From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Marios Pomonis" <pomonis@google.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Nick Finco" <nifi@google.com>,
"Andrew Honig" <ahonig@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 12:16:41 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALMp9eQ5S1oD6YtEp-peX+iLRbX5bhRVTrD4DamAsDJtwe7yOA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <73a7a1ce-7e68-7b15-70eb-7b6217af5e1a@de.ibm.com>
On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 9:47 AM Christian Borntraeger
<borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12.12.19 18:44, Jim Mattson wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 9:31 AM Christian Borntraeger
> > <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 11.12.19 21:47, Marios Pomonis wrote:
> >>> This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
> >>> and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
> >>> These functions contain index computations that use the
> >>> (attacker-controlled) MSR number.
> >>>
> >>> Fixes: commit e7d9513b60e8 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
> >>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-06 20:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-11 20:47 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:16 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 9:43 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-12 17:11 ` Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 17:31 ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 17:44 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-12 17:47 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-06 20:16 ` Jim Mattson [this message]
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Paolo Bonzini
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