From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>,
rkrcmar@redhat.com,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>,
Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 21:18:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ac5b982c-fc76-b33e-fc5b-cbf9e94833e5@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191211204753.242298-1-pomonis@google.com>
On 11/12/19 21:47, Marios Pomonis wrote:
> From: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
>
> This extends the Spectre-v1 mitigation introduced in
> commit 75f139aaf896 ("KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup")
> and commit 085331dfc6bb ("x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation") in light
> of the Spectre-v1/L1TF combination described here:
> https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html
>
> As reported in the link, an attacker can use the cache-load part of a
> Spectre-v1 gadget to bring memory into the L1 cache, then use L1TF to
> leak the loaded memory. Note that this attack is not fully mitigated by
> core scheduling; firstly when "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush" is not set
> to "always", an attacker could use L1TF on the same thread that loaded the
> memory values in the cache on paths that do not flush the L1 cache on
> VMEntry. Otherwise, an attacker could perform this attack using a
> collusion of two sibling hyperthreads: one that loads memory values in
> the cache during VMExit handling and another that performs L1TF to leak
> them.
>
> This patch uses array_index_nospec() to prevent index computations from
> causing speculative loads into the L1 cache. These cases involve a
> bounds check followed by a memory read using the index; this is more
> common than the full Spectre-v1 pattern. In some cases, the index
> computation can be eliminated entirely by small amounts of refactoring.
>
> Marios Pomonis (13):
> KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from
> Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
> KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in
> fixed_msr_to_seg_unit()
> KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h
> KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF
> attacks in x86.c
> KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in
> x86.c
> KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF
> attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF
> attacks
> KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
>
> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 11 ++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 10 +++--
> arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c | 6 ++-
> arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c | 15 +++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 13 +++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c | 8 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h | 18 +++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 24 ++++++++----
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 +++++++--
> 10 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
>
Queued all except patch 10, thanks.
Paolo
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-18 20:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-11 20:47 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:16 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 9:43 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-12-12 17:11 ` Marios Pomonis
2019-12-12 17:31 ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 17:44 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-12 17:47 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-01-06 20:16 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:17 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:18 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Protect memory accesses " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Protect exit_reason from being used in Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Marios Pomonis
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2019-12-11 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c " Marios Pomonis
2020-01-06 20:19 ` Jim Mattson
2020-01-18 20:18 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
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