > + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
> > + continue;
> > + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
> > + if (error) {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
> > + i ? " " : "",
> > + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
> > + if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> > + } else {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
> > + i ? " " : "",
> > + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
> > + context.context);
> > + security_release_secctx(&context);
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
> > + }
> > + return;
> > +
> > +error_path:
> > + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>
> This moves the audit_panic around, so certain operations are not
> done before the call. I am currently not sure of the implications.
Short version: It's okay.
Longer version: The audit_panic() call is either going to panic the
kernel (NOT the default), do a pr_err(), or essentially be a no-op.
In the case of the full blown kernel panic we don't really care, the
system is going to die before there is any chance of this record in
progress getting logged. In the case of a pr_err() or no-op the key
part is making sure we leave the audit_buffer in a consistent state so
that we preserve whatever information is already present. In the
!lsm_multiple_contexts case we simply return without making any
changes to the audit_buffer so we're good there; in the multiple LSM
case we always end the aux record properly (using a "?" when
necessary) if an aux record has been successfully created.
Feel free to point out a specific scenario that you think looks wrong
- I may have missed it - but I believe this code to be correct.
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>
> If pushing audit_panic into audit_log_object_context() is acceptable then this call_panic arg is
> no longer needed. The same goes for the call_panic arg in audit_log_name(). And call_panic can
> be dropped from audit_log_exit()
Good catch.
I suspect this is a vestige from when audit_log_end() used to do the
record's skb write to userspace, meaning it was possible that you
might get some of the records written to userspace before the system
killed itself. Now with all of the queuing involved it's less likely
that this would be the case, and even if it does happen in some cases,
it's basically a toss up depending on how the system is loaded, the
scheduler, etc.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
@ 2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 18:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 11:38 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
> > An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
> >
> > type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
> > msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
> > obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
> >
> > When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
> > the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
> > An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> > multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> > on an object security context.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> > kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
> > 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
...
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> > ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
> > }
> >
> > +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > + int error;
> > + struct lsmcontext context;
> > +
> > + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
> > + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
> > + if (error) {
> > + if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + goto error_path;
> > + return;
> > + }
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
> > + security_release_secctx(&context);
> > + } else {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
> > + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
> > + if (error)
> > + goto error_path;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
> > + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
> > + continue;
> > + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
> > + if (error) {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
> > + i ? " " : "",
> > + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
> > + if (error != -EINVAL)
> > + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
> > + } else {
> > + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
> > + i ? " " : "",
> > + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
> > + context.context);
> > + security_release_secctx(&context);
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
> > + }
> > + return;
> > +
> > +error_path:
> > + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>
> This moves the audit_panic around, so certain operations are not
> done before the call. I am currently not sure of the implications.
Short version: It's okay.
Longer version: The audit_panic() call is either going to panic the
kernel (NOT the default), do a pr_err(), or essentially be a no-op.
In the case of the full blown kernel panic we don't really care, the
system is going to die before there is any chance of this record in
progress getting logged. In the case of a pr_err() or no-op the key
part is making sure we leave the audit_buffer in a consistent state so
that we preserve whatever information is already present. In the
!lsm_multiple_contexts case we simply return without making any
changes to the audit_buffer so we're good there; in the multiple LSM
case we always end the aux record properly (using a "?" when
necessary) if an aux record has been successfully created.
Feel free to point out a specific scenario that you think looks wrong
- I may have missed it - but I believe this code to be correct.
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>
> If pushing audit_panic into audit_log_object_context() is acceptable then this call_panic arg is
> no longer needed. The same goes for the call_panic arg in audit_log_name(). And call_panic can
> be dropped from audit_log_exit()
Good catch.
I suspect this is a vestige from when audit_log_end() used to do the
record's skb write to userspace, meaning it was possible that you
might get some of the records written to userspace before the system
killed itself. Now with all of the queuing involved it's less likely
that this would be the case, and even if it does happen in some cases,
it's basically a toss up depending on how the system is loaded, the
scheduler, etc.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 18:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
>>> } context;
>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>>
>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
>
> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
> groups multiple records into a single "event").
>
sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
ctx->serial. Eg. in audit_reset_context() we have
- ctx->serial = 0;
+ ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
I don't see a reason why we need both ctx->serial and ctx->stamp.serial
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 18:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
>>> } context;
>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>>
>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
>
> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
> groups multiple records into a single "event").
>
sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
ctx->serial. Eg. in audit_reset_context() we have
- ctx->serial = 0;
+ ctx->stamp.serial = 0;
I don't see a reason why we need both ctx->serial and ctx->stamp.serial
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-04-26 19:01 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/26/22 11:12, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:06 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
>>> a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
>>> to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
>>> will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
>>> with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added
>>> to the list.
>>>
>>> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> I agree with Paul that audit_buffer_aux_new() and
>> audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in this patch
>>
>>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>>> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
>>> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
>>> * use simultaneously. */
>>> struct audit_buffer {
>>> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
>>> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
>>> + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
>>> struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
>>> gfp_t gfp_mask;
>>> };
>>>
>>> @@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
>>>
>>> static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> {
>>> + struct sk_buff *skb;
>>> +
>>> if (!ab)
>>> return;
>>>
>>> - kfree_skb(ab->skb);
>>> + while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
>>> + kfree_skb(skb);
>>
>> we still have and ab->skb can we have a debug check that its freed by walking the queue?
