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From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 05/11] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD}
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 13:04:01 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d2f22673-7545-7c1b-cf81-2dc1c2998732@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516290370-14958-6-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 01/18/2018 10:46 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> For performance reasons, HVM guests should have direct access to these MSRs
> when possible.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> ---
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
> CC: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
> CC: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
>
> v7:
>  * Drop excess brackets
> v9:
>  * Re-implement it light of Intels new spec.  Drop R-by's.
>  * Spelling fixes

Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-18 18:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-18 15:45 [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 01/11] x86/thunk: Fix GEN_INDIRECT_THUNK comment Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 16:06   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 02/11] x86/cpuid: Handling of IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBRS for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 10:40   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 10:53     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 11:46       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 12:01         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 12:11           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 12:36             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 12:52               ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 13:06                 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 13:33                   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 15:00                     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 15:09                       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 03/11] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} " Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 10:45   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 11:05     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 14:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 04/11] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 05/11] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 18:04   ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2018-01-19 10:52   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 10:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22  1:47   ` Tian, Kevin
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 06/11] x86/entry: Organise the use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 10:39   ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 11:43   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 13:36     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 13:51       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-22 11:42         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 12:06           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-22 13:52             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 22:27       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-23  0:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-23  2:19           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-23 20:00             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 12:06   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 13:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-22 15:11     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 08/11] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer/Return Address Stack on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 12:47   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 14:24     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 15:02       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 16:10         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 16:19           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 16:43             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 15:51         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 16:49           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-22 17:04             ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 13:25   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-19 14:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-19 15:07       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-20 11:10         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 10:15           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 10/11] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-18 15:46 ` [PATCH v9 11/11] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper

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