From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>, Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>, "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 23:51:36 +0200 Message-ID: <57DB17E8.9000509@digikod.net> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160914232815.GE60248@ast-mbp.thefacebook.com> [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6355 bytes --] On 15/09/2016 01:28, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 01:22:49AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> >> On 14/09/2016 20:51, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: >>> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 09:23:56AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>>> This new arraymap looks like a set and brings new properties: >>>> * strong typing of entries: the eBPF functions get the array type of >>>> elements instead of CONST_PTR_TO_MAP (e.g. >>>> CONST_PTR_TO_LANDLOCK_HANDLE_FS); >>>> * force sequential filling (i.e. replace or append-only update), which >>>> allow quick browsing of all entries. >>>> >>>> This strong typing is useful to statically check if the content of a map >>>> can be passed to an eBPF function. For example, Landlock use it to store >>>> and manage kernel objects (e.g. struct file) instead of dealing with >>>> userland raw data. This improve efficiency and ensure that an eBPF >>>> program can only call functions with the right high-level arguments. >>>> >>>> The enum bpf_map_handle_type list low-level types (e.g. >>>> BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS_FD) which are identified when >>>> updating a map entry (handle). This handle types are used to infer a >>>> high-level arraymap type which are listed in enum bpf_map_array_type >>>> (e.g. BPF_MAP_ARRAY_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS). >>>> >>>> For now, this new arraymap is only used by Landlock LSM (cf. next >>>> commits) but it could be useful for other needs. >>>> >>>> Changes since v2: >>>> * add a RLIMIT_NOFILE-based limit to the maximum number of arraymap >>>> handle entries (suggested by Andy Lutomirski) >>>> * remove useless checks >>>> >>>> Changes since v1: >>>> * arraymap of handles replace custom checker groups >>>> * simpler userland API >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> >>>> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> >>>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> >>>> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> >>>> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> >>>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >>>> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWwTiz3kZTkEgOW24-DvhQq6LftwEXh77FD2G5o71yD7g@mail.gmail.com >>>> --- >>>> include/linux/bpf.h | 14 ++++ >>>> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 18 +++++ >>>> kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 203 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 ++- >>>> 4 files changed, 246 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h >>>> index fa9a988400d9..eae4ce4542c1 100644 >>>> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h >>>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h >>>> @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ >>>> #include <linux/percpu.h> >>>> #include <linux/err.h> >>>> >>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK >>>> +#include <linux/fs.h> /* struct file */ >>>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ >>>> + >>>> struct perf_event; >>>> struct bpf_map; >>>> >>>> @@ -38,6 +42,7 @@ struct bpf_map_ops { >>>> struct bpf_map { >>>> atomic_t refcnt; >>>> enum bpf_map_type map_type; >>>> + enum bpf_map_array_type map_array_type; >>>> u32 key_size; >>>> u32 value_size; >>>> u32 max_entries; >>>> @@ -187,6 +192,9 @@ struct bpf_array { >>>> */ >>>> enum bpf_prog_type owner_prog_type; >>>> bool owner_jited; >>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK >>>> + u32 n_entries; /* number of entries in a handle array */ >>>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ >>>> union { >>>> char value[0] __aligned(8); >>>> void *ptrs[0] __aligned(8); >>>> @@ -194,6 +202,12 @@ struct bpf_array { >>>> }; >>>> }; >>>> >>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK >>>> +struct map_landlock_handle { >>>> + u32 type; /* enum bpf_map_handle_type */ >>>> +}; >>>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ >>>> + >>>> #define MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT 32 >>>> >>>> struct bpf_event_entry { >>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h >>>> index 7cd36166f9b7..b68de57f7ab8 100644 >>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h >>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h >>>> @@ -87,6 +87,15 @@ enum bpf_map_type { >>>> BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY, >>>> BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE,P_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY >>>> BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY, >>>> + BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_ARRAY, >>>> +}; >>>> + >>>> +enum bpf_map_array_type { >>>> + BPF_MAP_ARRAY_TYPE_UNSPEC, >>>> +}; >>>> + >>>> +enum bpf_map_handle_type { >>>> + BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_UNSPEC, >>>> }; >>> >>> missing something. why it has to be special to have it's own >>> fd array implementation? >>> Please take a look how BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY, >>> BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY are done. >>> The all store objects into array map that user space passes via FD. >>> I think the same model should apply here. >> >> The idea is to have multiple way for userland to describe a resource >> (e.g. an open file descriptor, a path or a glob pattern). The kernel >> representation could then be a "struct path *" or dedicated types (e.g. >> custom glob). > > hmm. I think user space api should only deal with FD. Everything > else is user space job to encapsulate/hide. How would you create a FD referring to a glob, a user or port ranges for example ? > >> Another interesting point (that could replace >> check_map_func_compatibility()) is that BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_ARRAY >> translate to dedicated (abstract) types (instead of CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) >> thanks to bpf_reg_type_from_map(). This is useful to abstract userland >> (map) interface with kernel object(s) dealing with that type. > > I probably missing something. If user space interface is FD, > to the kernel they're different object types. Nothing else. Yes but what if there is more than one way to express a resource (cf. previous comment). A FD can refer to an *existing file* but a glob pattern could match a bunch of files (existing or not). This was a concern for Kees Cook and James Morris [1]. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAGXu5jK1U12vMk11HD_x_gNz3Rk4ZgEfdThY7DHvm4e4sPRh4g@mail.gmail.com > >> A third point is that BPF_MAP_TYPE_LANDLOCK_ARRAY is a kind of set. It >> is optimized to quickly walk through all the elements in a sequential way. > > why set is any faster to walk vs array? It is an array with only sequential entries (i.e. no hole in the array). [-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 455 bytes --]
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-09-14 7:23 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 23:22 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message] 2016-10-03 23:53 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 14:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 15:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 15:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-10-19 22:42 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 19:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn 2016-09-14 22:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 23:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 23:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 21:25 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-20 0:12 ` [kernel-hardening] lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-20 1:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon 2016-09-20 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-05 21:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 22:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 2:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-20 4:37 ` Sargun Dhillon 2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-10-03 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight
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