>
> By definition ab->skb is always going to point at something on the
> list, if it doesn't we are likely to have failures elsewhere. The
> structure definition is private to kernel/audit.c and the
> allocation/creation is handled by an allocator function which always
> adds the new skb to the list so I think we're okay.
>
yeah I got that eventually, though it wasn't immediately obvious
> We could add additional checks, but with audit performance already a
> hot topic I would prefer to draw the debug-check line at input coming
> from outside the audit subsystem.
>
and that is why I asked for a debug check. But its not a hard requirement
just a nice to have because I have been bitten by internal consistency
issues all to often.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer
@ 2022-04-26 19:01 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On 4/26/22 11:12, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:06 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with
>>> a list of skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information
>>> to the audit_buffer as there's no guarantee that there
>>> will be an audit_context containing the stamp associated
>>> with the event. At audit_log_end() time create auxiliary
>>> records (none are currently defined) as have been added
>>> to the list.
>>>
>>> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> I agree with Paul that audit_buffer_aux_new() and
>> audit_buffer_aux_end() belong in this patch
>>
>>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/audit.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>>> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 6b6c089512f7..4d44c05053b0 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -197,8 +197,10 @@ static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
>>> * to place it on a transmit queue. Multiple audit_buffers can be in
>>> * use simultaneously. */
>>> struct audit_buffer {
>>> - struct sk_buff *skb; /* formatted skb ready to send */
>>> + struct sk_buff *skb; /* the skb for audit_log functions */
>>> + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; /* formatted skbs, ready to send */
>>> struct audit_context *ctx; /* NULL or associated context */
>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* audit stamp for these records */
>>> gfp_t gfp_mask;
>>> };
>>>
>>> @@ -1765,10 +1767,13 @@ __setup("audit_backlog_limit=", audit_backlog_limit_set);
>>>
>>> static void audit_buffer_free(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> {
>>> + struct sk_buff *skb;
>>> +
>>> if (!ab)
>>> return;
>>>
>>> - kfree_skb(ab->skb);
>>> + while((skb = skb_dequeue(&ab->skb_list)))
>>> + kfree_skb(skb);
>>
>> we still have and ab->skb can we have a debug check that its freed by walking the queue?
>
> By definition ab->skb is always going to point at something on the
> list, if it doesn't we are likely to have failures elsewhere. The
> structure definition is private to kernel/audit.c and the
> allocation/creation is handled by an allocator function which always
> adds the new skb to the list so I think we're okay.
>
yeah I got that eventually, though it wasn't immediately obvious
> We could add additional checks, but with audit performance already a
> hot topic I would prefer to draw the debug-check line at input coming
> from outside the audit subsystem.
>
and that is why I asked for a debug check. But its not a hard requirement
just a nice to have because I have been bitten by internal consistency
issues all to often.
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-04-26 19:07 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/26/22 11:15, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:08 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
>>> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
>>>
>>> type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
>>> msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
>>> subj_apparmor=unconfined
>>> subj_smack=_
>>>
>>> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
>>> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
>>> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
>>> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
>>> on a subject security context.
>>>
>>> Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> Besides moving the aux fns, and the whining below
>> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
>
> ...
>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>>> return 0;
>>>
>>> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>>> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
>>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
>>> + LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + goto error_path;
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>>
>>> - if (error) {
>>> - if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
>>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>>> + } else {
>>> + /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
>>
>> just me whining, you sure we can't just drop subj= here
>
> Have I recently given you my "the audit code is crap" speech? ;)
>
hehehe, I get it, something about glass houses and stones. the whole newline
mess in path 28/29 that I would dearly love to drop.
> I more or less answered this with my comments on the earlier patch,
> but we need to keep this around for compatibility. It will get better
> in the future.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts
@ 2022-04-26 19:07 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On 4/26/22 11:15, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 9:08 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
>>> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1420) record is:
>>>
>>> type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1420]
>>> msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
>>> subj_apparmor=unconfined
>>> subj_smack=_
>>>
>>> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
>>> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
>>> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
>>> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
>>> on a subject security context.
>>>
>>> Functions are created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
>> Besides moving the aux fns, and the whining below
>> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
>
> ...
>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 4d44c05053b0..8ed2d717c217 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -2185,16 +2238,44 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
>>> return 0;
>>>
>>> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>>> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
>>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &context,
>>> + LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + goto error_path;
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>>
>>> - if (error) {
>>> - if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", context.context);
>>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>>> + } else {
>>> + /* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
>>
>> just me whining, you sure we can't just drop subj= here
>
> Have I recently given you my "the audit code is crap" speech? ;)
>
hehehe, I get it, something about glass houses and stones. the whole newline
mess in path 28/29 that I would dearly love to drop.
> I more or less answered this with my comments on the earlier patch,
> but we need to keep this around for compatibility. It will get better
> in the future.
>
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen
@ 2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 19:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
> > <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> >>> with a structure containing the two elements.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> >>> ---
> >>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> >>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> >>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> >>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
> >
> > ...
> >
> >>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> >>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> >>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> >>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> >>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> >>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> >>> } context;
> >>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
> >>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> >>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
> >>
> >> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
> >> moved it into the audit_stamp?
> >
> > Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
> > need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
> > associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
> > groups multiple records into a single "event").
