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From: Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	 kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 "the arch\/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	 Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	 Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	 Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 17:48:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <y2afu71pwob.fsf@offog.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0Y97-gyzWBmcVbUyLuzUG42To=Mm8PAKuzWma6XbFmew@mail.gmail.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Fri, 19 Jan 2018 11:20:48 +0100")

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> writes:

>> +/*
>> + * If idx is negative or if idx > size then bit 63 is set in the mask,
>> + * and the value of ~(-1L) is zero. When the mask is zero, bounds check
>> + * failed, array_ptr will return NULL.
>> + */
>> +#ifndef array_ptr_mask
>> +static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx,
>> unsigned long sz)
>> +{
>> +       return ~(long)(idx | (sz - 1 - idx)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
>> +}
>> +#endif
>
> Nit: Maybe add a comment saying that this is equivalent to
> "return ((long)idx >= 0 && idx < sz) ? ULONG_MAX : 0"?

That's only true when sz < LONG_MAX, which is documented below but not
here; it's also different from the asm version, which doesn't do the idx
<= LONG_MAX check. So making the constraint explicit would be a good idea.

>From a bit of experimentation, when the top bit of sz is set, this
expression, the C version and the assembler version all have different
behaviour. For example, with 32-bit unsigned long:

index=00000000 size=80000001: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=80000000 size=80000001: expr=00000000 c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=00000000 size=a0000000: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=00000001 size=a0000000: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=fffffffe size=ffffffff: expr=00000000 c=00000000 asm=ffffffff

It may be worth noting that:

     return 0 - ((long) (idx < sz));

causes GCC, on ia32 and amd64, to generate exactly the same cmp/sbb
sequence as in Linus's asm. Are there architectures where this form
would allow speculation?

Thanks,

-- 
Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>                         <http://offog.org/>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 17:48:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <y2afu71pwob.fsf@offog.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0Y97-gyzWBmcVbUyLuzUG42To=Mm8PAKuzWma6XbFmew@mail.gmail.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Fri, 19 Jan 2018 11:20:48 +0100")

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> writes:

>> +/*
>> + * If idx is negative or if idx > size then bit 63 is set in the mask,
>> + * and the value of ~(-1L) is zero. When the mask is zero, bounds check
>> + * failed, array_ptr will return NULL.
>> + */
>> +#ifndef array_ptr_mask
>> +static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx,
>> unsigned long sz)
>> +{
>> +       return ~(long)(idx | (sz - 1 - idx)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
>> +}
>> +#endif
>
> Nit: Maybe add a comment saying that this is equivalent to
> "return ((long)idx >= 0 && idx < sz) ? ULONG_MAX : 0"?

That's only true when sz < LONG_MAX, which is documented below but not
here; it's also different from the asm version, which doesn't do the idx
<= LONG_MAX check. So making the constraint explicit would be a good idea.

From a bit of experimentation, when the top bit of sz is set, this
expression, the C version and the assembler version all have different
behaviour. For example, with 32-bit unsigned long:

index=00000000 size=80000001: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=80000000 size=80000001: expr=00000000 c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=00000000 size=a0000000: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=00000001 size=a0000000: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=fffffffe size=ffffffff: expr=00000000 c=00000000 asm=ffffffff

It may be worth noting that:

     return 0 - ((long) (idx < sz));

causes GCC, on ia32 and amd64, to generate exactly the same cmp/sbb
sequence as in Linus's asm. Are there architectures where this form
would allow speculation?

Thanks,

-- 
Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>                         <http://offog.org/>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 17:48:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <y2afu71pwob.fsf@offog.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20180119174804.ngq0Y3Er2lE5OY0421QntnGpkQmg-sSlnAPbZEP0bIA@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0Y97-gyzWBmcVbUyLuzUG42To=Mm8PAKuzWma6XbFmew@mail.gmail.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Fri, 19 Jan 2018 11:20:48 +0100")

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> writes:

>> +/*
>> + * If idx is negative or if idx > size then bit 63 is set in the mask,
>> + * and the value of ~(-1L) is zero. When the mask is zero, bounds check
>> + * failed, array_ptr will return NULL.
>> + */
>> +#ifndef array_ptr_mask
>> +static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx,
>> unsigned long sz)
>> +{
>> +       return ~(long)(idx | (sz - 1 - idx)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
>> +}
>> +#endif
>
> Nit: Maybe add a comment saying that this is equivalent to
> "return ((long)idx >= 0 && idx < sz) ? ULONG_MAX : 0"?

That's only true when sz < LONG_MAX, which is documented below but not
here; it's also different from the asm version, which doesn't do the idx
<= LONG_MAX check. So making the constraint explicit would be a good idea.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 17:48:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <y2afu71pwob.fsf@offog.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0Y97-gyzWBmcVbUyLuzUG42To=Mm8PAKuzWma6XbFmew@mail.gmail.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Fri, 19 Jan 2018 11:20:48 +0100")

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> writes:

>> +/*
>> + * If idx is negative or if idx > size then bit 63 is set in the mask,
>> + * and the value of ~(-1L) is zero. When the mask is zero, bounds check
>> + * failed, array_ptr will return NULL.
>> + */
>> +#ifndef array_ptr_mask
>> +static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx,
>> unsigned long sz)
>> +{
>> +       return ~(long)(idx | (sz - 1 - idx)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
>> +}
>> +#endif
>
> Nit: Maybe add a comment saying that this is equivalent to
> "return ((long)idx >= 0 && idx < sz) ? ULONG_MAX : 0"?

That's only true when sz < LONG_MAX, which is documented below but not
here; it's also different from the asm version, which doesn't do the idx
<= LONG_MAX check. So making the constraint explicit would be a good idea.

>From a bit of experimentation, when the top bit of sz is set, this
expression, the C version and the assembler version all have different
behaviour. For example, with 32-bit unsigned long:

index=00000000 size=80000001: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=80000000 size=80000001: expr=00000000 c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=00000000 size=a0000000: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=00000001 size=a0000000: expr=ffffffff c=00000000 asm=ffffffff
index=fffffffe size=ffffffff: expr=00000000 c=00000000 asm=ffffffff

It may be worth noting that:

     return 0 - ((long) (idx < sz));

causes GCC, on ia32 and amd64, to generate exactly the same cmp/sbb
sequence as in Linus's asm. Are there architectures where this form
would allow speculation?

Thanks,

-- 
Adam Sampson <ats@offog.org>                         <http://offog.org/>

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-19 17:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-19  0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 10:20   ` Jann Horn
2018-01-19 17:48     ` Adam Sampson [this message]
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 18:12       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:18           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 18:18       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 20:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-25  7:09   ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25  7:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 22:37     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 22:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-24 14:40   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-24 14:40     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Slaby
2018-02-06 19:29   ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 19:48     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:37         ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:42           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:58               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:37                 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07  0:33                     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-07  1:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:51       ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 22:51         ` Luis Henriques
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  8:42   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  8:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-21 10:37   ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-20  6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-20 16:56   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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