All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v2 3/8] MDSv2 5
Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 10:21:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wj2L_vKXa4h+0woa3HjVAe-9mjWMp4=ucUNNzpXsBLmbA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiVBrGJvQhYVDU6McsPrnG7Oy7VU70cv3h87gkBh2oXJA@mail.gmail.com>

Ok, re-sending again.

It looks like speck doesn't have my other cert, so when I send with
the cert I want to use it ends up never being decrypted (and then
re-encrypted with the speck cert) by the mailing list.

               Linus

On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 9:55 AM Linus Torvalds wrote:
>
> [ Let's see if this comes through legibly ]
>
> On Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 7:27 PM speck for Andi Kleen wrote:
> >
> > > In fact, maybe we could have something like a TIF_SCRUBME thread flag,
> > > which we react to on return to user space, and on context switch.
> >
> > We'll have to disable interrupts in that window, but that
> > should be ok.
>
> I don't think we even need to disable interrupts.
>
> If an interrupt comes in while we're scrubbing, either that interrupt
> will touch sensitive data (and set TIF_SCRUBME) or it won't.
>
> If it *does* set TIF_SCRUBME, we'll just re-do the scrub, and if it
> *doesn't* touch sensitive data, we'll return to the scrubbing having
> touched even more cachelines so any old sensitive data should be fine.
>
> Yeah, yeah, it might affect some cache replacement logic that the SW
> scrubbing code might depend on in theory, but that's pretty damn
> theoretical. Good luck to anybody trying to attack that.
>
>                 Linus

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-12-11 18:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-10 17:53 [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 0/8] MDSv2 8 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 1/8] MDSv2 4 Andi Kleen
2018-12-11 14:14   ` [MODERATED] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-12-12 21:22   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 21:28     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 21:25   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 2/8] MDSv2 1 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 22:49   ` [MODERATED] " Jiri Kosina
2018-12-11  0:03     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:13     ` Kanth Ghatraju
2018-12-11  2:00       ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  5:36       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-12-11 10:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-12 21:31         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 21:43           ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 22:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-12 22:40             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 22:45               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-13 15:15                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-13 16:52                   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 3/8] MDSv2 5 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 23:00   ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  0:03     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:43       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  1:33         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  2:12           ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  2:20           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11  3:25             ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11 17:55               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-11 18:10                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-11 18:21                 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2018-12-11 18:26                   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-11 19:47                   ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11 21:22                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-12-12 14:02               ` [MODERATED] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-12-12 17:58                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 18:47                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-13 19:44                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-13 20:48                       ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-13 20:56                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-12-15  0:30                         ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  2:10         ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 4/8] MDSv2 0 Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 21:45   ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 22:09     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-12 22:36       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 5/8] MDSv2 7 Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:33   ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2018-12-12 18:05     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-12 21:41   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-12-12 22:12     ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 6/8] MDSv2 3 Andi Kleen
2018-12-11  0:37   ` [MODERATED] " Andrew Cooper
2018-12-11  0:46     ` Luck, Tony
2018-12-11  1:02       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-12-11  1:53       ` Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 7/8] MDSv2 6 Andi Kleen
2018-12-10 17:53 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH v2 8/8] MDSv2 2 Andi Kleen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAHk-=wj2L_vKXa4h+0woa3HjVAe-9mjWMp4=ucUNNzpXsBLmbA@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=speck@linutronix.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.