> >
> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
> ctx->serial ...
My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-26 19:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
> > <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> >>> with a structure containing the two elements.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> >>> ---
> >>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> >>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> >>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> >>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
> >
> > ...
> >
> >>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> >>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> >>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> >>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> >>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> >>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> >>> } context;
> >>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
> >>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> >>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
> >>
> >> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
> >> moved it into the audit_stamp?
> >
> > Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
> > need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
> > associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
> > groups multiple records into a single "event").
> >
> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
> ctx->serial ...
My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-04-26 19:24 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 19:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel
On 4/26/22 11:57, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 11:38 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
>>> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>>>
>>> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
>>> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
>>> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>>>
>>> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
>>> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
>>> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
>>> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
>>> on an object security context.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
>>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
>>> kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
>>> 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
>>> +{
>>> + int i;
>>> + int error;
>>> + struct lsmcontext context;
>>> +
>>> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
>>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + goto error_path;
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
>>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>>> + } else {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>>> + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
>>> + if (error)
>>> + goto error_path;
>>> +
>>> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
>>> + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
>>> + continue;
>>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
>>> + i ? " " : "",
>>> + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
>>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>>> + } else {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
>>> + i ? " " : "",
>>> + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
>>> + context.context);
>>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
>>> + }
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> +error_path:
>>> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>>
>> This moves the audit_panic around, so certain operations are not
>> done before the call. I am currently not sure of the implications.
>
> Short version: It's okay.
>
> Longer version: The audit_panic() call is either going to panic the
> kernel (NOT the default), do a pr_err(), or essentially be a no-op.
> In the case of the full blown kernel panic we don't really care, the
> system is going to die before there is any chance of this record in
> progress getting logged. In the case of a pr_err() or no-op the key
> part is making sure we leave the audit_buffer in a consistent state so
> that we preserve whatever information is already present. In the
> !lsm_multiple_contexts case we simply return without making any
> changes to the audit_buffer so we're good there; in the multiple LSM
> case we always end the aux record properly (using a "?" when
> necessary) if an aux record has been successfully created.
>
> Feel free to point out a specific scenario that you think looks wrong
> - I may have missed it - but I believe this code to be correct.
>
mostly I am good, I was worried I was missing something since the old
code made an effort to have the call of audit_panic() at the end.
The current change does result in potential multiple calls to
audit_panic() in a single audit_log_exit(). This doesn't matter in
the case of a full blown kernel panic, but it could result in multiple
pr_err() messages where previously the code would only generate one.
It does simplify the code, and the case should be quite rare so I
am fine with the trade-off.
>>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>>
>> If pushing audit_panic into audit_log_object_context() is acceptable then this call_panic arg is
>> no longer needed. The same goes for the call_panic arg in audit_log_name(). And call_panic can
>> be dropped from audit_log_exit()
>
> Good catch.
>
> I suspect this is a vestige from when audit_log_end() used to do the
> record's skb write to userspace, meaning it was possible that you
> might get some of the records written to userspace before the system
> killed itself. Now with all of the queuing involved it's less likely
> that this would be the case, and even if it does happen in some cases,
> it's basically a toss up depending on how the system is loaded, the
> scheduler, etc.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts
@ 2022-04-26 19:24 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 19:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On 4/26/22 11:57, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 11:38 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS.
>>> An example of the MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS (1421) record is:
>>>
>>> type=MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS[1421]
>>> msg=audit(1601152467.009:1050):
>>> obj_selinux=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
>>>
>>> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record
>>> the "obj=" field in other records in the event will be "obj=?".
>>> An AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
>>> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
>>> on an object security context.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++
>>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
>>> kernel/audit.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 79 ++++++++++++--------------------------
>>> 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 8ed2d717c217..a8c3ec6ba60b 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -2226,6 +2226,53 @@ static void audit_buffer_aux_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> ab->skb = skb_peek(&ab->skb_list);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +void audit_log_object_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct lsmblob *blob)
>>> +{
>>> + int i;
>>> + int error;
>>> + struct lsmcontext context;
>>> +
>>> + if (!lsm_multiple_contexts()) {
>>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, LSMBLOB_FIRST);
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + goto error_path;
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", context.context);
>>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>>> + } else {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=?");
>>> + error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS);
>>> + if (error)
>>> + goto error_path;
>>> +
>>> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) {
>>> + if (blob->secid[i] == 0)
>>> + continue;
>>> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &context, i);
>>> + if (error) {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=?",
>>> + i ? " " : "",
>>> + lsm_slot_to_name(i));
>>> + if (error != -EINVAL)
>>> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>>> + } else {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sobj_%s=%s",
>>> + i ? " " : "",
>>> + lsm_slot_to_name(i),
>>> + context.context);
>>> + security_release_secctx(&context);
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
>>> + }
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> +error_path:
>>> + audit_panic("error in audit_log_object_context");
>>
>> This moves the audit_panic around, so certain operations are not
>> done before the call. I am currently not sure of the implications.
>
> Short version: It's okay.
>
> Longer version: The audit_panic() call is either going to panic the
> kernel (NOT the default), do a pr_err(), or essentially be a no-op.
