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From: Damien Zammit via Grub-devel <grub-devel@gnu.org>
To: grub-devel@gnu.org, ross.lagerwall@citrix.com
Cc: Damien Zammit <damien@zamaudio.com>,
	jbeulich@suse.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, daniel.kiper@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] multiboot2: Add load type header and support for the PE binary type
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 08:12:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <AF72X2ysQoPQwSN_InXfIHzizVxNQs0hUR86S4yu_BZgD9iYFNosWTrYx9W5LW3MsdasBvKu6rugHbbVFFv18dRjcJBsqTdaYsZdVsEUbF8=@zamaudio.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c6e79962-0537-4ed8-b99f-f2614f5a7987@suse.com>


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Hi, I saw this on the list and have concerns:

-------- Original Message --------
On 14 Mar 2024, 6:24 pm, Jan Beulich via Grub-devel < grub-devel@gnu.org> wrote:
On 13.03.2024 16:07, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
>> In addition to the existing address and ELF load types, specify a new
>> optional PE binary load type. This new type is a useful addition since
>> PE binaries can be signed and verified (i.e. used with Secure Boot).

> And the consideration to have ELF signable (by whatever extension to the ELF spec) went nowhere? Jan

If the purpose of signing binaries is to prevent their execution unless they are signed by their owner, this is MALWARE unless the end user can replace the keys with one of their choosing.
Adding a field to elf to provide this feature is IMHO asking for trouble because the key is stored elsewhere and there is nothing to prevent abuse of this field to deny users their freedom to run code, (ie by not providing them the key or a guaranteed mechanism for providing their own).

On that note, why is it such a useful feature to restrict the freedom to run code in grub? If grub selects malware to execute, the user must have chosen to run it - or grub itself is compromised?

Do you think that locking binaries down is the future for users to ensure their own security or it is acceptable for 3rd parties to hide platform keys to lock all systems down, even by binary?

I'm not convinced.

Damien Zammit
GNU/Hurd hacker

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Damien Zammit <damien@zamaudio.com>
To: grub-devel@gnu.org, ross.lagerwall@citrix.com
Cc: jbeulich@suse.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, daniel.kiper@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] multiboot2: Add load type header and support for the PE binary type
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 08:12:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <AF72X2ysQoPQwSN_InXfIHzizVxNQs0hUR86S4yu_BZgD9iYFNosWTrYx9W5LW3MsdasBvKu6rugHbbVFFv18dRjcJBsqTdaYsZdVsEUbF8=@zamaudio.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c6e79962-0537-4ed8-b99f-f2614f5a7987@suse.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1450 bytes --]

Hi, I saw this on the list and have concerns:

-------- Original Message --------
On 14 Mar 2024, 6:24 pm, Jan Beulich via Grub-devel < grub-devel@gnu.org> wrote:
On 13.03.2024 16:07, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
>> In addition to the existing address and ELF load types, specify a new
>> optional PE binary load type. This new type is a useful addition since
>> PE binaries can be signed and verified (i.e. used with Secure Boot).

> And the consideration to have ELF signable (by whatever extension to the ELF spec) went nowhere? Jan

If the purpose of signing binaries is to prevent their execution unless they are signed by their owner, this is MALWARE unless the end user can replace the keys with one of their choosing.
Adding a field to elf to provide this feature is IMHO asking for trouble because the key is stored elsewhere and there is nothing to prevent abuse of this field to deny users their freedom to run code, (ie by not providing them the key or a guaranteed mechanism for providing their own).

On that note, why is it such a useful feature to restrict the freedom to run code in grub? If grub selects malware to execute, the user must have chosen to run it - or grub itself is compromised?

Do you think that locking binaries down is the future for users to ensure their own security or it is acceptable for 3rd parties to hide platform keys to lock all systems down, even by binary?

I'm not convinced.

Damien Zammit
GNU/Hurd hacker

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  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-14  8:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-13 15:07 [PATCH 0/7] GRUB: Supporting Secure Boot of xen.gz Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07 ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 1/7] multiboot2: Add load type header and support for the PE binary type Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-14  7:24   ` Jan Beulich
2024-03-14  7:24     ` Jan Beulich via Grub-devel
2024-03-14  8:12     ` Damien Zammit via Grub-devel [this message]
2024-03-14  8:12       ` Damien Zammit
2024-03-14  8:49     ` Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko
2024-03-14  9:30     ` Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-14  9:30       ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-14 13:37       ` Jan Beulich
2024-03-14 13:37         ` Jan Beulich via Grub-devel
2024-03-14 14:24         ` Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-14 14:24           ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-14 14:33           ` Jan Beulich
2024-03-14 14:33             ` Jan Beulich via Grub-devel
2024-03-19 12:12           ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-03-19 12:12             ` Roger Pau Monné via Grub-devel
2024-03-19 13:18   ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-03-19 13:18     ` Roger Pau Monné via Grub-devel
2024-03-19 14:46     ` Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-19 14:46       ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-20 11:04       ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-03-20 11:04         ` Roger Pau Monné via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 2/7] multiboot2: Allow 64-bit entry tags Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-19 10:07   ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-03-19 10:07     ` Roger Pau Monné via Grub-devel
2024-03-28 15:05     ` Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-28 15:05       ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-28 15:41       ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-03-28 15:41         ` Roger Pau Monné via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 3/7] multiboot2: Add support for the load type header tag Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-15  7:30   ` Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko
2024-03-15  7:30     ` Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko
2024-03-28 14:58     ` Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-28 14:58       ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4/7] multiboot2: Add PE load support Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 5/7] multiboot2: Add support for 64-bit entry addresses Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 6/7] efi: Allow loading multiboot modules without verification Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 7/7] verifiers: Verify after decompression Ross Lagerwall
2024-03-13 15:07   ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel
2024-03-15  3:50   ` Michael Chang
2024-03-15  3:50     ` Michael Chang via Grub-devel
2024-03-15  7:25   ` Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko
2024-03-28 14:55     ` Ross Lagerwall via Grub-devel

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