From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> To: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com>, "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] pid: add pidfd_open() Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 14:30:19 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHk-=wgjndAqzMBxgXZxbSRXLRqdXtNM3aHc9X-xj+Px1fsG-Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190401194214.4rbvmwogpke3cjcx@brauner.io> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 12:42 PM Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> wrote: > > From what I gather from this thread we are still best of with using fds > to /proc/<pid> as pidfds. Linus, do you agree or have I misunderstood? That does seem to be the most flexible option. > Yes, we can have an internal mount option to restrict access to various > parts of procfs from such pidfds I suspect you'd find that other parties might want such a "restrict proc" mount option too, so I don't think it needs to be anything internal. But it would be pretty much independent of the pidfd issue, of course. > One thing is that we also need something to disable access to the > "/proc/<pid>/net". One option could be to give the files in "net/" an > ->open-handler which checks that our file->f_path.mnt is not one of our > special clone() mounts and if it is refuse the open. I would expect that that would be part of the "restrict proc" mount options, no? > Basically, if you have a system without CONFIG_PROC_FS it makes sense > that clone gives back an anon inode file descriptor as pidfds because > you can still signal threads in a race-free way. But it doesn't make a > lot of sense to have pidfd_open() in this scenario because you can't > really do anything with that pidfd apart from sending signals. Well, people might want that. But realistically, everybody enables /proc support anyway. Even if you don't actually fully *mount* it in some restricted area, the support is pretty much always there in any kernel config. But yes, in general I agree that that also most likely means that a separate system call for "open_pidfd()" isn't worth it. Because if the main objection to /proc is that it exposes too much, then I think a much better option is to see how to sanely restrict the "too much" parts. Because I think there might be a lot of people who want a restricted /proc, in various container models etc. Linus
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> To: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com>, "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-founda> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] pid: add pidfd_open() Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 14:30:19 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHk-=wgjndAqzMBxgXZxbSRXLRqdXtNM3aHc9X-xj+Px1fsG-Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190401194214.4rbvmwogpke3cjcx@brauner.io> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 12:42 PM Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> wrote: > > From what I gather from this thread we are still best of with using fds > to /proc/<pid> as pidfds. Linus, do you agree or have I misunderstood? That does seem to be the most flexible option. > Yes, we can have an internal mount option to restrict access to various > parts of procfs from such pidfds I suspect you'd find that other parties might want such a "restrict proc" mount option too, so I don't think it needs to be anything internal. But it would be pretty much independent of the pidfd issue, of course. > One thing is that we also need something to disable access to the > "/proc/<pid>/net". One option could be to give the files in "net/" an > ->open-handler which checks that our file->f_path.mnt is not one of our > special clone() mounts and if it is refuse the open. I would expect that that would be part of the "restrict proc" mount options, no? > Basically, if you have a system without CONFIG_PROC_FS it makes sense > that clone gives back an anon inode file descriptor as pidfds because > you can still signal threads in a race-free way. But it doesn't make a > lot of sense to have pidfd_open() in this scenario because you can't > really do anything with that pidfd apart from sending signals. Well, people might want that. But realistically, everybody enables /proc support anyway. Even if you don't actually fully *mount* it in some restricted area, the support is pretty much always there in any kernel config. But yes, in general I agree that that also most likely means that a separate system call for "open_pidfd()" isn't worth it. Because if the main objection to /proc is that it exposes too much, then I think a much better option is to see how to sanely restrict the "too much" parts. Because I think there might be a lot of people who want a restricted /proc, in various container models etc. Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-01 21:30 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-03-29 15:54 [PATCH v2 0/5] pid: add pidfd_open() Christian Brauner 2019-03-29 15:54 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] Make anon_inodes unconditional Christian Brauner 2019-03-29 15:54 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] pid: add pidfd_open() Christian Brauner 2019-03-29 23:45 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-29 23:45 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-29 23:55 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-29 23:55 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 11:53 ` Jürg Billeter 2019-03-30 14:37 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 14:51 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-30 14:51 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-29 15:54 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] signal: support pidfd_open() with pidfd_send_signal() Christian Brauner 2019-03-29 15:54 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] signal: PIDFD_SIGNAL_TID threads via pidfds Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 1:06 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-30 1:06 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-30 1:22 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 1:22 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 1:34 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 1:34 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 1:42 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 1:42 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-29 15:54 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] tests: add pidfd_open() tests Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 16:09 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] pid: add pidfd_open() Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:09 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:11 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-03-30 16:11 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-03-30 16:16 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:16 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 1:07 ` Joel Fernandes 2019-03-31 1:07 ` Joel Fernandes 2019-03-31 2:34 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-31 2:34 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-31 4:08 ` Joel Fernandes 2019-03-31 4:08 ` Joel Fernandes 2019-03-31 4:46 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-31 4:46 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-31 14:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 14:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 15:05 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 15:05 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 15:21 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-03-31 15:21 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-03-31 15:33 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-31 15:33 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-30 16:19 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 16:19 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 16:24 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:24 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 16:34 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-03-30 16:34 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-03-30 16:38 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 16:38 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:04 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 17:04 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 17:12 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:12 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:24 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 17:24 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-30 17:37 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:37 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:50 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-30 17:50 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-30 17:52 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:52 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 17:59 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-30 17:59 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-30 18:02 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 18:02 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 18:00 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-30 18:00 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-31 20:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-31 20:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-31 21:03 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 21:03 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 21:10 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 21:10 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 21:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 21:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 22:03 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 22:03 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 22:16 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 22:16 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 22:33 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 22:33 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 0:52 ` Jann Horn 2019-04-01 0:52 ` Jann Horn 2019-04-01 8:47 ` Yann Droneaud 2019-04-01 8:47 ` Yann Droneaud 2019-04-01 10:03 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 10:03 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-31 23:40 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-03-31 23:40 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 0:09 ` Al Viro 2019-04-01 0:09 ` Al Viro 2019-04-01 0:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 0:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 0:21 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 0:21 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 6:37 ` Al Viro 2019-04-01 6:37 ` Al Viro 2019-04-01 6:41 ` Al Viro 2019-04-01 6:41 ` Al Viro 2019-03-31 22:03 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-03-31 22:03 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 2:13 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-01 2:13 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-01 11:40 ` Aleksa Sarai 2019-04-01 11:40 ` Aleksa Sarai 2019-04-01 15:36 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 15:36 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 15:47 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 15:47 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 15:55 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 15:55 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 16:01 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 16:01 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 16:13 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 16:13 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 19:42 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 19:42 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 21:30 ` Linus Torvalds [this message] 2019-04-01 21:30 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 21:58 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 21:58 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 22:13 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 22:13 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 22:34 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 22:34 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 16:07 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 16:07 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 16:15 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 16:15 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 16:27 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 16:27 ` Jonathan Kowalski 2019-04-01 16:21 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 16:21 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 16:29 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 16:29 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 16:45 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 16:45 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-04-01 17:00 ` David Laight 2019-04-01 17:00 ` David Laight 2019-04-01 17:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-01 17:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-04-02 11:03 ` Florian Weimer 2019-04-02 11:03 ` Florian Weimer 2019-04-01 16:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-01 16:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-04-01 12:04 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 12:04 ` Christian Brauner 2019-04-01 13:43 ` Jann Horn 2019-04-01 13:43 ` Jann Horn 2019-03-31 21:19 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-31 21:19 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 16:37 ` Christian Brauner 2019-03-30 16:37 ` Christian Brauner
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