> In the case of the full blown kernel panic we don't really care, the
> system is going to die before there is any chance of this record in
> progress getting logged. In the case of a pr_err() or no-op the key
> part is making sure we leave the audit_buffer in a consistent state so
> that we preserve whatever information is already present. In the
> !lsm_multiple_contexts case we simply return without making any
> changes to the audit_buffer so we're good there; in the multiple LSM
> case we always end the aux record properly (using a "?" when
> necessary) if an aux record has been successfully created.
>
> Feel free to point out a specific scenario that you think looks wrong
> - I may have missed it - but I believe this code to be correct.
>
mostly I am good, I was worried I was missing something since the old
code made an effort to have the call of audit_panic() at the end.
The current change does result in potential multiple calls to
audit_panic() in a single audit_log_exit(). This doesn't matter in
the case of a full blown kernel panic, but it could result in multiple
pr_err() messages where previously the code would only generate one.
It does simplify the code, and the case should be quite rare so I
am fine with the trade-off.
>>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> index 557713954a69..04bf3c04ef3d 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> @@ -1420,18 +1409,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
>>
>> If pushing audit_panic into audit_log_object_context() is acceptable then this call_panic arg is
>> no longer needed. The same goes for the call_panic arg in audit_log_name(). And call_panic can
>> be dropped from audit_log_exit()
>
> Good catch.
>
> I suspect this is a vestige from when audit_log_end() used to do the
> record's skb write to userspace, meaning it was possible that you
> might get some of the records written to userspace before the system
> killed itself. Now with all of the queuing involved it's less likely
> that this would be the case, and even if it does happen in some cases,
> it's basically a toss up depending on how the system is loaded, the
> scheduler, etc.
>
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-26 23:15 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 23:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, Mickaël Salaün
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
>
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
> security module data rather than a single instance.
> A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
> confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
> void ** parameters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
small nit below, otherwise Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
> kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
> security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
> security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> 21 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/audit_arch.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
> @@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
> /* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
> #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
>
> +struct audit_lsm_rules {
> + void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> struct audit_field {
> u32 type;
> union {
> @@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> struct {
> - char *lsm_str;
> - void *lsm_rule;
> + bool lsm_isset;
lsm_isset is unused in this patch, so it shouldn't be added here
> + char *lsm_str;
> + struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
> };
> };
> u32 op;
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 14d88e1312eb..fd63ae215104 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1587,6 +1587,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> #undef LSM_HOOK
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> +/*
> + * Information that identifies a security module.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id {
> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Security module hook list structure.
> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
> @@ -1595,7 +1603,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
> struct hlist_node list;
> struct hlist_head *head;
> union security_list_options hook;
> - char *lsm;
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> /*
> @@ -1631,7 +1639,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
> extern char *lsm_names;
>
> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm);
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>
> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2986342dad41..ed51baa94a30 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
> struct sembuf;
> struct kern_ipc_perm;
> struct audit_context;
> +struct audit_lsm_rules;
> struct super_block;
> struct inode;
> struct dentry;
> @@ -134,6 +135,66 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>
> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is a value in the lsmblob
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + const struct lsmblob empty = {};
> +
> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> + const struct lsmblob *blobb)
> +{
> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -1887,15 +1948,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -1906,12 +1969,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> }
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> { }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> kfree(f->lsm_str);
> - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
> + security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
> entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
> f->lsm_str = str;
> err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
> - (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (err == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
> +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
> * re-initialized. */
> static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> struct audit_field *sf)
> @@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> return -ENOMEM;
> df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
>
> - /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
> + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
> ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
> - (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
> + &df->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (ret == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
> new->tree = old->tree;
> memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
>
> - /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
> + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
> @@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> + f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> @@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> +static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
> {
> struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
> struct audit_entry *nentry;
> @@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> return err;
> }
>
> -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
> +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
> * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
> * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
> * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
> @@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
>
> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
> list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
> - int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
> + int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
> if (!err)
> err = res;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index ea2ee1181921..d272b5cf18a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> match for now to avoid losing information that
> may be wanted. An error message will also be
> logged upon error */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> if (need_sid) {
> /* @tsk should always be equal to
> * @current with the exception of
> @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
> @@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
> also applies here */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> name->osid,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid,
> - f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule)) {
> + n->osid, f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> }
> @@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> break;
> if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> f->type, f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule))
> + &f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> }
> break;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "apparmor",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
> goto buffers_out;
> }
> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
> - "apparmor");
> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
> apparmor_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
> };
>
> +/*
> + * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
> + * supplied by this module require a slot.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "bpf",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
> {
> - security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
> + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
> + &bpf_lsmid);
> pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "capability",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> @@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static int __init capability_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
> - "capability");
> + &capability_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
> index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
> @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> @@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
> };
>
> +struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
> +};
> +
> static int __init landlock_init(void)
> {
> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
> index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
> @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
> extern bool landlock_initialized;
>
> extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
> +extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
>
> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "loadpin",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> @@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> enforce ? "" : "not ");
> parse_exclude();
> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
> + &loadpin_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "lockdown",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> {
> #if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
> @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
> #endif
> security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
> - "lockdown");
> + &lockdown_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "safesetid",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
> @@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
> safesetid_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d956912741d5..49fa61028da2 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>
> /*
> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + */
> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> * @hooks: the hooks to add
> * @count: the number of hooks to add
> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
> *
> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
> + * for it in the lsmblob.
