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From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: KVM <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>,
	Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>,
	Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/42] s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:26:21 -0500
Message-ID: <20200214222658.12946-6-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200214222658.12946-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>

This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope
with secure guests:
- provide arch_make_page_accessible
- make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests
- provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure
- provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared
- provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible)
 - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the
   host is not accessing them
 - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages

Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
[borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h        |   4 +
 arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h         |   2 +
 arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   1 +
 arch/s390/include/asm/page.h        |   5 +
 arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h     |  35 ++++-
 arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h          |  31 ++++
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c               | 223 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 296 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h
index 37f96b6f0e61..3c4926aa78f4 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_S390_GMAP_H
 #define _ASM_S390_GMAP_H
 
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
 
 /* Generic bits for GMAP notification on DAT table entry changes. */
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
  * @table: pointer to the page directory
  * @asce: address space control element for gmap page table
  * @pfault_enabled: defines if pfaults are applicable for the guest
+ * @guest_handle: protected virtual machine handle for the ultravisor
  * @host_to_rmap: radix tree with gmap_rmap lists
  * @children: list of shadow gmap structures
  * @pt_list: list of all page tables used in the shadow guest address space
@@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ struct gmap {
 	unsigned long asce_end;
 	void *private;
 	bool pfault_enabled;
+	/* only set for protected virtual machines */
+	unsigned long guest_handle;
 	/* Additional data for shadow guest address spaces */
 	struct radix_tree_root host_to_rmap;
 	struct list_head children;
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h
index bcfb6371086f..e21b618ad432 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	unsigned long asce;
 	unsigned long asce_limit;
 	unsigned long vdso_base;
+	/* The mmu context belongs to a secure guest. */
+	atomic_t is_protected;
 	/*
 	 * The following bitfields need a down_write on the mm
 	 * semaphore when they are written to. As they are only
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 8d04e6f3f796..afa836014076 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->context.gmap_list);
 	cpumask_clear(&mm->context.cpu_attach_mask);
 	atomic_set(&mm->context.flush_count, 0);
+	atomic_set(&mm->context.is_protected, 0);
 	mm->context.gmap_asce = 0;
 	mm->context.flush_mm = 0;
 	mm->context.compat_mm = test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT);
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
index 85e944f04c70..4ebcf891ff3c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
@@ -153,6 +153,11 @@ static inline int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
 #define HAVE_ARCH_FREE_PAGE
 #define HAVE_ARCH_ALLOC_PAGE
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE)
+int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page);
+#define HAVE_ARCH_MAKE_PAGE_ACCESSIBLE
+#endif
+
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #define __PAGE_OFFSET		0x0UL
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 137a3920ca36..cc7a1adacb94 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/uv.h>
 
 extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[];
 extern void paging_init(void);
@@ -520,6 +521,15 @@ static inline int mm_has_pgste(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int mm_is_protected(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PGSTE
+	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&mm->context.is_protected)))
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int mm_alloc_pgste(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PGSTE
@@ -1061,7 +1071,12 @@ static inline int ptep_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				       unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
-	return ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+	pte_t res;
+
+	res = ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+	if (mm_is_protected(mm) && pte_present(res))
+		uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
+	return res;
 }
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_MODIFY_PROT_TRANSACTION
@@ -1073,7 +1088,12 @@ void ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long,
 static inline pte_t ptep_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				     unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
-	return ptep_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+	pte_t res;
+
+	res = ptep_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+	if (mm_is_protected(vma->vm_mm) && pte_present(res))
+		uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
+	return res;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1088,12 +1108,17 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					    unsigned long addr,
 					    pte_t *ptep, int full)
 {
+	pte_t res;
+
 	if (full) {
-		pte_t pte = *ptep;
+		res = *ptep;
 		*ptep = __pte(_PAGE_INVALID);
-		return pte;
+	} else {
+		res = ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
 	}
-	return ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+	if (mm_is_protected(mm) && pte_present(res))
+		uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
+	return res;
 }
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_SET_WRPROTECT
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index f5b55e3972b3..e45963cc7f40 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/gmap.h>
 
 #define UVC_RC_EXECUTED		0x0001
 #define UVC_RC_INV_CMD		0x0002
@@ -24,6 +25,10 @@
 
 #define UVC_CMD_QUI			0x0001
 #define UVC_CMD_INIT_UV			0x000f
+#define UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR	0x0200
+#define UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR	0x0201
+#define UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED		0x0341
+#define UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED	0x0342
 #define UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS	0x1000
 #define UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS	0x1001
 
@@ -31,8 +36,12 @@
 enum uv_cmds_inst {
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_QUI = 0,
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_INIT_UV = 1,
+	BIT_UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR = 6,
+	BIT_UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR = 7,
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS = 8,
 	BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS = 9,
+	BIT_UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED = 21,
+	BIT_UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED = 22,
 };
 
 struct uv_cb_header {
@@ -69,6 +78,19 @@ struct uv_cb_init {
 	u64 reserved28[4];
 } __packed __aligned(8);
 
