From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
To: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>,
Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
rkrcmar@redhat.com,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 09:11:14 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKXAmdjmYzY=eQUpt2f7J6OLBozAjg=pgEgkFXEVDudH4-EydQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87eex9c20c.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>
On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 1:43 AM Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com> writes:
>
> > This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
> > and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
> > These functions contain index computations that use the
> > (attacker-controlled) MSR number.
>
> Just to educate myself,
>
> in both cases 'index' is equal to 'msr - HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0' where
> 'msr' is constrained:
> case HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4:
> ....
>
> and moreover, kvm_hv_{get,set}_msr_common() is only being called for a
> narrow set of MSRs. How can an atacker overcome these limitations?
>
This attack scenario relies on speculative execution. Practically, one
could train the branch predictors involved to speculatively execute
this path even if the adversary-supplied MSR number does not fall into
the legitimate range. The adversary-supplied MSR number however is
going to be used when -speculatively- computing the index of the array
thus allowing an attacker to load normally illegitimate memory values
in the L1 cache.
> >
> > Fixes: commit e7d9513b60e8 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 10 ++++++----
> > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> > index 23ff65504d7e..26408434b9bc 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> > @@ -809,11 +809,12 @@ static int kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > u32 index, u64 *pdata)
> > {
> > struct kvm_hv *hv = &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv;
> > + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
> >
> > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param)))
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - *pdata = hv->hv_crash_param[index];
> > + *pdata = hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)];
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > @@ -852,11 +853,12 @@ static int kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > u32 index, u64 data)
> > {
> > struct kvm_hv *hv = &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv;
> > + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
> >
> > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param)))
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > - hv->hv_crash_param[index] = data;
> > + hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)] = data;
> > return 0;
> > }
>
> --
> Vitaly
>
--
Marios Pomonis
Software Engineer, Security
GCP Platform Security
US-KIR-6THC
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-12 17:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-11 20:47 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:16 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 9:43 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-12 17:11 ` Marios Pomonis [this message]
2019-12-12 17:31 ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 17:44 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-12 17:47 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-06 20:16 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini
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