> */
> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm)
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
> {
> int i;
>
> + WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
> +
> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> + lsmid->slot);
> + }
> +
> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
> }
>
> @@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> * and fix this up afterwards.
> */
> if (slab_is_available()) {
> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
> }
> }
> @@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> @@ -2101,7 +2119,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> @@ -2599,9 +2617,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + bool one_is_good = false;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int trc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (trc == 0)
> + one_is_good = true;
> + else
> + rc = trc;
> + }
> + if (one_is_good)
> + return 0;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> @@ -2609,14 +2645,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
> }
>
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7aca813b5826..429309d8a910 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6992,6 +6992,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "selinux",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
> * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
> @@ -7308,7 +7313,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>
> hashtab_cache_init();
>
> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
> + &selinux_lsmid);
>
> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 2689486160a2..6e0eaecd8256 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "smack",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> /*
> * Register with LSM
> */
> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
> smack_enabled = 1;
>
> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> }
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
> * registering TOMOYO.
> @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>
> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "yama",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
> static int __init yama_init(void)
> {
> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
> yama_init_sysctl();
> return 0;
> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure.
@ 2022-04-26 23:15 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-26 23:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-kernel, Mickaël Salaün, linux-audit
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
>
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of
> security module data rather than a single instance.
> A new structure audit_lsm_rules is defined to avoid the
> confusion which commonly accompanies the use of
> void ** parameters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
small nit below, otherwise Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 23 +++++-----
> kernel/auditsc.c | 17 +++-----
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 +++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++-
> security/landlock/cred.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 +-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 5 +++
> security/landlock/setup.h | 1 +
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++-
> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++-
> security/security.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++-
> 21 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index d06134ac6245..14849d5f84b4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/audit_arch.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
> @@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ struct audit_krule {
> /* Flag to indicate legacy AUDIT_LOGINUID unset usage */
> #define AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY 0x1
>
> +struct audit_lsm_rules {
> + void *rule[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> struct audit_field {
> u32 type;
> union {
> @@ -66,8 +71,9 @@ struct audit_field {
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
> struct {
> - char *lsm_str;
> - void *lsm_rule;
> + bool lsm_isset;
lsm_isset is unused in this patch, so it shouldn't be added here
> + char *lsm_str;
> + struct audit_lsm_rules lsm_rules;
> };
> };
> u32 op;
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 14d88e1312eb..fd63ae215104 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1587,6 +1587,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> #undef LSM_HOOK
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> +/*
> + * Information that identifies a security module.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id {
> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Security module hook list structure.
> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
> @@ -1595,7 +1603,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
> struct hlist_node list;
> struct hlist_head *head;
> union security_list_options hook;
> - char *lsm;
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> /*
> @@ -1631,7 +1639,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
> extern char *lsm_names;
>
> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm);
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>
> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2986342dad41..ed51baa94a30 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct kernel_siginfo;
> struct sembuf;
> struct kern_ipc_perm;
> struct audit_context;
> +struct audit_lsm_rules;
> struct super_block;
> struct inode;
> struct dentry;
> @@ -134,6 +135,66 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>
> extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize a lsmblob structure
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is a value in the lsmblob
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + const struct lsmblob empty = {};
> +
> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> + const struct lsmblob *blobb)
> +{
> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -1887,15 +1948,17 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
>
> #else
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> - void **lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -1906,12 +1969,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> }
>
> static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> { }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 42d99896e7a6..de75bd6ad866 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> kfree(f->lsm_str);
> - security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
> + security_audit_rule_free(&f->lsm_rules);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
> entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
> f->lsm_str = str;
> err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
> - (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (err == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
> +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
> * re-initialized. */
> static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> struct audit_field *sf)
> @@ -796,9 +796,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
> return -ENOMEM;
> df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
>
> - /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
> + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
> ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
> - (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
> + &df->lsm_rules);
> /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
> * become valid after a policy reload. */
> if (ret == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
> new->tree = old->tree;
> memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
>
> - /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
> + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
> * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
> for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
> switch (new->fields[i].type) {
> @@ -1367,10 +1367,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> + f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> @@ -1397,7 +1398,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> +static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
> {
> struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
> struct audit_entry *nentry;
> @@ -1429,7 +1430,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
> return err;
> }
>
> -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
> +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
> * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
> * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
> * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
> @@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
>
> for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
> list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
> - int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
> + int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
> if (!err)
> err = res;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index ea2ee1181921..d272b5cf18a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> match for now to avoid losing information that
> may be wanted. An error message will also be
> logged upon error */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> if (need_sid) {
> /* @tsk should always be equal to
> * @current with the exception of
> @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
> @@ -690,21 +689,19 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
> /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
> also applies here */
> - if (f->lsm_rule) {
> + if (f->lsm_str) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> name->osid,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule);
> + &f->lsm_rules);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid,
> - f->type,
> - f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule)) {
> + n->osid, f->type, f->op,
> + &f->lsm_rules)) {
> ++result;
> break;
> }
> @@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> break;
> if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> f->type, f->op,
> - f->lsm_rule))
> + &f->lsm_rules))
> ++result;
> }
> break;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index be8976c407f4..1e53fea61335 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1168,6 +1168,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "apparmor",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -1853,7 +1858,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
> goto buffers_out;
> }
> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
> - "apparmor");
> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
> apparmor_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index e5971fa74fd7..7a58fe9ab8c4 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
> };
>
> +/*
> + * slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks
> + * supplied by this module require a slot.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "bpf",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
> {
> - security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
> + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