+struct uv_cb_cts {
+	struct uv_cb_header header;
+	u64 reserved08[2];
+	u64 guest_handle;
+	u64 gaddr;
+} __packed __aligned(8);
+
+struct uv_cb_cfs {
+	struct uv_cb_header header;
+	u64 reserved08[2];
+	u64 paddr;
+} __packed __aligned(8);
+
 struct uv_cb_share {
 	struct uv_cb_header header;
 	u64 reserved08[3];
@@ -170,12 +192,21 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void)
 	return prot_virt_host;
 }
 
+int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb);
+int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
+int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr);
+
 void setup_uv(void);
 void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax);
 #else
 #define is_prot_virt_host() 0
 static inline void setup_uv(void) {}
 static inline void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax) {}
+
+static inline int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) ||                          \
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 1424994f5489..9a6c309864a0 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #include <linux/sizes.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <asm/facility.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/uv.h>
@@ -100,4 +102,225 @@ void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax)
 {
 	*vmax = min_t(unsigned long, *vmax, uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Requests the Ultravisor to pin the page in the shared state. This will
+ * cause an intercept when the guest attempts to unshare the pinned page.
+ */
+static int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+	struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
+		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED,
+		.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+		.paddr = paddr,
+	};
+
+	if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it
+ * accessible to the host for paging (export).
+ *
+ * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be exported
+ */
+int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+	struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
+		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR,
+		.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+		.paddr = paddr
+	};
+
+	if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the expected ref_count for a page that would otherwise have no
+ * further pins. This was cribbed from similar functions in other places in
+ * the kernel, but with some slight modifications. We know that a secure
+ * page can not be a huge page for example.
+ */
+static int expected_page_refs(struct page *page)
+{
+	int res;
+
+	res = page_mapcount(page);
+	if (PageSwapCache(page)) {
+		res++;
+	} else if (page_mapping(page)) {
+		res++;
+		if (page_has_private(page))
+			res++;
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int make_secure_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
+			   struct page *exp_page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
+{
+	pte_t entry = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+	struct page *page;
+	int expected, rc = 0;
+
+	if (!pte_present(entry))
+		return -ENXIO;
+	if (pte_val(entry) & _PAGE_INVALID)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	page = pte_page(entry);
+	if (page != exp_page)
+		return -ENXIO;
+	if (PageWriteback(page))
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	expected = expected_page_refs(page);
+	if (!page_ref_freeze(page, expected))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	set_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+	rc = uv_call(0, (u64)uvcb);
+	page_ref_unfreeze(page, expected);
+	/* Return -ENXIO if the page was not mapped, -EINVAL otherwise */
+	if (rc)
+		rc = uvcb->rc == 0x10a ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requests the Ultravisor to make a page accessible to a guest.
+ * If it's brought in the first time, it will be cleared. If
+ * it has been exported before, it will be decrypted and integrity
+ * checked.
+ */
+int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	unsigned long uaddr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int rc, local_drain = 0;
+	spinlock_t *ptelock;
+	pte_t *ptep;
+
+again:
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	down_read(&gmap->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr))
+		goto out;
+	vma = find_vma(gmap->mm, uaddr);
+	if (!vma)
+		goto out;
+	/*
+	 * Secure pages cannot be huge and userspace should not combine both.
+	 * In case userspace does it anyway this will result in an -EFAULT for
+	 * the unpack. The guest is thus never reaching secure mode. If
+	 * userspace is playing dirty tricky with mapping huge pages later
+	 * on this will result in a segmenation fault.
+	 */
+	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENXIO;
+	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE);
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
+		goto out;
+
+	lock_page(page);
+	ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock);
+	rc = make_secure_pte(ptep, uaddr, page, uvcb);
+	pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock);
+	unlock_page(page);
+out:
+	up_read(&gmap->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+	if (rc == -EAGAIN) {
+		wait_on_page_writeback(page);
+	} else if (rc == -EBUSY) {
+		/*
+		 * If we have tried a local drain and the page refcount
+		 * still does not match our expected safe value, try with a
+		 * system wide drain. This is needed if the pagevecs holding
+		 * the page are on a different CPU.
+		 */
+		if (local_drain) {
+			lru_add_drain_all();
+			/* We give up here, and let the caller try again */
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * We are here if the page refcount does not match the
+		 * expected safe value. The main culprits are usually
+		 * pagevecs. With lru_add_drain() we drain the pagevecs
+		 * on the local CPU so that hopefully the refcount will
+		 * reach the expected safe value.
+		 */
+		lru_add_drain();
+		local_drain = 1;
+		/* And now we try again immediately after draining */
+		goto again;
+	} else if (rc == -ENXIO) {
+		if (gmap_fault(gmap, gaddr, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_make_secure);
+
+int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
+{
+	struct uv_cb_cts uvcb = {
+		.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR,
+		.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+		.guest_handle = gmap->guest_handle,
+		.gaddr = gaddr,
+	};
+
+	return gmap_make_secure(gmap, gaddr, &uvcb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_convert_to_secure);
+
+/**
+ * To be called with the page locked or with an extra reference!
+ */
+int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* Hugepage cannot be protected, so nothing to do */
+	if (PageHuge(page))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * PG_arch_1 is used in 3 places:
+	 * 1. for kernel page tables during early boot
+	 * 2. for storage keys of huge pages and KVM
+	 * 3. As an indication that this page might be secure. This can
+	 *    overindicate, e.g. we set the bit before calling
+	 *    convert_to_secure.
+	 * As secure pages are never huge, all 3 variants can co-exists.
+	 */
+	if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = uv_pin_shared(page_to_phys(page));
+	if (!rc) {
+		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+	if (!rc) {
+		clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_page_accessible);
+
 #endif
-- 
2.25.0


