[dora][PATCH 0/6] OpenSSL CVE fixes for the dora branch

[dora][PATCH 0/6] OpenSSL CVE fixes for the dora branch

[Paul Eggleton]

The following changes since commit 68da848e0f7f026bf18707d8d59143177ff66f9b:

  gnutls: patch for CVE-2014-3466 backported (2014-06-06 10:27:11 +0100)

are available in the git repository at:

  git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib paule/openssl-dora
  http://cgit.openembedded.org/cgit.cgi/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=paule/openssl-dora

Paul Eggleton (5):
  openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195
  openssl: use upstream fix for CVE-2014-0198
  openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221
  openssl: fix CVE-2014-0224
  openssl: fix CVE-2014-3470

Yue Tao (1):
  openssl: fix for CVE-2010-5298

 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch             |  40 ++++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch             |  38 ++++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch             |  38 ++++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch             | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch             |  31 +++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch     |  24 +++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch |  23 -----
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |   7 +-
 8 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch

-- 
1.9.3

[dora][PATCH 1/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195

[Paul Eggleton]

From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)

A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.

(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch             | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c43919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+    
+    A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
+    to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
+    run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
+    
+    Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
+    
+    Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ 		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	else
++		{
+ 		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++			{
++			item = NULL;
++			frag = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
+ 
+ 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ 	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 842a903..7783206 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \
             file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
             file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3

[dora][PATCH 2/6] openssl: use upstream fix for CVE-2014-0198

[Paul Eggleton]

This replaces the fix for CVE-2014-0198 with one borrowed from Fedora,
which is the same as the patch which was actually applied upstream for
the issue, i.e.:

https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b107586c0c3447ea22dba8698ebbcd81bb29d48c

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch             | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch | 23 -------------
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12dcfb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 23:38:37 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=b107586
+
+Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index 40eb0dd..d961d12 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -657,9 +657,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ 
+- 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
+-		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+-			return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
+@@ -675,6 +672,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ 		}
+ 
++ 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
++		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
++			return -1;
++
+ 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c51d74..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1093837
-
-CVE-2014-0198: An attacker can trigger generation of an SSL
-alert which could cause a null pointer dereference.
-
-Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
----
-diff -Naur openssl-1.0.1g-orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c openssl-1.0.1g/ssl/s3_pkt.c
---- openssl-1.0.1g-orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2014-03-17 17:14:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1g/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2014-05-06 02:32:43.862587660 +0200
-@@ -657,6 +657,10 @@
- 		if (i <= 0)
- 			return(i);
- 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
-+		/* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */
-+		if (wb->buf == NULL)
-+			if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
-+				return -1;
- 		}
- 
- 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 7783206..38cdb3f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://0001-Fix-DTLS-retransmission-from-previous-session.patch \
             file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \
             file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
-            file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3

[dora][PATCH 3/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221

[Paul Eggleton]

From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221)

By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code
can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack.

Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected.

(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch             | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf730a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix CVE-2014-0221
+    
+    Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
+    crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
+    
+    Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ 	int i,al;
+ 	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+ 
++	redo:
+ 	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ 	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ 		{
+@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ 					s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 			
+ 			s->init_num = 0;
+-			return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+-				max, ok);
++			goto redo;
+ 			}
+ 		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ 			{
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 38cdb3f..dc77330 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3

[dora][PATCH 4/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0224

[Paul Eggleton]

From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)

An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.

The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.

(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch             | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ed1d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+
+Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
+time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
+secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
+
+Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
+and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
+
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm	2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h	2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200
+@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
+  
+ /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200
+@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ 
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -916,6 +917,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
++	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 	    s->hit=1;
+ 	    }
+ 	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm	2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start:
+ 			goto f_err;
+ 			}
+ 
++		if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
++			{
++			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++
++		s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
++
+ 		rr->length=0;
+ 
+ 		if (s->msg_callback)
+@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ 		{
+-		if (s->session == NULL) 
++		if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ 			{
+ 			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm	2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ 
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
++			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #else
+ 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
++					{
++					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
++					}
+ 				else
+ 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #endif
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index dc77330..fae0b93 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3

[dora][PATCH 5/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-3470

[Paul Eggleton]

From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt

Anonymous ECDH denial of service (CVE-2014-3470)

OpenSSL TLS clients enabling anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a
denial of service attack.

(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch             | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..025727f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+commit 4ad43d511f6cf064c66eb4bfd0fb0919b5dd8a86
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date:   Thu May 29 15:00:05 2014 +0100
+
+    Fix CVE-2014-3470
+    
+    Check session_cert is not NULL before dereferencing it.
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+index d35376d..4324f8d 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+@@ -2511,6 +2511,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ 			int field_size = 0;
+ 
++			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
++				{
++				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++				goto err;
++				}
++
+ 			/* Did we send out the client's
+ 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index fae0b93..65083fb 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3

[dora][PATCH 6/6] openssl: fix for CVE-2010-5298

[Paul Eggleton]

From: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com>

Race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function in s3_pkt.c in OpenSSL
through 1.0.1g, when SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, allows remote
attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service
(use-after-free and parsing error) via an SSL connection in a
multithreaded environment.

http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5298

(From OE-Core master rev: 751f81ed8dc488c500837aeb3eb41ebf3237e10b)

Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Roy Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch     | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..417a774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+openssl fix for CVE-2010-5298
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Race condition in the ssl3_read_bytes function in s3_pkt.c in OpenSSL
+through 1.0.1g, when SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS is enabled, allows remote
+attackers to inject data across sessions or cause a denial of service
+(use-after-free and parsing error) via an SSL connection in a
+multithreaded environment.
+
+http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-5298
+
+Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao@windriver.com>
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ start:
+ 				{
+ 				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ 				rr->off=0;
+-				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
++				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
+ 					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ 				}
+ 			}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 65083fb..d639d0a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch \
+            file://openssl-CVE-2010-5298.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3