> + &bpf_lsmid);
> pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5fc8986c3c77..c94ec46e07ac 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "capability",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> @@ -1470,7 +1475,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static int __init capability_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
> - "capability");
> + &capability_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
> index 6725af24c684..56b121d65436 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
> @@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 97b8e421f617..319e90e9290c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -688,5 +688,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> index f55b82446de2..54ccf55a077a 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> @@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> - LANDLOCK_NAME);
> + &landlock_lsmid);
> }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index f8e8e980454c..759e00b9436c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
> };
>
> +struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = LANDLOCK_NAME,
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED,
> +};
> +
> static int __init landlock_init(void)
> {
> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
> index 1daffab1ab4b..38bce5b172dc 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
> @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
> extern bool landlock_initialized;
>
> extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
> +extern struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
>
> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index b12f7d986b1e..b569f3bc170b 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -192,6 +192,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "loadpin",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> @@ -239,7 +244,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> enforce ? "" : "not ");
> parse_exclude();
> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
> + &loadpin_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 87cbdc64d272..4e24ea3f7b7e 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "lockdown",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> {
> #if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
> @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
> lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
> #endif
> security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
> - "lockdown");
> + &lockdown_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index 963f4ad9cb66..0c368950dc14 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "safesetid",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
> @@ -250,7 +255,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
> safesetid_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d956912741d5..49fa61028da2 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %zu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>
> /*
> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -472,21 +473,38 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + */
> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
> +
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> * @hooks: the hooks to add
> * @count: the number of hooks to add
> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
> *
> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
> + * for it in the lsmblob.
> */
> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm)
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
> {
> int i;
>
> + WARN_ON(!lsmid->slot || !lsmid->lsm);
> +
> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> + lsmid->slot);
> + }
> +
> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
> }
>
> @@ -495,7 +513,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> * and fix this up afterwards.
> */
> if (slab_is_available()) {
> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
> }
> }
> @@ -2088,7 +2106,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> @@ -2101,7 +2119,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> @@ -2599,9 +2617,27 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
>
> -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + bool one_is_good = false;
> + int rc = 0;
> + int trc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (trc == 0)
> + one_is_good = true;
> + else
> + rc = trc;
> + }
> + if (one_is_good)
> + return 0;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> @@ -2609,14 +2645,36 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
> }
>
> -void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> + struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> + &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7aca813b5826..429309d8a910 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6992,6 +6992,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "selinux",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
> * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
> @@ -7308,7 +7313,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>
> hashtab_cache_init();
>
> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
> + &selinux_lsmid);
>
> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 2689486160a2..6e0eaecd8256 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4744,6 +4744,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "smack",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -4947,7 +4952,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> /*
> * Register with LSM
> */
> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
> smack_enabled = 1;
>
> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index b6a31901f289..e8f6bb9782c1 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -521,6 +521,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> }
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
> * registering TOMOYO.
> @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>
> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index 06e226166aab..a9639ea541f7 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "yama",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
> static int __init yama_init(void)
> {
> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
> yama_init_sysctl();
> return 0;
> }
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-27 0:38 ` John Johansen
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-27 0:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul,
stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
> structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
> module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
>
> The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
> The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
> To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
> kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
> security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 68ab0add23d3..57879f0b9f89 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -199,6 +199,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
> extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
>
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data
> + *
> + * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
> + * it is appropriate are rare.
> + *
> + * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
> + * There should only be one.
> + */
> +static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + if (blob->secid[i])
> + return blob->secid[i];
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -529,7 +550,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1384,7 +1406,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>
> static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
> u32 seclen,
> - u32 *secid)
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 3925d38f49f4..adea727744f4 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -791,14 +791,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
> int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> {
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - u32 secid;
> int ret;
>
> - ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> + ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> return set_security_override(new, &blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index ac4859241e17..fc0028c9e33d 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -860,21 +860,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
> {
> - u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (!tmp_secid)
> + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return -ENOENT;
>
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> + priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index 498a0bf6f044..87ca3a537d1c 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
>
> static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
> info->secid = 0;
>
> err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> - &info->secid);
> + &blob);
> if (err) {
> if (err == -EINVAL)
> pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
> return err;
> }
>
> + /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
> + * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
> + * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
> + info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> if (!info->secid) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
> info->secctx);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 8490e46359ae..f3e2cde76919 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -904,13 +904,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
> + * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
> + * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
> + * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
> +
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -931,7 +936,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -953,13 +958,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
> + * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index e9f1487af0e5..f814a41c5d9f 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2211,10 +2211,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> @@ -2365,10 +2377,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> optval, optlen, len);
> }
>
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + u32 *secid)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - skb, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> + /*
> + * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
> + * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
> + * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
> + */
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
> + if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
@ 2022-04-27 0:38 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2022-04-27 0:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, linux-audit, netfilter-devel
On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_secctx_to_secid interface to use a lsmblob
> structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
> module stacking. Change its callers to do the same.
>
> The security module hook is unchanged, still passing back a secid.
