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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 12:17:10 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJtC1gkJ0ZKDFroL8UzvjiPfmC+6EsrzyB0j0oETdSQQg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <abe03d09-4dcb-2b02-4102-5e108d617a42@canonical.com>

On Tue, Oct 2, 2018 at 11:57 AM, John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> Under the current scheme
>
> lsm.enabled=selinux
>
> could actually mean selinux,yama,loadpin,something_else are
> enabled. If we extend this behavior to when full stacking lands
>
> lsm.enabled=selinux,yama
>
> might mean selinux,yama,apparmor,loadpin,something_else
>
> and what that list is will vary from kernel to kernel, which I think
> is harder for the user than the lsm.enabled list being what is
> actually enabled at boot

Ah, I think I missed this in your earlier emails. What you don't like
here is that "lsm.enable=" is additive. You want it to be explicit.

Are you okay with lsm.order= having fallback?

The situation we were trying to solve was with new LSMs getting
implicitly disabled if someone is booting with an explicit list. For
example:

lsm.enable=yama,apparmor

means when "landlock" gets added to the kernel, it will be implicitly disabled.

> If we have to have multiple kernel parameter, I prefer a behvior where
> if you hav conflicting kernel parameters specified
>
>   apparmor=0 lsm.enabled=apparmor
>
> that the conflict is logged and the lsm is left disabled, as I think
> it is easier for users to understand than the overrides scheme of v3,
> and sans logging of the conflict is effectively what we had in the
> past
>
>   apparmor=0 security=apparmor
> or
>   apparmor=1 security=selinux
>
> would result in apparmor being disabed

Okay, so for this part you want per-LSM boot param to have priority
(which seems to match SELinux's concerns), possibly logging the
conflict, but still accepting the apparmor= and selinux= state.
security= would still driving initialization ordering (so I think the
behavior I have in the series would be correct).

> That being said I get we have a mess currently, and there really
> doesn't seem to be a good way to fix it. I think getting this right
> for the user is important enough that I am willing to break current
> apparmor userspace api. While apparmor=0 is documented we have also
> documented security=X for years and apparmor=0 isn't used too often
> so I think we can drop it to help clean this mess up abit.
>
> I am not going to Nak, or block on v3 behavior if that is considered
> the best path forward after this discussion/rant.

I could define CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE as being "additive" to
SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE and
SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-02 19:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-02  0:54 [PATCH security-next v4 00/32] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 01/32] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 02/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 03/32] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 04/32] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:14   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 05/32] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 06/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:15   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 07/32] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:16   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 08/32] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 09/32] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:17   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 10/32] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:20   ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:38     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 11/32] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 12/32] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-02  1:06   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02  4:47     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 14/32] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 15/32] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 16/32] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 17/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 18/32] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 19/32] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 20/32] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 21/32] LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02  1:18   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02  4:49     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 12:12   ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 13:42     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:44       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:58         ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 16:33           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:54             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:33               ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 19:02                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:57               ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:17                 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-02 19:47                   ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 20:29                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:11                       ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 22:06                   ` James Morris
2018-10-02 23:06                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:46                       ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:54                         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03  0:05                           ` John Johansen
2018-10-03  0:12                             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 13:15                               ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:39                           ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 17:26                             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 19:43                               ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-04  5:38                               ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:02                                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 14:25                                 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-03 18:17                         ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:20                           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:28                             ` James Morris
2018-10-03 20:10                               ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36                                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:19                                   ` James Morris
2018-10-04  5:56                                   ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:18                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:40                                       ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:42                                         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:34                                 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 23:55                                   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:59                                     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-04  0:03                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04  6:22                                       ` John Johansen
2018-10-04  6:18                                     ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 17:49                                     ` James Morris
2018-10-05  0:05                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05  4:58                                         ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29                                           ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:35                                           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:28                     ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 16:34           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 24/32] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 25/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 26/32] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 27/32] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 28/32] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 29/32] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 30/32] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 31/32] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 32/32] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook

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