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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v2 3/8] MDSv2 5
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 18:20:16 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=whn9zNZG8bWi1HkYtNxuzi9Ry5O2STGsS1zJ4Q=EoncKg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgQB8Et-mGmNXbdVH084f1jd8GcNiK9iYG+309gHpp4BA@mail.gmail.com>

Re-sending, because apparently the previous email was so well
encrypted that Andi couldn't even read it.

Oh well. I was so happy to get my s/mime setup fixed up and finally
talking to the speck list automatically and properly, but I was
apparently celebrating too early, so this downgrades to the earlier
(somewhat broken) setup.

I suspect Thomas could write a book about his frustrations by now.

                 Linus

On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 5:33 PM Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 4:43 PM Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >
> > I think the encryption key case could easily have a "let's scrub cpu state" thing.
>
> In fact, maybe we could have something like a TIF_SCRUBME thread flag,
> which we react to on return to user space, and on context switch.
>
> That way anybody who thinks they are really working with sensitive
> information could just set the flag. We could set it automatically in
> kzfree() and memzero_explicit().
>
> Using a TIF_xyz flag would seem to be very natural. Sure, there's a
> window between the "handle TIF_xyz" flags and the actual return to
> user space, but nothing in that window should touch anything remotely
> sensitive. It's mainly just restoring user state.
>
>                    Linus

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-12-11  2:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-10 17:53 [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 0/8] MDSv2 8 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 1/8] MDSv2 4 Andi Kleen
2018-12-11 14:14   ` [MODERATED] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-12-12 21:22   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 21:28     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 21:25   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 2/8] MDSv2 1 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 22:49   ` [MODERATED] " Jiri Kosina
2018-12-11  0:03     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:13     ` Kanth Ghatraju
2018-12-11  2:00       ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  5:36       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-12-11 10:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-12 21:31         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 21:43           ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 22:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-12 22:40             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 22:45               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-13 15:15                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-13 16:52                   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 3/8] MDSv2 5 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 23:00   ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  0:03     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:43       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  1:33         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  2:12           ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  2:20           ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2018-12-11  3:25             ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11 17:55               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11 18:10                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-11 18:21                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11 18:26                   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-11 19:47                   ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11 21:22                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-12-12 14:02               ` [MODERATED] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-12-12 17:58                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 18:47                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-13 19:44                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-13 20:48                       ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-13 20:56                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-15  0:30                         ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  2:10         ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 4/8] MDSv2 0 Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 21:45   ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 22:09     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 22:36       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 5/8] MDSv2 7 Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:33   ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2018-12-12 18:05     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-12 21:41   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 22:12     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 6/8] MDSv2 3 Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:37   ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2018-12-11  0:46     ` Luck, Tony
2018-12-11  1:02       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-11  1:53       ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 7/8] MDSv2 6 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 8/8] MDSv2 2 Andi Kleen

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