> The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
> To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++--
> kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 10 ++++----
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +++++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++-------
> security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 68ab0add23d3..57879f0b9f89 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -199,6 +199,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(const struct lsmblob *bloba,
> extern int lsm_name_to_slot(char *name);
> extern const char *lsm_slot_to_name(int slot);
>
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data
> + *
> + * This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where
> + * it is appropriate are rare.
> + *
> + * Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob.
> + * There should only be one.
> + */
> +static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + if (blob->secid[i])
> + return blob->secid[i];
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> @@ -529,7 +550,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1384,7 +1406,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>
> static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
> u32 seclen,
> - u32 *secid)
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 3925d38f49f4..adea727744f4 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -791,14 +791,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
> int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> {
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - u32 secid;
> int ret;
>
> - ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> + ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> return set_security_override(new, &blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index ac4859241e17..fc0028c9e33d 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -860,21 +860,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
> {
> - u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (!tmp_secid)
> + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return -ENOENT;
>
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(lsmblob_value(&blob));
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> + priv->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index 498a0bf6f044..87ca3a537d1c 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
>
> static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
> info->secid = 0;
>
> err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> - &info->secid);
> + &blob);
> if (err) {
> if (err == -EINVAL)
> pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info_v1 *info)
> return err;
> }
>
> + /* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because
> + * it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one
> + * value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */
> + info->secid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
> if (!info->secid) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
> info->secctx);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 8490e46359ae..f3e2cde76919 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -904,13 +904,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob *
> + * instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid()
> + * will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is
> + * safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */
> +
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -931,7 +936,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -953,13 +958,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob
> + * so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> - &audit_info);
> + NULL, addr, mask, addr_len,
> + lsmblob_value(&blob), &audit_info);
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index e9f1487af0e5..f814a41c5d9f 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2211,10 +2211,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
> @@ -2365,10 +2377,26 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> optval, optlen, len);
> }
>
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + u32 *secid)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - skb, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> + /*
> + * Only one security module should provide a real hook for
> + * this. A stub or bypass like is used in BPF should either
> + * (somehow) leave rc unaltered or return -ENOPROTOOPT.
> + */
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
> + if (rc != -ENOPROTOOPT)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-27 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, John Johansen
Cc: jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux, linux-audit, keescook,
penguin-kernel, stephen.smalley.work, linux-kernel,
Casey Schaufler
On 4/26/2022 12:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
>>>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
>>>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
>>>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>>> ...
>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
>>>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
>>>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
>>>>> } context;
>>>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
>>>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
>>>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>>>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
>>>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
>>> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
>>> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
>>> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
>>> groups multiple records into a single "event").
>>>
>> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
>> ctx->serial ...
> My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
> were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
> favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
>
> Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
Thank you for catching that. Easy (I expect) fix.
BTW, I'm not supposed to be working the next few weeks,
but I should be able to sneak v36 in before the next merge
window.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-27 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore, John Johansen
Cc: selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-audit
On 4/26/2022 12:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
>>>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
>>>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
>>>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>>> ...
>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
>>>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
>>>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
>>>>> } context;
>>>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
>>>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
>>>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>>>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
>>>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
>>> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
>>> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
>>> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
>>> groups multiple records into a single "event").
>>>
>> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
>> ctx->serial ...
> My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
> were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
> favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
>
> Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
Thank you for catching that. Easy (I expect) fix.
BTW, I'm not supposed to be working the next few weeks,
but I should be able to sneak v36 in before the next merge
window.
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-27 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: John Johansen, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, stephen.smalley.work,
linux-kernel
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 11:49 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/26/2022 12:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
> > <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
> >>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >>>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> >>>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> >>>>> ---
> >>>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> >>>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> >>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> >>>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
> >>> ...
> >>>
> >>>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> >>>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> >>>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> >>>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> >>>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> >>>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> >>>>> } context;
> >>>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
> >>>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> >>>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
> >>>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
> >>>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
> >>> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
> >>> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
> >>> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
> >>> groups multiple records into a single "event").
> >>>
> >> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
> >> ctx->serial ...
> > My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
> > were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
> > favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
> >
> > Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
>
> Thank you for catching that. Easy (I expect) fix.
> BTW, I'm not supposed to be working the next few weeks,
> but I should be able to sneak v36 in before the next merge
> window.
Enjoy the time away :)
FWIW, this isn't my call to make, but I would strongly prefer if this
got a *full* run in linux-next before it was merged into Linus' tree
during the merge window. For example, get this into the LSM -next
tree at -rc1 instead of -rc6.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2022-04-27 16:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: John Johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 11:49 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/26/2022 12:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
> > <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
> >>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >>>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
> >>>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> >>>>> ---
> >>>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> >>>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
> >>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
> >>>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
> >>> ...
> >>>
> >>>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> >>>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
> >>>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> >>>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> >>>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
> >>>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
> >>>>> } context;
> >>>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
> >>>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
> >>>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
> >>>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
> >>>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
> >>> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
> >>> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
> >>> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
> >>> groups multiple records into a single "event").
> >>>
> >> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
> >> ctx->serial ...
> > My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
> > were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
> > favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
> >
> > Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
>
> Thank you for catching that. Easy (I expect) fix.
> BTW, I'm not supposed to be working the next few weeks,
> but I should be able to sneak v36 in before the next merge
> window.
