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From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>,
	Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>,
	Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:47:53 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191211204753.242298-14-pomonis@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191211204753.242298-1-pomonis@google.com>

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: commit 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
index 7023138b1cb0..34a3a17bb6d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -86,10 +86,14 @@ static unsigned intel_find_arch_event(struct kvm_pmu *pmu,
 
 static unsigned intel_find_fixed_event(int idx)
 {
-	if (idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events))
+	u32 event;
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events);
+
+	if (idx >= size)
 		return PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX;
 
-	return intel_arch_events[fixed_pmc_events[idx]].event_type;
+	event = fixed_pmc_events[array_index_nospec(idx, size)];
+	return intel_arch_events[event].event_type;
 }
 
 /* check if a PMC is enabled by comparing it with globl_ctrl bits. */
@@ -130,16 +134,20 @@ static struct kvm_pmc *intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
 	bool fixed = idx & (1u << 30);
 	struct kvm_pmc *counters;
+	unsigned int num_counters;
 
 	idx &= ~(3u << 30);
-	if (!fixed && idx >= pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters)
-		return NULL;
-	if (fixed && idx >= pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters)
+	if (fixed) {
+		counters = pmu->fixed_counters;
+		num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters;
+	} else {
+		counters = pmu->gp_counters;
+		num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+	}
+	if (idx >= num_counters)
 		return NULL;
-	counters = fixed ? pmu->fixed_counters : pmu->gp_counters;
 	*mask &= pmu->counter_bitmask[fixed ? KVM_PMC_FIXED : KVM_PMC_GP];
-
-	return &counters[idx];
+	return &counters[array_index_nospec(idx, num_counters)];
 }
 
 static bool intel_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
-- 
2.24.0.525.g8f36a354ae-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-12-11 20:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-11 20:47 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:16   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12  9:43   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-12 17:11     ` Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 17:31   ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 17:44     ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-12 17:47       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-06 20:16         ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:13   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19   ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` Marios Pomonis [this message]
2020-01-06 20:19   ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c " Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini

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