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 132+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-14 22:26 [PATCH v2 00/42] KVM: s390: Add support for protected VMs Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/42] mm:gup/writeback: add callbacks for inaccessible pages Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17  9:14   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 11:10     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  8:27       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18 15:46         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-18 16:02           ` Will Deacon
2020-02-18 16:15             ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18 21:35               ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-19  8:31                 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/42] KVM: s390/interrupt: do not pin adapter interrupt pages Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17  9:43   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-20 12:18     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-20 13:31     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-20 13:34       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/42] s390/protvirt: introduce host side setup Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17  9:53   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 11:11     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 11:13       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/42] s390/protvirt: add ultravisor initialization Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17  9:57   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 11:13     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2020-02-17 10:21   ` [PATCH v2 05/42] s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 11:28     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 12:07       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/42] s390/mm: add (non)secure page access exceptions handlers Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add UV debug trace Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 10:41   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/42] KVM: s390: add new variants of UV CALL Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 10:42   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 10:56   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 12:04     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 12:09       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 14:53         ` [PATCH 0/2] example changes Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 14:53           ` [PATCH 1/2] lock changes Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 14:53           ` [PATCH 2/2] merge vm/cpu create Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 15:00             ` Janosch Frank
2020-02-17 15:02               ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-19 11:02               ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 19:18           ` [PATCH 0/2] example changes David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18  8:09     ` [PATCH v2 09/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  8:39   ` [PATCH v2.1] " Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:12     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18 21:18       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-19  8:32         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-19 11:01       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:56     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18 20:26       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add KVM api documentation Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Secure memory is not mergeable Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/42] KVM: s390/mm: Make pages accessible before destroying the guest Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Handle SE notification interceptions Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Instruction emulation Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add interruption injection controls Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 10:59   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Implement interruption injection Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add SCLP interrupt handling Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Handle spec exception loops Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add new gprs location handling Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 11:01   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 11:33     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 14:37     ` Janosch Frank
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/42] KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 11:08   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 14:47     ` Janosch Frank
2020-02-17 15:00       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 15:38         ` Janosch Frank
2020-02-17 16:58           ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: handle secure guest prefix pages Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 11:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/42] KVM: s390/mm: handle guest unpin events Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 14:23   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Write sthyi data to instruction data area Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 14:24   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-17 18:40     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 19:16       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: STSI handling Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  8:35   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18  8:44     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:08       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18  9:11         ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:13           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: disallow one_reg Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  8:40   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18  8:57     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 26/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Do only reset registers that are accessible Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  8:42   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18  9:20     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:28       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 27/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Only sync fmt4 registers Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 28/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add program exception injection Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:33   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18  9:37     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:39       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 29/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add diag 308 subcode 8 - 10 handling Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:38   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-19 12:45     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 30/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: UV calls in support of diag308 0, 1 Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:44   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-19 11:53     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 31/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Report CPU state to Ultravisor Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:48   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-19 19:36     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-19 19:46       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-20 10:52         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 32/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Support cmd 5 operation state Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:50   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-19 11:06     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-19 11:08       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 33/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Mask PSW interrupt bits for interception 104 and 112 Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:53   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18 10:02     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18 10:05     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 34/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: do not inject interrupts after start Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:53   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-18 10:02     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 35/42] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add UV cpu reset calls Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18  9:54   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 36/42] DOCUMENTATION: Protected virtual machine introduction and IPL Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 37/42] s390/uv: Fix handling of length extensions (already in s390 tree) Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 38/42] s390: protvirt: Add sysfs firmware interface for Ultravisor information Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 39/42] example for future extension: mm:gup/writeback: add callbacks for inaccessible pages: error cases Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18 16:25   ` Will Deacon
2020-02-18 16:30     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-18 16:33       ` Will Deacon
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 40/42] example for future extension: mm:gup/writeback: add callbacks for inaccessible pages: source indication Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-17 14:15   ` Ulrich Weigand
2020-02-17 14:38     ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 41/42] potential fixup for "s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests" Christian Borntraeger
2020-02-14 22:26 ` [PATCH v2 42/42] KVM: s390: rstify new ioctls in api.rst Christian Borntraeger

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