Enjoy the time away :)
FWIW, this isn't my call to make, but I would strongly prefer if this
got a *full* run in linux-next before it was merged into Linus' tree
during the merge window. For example, get this into the LSM -next
tree at -rc1 instead of -rc6.
--
paul-moore.com
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore
@ 2022-04-27 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-27 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: John Johansen, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
linux-audit, keescook, penguin-kernel, stephen.smalley.work,
linux-kernel, Casey Schaufler
On 4/27/2022 9:02 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 11:49 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 4/26/2022 12:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
>>>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
>>>>>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
>>>>>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>>>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
>>>>>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>>>>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
>>>>>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
>>>>>>> } context;
>>>>>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
>>>>>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
>>>>>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>>>>>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
>>>>>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
>>>>> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
>>>>> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
>>>>> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
>>>>> groups multiple records into a single "event").
>>>>>
>>>> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
>>>> ctx->serial ...
>>> My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
>>> were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
>>> favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
>>>
>>> Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
>> Thank you for catching that. Easy (I expect) fix.
>> BTW, I'm not supposed to be working the next few weeks,
>> but I should be able to sneak v36 in before the next merge
>> window.
> Enjoy the time away :)
>
> FWIW, this isn't my call to make, but I would strongly prefer if this
> got a *full* run in linux-next before it was merged into Linus' tree
> during the merge window. For example, get this into the LSM -next
> tree at -rc1 instead of -rc6.
I am in complete agreement. There's too much Murphy to rush it.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure
@ 2022-04-27 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 132+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2022-04-27 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: John Johansen, selinux, jmorris, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, linux-audit
On 4/27/2022 9:02 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 11:49 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 4/26/2022 12:18 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 2:58 PM John Johansen
>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>> On 4/26/22 11:03, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 7:31 PM John Johansen
>>>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>>>> Replace the timestamp and serial number pair used in audit records
>>>>>>> with a structure containing the two elements.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> kernel/audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
>>>>>>> kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>>>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
>>>>>>> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>>>> index 4af63e7dde17..260dab6e0e15 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>>>>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>>>>>> @@ -108,10 +114,10 @@ struct audit_context {
>>>>>>> AUDIT_CTX_URING, /* in use by io_uring */
>>>>>>> } context;
>>>>>>> enum audit_state state, current_state;
>>>>>>> + struct audit_stamp stamp; /* event identifier */
>>>>>>> unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
>>>>>> shouldn't we be dropping serial from the audit_context, since we have
>>>>>> moved it into the audit_stamp?
>>>>> Unless we make some significant changes to audit_log_start() we still
>>>>> need to preserve a timestamp in the audit_context so that regularly
>>>>> associated audit records can share a common timestamp (which is what
>>>>> groups multiple records into a single "event").
>>>>>
>>>> sure, but the patch changes things to use ctx->stamp.serial instead of
>>>> ctx->serial ...
>>> My apologies, I read your original comment wrong; I was thinking you
>>> were suggesting removing the timestamp info from audit_context in
>>> favor of using the timestamp info contained in the audit_buffer.
>>>
>>> Yes, audit_context:serial is no longer needed with audit_context:stamp.
>> Thank you for catching that. Easy (I expect) fix.
>> BTW, I'm not supposed to be working the next few weeks,
>> but I should be able to sneak v36 in before the next merge
>> window.
> Enjoy the time away :)
>
> FWIW, this isn't my call to make, but I would strongly prefer if this
> got a *full* run in linux-next before it was merged into Linus' tree
> during the merge window. For example, get this into the LSM -next
> tree at -rc1 instead of -rc6.
I am in complete agreement. There's too much Murphy to rush it.
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 132+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2022-04-27 20:55 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 132+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
[not found] <20220418145945.38797-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 00/29] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-21 16:51 ` John Johansen
2022-04-21 16:51 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 02/29] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-26 23:15 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 23:15 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-19 16:50 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-20 19:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-04-20 21:15 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-21 3:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
2022-04-21 16:50 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-21 16:49 ` John Johansen
2022-04-21 16:49 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 07/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-27 0:38 ` John Johansen
2022-04-27 0:38 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 09/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 10/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 11/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 12/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 18:02 ` kernel test robot
2022-04-18 18:02 ` kernel test robot
2022-04-19 0:41 ` kernel test robot
2022-04-19 0:41 ` kernel test robot
2022-04-19 0:51 ` kernel test robot
2022-04-19 0:51 ` kernel test robot
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 14/29] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 15/29] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 16/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 17/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 18/29] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 19/29] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 20/29] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
2022-04-25 23:32 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 17:57 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 17:57 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen
2022-04-25 23:31 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 18:03 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 18:58 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 19:18 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-27 15:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-27 16:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-27 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-27 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-22 16:26 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-22 16:26 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-25 23:33 ` John Johansen
2022-04-25 23:33 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-22 16:27 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 1:06 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 18:12 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 19:01 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 19:01 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-22 16:28 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-22 16:28 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 1:08 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 18:15 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 19:07 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 19:07 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-22 16:29 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-22 16:29 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 3:37 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 18:57 ` Paul Moore
2022-04-26 19:24 ` John Johansen
2022-04-26 19:24 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-22 8:37 ` John Johansen
2022-04-22 8:37 ` John Johansen
2022-04-18 14:59 ` [PATCH v35 29/29] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2022-04-18 14:59 ` Casey Schaufler
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