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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage
Date: Sat, 05 Jun 2021 12:18:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mts4zkac.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <433086cd-fadf-efe2-955b-0263a2fc969f@intel.com>

On Fri, Jun 04 2021 at 15:04, Dave Hansen wrote:
> The nice Intel 0day folks threw some tests at this series.  It managed
> to trigger an oops.  I can't right this moment publish the source for
> the test, but it looks pretty trivial.  It basically creates a 0'd XSAVE
> buffer, sets XCOMP_BV to:
>
> #define XSAVES_FEATURES ( \
>         XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \
>         XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER | \
>         XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL | \
>         0x8000000000000000 \
>         )
>
> Then passes that buffer in to ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, ...).
>
> The oops is below.  It doesn't *look* to be XSAVES-related.  The oops
> looks like it's happening in xstateregs_set() itself as opposed to down
> in the code actually concerned with supervisor state.
>
> No bug is jumping out of the code as I took a brief look at it.  The
> xbuf versus kbuf code looks a bit wonky, but I can't find a hole in it.

I can....

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *t
 		xbuf = vmalloc(count);
 		if (!xbuf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, NULL, &ubuf, xbuf, 0, -1);
+		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xbuf, 0, -1);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 	}

  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-05 10:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02  9:55 [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 1/8] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 12:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:15     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 13:16       ` Shuah Khan
2021-06-02 15:59   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:02     ` [patch V2a " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 13:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:58   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-03 19:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 4/8] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 5/8] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:01   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 11:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:24   ` [patch " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 6/8] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 7/8] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 8/8] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_xxx_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 16:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 21:28 ` [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 14:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 16:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 17:46     ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-04 18:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-05 10:18   ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2021-06-05 11:56     ` Thomas Gleixner

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